



DIPLOMARBEIT

THE ROLE OF POWER IN THE PARTICIPATORY BUDGET OF PARIS

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ABSTRACT

In 2014, newly elected mayor of Paris Anne Hidalgo initiated a participatory budget of 500 million Euros to be invested over the course of six years. The process was conceived of as a way to afford the citizens of Paris with a say in the development of their city. Every resident, regardless of age or nationality was free to propose ideas and take part in a binding vote to select the winning projects. The aim of this work is to determine what role power had to play in the participatory budget of Paris, both in terms of what forces it was subject to as well as what power relations it created. Drawing from the works of Bent Flyvbjerg, the power conception of Michel Foucault and the history of participatory budgeting, a framework is created through which the process is analysed and networks of power relations shaping it are discerned.

This work argues that while the participatory budget constitutes a significant new avenue for citizen participation, the city as initiator and designer of the process keeps control for itself. Furthermore, the city as well as mayor Hidalgo herself utilise the existence of the participatory budget for its prestige, both on a local and an international level.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

2014 rief die neugewählte Pariser Bürgermeisterin Anne Hidalgo ein partizipatives Budget ins Leben. 500 Millionen Euro standen über die folgenden sechs Jahre zur Investition zur Verfügung. Der Prozess wurde als Möglichkeit konzipiert der Pariser Bevölkerung Mitspracherecht in der Entwicklung ihrer Stadt zu gewähren. Jede:r Bewohner:in, unabhängig von Alter oder Nationalität, konnte Ideen einreichen und in einer verbindlichen Abstimmung die siegreichen Projekte küren. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es herauszufinden, welche Rolle Macht im partizipativen Budget von Paris gespielt hat, sowohl in Bezug auf Kräfte, die darauf eingewirkt haben, als auch auf die Machtrelationen, die es geschaffen hat. In Anlehnung an Bent Flyvbjergs Vorgangsweisen, Michel Foucaults Machtverständnis und die Geschichte des partizipativen Budgets wird ein Rahmen entwickelt, mit dem der Prozess analysiert wird sowie prägende Netzwerke von Machtrelationen abgeleitet werden.

Diese Arbeit argumentiert, dass das partizipative Budget zwar einen bedeutenden neuen Weg für Bürger:innenbeteiligung darstellt, die Stadt als Initiatorin und Gestalterin des Prozesses die Kontrolle jedoch für sich behält. Zudem nutzt sowohl die Stadt als auch Bürgermeisterin Hidalgo selbst das Vorhandensein des partizipativen Budgets für Prestigezwecke, sowohl auf der lokalen als auch auf der internationalen Ebene.



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INTRODUCTION



1.1 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM

Spatial planning and urban development are a dynamic field undergoing constant shifts in attitudes, approaches and orientation. One aspect that has been with the practice for a long time and has steadily made its way to the forefront of current conversation is the call for greater citizen participation in planning. There is a re-evaluation of the position of the lay-citizen in the system of development from object and bystander towards being given active consideration. This leads to recognising them as experts in their environment with valuable insights to give and a right to a voice in matters affecting their lived reality.

Traditional forms of input, largely restricted to the election of representatives, with little to no bearing on the administrative branches of the governance system are increasingly perceived to be insufficient in reflecting the will of the citizenry. Together with larger societal shifts, this narrow scope of influencing the processes that directly affect lay citizens leads to discontent and a subsequent crisis of representation.

There are calls for more open systems with greater possibilities for directing development and more immediate input. What this extends to is a rethinking of governance structures, away from monolithic holds of power by governments and their administrative bodies, towards a broader redistribution of power that ideally is able to cater to a more diverse range of groups and interests.

One approach that has its roots in a call for the redistribution of power benefiting the citizenry at large, is that of Participatory Budgeting (PB). With its fundamental idea of giving lay-people a say in the use of parts or the entirety of municipal budgets, it seeks to create a potentially powerful avenue for expressing and achieving the interests of those partaking.

While the approach did not arrive in Europe with the PB Paris started in 2014, through its scale and notoriety it does set a precedent for how PB is understood to function and what can be achieved through it. It is a point of reference for other cities, such as Vienna, which model their own variations of PB processes closely after the Parisian approach (Stadt Wien, 2022). As such it warrants close examination.

1.2 OBJECTIVE AND RELEVANCY

There is a vested interest in understanding the workings and functioning of spatial planning processes, in order to be able to adapt and implement them with greater precision and accuracy. This is especially true for cases of PB that come in a wide range of variations. Over the course of its thirty-year existence different types and approaches have emerged, that are at times downright contradictory. Understanding

where these variations come from and how they influence the process itself as well as its results is therefore crucial for being able to deploy PB in a desired way.

While the mechanics of participation in its position as one of the major tendencies of spatial planning are being thoroughly researched, one viewpoint that is not routinely given attention in attempts to understand the functioning of those sorts of processes, is the viewpoint of power. According to power theoreticians such as Foucault, every interaction is at once shaped by and producing relations of power, which in turn form networks that can be analysed.

Participatory planning processes are no exception. They are understood to be influenced by the various layers of context in which they take place. Relations of power underlie the reasons behind their initiation as well as the structure of their implementation. All actors, passive or active, are related to each other through power they can or cannot exercise. Even the results are not static endpoints but in themselves results and sources of power relations.

The more awareness exists on the various points of influence that can act on a process from within and without, the more deliberately it is possible to act. Nothing happens in a vacuum and as much as it might be desirable, it is unrealistic that every part of a complex process is underpinned purely by rational choices and actions.

By opening up to the consideration of power, inevitable biases and distortions brought on by it can be acknowledged and this consciousness enables reaction, mitigation and potentially higher accuracy as a result. The wish for normative or rational ideals should not stand in the way of allowing for the realities of the situation. If the influence of power beyond what is actively planned for is overlooked, one risks being led by the process rather than being able to lead it.

The aim behind this work is to gain insight into the complex interplays of power within the process of the Paris PB. Through incorporating various levels of context, causalities and relations an attempt at a systemic understanding of the process is made. Specific attention is paid to the various actors that feature in the process as well as their interests and abilities.

Through studying the network of power relations, specific prominent points of influence can be identified and thereby made tangible and comprehensible. In this way a better sense of the functioning and impact of the process as a whole can be gained.

The guiding question to that end is: How does power feature in the process of the Paris PB?

This question will be approached by first getting a sense of both Participatory Budgeting as well as the study of power as it relates to spatial planning. Based on the

existent body of research on both the field of PB and the lens of power, a framework will be constructed. The framework aims to cover the major points of influence on and through PB. It will subsequently be applied to the case of the Paris PB. On the basis of this applied framework, bearing in mind the laid-out theories of power in planning, conclusions will be drawn.

1.3 DELIMITATION

There are limits to the results possible to be reached through the chosen approach. For one, the use of a single case study, even when contextualised into a wider field, may yield insight on potential points of interest, not any sort of objective representation. Furthermore, the high level of context dependency in analysing the process makes the creation of a universally applicable framework impossible.

As for the working of the case itself, there exists very little access to central actors of the process, namely the municipal government and relevant administration branches of the city of Paris. This fact induces the need to rely on secondary sources, both in terms of literature and empirical work as well as a certain level of deduction for parts of the process.

Lastly, the inherent political nature of notions of power distribution, participation and spatial development as a whole need to be acknowledged. These aspects are subject to individual as well as societal values on what is or is not aspirational, essential or up for debate. These value judgements will come to ahead in the discussion of the results, but even before that influence cannot be ruled out.

The decision to aim for a comprehensive and therefore wide understanding of the various levels and directions of influence also precludes the research from going into great depths, which is one of the points further research could branch of from.

1.4 STRUCTURE

As far as the structure of the work is concerned, the next, second chapter will introduce the field of PB, its character, origins, changeable nature and ways of categorising it. It will subsequently deal with power, first as a general concept as conceptualised by Michel Foucault and then applied to spatial planning, using the work of Bent Flyvbjerg.

Flyvbjerg will also feature in Chapter three which lays out the methodology used to arrive at the framework that builds the heart of this work. Phronetic Planning Research (PPR) as described by Flyvbjerg as a methodological relative to the broader Grounded Theory Method will be central in that effort.

1. Introduction

In Chapter 4 the general framework, constructed out of a power-lead reading of the literature dealing with PB, will be introduced and its various levels and parts explained. In Chapter 5 the case of Paris and its PB will be presented, before Chapter 6 sees the application of the framework onto the case itself.

Chapter 7 will deal with connecting the main insights gained through the application of the framework into networks of power, as well as putting them into the logic of Bent Flyvbjerg's PPR through its four central questions. Furthermore, the limitations of the framework as apparent in its application as well as avenues for further research will be discussed.

1. Introduction

2

THEORY

2.1 PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

2.1.1 BASIC PRINCIPLE

Participatory Budgeting (PB) is not an easy concept to define, by virtue of its many differing, sometimes downright contradictory ways of being implemented. To describe one project may inadvertently exclude others, which is an issue a large part of works dealing with PB dedicate their opening portion to. As Ganuza, Nez and Morales write:

“The heterogeneous nature of the existing experiments calls into question even the possibility of defining PB. Under Brazilian criteria the European approach would be questionable and under European criteria China’s might be questionable too.” (Ganuza et al., 2014, p. 2)

At the same time some sort of understanding needs to be, and indeed can be, found. While there is no politically or scientifically agreed upon definition (Sintomer et al., 2012), attempts at minimal requirements or approximations have been made. Cabannes (2021, p. 443) offers *“PB is a mechanism or a process through which people make decisions on the destination of all or a portion of the public resources available, or else are associated to the decision-making process”*. Sintomer et al. (2008) opt instead for a methodological definition distinguishing PB from other procedures by five criteria:

- 1) Discussion of financial and or budgetary processes as a centre-point
- 2) Location on the city level rather than exclusively neighbourhood-based
- 3) Repetition over multiple years
- 4) Some form of public deliberation, which doesn’t necessarily lead to decision-making
- 5) Some measure of accountability

Though exact numbers vary, depending on the standards applied, it can safely be said that the idea of PB has found a broad adoption in its over thirty years of existence. By 2018, there are over 6000 instances to be found in at least 40 countries worldwide (Cabannes, 2021).

2.1.2 HISTORY

2.1.2.1 FROM PORTO ALEGRE

The story of PB begins in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in the late 1980s. With the fall of the military dictatorship imminent, there are calls for more democracy on every level. In this climate, the Union of Neighbourhood Associations, a collection of activists and local initiatives, petitions for investment in urban infrastructure and a greater level of civic rights (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012; Novy & Leubolt, 2005). Their demand is to democratise the city budget and change distribution priorities to favour socially

marginalised groups (Novy & Leubolt, 2005), which they pose to the candidates for Porto Alegre's mayoral election in 1988 (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). The candidate for the Worker's Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT) Olívio Dutra takes up the idea and after winning the election sets out to realise it (ibid).

PB is implemented in 1989. The first year the inexperienced government is not able to deliver on the decisions reached through the PB, which leads to frustration and a sharp decline in participation the following year (Novy & Leubolt, 2005). To address the issues, the city government decides to depart from some of the key aspects of the original concept. For one, the decision power is given directly to the citizenry, in the form of public deliberations and votes for representatives, rather than organising the PB around associations. For another, PB is made a central feature of a wider administrative restructuring project to strengthen its position further (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). These changes cause some controversy among the original proponents, as they shift power away from associations and social movements (ibid), some of whom claim that the PB's political power and impact is weakened (Ganuza et al., 2014).

As a result of the administrative restructuring as well as a progressive tax reform increasing the available funds significantly, trust is growing, reflected in the raising number of participants over the course of the next years (Novy & Leubolt, 2005).

The first decade of PB in Porto Alegre sees major improvements in the city's infrastructure. Paving roads is among the three highest ranked investment priorities until 2001 (Novy & Leubolt, 2005). Access to the sewage network rises from 46 % in 1989 to 85 % in 1996 and the number of children in public school more than doubles before the decade is out (ibid). By virtue of the process's attention to questions of distributive and representative justice these changes benefit primarily poor and previously underfunded districts whose residents also account for the majority of participants (ibid).

This overall trend continues until 2004 when the Worker's Party loses the municipal elections and the incumbent mayor dilutes the power of PB by amending the scope of the process (Calisto Friant, 2019) and introducing competing techniques of participation (Novy & Leubolt, 2005). *"PB was a first innovative and courageous step towards democratisation and changing power relations, but it was not followed by any further steps"* (Novy & Leubolt, 2005, p. 2033).

2.1.2.2 TO SOUTH-AMERICA

In light of its success both in terms of public acceptance and outcomes, PB soon gets adopted beyond its hometown. This happens first in other Brazilian cities and over the course of the 1990s all across South-America.

By the end of the 2000s there are between 510 and 920 cities in Latin-America that have introduced some form of PB with the epicentre still being Brazil. In 2008, 41 % of Brazilian cities with more than 100.000 inhabitants partake in PB (Sintomer et al., 2012). However, the character and quality of these experiments do not always hold up to that of the initial phase of PB in Porto Alegre, reducing the potential for empowerment (ibid). At the same time, many efforts do succeed in increasing transparency and accountability, thereby reducing corruption, which can be an important outcome in its own right (ibid).

2.1.2.3 AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

By the mid-1990s PB starts to spread beyond the continent, attracting the attention of European cities as well as international organisations like the World Bank, USAID or the German Society for International Cooperation (Sintomer et al., 2012). In 1996, UN Habitat declares it a best practice, however, it does so in a heavily curtailed version, dropping all notions of PB being part of larger administrative reform and much of its political ambitions (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012).

This shift from a structural effort towards a more isolated procedure is also present in the way PB is adopted in Europe. While some local experiments stick with the more radical character developed in Porto Alegre, most lean towards more subdued versions, with PB as a tool to facilitate citizen involvement and increase transparency of public management, rather than striving for social justice (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012).

The implementation of PB across Europe also follows clear national patterns, with different countries emphasising specific use cases, goals and sets of procedures (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012).

In contrast to South-America and Europe, Africa is introduced to PB not so much as a force from within, but rather as something promoted by and dependent on international institutions and NGOs. As such, there are critical voices warning of neo-colonial implications (Sintomer et al., 2012). One such concern is that money is spent according to the wishes of the donor organisations rather than to those of the citizens, another that the not self-supporting character of such schemes cannot lead to the necessary level of dependability (ibid).

Lastly, Asia sees a very varied adoption of PB, in line with its varied political cultures. There are projects, unparalleled outside Latin-America, like Kerala in India, which sparks mass interest and lasts for over 13 years, surviving multiple changes in government (Sintomer et al., 2012). Contrasted with that is China's stance on PB, given its autocratic and centralised system of government. Actual participation is rarely found, rather there tends to be a move towards making budgets public. In the

2010s, however, there have been examples of projects in which money can actually be decided on (Sintomer et al., 2012).

Regardless of regional differences, by the end of the 2000s, there are projects involving the character of PB on every continent, making it a truly global phenomenon (Sintomer et al., 2012).

2.1.3 A MALLEABLE TOOL

Given the immense variety as well as the level of interpretation PB experiences in its spread across the world, it is safe to say that what travelled out from Porto Alegre is not so much PB as a process, but PB as an idea. Allegretti and Falanga (2016) refer to it as an ideoscape: “*a model that travels around the world and becomes real only through local experimentation*” (Allegretti & Falanga, 2016, p. 34). These experiments are in turn conceived of in the context of local needs, intentions and possibilities. They project these factors onto PB, both in the way the core process itself is set up, as well as in how far they are integrated into the wider administrative context, the way the PB in Porto Alegre notably was (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012).

As far as intentions go, the original PB is very much concerned with progressive social change and distributive justice. The aim is not purely to facilitate rational decision-making and learning, but ultimately to go against prevailing capitalist ideals and empower citizens beyond the process itself (Novy & Leubolt, 2005). In order to stay true to these intentions the citizenry is given a lot of leeway, both within the process itself as well as in amending it over time (Calisto Friant, 2019). The administrative system is also reorganised around the PB rather than the other way around (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). This commitment to deepening participatory democracy and the creation of transformative potential is emblematic of what Cabannes and Lipietz (2018) term a political logic underpinning PB.

The situation is decidedly different in Europe, where only a few early experiments mainly in Spain and Italy kept close to Porto Alegre’s spirit (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018). The overwhelming intention is not to radically change the prevailing system, nor have PB at the centre of participatory operations, but rather as a way to boost the existing way of doing things (ibid). The goals are an increase in transparency, a modernisation of the administration, decentralisation and more economic efficiency (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018; Novy & Leubolt, 2005), all of which are ideas following a good governance logic (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018). The result is PB in which the empowerment of the citizenry is ranked behind the better functioning of and more trust in existent structures in which actual decision-making is often replaced by consultation (Novy & Leubolt, 2005).

2. Theory

The third and last logic Cabannes and Lipietz outline and the one farthest removed from PB's origins, is the technocratic logic, found, among other places, in Germany. It places no value on empowerment or PB as a political force, instead opting for *“making the budgetary process more transparent and accessible to citizens”* (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018, p. 74). In contrast to other kinds of PB, the way of doing this is not to propose projects, but rather to propose cuts to the budget where greater efficiency is believed to be possible (ibid).

The distinction according to underlying logics is only one possibility. Beyond it there are also the organisation and the focus of the PB to consider. Cabannes (2021; Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018) distinguishes three basic types: territorial, thematic and actor-based. Territorial based PB operate in a certain space, a city, a district, a neighbourhood or some other place-based distinction, while thematic PB focus on a specific sector like housing, education or health services. The last type is the rarest of the three, namely actor-based PB in which a specific demographic, for example teenagers, migrants or women, is sought out. There also exist mixed forms of these types, like an actor-based PB focussed on a certain issue and it is also possible for multiple PB to run alongside or loosely related to each other in the same city (Cabannes, 2021).

Looking at the variation among PB implementation through this lens demonstrates the strength of a loosely defined idea. While the basic functioning and requirements do not vary greatly from case to case, the range of challenges able to be served increases greatly with the parameters not being fixed on a certain scale or method of deployment (Cabannes, 2021). This scalability makes PB accessible for smaller communities as well. By lowering the barrier of entry, smaller projects can be taken on first with the possibility of them eventually growing to be more substantial. In this way PB can evolve beyond the good governance logic they may be initially created with and in turn foster social change (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014).

At the same time, it is also this amending of the original idea that draws criticism of diluting or obscuring both the extent as well as the intent of PB, suggesting ideals of empowerment and progressive change evoked by examples such as Porto Alegre while not actually delivering on them (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). Focus is divested away from the context of broader administrative reform as well, in favour of creating an untethered policy device that can be readily deployed in almost every context (ibid).

Both through its reduction in scope as well as through its framing as a tool compatible with good governance logic, PB also loses its radical political character, becoming a neutral, flexible and none-threatening process (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). The cumulation of this striving for universal appeal is that organisations out to promote the adoption of PB offer talking points custom-made to sway representatives of every political persuasion, into agreeing to the same idea, merely by stressing different

points or framing them a certain way (ibid). The message being that there is something for everyone, which may well be true, though this strategy of vehement value-neutrality could also simply result falling flat on offering change in any direction.

Ultimately, the variability PB grew into, needs to be taken into account when trying to understand different iterations of PB, especially when that is done with a comparative element.

2.2 POWER

Power is a fundamental idea of much of philosophy and beyond. From antiquity onwards people have considered power and its role in society, trying to condense it into a workable form, to root out its edges and determine its origins. It has not proven an easy task. There is a lot of ambiguity and uncertainty hiding behind a word that is used rather liberally in everyday life. To this day it remains slippery, seemingly impossible to pin down with any kind of finality and as a result hotly contested.

The versatility of power as a concept makes it so that every attempt to contain it, necessarily contorts it (Roth, 2016). There seems to be no way past accepting some degree of theoretical plurality concerning this subject (ibid).

For the purposes of this work, an attempt at summarising the long and varied history of the field is both unfeasible as well as impractical. At the same time, it feels important to stress that the views on power that will be worked with here, namely those of Foucault and by extension Flyvbjerg, are neither comprehensive of the field nor uncontested within it.

2.2.1 FOUCAULT'S POWER AS RELATION

Michel Foucault is not a philosopher by trade as much as he is one by consequence, coming at his work first and foremost as a historian. He engages in the meticulous study of societal phenomena carried out from an historically analytical point of view, inspired heavily by Nietzsche's "*Wirkliche Historien*" (Flyvbjerg, 2001). It is through his in-depth studies of prisons, sexuality or psychiatry among others, that he arrives at his overarching observations and ideas. These origins in the micropolitics of a matter at hand carry over significantly into the way he understands his broader deliberations concerning for example the nature and role of power and knowledge in society. Through his being firmly rooted in the particular context and reality of the subject, his derived ideas share that character of specificity rather than striving for universal applicability or overarching theory (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002).

Foucault is convinced that there are no such things as universal principles. He says: "*Nothing is fundamental. That is what is interesting in the analysis of society*"

(Foucault as cited in Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 100). At the same time, he does not go so far as relativists would, in that every interpretation is equally valid. He seeks to base his ideas on what is observable, what transpired in history and what is happening still. It is through careful and critical observation that social arrangements can be identified and according to personal and context-based norms evaluated as beneficial or not (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

Context is key as far as Foucault is concerned. In fact, he is not a proponent of any kind of generally applicable theories, both when it comes to understanding a process and, more vehemently, when it comes to actions that might be taken. His aim is never to provide a path that can be followed, but rather to problematize a certain matter to the point where every action or position that were so far taken for granted need to be re-evaluated critically (Huxley, 2002).

“People reproach me for not presenting an overall theory. I am attempting, to the contrary, apart from any totalization – which would be at once abstract and limiting – to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible.” (Foucault as cited in Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 101)

As far as his thoughts on power are concerned, one of the most central tenets of Foucault’s approach are that *“power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere”* (Foucault, 1978, p. 93). It is unavoidable and not something that can be overcome or circumvented. It permeates every facet of society by virtue of not being a distinct entity, but rather a relation that exists within and influences all other relations, be they economic, political, social, etc. (Flyvbjerg, 2001). In Foucault’s eyes, it is also not correct to suggest that the influence of power on these relations is purely negative or destructive, he argues that it is the power present that allows for productive and positive outcomes as well. Keeping in line with it being a relation rather than a fixed property, power is also to be understood as dynamic and variable (ibid).

The multitude of omnipresent and yet fluid power relations form a tight network which penetrates and influences institutions without actually being localized in them (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Foucault explains it thusly:

“I wish to suggest that one must analyse institutions from a standpoint of power relations, rather than vice versa and that the fundamental point of anchorage of the relationships, even if they are embodied and crystallized in an institution, is to be found outside the institution.” (Foucault as cited in Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 117)

Power in this understanding does not originate from laws, institutions or instances of domination, but rather can be found within them, having brought them forth and

continuing to shape and influence them. They are a type of effect power can have, a form it can take (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

Foucault breaks with many thinkers before him in so far as he disagrees with the notion that power is a distinct good to be acquired, traded and, in the most basic sense, possessed. For Foucault, power cannot be monopolised by certain persons or institutions, nor can it be hierarchical in the sense that there exists a clear distinction between the ruling class and the ruled, for example. Even in processes of domination all sides are part of the relation and within it nobody holds absolute control (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

In Foucault's mind, there is also no line drawn to separate power on the inside and resistance against it as an outside force. They are both part of the same relation, one inevitably brings with it at least the possibility for the other. Resistance, in much the same vein as power, is also to be understood as decentralized and multifaceted (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002).

Facing power head-on is imperative as far as Foucault is concerned and very much in line with what he sees as his political task namely:

“To criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them.” (Foucault as cited in Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 102)

In his view, the way of advancing democracy is not to turn a blind eye towards questions of power or to strive towards systems that seek to overcome it. For that, if approached with Foucault's understanding of power, is neither possible nor desirable. Power is omnipresent and unavoidable, but it is not unchangeable. This leaves those who seek to change society to be more in line with their morals with having to acknowledge power. By engaging with and understanding it, power as well as its results can be influenced in potentially beneficial ways.

2.2.2 THE RELEVANCY OF POWER IN PLANNING

2.2.2.1 A NEUTRAL AND RATIONAL DISCIPLINE

While spatial planning does not suddenly start in the 1960s and 70s, these decades do constitute a formational period in planning theory, laying the groundwork for many practices and ideas that are still influential today. One of which is the positivist notion of planning as “a rational decision-making process in which value-free experts rely on evidence to solve well-defined and neatly structured planning problems” (Davoudi, 2012, p. 436).

Space is considered an observable, measurable and objective entity and it follows that its structuring and planning can and should be equally rational and fact-based.

There is little consideration for questions of values, political influence or subjectivity (Davoudi, 2012). By extension planners and researchers are thought of as neutral third parties, able to fully divest themselves of personal background, political affiliation or bias. They feel themselves reliant on objective data and scientific theory, legitimising their decisions and the fact that they reach them largely without input of the actors affected by them (ibid).

With time, views on spatiality, objective truth and the position of researchers relative to their field of study change, moving away from a positivist understanding towards others based in constructivism, communicative theories or post-structuralism. With these various theoretical shifts some argue that there is no longer a need to engage with outdated ideas of objectivism. As Judith Innes (quoted after (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 285)) puts it: *“to keep worrying about the positivist model seems to be beating a dead horse”*.

Others disagree, arguing that while planning theory may or may not have moved on, positivism is still going strong in planning practice and should therefore not be dismissed yet.

“In short, the ideology wanes, but the practices [of positivism] remain embedded in our educational and governmental institutions. And, because they still play a powerful ideological role in determining what is considered important and what is not, all the more so because they are hidden, it is unlikely that they will simply go away if we ignore them.” (Frank Fischer as cited by Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 285)

2.2.2.2 ...OR IS IT?

“[T]he days in which planners and planning were widely regarded as rational and progressive agents of change are well and truly over.” (Yiftachel, 2001, p. 254)

Beyond the idealism of normative, positivism-inspired planning, exists a whole host of realities that contradict the lofty claims of planning as a neutral discipline capable of reaching rational, entirely fact-based and, at the end of the day, “right” decisions.

Even before taking into account the influences of power and social relations that permeate planning as they permeate all other aspects of human interaction, there is the mere factor of temporality that renders all claims to perfect rationality mute by default. One cannot make definitively right calls on the development of a matter, if one cannot be sure what other changes it or its context might become subjected to. There is always an element of uncertainty in a decision that concerns the future while being made in the present (Rydin, 2020).

The limits of rationality go beyond that, however. They concern every part of planning from the actors that are partaking in and affected by it, the societal context it is happening in and the concepts it bases its validity on.

As is demonstrated in the previous section, planning strives to be a discipline anchored in knowledge and rationality. On the face of it that is supposed to be happening divorced from any connection to power, on value of the better argument alone. Foucault disagrees with that on principle: *“There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations”* (Foucault, 1995, p. 27).

Knowledge and power, for Foucault, are intrinsically linked, not just in the one-way connection made famous by Francis Bacon, whereas knowledge is power, but in a reciprocal relationship. Both are the necessary precursor to the other and can never be understood as fully separate entities.

In the same way that it is always linked with power, knowledge is also hardly ever straight-forward or universally agreed upon. Any claims brought forth are likely to be challenged from one side or another. Few things are ever truly settled and even if there is the bedrock of some clearly observable or undisputable fact, the way it is presented, framed and put into context gives ample possibility to shape truth into forms that might suit one party more than the other. Also, as Rydin (2020, p. 220) puts it *“knowledge claims give voice to certain issues (and by association, certain groups) and silence others”*.

A certain level of preselection and settling for one narrative over the other is understandable and even necessary, of course. In light of the sheer endless number of positions and interpretations possible, a choice has to be made at some point. *“Attention is a limited resource [...] It matters where attention is directed; where the focus lies, what it ignored and what counts as relevant knowledge”* (Rydin, 2020, p. 217). Especially in fields such as planning there exists a goal that needs to be reached in a given timeframe, complexity has to be reduced, for there to be any progress possible at all. Yet at the same time there needs to be awareness of the fact that choices are being made, that power relations influence how they come about in multiple ways and that new power relations are a by-product of every one of these choices.

It is not merely the knowledge that goes into planning processes that is affected by power, however. It is also the base blocks of processes themselves. In his work, Foucault makes a point of the importance of challenging what is assumed and taken for granted (Huxley, 2002), this applies to planning as well. As Rydin writes, there are no intrinsic qualities that makes someone or something an actor, a piece of evidence or a relevant impact, rather it is *“discursive repetition within regulation [that] contributes*

to the creation of categories that otherwise seem to be pre-existing entities that regulators are merely engaging with” (Rydin, 2020, p. 219).

These subsummations into workable groups are not exclusively performed in a top-down manner. In certain contexts, being perceived as a group can be advantageous and in order for that perception to be fortified, groups can be formed along the lines of what is to appear like “*natural conditions underlying those identities*” (Rydin, 2020, p. 219). Invoking such identities is to work with power (Rydin, 2020).

The abovementioned points are at least to a certain degree by and large results of either necessity or the logic of the process. What needs to be accounted for as well, is the fact that humans are not purely rational beings. We are influenced by emotions, values, sympathies and boundless other social factors. There might be a concerted effort to curb the weight of these factors, but it would be presumptuous to assume that we are able to fully rise above them if only we so choose.

One example of such influence is Flyvbjerg’s dismissal of one of the central tenets of Habermas’ theory of communicative action, namely the strength of the better argument and by extension the division of speech into successful and distorted along the line of reason and rationality. Flyvbjerg argues that it is precisely in straying from the better argument, by applying eloquence, hidden control, charisma or other distorting factors that one gains validity in actual, practical communication (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002).

Lastly, there remains the fact that in a complex endeavour such as planning, with its multitude of often conflicting interests, relevant factors and inherent uncertainties and trade-offs, the option to come to a universally agreed upon and certifiably rational decision is not always given. Sometimes, there is willingness from all participants to strive towards the proclaimed ideal of rationality, other times there is not. But as Bernstein (1992) says “*Any society must have some procedures for dealing with conflicts that cannot be resolved by argumentation, even when all parties are committed to rational argumentation*” (Bernstein, 1992 as cited in Flyvbjerg & Richardson (2002) p. 48).

Foucault takes this sentiment even further, arguing that conflict, or at least the possibility thereof, is a key feature of any free society and that it actually sustains and strengthens it (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). As such it should not be sought to be suppressed or ignored, but engaged with. Conflict can also open up avenues of change and progress for those excluded or willingly abstaining from participating through means of engagement that are established and deemed as acceptable. Contemporary planning culture with its aim at inclusivity should not confine itself to the narrow

window of reason and refined procedure. These would leave out those who have to or chose to make use of power and conflict more directly.

2.2.2.3 IMPORTANCE OF CONSIDERING POWER

Once one begins to look out for it, power, its traces as well as its emergence can be found everywhere in planning. It muddles the clear waters of rational debate and fact-based consensus, while at the same time giving strength to various positions and possibly driving change. It might not always be conducive to the straight-forward and structured way of doing this favoured by many planners, but power is not going anywhere. It is omnipresent and its network of relations necessarily permeates planning as well. There is no way to avoid it or its influence. At the same time as they are unavoidable, power relations are not immutable. Depending on one's way of looking at things, there are good reasons in favour of acknowledging and even directly engaging with the reality of power in planning.

For one, it is generally easier to understand the impacts of something that one allows oneself to see or even to look out for. There are a multitude of biases and distortions, both internal and external, that sway every decision made and action taken. The more conscious one is about them, the easier it is to recognise their patterns and, if necessary, counteract these tendencies.

There might also be a certain degree of apprehension towards the often times unstructured ways power manifests beyond the bounds of rational procedure. This can be disconcerting, especially in planning, when the discipline is by nature inclined towards promoting order and structure on the oftentimes unruly forms society presents it with. Especially considering that the structured ways of doing things serve distinct and important purposes, for example, promoting fair treatment of all participants and their interests rather than favouring the whims and wishes of the most influential.

Seemingly surrendering these bulwarks of equality in favour of raw power play seems ill-advised and short-sighted. There are two things to consider with this point: firstly, not all conflict is bad and when approached from a Foucauldian perspective, power is not concentrated with the ruling or the otherwise influential, its relational properties make it accessible to every concerned party. Secondly, acknowledging power is not an all-or-nothing proposition. There exists no obligation to discard any and all attempts at structuring interactions, in planning or otherwise, simply because one actively recognises the influence of power relations within and beyond the structuring efforts.

One reaction to the admission of power influencing planning that Flyvbjerg addresses in his work is the call for constitutional or institutional reform to fortify against power encroaching on democratic processes. He dismisses neither the possibility, nor

the effectiveness of such an approach in changing political and planning practices, what he does call into question, however, is the timeframe. “[...] *looking at democracy in the time perspective of the longue durée is only depressing to those impatient for instant change*” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 326). What he proposes, not instead, but alongside such amendments to democratic traditions, is to engage head-on with “*what they cannot accept in much of modern democratic theory: power, conflict, and partisanship*” (ibid).

This responsibility for planners to engage with the implications of power is shared by other theorists as well. Mashhadi Moghadam and Rafieian (2019) say that it is precisely because power relations are not distributed fairly or evenly within society, that “*the planner in the view should accept [this] in order to attempt to increase the span of power of weaker players by injecting knowledge*” (Mashhadi Moghadam & Rafieian, 2019, p. 14).

Not everyone is equally optimistic about the abilities of planners to single-handedly influence power relations for the betterment of society. Huxley argues that it is presumptuous, both to assume that planners can be the arbiters of what constitutes positive social change as well as the assumption that they are positioned externally enough to have such agency in the first place. In reference to Foucauldian logic being applied to promoting feminism through planning, she writes:

“For if planning is the conduct of conduct and the shaping of identities through strategies of governmentality, these discourses are likely to perpetuate normalised, gendered (racialised, “etc.”) hierarchies, regardless of the intentions of individual planners, no matter what their own gender.” (Huxley, 2002, p. 146)

In her line of argument, it seems naive or at the very least overly ambitious to assume that the mere acknowledgement of a certain influence might be enough to counteract it, referring to other voices criticising for example Flyvbjerg for assertions to that end. She goes further, calling into question the normative line underpinning all ambitions of reform, saying “*the nexus between beneficial change and social control can never be completely unravelled*” (Huxley, 2002, p. 151).

Regardless of the extent that agency is afforded to planners when it comes to challenging power relations, their importance and influence is made clear.

2.2.3 BENT FLYVBJERG’S DARK SIDE OF PLANNING THEORY

One planning researcher, who took Foucault’s ideas surrounding power, knowledge and rationality to heart and applied them to the praxis of planning, is Bent Flyvbjerg. His detailed case study of the inner working in the Danish city of Aalborg proved seminal for applying power to planning.

Early on in his professional career Flyvbjerg has experiences that might strike a familiar chord with many in the profession, who take their first steps out of their education into “the real world”. In his work doing background research for a regional planning entity, he comes up against the expectation to focus not on all information relevant to the matter at hand, but rather on what is also in accordance with a certain preordained narrative based in political will (Flyvbjerg, 2003). Reflecting this experience back on the guiding principle during his education, namely Francis Bacon’s famous “*knowledge is power*”, Flyvbjerg comes to question the relatively narrow scope of this assertion. Writing:

“I had seen knowledge being marginalized by power and power producing the knowledge that served its purposes best. I concluded that knowledge about the phenomena that decide whether economic, social, geographic, or other knowledge gets to count as important is at least as important as that knowledge itself.” (Flyvbjerg, 2003, p. 354)

Flyvbjerg picks up on this formative realisation in his decision to conduct a study on the Aalborg project, a city centre redevelopment of the city in which he lives. The project is first praised for its ambition, only to lose much of it during the course of implementation (Flyvbjerg, 2003). This meticulous and in-depth case study is at once source of as well as example for Flyvbjerg’s observations on the relation between rationality and power, ideal and praxis.

The method he uses for this significant undertaking is in a next step formalised into what he names Phronetic Planning Research, drawing on the Aristotelian concept of phronesis (see 3.1.2 Phronetic Planning Research).

In his study of Aalborg, titled *Rationality and Power* (Flyvbjerg, 1998), Flyvbjerg lays out his influences, drawing a line from Machiavelli, through Nietzsche, culminating in the work of Foucault. He understands his case study to be in the same vein as Machiavelli’s observations on Florence: an unflinching discovery of the *verita effettuale* as Machiavelli puts it, the effective truth (Flyvbjerg, 2003). To bring to light what is actually done, rather than just what is supposed to be done. He also draws on Nietzsche when it comes to the ways in which knowledge and by extension reality can be shaped, quoting him as saying “*interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something*” (Nietzsche & Kaufmann, 1968, p. 342).

The main take-away from the Aalborg study are Flyvbjerg’s ten propositions concerning what he termed as Realrationalität. The term takes after Realpolitik to mean the rationality that is actually used in practice rather than the idealised form present in theory. Additionally, he addresses the nature of power relations within a process.

He begins by stating that power defines reality, by deciding what counts as relevant knowledge. He goes on to explain how in practical communication so to say irrational

strategies of communication, like a use of rhetoric, can be employed to produce the rationality – and if need be, the rationalisation – required to arrive at a certain end (Flyvbjerg, 1998). As the force of the better argument should be the decisive factor in an accountable system, rationality will be used up-front, while the backstage is dominated by rationalizations and exercises of power (ibid). Furthermore, the need for any degree of rationality, decreases with the amount of power being held (ibid).

In the second half of his propositions, Flyvbjerg focusses on the nature of power relations in connection with rationality. In his work he concludes that while antagonistic relations and open confrontation might be more visible and thereby often focussed on, it is actually stable power relations that are dominant. However, even stable power relations are subject to change, being constantly produced and reproduced, allowing for redistribution of power (Flyvbjerg, 1998).

One reason for the rationality of power being prevalent are its deep historical roots, practices of power go back a lot further than democratic values and are thereby much deeper ingrained (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Another is that raw power can be wielded both more easily and more effectively in cases of open conflict, when appeals to reason often fall on deaf ears (ibid). Conversely, rationality is valued higher in stable relations, where informed decisions are seen as more legitimate (ibid).

Ultimately Flyvbjerg is doubtful about the capacity of democracy in its current form, with its uncritical insistence on rationality, being able to assert itself in the face of power. He writes *“if the interrelations between rationality and power are even remotely close to the asymmetrical relationship depicted above [...] then rationality is such a weak form of power that democracy built on rationality will be weak, too”* (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 325). At the same time, he does not give in to a nihilistic view on democracy, not even dismissing amending it through its internally preferred form of constitutional and institutional reform. Quite on the contrary, Flyvbjerg understands himself not just as an avid champion of modern democracy, but also sees great value in efforts to improve it from the inside.

“[...] we begin to see what it takes to make democracy work in practice. [...] we see that people working for more democracy form part of a century-long and remarkably successful practical tradition that focuses on more participation, more transparency, and more civic reciprocity in public decision making” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 326)

What he cautions against, however, is to rely on reform alone, seeing as it is too slow in addressing the problems at hand. There needs to be a reckoning with the *“mechanisms of power”* and the *“practices of class and privilege”* at the same time (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 326).

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3.1 REFERENCED APPROACHES

3.1.1 GROUNDED THEORY METHODOLOGY

Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM) was first conceived of in 1967 by Glaser and Strauss as an alternative strategy in contrast to the focus on grand theories prevalent in social science at the time (Mey & Mruck, 2011). In its most basic form, GTM is the practice of discovering a theory from data, rather than using data to test an existing one (ibid). It constitutes a decisive shift towards a more inductive way of approaching social science problems, making sure that the theory fits the data and not the other way around (ibid).

In the decades since, GTM has seen both a wide adoption as well as a diversification of or – according to some – a departure from the original premise. Multiple schools shifted GTM to be either more formalised or more free-formed or transforming its positivist roots towards a more constructivist approach (Mey & Mruck, 2011). The basic steps of the process remain largely the same between schools, though details, level of formality as well as interpretation vary. Consequently, it serves to clarify that for the purpose of this work the followed method is in reference to Kathy C. Charmaz and her constructivist GTM.

The starting point for the application of any GTM is a field of study to be entered as openly and as impartially as possible (Breuer et al., 2010). While this aspect was stressed in early versions that adhere more closely to the positivist idea of research existing beyond and independent of the world being studied, later scholars, such as Charmaz make a point of the fact that such separation cannot exist. Researchers both carry their own intrinsic biases as well as influence the world through their research efforts (Charmaz, 2011). Her strategy for counteracting this is decisive and conscious reflexion on these biases (ibid).

Once in the field, data is to be gathered liberally, through theoretical sampling with the analysis starting immediately rather than waiting for all data to be collected (Breuer et al., 2010). Datapoints are coded through comparing them with each other, while the exact way of encoding depends on the school of GTM being followed (ibid).

Out of the derived codes, categories are being synthesised which in turn get assimilated into a theory describing the field at hand (Breuer et al., 2010). The process of sampling, coding and categorising is repeated iteratively until theoretical saturation is reached, meaning that new data offers no new insight (ibid). The result is a grounded theory.

Alongside all steps of the process, memos are created to document thought processes, ideas and emergent theories (Breuer et al., 2010).

3.1.2 PHRONETIC PLANNING RESEARCH

Spurred on by what he sees to be a disregard for the role of power in the contemporary analysis of planning practices, Bent Flyvbjerg conceives of his own approach. He does so, drawing heavily from his work in the field as well as the philosophical and procedural underpinnings of Aristotle, Nietzsche and Foucault. The resulting approach is named Phronetic Planning Research (PPR).

The name refers to the concept of phronesis, one of the three intellectual virtues proposed by Aristotle: episteme, techne, phronesis. While episteme refers to a context-independent, scientific knowledge derived from analytical rationality in the search of universal truths and techne is the pragmatic and practical knowledge of craft and production, phronesis concerns itself with values, ethics and context (Flyvbjerg, 2004). It is a point of convergence between the general and the concrete, not concerned with claims of universality such as episteme, but rather with deliberation and judgement based on interests and values (ibid). It strives for an understanding of practical realities rather than that of ideals (ibid).

Flyvbjerg uses this concept of phronesis and expands it by the relevance of considering power, which he argues for in reference to Foucault (see 2.2.4). He combines his understanding of power with his focus on practised reality. In this view, power is an omnipresent, productive network of relations, that is linked with and shaping knowledge and rationality. Practised reality needs to be considering for all its details and context, in order to reach knowledge in the vein of phronesis rather than episteme or techne. Out of this nexus Flyvbjerg formulates four guiding questions planning researchers may orient themselves towards (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 290):

“Where are we going with planning?”

Who gains, who loses, and by which mechanisms of power?”

Is this development desirable?”

What, if anything, should we do about it?”

With these questions Flyvbjerg clarifies both the expressed expectation of reaching results not as neutral or strictly rational observations, but as deliberated judgements based in context and values. He also centres the role of the planner and researcher as the one creating rather than objectively observing reality. Engaging with these questions, just as any act of planning cannot happen from a point of neutrality, but from a distinct perspective (Flyvbjerg, 2004).

Flyvbjerg emphasises that these questions are to be understood as orientation and not as if they can or ought to be answered definitively (Flyvbjerg, 2004). The same applies to the set of methodological principles he outlines in order to introduce phronesis into planning research. They are guidelines not imperatives (ibid), because ultimately “[p]

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hronetic planning research is not method-driven, even if questions of method may have some significance. Phronetic planning research is problem-driven.” (ibid).

The first of these principles is a focus on values and by consequence the status of its results as interpretations. Like Foucault, Flyvbjerg distances himself both from fundamentalism, with its claim to universally grounded values, as well as relativism, awarding the same legitimacy to all sets of values. Flyvbjerg does that by rooting PPR in the specific historical and societal context. While there can be multiple interpretations, validity derives from a basis in evidence and argument. As such, there is no claim to objectivity or objective truth (Flyvbjerg, 2004).

As mentioned above, power is the key-component of PPR and should be placed at the core of the analysis. Flyvbjerg does not argue for a definitive conception of power to be used to that end, he proposes some features of his own understanding, however, constructed from Foucault, Nietzsche, Weber and Dahl. The main tenets being, that power is productive, not just restrictive, that it is an omnipresent net of relations and as such dynamic and that knowledge, truth and rationality are inseparably intertwined with power. As far as studying it, Flyvbjerg favours asking how power is exercised in addition to “why?” and “by whom?” and searching for it in the analysis of specific practices (Flyvbjerg, 2004).

Flyvbjerg further argues in favour of what he calls getting close to reality. This means to come into a position where the results of research are noticed by those it involves or implicates and to provoke reactions that the researcher should face and interact with. As such, the research and the researcher become part of the power relations they work upon and need to acknowledge that it may in and off itself influence the results (Flyvbjerg, 2004).

As far as scale is concerned, PPR seeks to emphasise the little things, setting aside big questions in favour of details and the intricacies of planning reality. Flyvbjerg bases this on a similar focus in the works of Nietzsche and Foucault (Flyvbjerg, 2004). The goal is that through decentred study of the “*micro-practices of planning*” (ibid p. 295), broader insights can be gained.

Another principle, inspired by Foucault is that of practice before discourse. What is observed in daily practices is what counts, regardless of what ought to happen. The researcher tries to understand practices in terms of their context and as far as that is possible. They try to distance themselves from their own assumptions of what planning is or ought to be, in favour of observing what is really being done. Flyvbjerg concedes that this may be difficult and uncomfortable, but that

“[i]f the researcher uncovers a planning reality that is ugly or even shocking when judged by the moral standards, which, we like to believe, apply in

modern planning, this reality may also demonstrate something that has to be faced squarely by planners, by planning researchers, and by the general public, if this reality is to be changed” (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 297).

The nature of PPR, being predicated on the knowledge of particular circumstances, lends itself best to the detailed study of specific cases or examples (Flyvbjerg, 2004), even though such a focus does not preclude PPR from taking empirical generalisations into consideration as well (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

Being primarily concerned with practice, PPR places a focus on asking how. It is through asking “how?” that a narrative between processes and their outcomes can be constructed (Flyvbjerg, 2004). By placing emphasis and arranging arguments, narratives provide the needed structure to understand experiences. They can also serve as an outlook beyond the matter at hand. The way a narrative is framed and shaped has significant influence on what gets conveyed in what way, consequently researcher, being the ones constructing them, need to be conscious of and deliberate in their choices (ibid).

Flyvbjerg rejects the strict dichotomy between agency and structure, writing that PPR concerns itself with both, as the influence of one can always be found in the other. Actors internalise the effects structures have on their dealings, while structures are impacted by the actors that constitute them (Flyvbjerg, 2004).

The last of the proposed methodological principles is a dialog with a polyphony of voices, meaning, not only, that multiple perspectives are taken into account, but also that no single one is awarded the status of being authoritative, not even the researchers. Results, well-argued as they may be, are but one perspective to be added to an ongoing dialogue (Flyvbjerg, 2004).

3.2 ADAPTION FOR THIS WORK

In its functioning Phronetic Planning Research (PPR) is not dissimilar from Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM). PPR shares its approach of entering into a field of study with an open mind and letting the insights gained along the way coalesce into a workable theory. Regardless of whether this similarity is intentional, it paves the way for a connection of the two approaches, with PPR being understood as a more thematically specific variant of GTM. For the purpose of this work, both GTM as well as PPR are drawn upon and used complementing each other in a composite approach.

The way this fusion works in this thesis is that there are four main steps, being based on or informed by the two methodological approaches to differing degrees. In a first step a GTM inspired approach is used on the existent research canon on PB detailing

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its history, classification and some notable cases. This canon is considered the field in which a shared theme is sought to be identified.

This theme, being power, is then sharpened into a lens allowing to closely analyse the field. To facilitate this step the understanding of power proposed by Flyvbjerg's PPR as well as the principles of PPR are drawn upon. The lens is used to determine relevant datapoints and categories. Out of these categories, a theory in the form of a framework for locating power in PB processes is distilled.

This framework is then applied to the case study of the Paris PB, in order to observe more easily the influence of power there. Following the detailed exploration of the case, the four core questions of PPR will be drawn upon to interpret the results and relate them back to the broader body of work on PB.

The initial study of the field of PB, the lens of power and by consequence the development of the framework is based entirely on literary sources. In order to understand the case of the Paris PB a combination of literary review and interviews are used (see Annex for transcripts).

Three interviews were conducted via video conference in June of 2021. The subjects are not directly implicated in the PB process itself, as such interview partners were not available for comment. While this brings with it less in-depth knowledge of the inner workings of the process, the absence of direct affiliation or implication allows for a critical view on the process and the raising of contentious issues about the implementation or the underlying logics.

The interview partners include Giovanni Allegretti, a leading expert on PB, researcher at the Centre for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra and associate professor at the University of Florence, and Yves Cabannes whose work also focusses primarily on PB and who consults cities in their conception of PB. Furthermore, he is a researcher with the Bartlett Development Planning Unit at the University College London. Lastly Marc Bourdier is an architect and professor of urban planning at the ENSA Paris La Villette, who while not dealing with PB in a professional capacity is a lifelong resident of Paris and actively involved in citizen-lead efforts.

While Mr. Allegretti and Mr. Cabannes provide insight into the relation of the Paris PB to the wider field of PB, Mr. Bourdier offers local political context as well as an impression of the reception among inhabitants.

Due to the scope of the work at hand, neither GTM nor PPR can be implemented on the scale that they would allow for. Concessions on the breadth and depths of the methods have to be made. Specifically, for GTM it implies acknowledging that theoretical saturation will not be reached. Similarly, in PPR the pertinent questions of power will only be able to be answered for certain aspects, not universally.

3.3 STRUCTURE




Figure 1: Outline of the research design; own illustration

3.3.1 FIELD

The field is the body of work that represents the baseline of the following steps. It is constituted of scientific papers dealing with PB, either as a general concept or through a specific example. Due to its fundamental nature the case most often discussed within these studies is Porto Alegre, although others are drawn upon as well to present a more rounded picture of the practice.

3.3.2 LENS

The lens is the identified theme applied to the cases making up the Field as well as any additional ones falling into allowing a detailed examination. As a result of the initial consultation of the works on PB and the case of Paris in particular, the role of power within PB emerges. Consequently, it is through this lens that the field is to be more closely examined. In order to do this the power understanding of Foucault is consulted, as applied to planning by Flyvbjerg. Especially the guiding questions outlined in PPR (see 3.1.2) are used in discerning how power influences PB.

3.3.3 FRAMEWORK

With the field viewed through the lens, points of interest present themselves that are compiled and arranged into a coherent form, accounting for their scale and their relation to each other. This is the framework. Its function is to offer a way of coherently deconstructing a case into its components in order for these components to be

3. Methodology

analysed according to their relation to power. Consequently, connections between points and conclusions on the nature of power in any specific case may be more easily drawn.

In order to offer assistance in applying the framework to a case, each point is described and possible manifestations are given as examples to look out for.

There are largely two ways used to determine if a certain aspect warrants consideration along the lines of power and should therefore be added to the framework. On the one hand there are explicit mentions of power in the consulted canon of research. This includes passages that deal with the relation between a certain decision, the power that brought it about and the power it brings into existence itself.

On the other hand, there are points of the process whose existence is acknowledged but which are not focussed on further in terms of power. This does not mean that they are devoid of or independent from power relations. In a way, they are even more important to pay attention to, because they are subtle and innocuous. Their implications might be deemed inconsequential or obvious and be overlooked for those reasons. In these cases, logical deduction will be used to construct possible power implications that may or may not be of significance when looking at a case at hand.

Regardless of the origin of the content, none of the presented power relations can be thought of as absolute, unchangeable or inevitable. There are variations beyond what is presented here and the close study of other cases may well reveal points or variations upon points that are not taken into account.

3.3.4 CASE

Lastly, the case is where the Framework finds its practical application, serving both as a roadmap and as a point of comparison. The case is considered in its historical, political and participatory context and discussed in detail. The points of the framework are located within it, their prevalent manifestations are identified and if necessary additional points of interest are amended. The approach of PPR is also referenced in investigating the case, though it is acknowledged that only an abridged version of the methodology can be performed in the context of this work.

The points laid out by the framework can then be understood on their own, in comparison with other possible manifestations of the same point or in relation to other points. Guided by the leading questions of PPR connections, conclusions are drawn of the case as a whole.

The result is a precise understanding of the case and its place within the field of PB in the context of power.

4 FRAMEWORK

4. Framework

This chapter outlines the instances at which power presents itself in connection with PB, both in terms of influences on it, the structuring of it, as well as results from it. As a complex process PB necessarily exists within a wider context that needs to be taken into account in order to understand the ideas that shape it and how these ideas are put into practice. The framework developed in this work follows this interplay of different scales, which is why it is structured in three levels: influences, structuring and implementation.

Influences deals with overarching mechanics shaping individual actions, devices and policies. Firstly, there are the ideologies underpinning each political system, dealing with what is deemed aspirational as well as ideas about which group has which role to play in the system. Secondly, anything predicated on the notion of equal opportunity participation needs to take into account the systemic factors that stack the deck before the game has even begun. Ignoring existing fault-lines or the reasons why something is even able to take place somewhere but not elsewhere is setting oneself up for perpetuating and perhaps even exacerbating existent inequalities. Thirdly, micro politics is a blanket term used to denote influences that go beyond the official structures of governance, but that instead arise from it being put into practice.

One level down, the influences get translated into the **structuring** behind a given PB process. It deals with the intentions that bring about PB efforts, the logics that result from those as well as the hierarchical implication. As this point concerns the planning and conception stages and because PB is enacted by and through governing institutions and the administration, the following points are approached primarily from their point of view. Consideration for the impact on other actors might be present, but for the most part assigned from the outside, not through direct cooperation.

The level of **implementation** concerns itself with how the aforementioned ideations and ambitions are translated into the PB process itself, how it is set up, what points of power emergence are created and who benefits in what way from the resulting range of motion. Different choices bring with them different levels of opportunity for different actors or groups. Consequently, power can be argued to be present in the potentiality a given structure offers as well as emerging from actors actually making use of these potentials. The use of established range of motion can happen as intended, through reappropriation according to actor's own needs or by opposing what has been created altogether.

Aim of this chapter is to point out some of the forms various points in the process can take on and highlight some of the possibilities they bring with them in terms of (potential) power.

4. Framework




Figure 2: Framework; own illustration

4.1 INFLUENCES

4.1.1 IDEOLOGY

4.1.1.1 TYPES OF DEMOCRACY

One of the core questions of any democratic system is who should hold the power to make decisions that affect others, that is: to govern. There are many different ways of approaching this challenge, different understandings of roles of the actors in the system and different views on what constitutes a desirable outcome. These attitudes shape what in terms of scope, capacity and responsibility is deemed aspirational when it comes to the structuring of participatory processes, like PB, as well.

In terms of its logic, PB shares ties with deliberative democratic convictions, in that decisions can only be as good as the discursive and cooperative efforts that preceded them. This focus on the lead-up to a decision rather than the vote themselves is present in a lot of PB. They generally consist of a year-long process with different stages of idea generation, discussion and decision-making rather than just a vote. The importance of the deliberative parts can also serve as an argument against the dismissal of purely advisory PB as it places the democratic weight on the part of the process that is actually in the hands of the participants.

With its principle, at least in certain iterations, of giving every person willing to participate an equal say in the decision-making process, PB can be seen as leaning towards direct democracy as well. Depending on the individual structure of the process, it can be a very immediate connection between people's wants and the budgetary means to see them fulfilled. At the same time many PB implementations, especially in Europe, take place in a predominantly representative democratic context, which influences the perception of how much power and with-it responsibility should actually be diverted away from the hands of elected officials.

There is also the issue of majority domination in one person one vote direct structures. It risks perpetuating marginalising tendencies, when groups with potentially greater needs are reliant on the good-will of the majority population. That and the fact that at a certain scale deliberation in a direct setting can be challenging if not impossible to implement, PB processes can opt for their own internal representative structures, by electing spokespeople or establishing councils as part of the process.

At the same time as some commend and demand a shift of decision making away from conventional governmental structures towards more immediate approaches, such as PB, there is also critique. One issue raised is the unloading of responsibility onto the citizenry. They are covertly tasked with solving issues of development and distribution of resources. However, as citizens they are not actually given the means of addressing these oftentimes systemic issues. Shifting the responsibility and

consequently also the blame if conditions do not improve onto individuals happens in an attempt of officials to evade having to contend with systemic issues themselves (Ganuza et al., 2014).

Another point is not so much a critique as a difference in understanding what PB adds to a system it's implemented in. Especially for cases that are not strongly interested in the empowerment potential PB holds, its addition into an existing representative democratic system can seem superfluous. Why spend money on an additional process if the people are already sufficiently represented? Following this view, held by a member of the World Bank as interviewed by Ganzua and Baiocchi (2012), PB is only sensible where there is no other kind of democratic rule of law and PB is the only way for the citizenry to voice their needs.

4.1.1.2 THE CITIZENRY'S ROLE IN GOVERNING

In his assertions on the nature of power in planning processes Bent Flyvbjerg writes that while antagonistic and openly confrontational relations are often given more attention due to their captivating and disruptive nature, it is actually amicable and stable relations that are the most prevalent interactions (Flyvbjerg, 1998). While this applies to a variety of relations, it may well be especially pertinent, when it comes to the interaction between governing institutions and civil society.

Generally, democratically elected bodies are deemed fit to represent the population that chose them and exercise power in their name. Yet at the same time there often exists a weariness if not mistrust between government and at least part of their constituency. This is based on the assertion that, if left to their own devices, elected officials or agents of the state are more likely to act in their own interest rather than in that of their voters. A similar concern can be extended to processes initiated by them.

Consequently, some see the role of civil society and activists in particular, not as being participants in arenas designed by those in positions of power, but as remaining on the outside, operating in an unrestricted way. As Ganuza and Baiocchi (2012, p. 6) write:

"[...] with PB it was the administration that established and regulated those communication channels. But it did so on its own terms. Participatory Budgeting translated the wishes that emerged in grassroots democracy into a technical and rational language, and into sensible projects that could be weighed against each other in a transparent way, thus helping citizens present their needs."

While opening up channels for effective input is in line with ideals of greater say in the development of their lived space, some activists are weary of going along with schemes such as PB. They fear that such approaches give too much power to the

initiators when it comes to shaping the debate (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012), especially if they involve simultaneously closing other avenues of input (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014).

Whether a given population is inclined towards cooperation or opposition is influenced heavily by the local political and historical context. If there is a history of good and respectful relations between local government and the population it is more likely that trust will be extended towards a new endeavour such as PB and that the citizenry will make use of it to further their aims. Conversely, if the working relation is strained already, it might take more to convince sceptical actors that taking part is in their best interest. People can fear being instrumentalised for the benefit of the current system. These attitudes exist not only in connection with the local political climate, but also with how civil society sees its own role either as challenging and opposing established systems of power or complying with them.

At this point it is furthermore important to note that civil society itself is far from monolithic in most contexts and differences in attitudes within the larger group need to be considered (see 4.1.1.3 Organised and Unorganised Voices and 4.3.3.2 Tensions within ‘Participants’).

4.1.1.3 ORGANISED AND UNORGANISED VOICES

Not entirely unlike the debate between direct and representative democracy, there are also two camps when it comes to the presence of civil society in the political arena. This concerns organised and unorganised citizenry. On the local level organisation is commonly based around some form of thematically or spatially defined association, for example around a neighbourhood or a specific policy goal. Associations are important actors in local development, as they accumulate the interests and weight of the people they represent, acting as a point of focus and of contact (Ganuza et al., 2014).

However, many PB processes, starting with the first one in Porto Alegre, do not target or at least do not exclusively or preferentially target associations. Rather they focus rather on giving a platform to unorganised individuals (Ganuza et al., 2014; Novy & Leubolt, 2005). This challenge to the station and power of associations is a point of contention when it comes to the political quality of PB.

“It [Porto Alegre’s PB] did not go against associations per se – as many imagined this process would empower civil society, as much as it was a challenge to their monopoly of representation of the people, or the idea that they represented all citizens.” (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012, p. 4)

Associations sometimes, as was the case in Porto Alegre, consider themselves necessary to the ordinary people off the street, whom they see as not well-versed enough in the intricacies of political manoeuvring and as such easily manipulated by the more

seasoned representatives of the system. They also call into question individual citizen's ability to effectively and consistently display solidarity and strive for high-level or long-term goals that are beyond their own sphere of immediate interest. Following that logic there needs to be an organised collective that is not just aware of its goals but also of its power. That way it can stand up to and defend its interests against an establishment that seeks to instrumentalise them for its own gain (Ganuza et al., 2014).

PB poses a threat to that end. The argument is that, by appealing to individuals, it undermines collective power. In this view untrained perspectives are supposedly favoured, because they can easily be steered. In a similar vein, centring individuals is said to detract from asking larger questions about the system itself, such as the way a city is funded or who gets to have a voice in what arena (Ganuza et al., 2014). Ultimately the argument is that PB undermines countervailing powers, depoliticises issues of distribution and development and puts the responsibility for solving systemic problems on the backs of individuals who then aren't being given the means to do so (ibid).

Conversely it has to be said, that regardless of whether or not this line of argument holds true, it is the privileged position of the current associations that is at stake. If there is a direct path into the heretofore inaccessible political decision making, there no longer remains a need for a middleman. When associations argue that individuals do not know how to have their voices heard sufficiently, because they do not know who to go to about what, it is implied if not outright stated that associations do (Ganuza et al., 2014). They know how to navigate the system, which is only an asset so long as the system is badly navigable, which gives them a vested interest in keeping the status quo.

There is also contention on the point of associations actually representing the citizenry as they claim and not merely their own interests or agendas (Ganuza et al., 2014). Consequently, PB could actually be beneficial in terms of representation, giving a platform to those whose interests do not align with those of associations.

Regardless of their thoughts on it as a matter of principle, a firmly enacted egalitarian PB faces associations with a choice. They can either go along with it and in doing so relinquish some measure of their radicalism in favour of deliberation and compromise on equal footing with others or reject it, thereby forfeiting most of their power (Ganuza et al., 2014).

4.1.2 SYSTEMIC FACTORS

4.1.2.1 CLASS

Matters of investment in the public sphere touch on matters of class, by virtue of the two being correlated and extend to matters of representation as well. The societal class a person falls into is often reflected in where they live and determines their access to public services and infrastructure. This can be reflective of how much or little value is placed on the satisfaction of the needs of certain classes in the political arena. Though it is hardly ever as straightforward: Poorer people, living in lower income areas not only have less money and time at their own disposal, they also generally do not benefit as much from investments made by municipalities, as those tend to be concentrated in higher income neighbourhoods (Cabannes, 2021; Novy & Leubolt, 2005). It is the latter where the political benefits in terms of votes are calculated to be greater.

As lower income people see less benefits for themselves coming from the system, they are less likely to take part in participatory efforts. This is especially pertinent in processes like PB where effort actively needs to come from those wanting to benefit from them. PB efforts need to be conscious about the unequal distribution of participatory ambitions, especially if the aim is to empower marginalised groups in particular, who often find themselves part of lower classes.

4.1.2.2 GENDER

Another central aspect of delineating the exercise of power in society is along the line of gender. Questions of gender sensitivity and mainstreaming are often times not given express consideration in the implementation of PB (Allegratti & Falanga, 2016). Even when they are, what can be observed is varied.

Some of the reasons Allegratti and Falanga (2016) offer to explain this lack of commitment are that often times questions of gender sensitivity are not integrated into the broader functioning of governing or administrative bodies, but rather relegated to separate entities, making it hard to integrate their goals into other policies. This is especially true, when their reach and influence is limited in the first place. Additionally, when it comes to the gender in relation to budgeting, the practice is to check the final proposal for potentially problematic decisions or implications, rather than promoting antidiscrimination from the start. Combined with focussing solely on women, leaving the actions of men largely unchallenged as well as ignoring the impact of overlapping factors of exclusion affecting women, the structure out of which PB emerges is regularly ill-equipped for dealing with or downright ignorant of issues of gender sensitivity (Allegratti & Falanga, 2016).

These issues are aggravated by factors such as women self-censoring in public settings, being seen as represented by the men in their lives or in contexts of representation, not being regarded as capable of occupying positions of power (Allegretti & Falanga, 2016).

Nevertheless, PB as a concept can be popular with and appealing to women. Participation is often split evenly between genders, sometimes even with an overrepresentation of women (Allegretti & Falanga, 2016). While PB efforts do not usually offer a significant gendered component, more targeted, actor-based approaches do, resulting in higher levels of social inclusion (ibid).

There is reason for pause, however. As Allegretti and Falanga (2016, p. 48) write: *“The numeric presence of women in participatory processes can create an illusion of equality, ignoring the differential of power and socio-political recognitions between sexes and other gender-related issues.”*

One notable observation is the fact that the feminisation of PB spaces often takes place as soon as commitment towards them, in terms of funding and priority, recede, with men no longer deeming them worth their time and effort (Allegretti & Falanga, 2016). It is also worth considering that the levels of representation in multi-layered processes such as the one in Porto Alegre often do not see equally balanced representation on all levels. While women made up the majority of general participants in Porto Alegre’s PB rather early on, their stake in council positions didn’t catch up until after the heyday of the process was already over (ibid).

There are some accommodations beyond an overarching commitment to gender-mainstreaming that can decrease the impact of pressures experienced primarily by women and thereby facilitating their participation, many of them on an organisational level. Time and setting are important to consider, as women often have to deal with various levels of care-work on top of their gainful employment, meaning that short distances and the provision of childcare can raise the chances of participation (Allegretti & Falanga, 2016). During meetings there needs to be an awareness of gendered dynamics in discussion culture and potentially adaption in the format, for example focussing on small groups first rather than opening on a discussion by the entire assembly directly (ibid). Many of these considerations could apply to other marginalised groups, be that queer, disabled or otherwise outside the mainstream, though needs may vary.

4.1.2.3 ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION

The two main types of actors that are considered when it comes to shaping PB are the governing body and civil society, whether organised or not. However, as Cabannes (2021) puts it in his list of pitfalls when considering the participatory

dimension of PB: *“Ignoring the powerful role and the function of the civil servants (and their capacity of obstruction) may become a real issue”* (Cabannes, 2021, p. 455).

While local government may be the entity with the political mandate and legitimacy to introduce policies and procedures, it is generally the job of the administrative bodies to enact these changes. Occupying this crucial position gives them a fair bit of influence over the success or failure of a new venture depending on their commitment to it (Cabannes, 2021).

Furthermore, while governments change periodically in tune with legislative periods, the administration often remains largely static, with changes coming slowly and gradually, depending on the local system. This longevity makes it possible for routines and networks to establish themselves, which in and of itself provides multiple points of the emergence of power. With that might also come a certain level of reluctance if not pushback if these ways of doing things and the influence they provide are to be challenged.

4.1.2.4 WEALTH

On the most basic level, PB is only possible if there are funds able to be allotted to it. Consequently, the financial state of a municipality directly impacts the forms PB can take, depending on how much or little money there is to go around. Wealthy cities can more easily decide on implementing PB. At the same time, those contexts in which budgets are tight to begin with might bring forth more influential processes as what little money there is goes through PB. This can increase its importance relative to instances where only a portion of investment means are channelled through PB. There will be more commitment and incentive to partake if PB is the only means to access meagre funds. At the same time, bigger pots enable more far-reaching projects to be implemented, which might raise awareness.

4.1.3 MICROPOLITICS

4.1.3.1 STATUS

While politics for the most part is best described as a team sport, regardless of how well the team works within itself, the influence of specific actors to see their will come to fruition must not be overlooked. Both institutions and individuals can wield this power, by virtue of their position, their reputation, their social capital or other similar factors.

Given sufficient levels of influence, actors may be in a position to initiate projects or changes by merit of their reputation or position alone. There can be legitimate considerations underpinning such an effort, however the fact that someone finds

themselves in a position to have their reasoning listened to and acted on, should be given attention in and of itself. It can further be of note how far this influence extends and where it finds its limits.

4.1.3.2 POLITICAL CALCULATION

Any action, policy or device can be understood for what it is created to be as well as for what functions it serves beyond its immediate and previewed results. While all actors have the ability to extract some form of additional value out of a measure, be that by making it work in their favour or by integrating it into a larger narrative, it is the instigators who have the first opportunity to do so and get to, at least initially, set the tone.

With a process like PB that is by virtue of needing access to public funds exclusively initiated by governing bodies, the resulting narratives follow a political aim. That can present itself as keeping campaign promises, as displaying a commitment to participation, equal opportunity or community building or as reflecting well on a specific person who is seen as having spearheaded the effort. These uses of a measure in constructing beneficial narratives might seem obvious, but that doesn't detract from their importance and influence they hold in the political arena.

It is further worth noting, that while embedding events in a larger narrative does inevitably frame and present reality to be one way and not the other, it doesn't mean that what is being portrayed is necessarily untrue or misleading. Pointing at an enacted PB process to attract votes doesn't detract from its empowerment qualities, nor does it mean that it is only done to curry favour with constituents. What it does mean is that it can be in the best interest of certain groups of actors to focus on certain aspects and overlook others in order to create an image that best suits their purposes, which can in turn influence the perception and the impact of PB.

4.1.3.3 OPPOSITION WORK

While a process that gets newly implemented reflects mostly the intentions and viewpoints of the party holding the power to enact it, in the political practice the opposition often times needs to be taken into consideration as well. They are able to influence the direction or the design of the PB process, if their votes are needed to pass it.

Opposition parties could use their support of the PB as a bargaining chip to receive other concessions. The same can be said of lower levels of administrations or government. If a PB is to be enacted both city wide and on the district level, the support of these institutions might also be required and possibly need to be negotiated for.

Navigating political differences is not restricted to the initial implementations stage. Over the course of the process oppositional forces could try to detract from or criticise

the procedures or they could attempt to claim results from PB as brought on by them. Additionally, the extent to which PB is enacted needs to be weighed against its steadiness:

“There is always a certain trade-off between the implementation of radical innovations, which are far-reaching and dependent on favourable political conditions and might therefore be abolished after a change in government, and less radical innovations, which are more easily supported by a broader political consensus and are therefore potentially more sustainable.” (Sintomer et al., 2012, p. 29)

4.2 STRUCTURING

4.2.1 INTENTIONS

Underlying any policy or project there are goals and aspirations sought to be achieved. They derive from the overarching social, political and cultural context influencing what is deemed a desirable outcome or a worthwhile pursuit as well as from more low-level decisions taken in view of a personal philosophy or party line. The starting point is often a perceived short-coming in the current system or a concrete target to be aimed at.

Such intentions can be held explicitly and be openly stated or implicitly, to be assumed based on the actions taken. Naturally, there can be more than one intention pursued at a time and it is also possible for them to contradict each other, which can lead to a discrepancy between the intentions that are claimed to be adhered to and those actually reflected in the actions taken.

Some of the possible intentions as far as PB are concerned are detailed here, though it is not an exhaustive array.

4.2.1.1 DEEPENING DEMOCRACY

One aim PB can be used to pursue is that of strengthening local democracy. A crisis of democracy is regularly brought into play when it comes to the reasoning behind new participatory ventures, PB being no exception (Allegretti & Falanga, 2016). The idea is to open new arenas of deliberation and decision-making in the hopes of encouraging the engagement of those heretofore unwilling or unable to partake in other forms of democracy (Ganuza et al., 2014). In so doing, these people and groups can have their voices heard, which may be especially important if it concerns marginalised groups.

4.2.1.2 SOCIAL JUSTICE

Efforts that can be subsumed under the banner of greater social justice are often brought up when it comes to instating PB. The intention then is to work towards

reverting or reversing existing priorities in matters of budgeting and spending. This can concern multiple forms. Spatial justice focussed on the way infrastructure and investment is disproportionately distributed across a city or other frame of reference, with some areas being poorer serviced or experiencing more negative effects than others, which is more often than not correlated with demographics such as income or ethnicity. PB might be considered as a means to counteract these spending habits (Cabannes, 2021).

Political justice means “[g]iving power to those who were powerless [...] [by] opening or increasing political space for those who never had political space or those with little access” (Cabannes, 2021, p. 445). Other aspects of social justice that might play into the rationale behind advocating for or enacting PB are gender mainstreaming or environmental justice (Allegretti & Falanga, 2016).

4.2.1.3 DIRECTING DEVELOPMENT

Seeing as the distribution of funds directly influences the development trajectory of a municipality, intentions behind PB can be related to ideas of how and by whom this steering should take place. This can take the form of a municipality seeking additional support or more detailed ideas for an existing planning direction or giving their constituents the opportunity to make their priorities and hopes known. A well-executed and accepted PB can set thematic precedents beyond itself, motivating other branches of development to follow suit with a direction set through it.

4.2.1.4 GOVERNANCE

Another intention that can be pursued when enacting PB is that of improving governance. Some of the expected benefits include improved communication between municipal actors and civil society and a better understanding of each other’s viewpoints resulting not just in easier cooperation in the context of the process itself, but also beyond that. The aim is “*bringing citizens closer to government*” (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014, p. 41). The heightened legitimacy and acceptance of projects brought forth by participatory means are also arguments in favour of PB from that point of view.

4.2.1.5 EFFICIENCY

A concern at the forefront of municipal considerations, especially, but not limited to those in Europe is economic efficiency and how best to incorporate it into the functioning of local government (Novy & Leubolt, 2005).

4.2.1.6 APPEASEMENT

As much as sincerely held beliefs of democracy, justice and cooperation might play a part, there is also the possibility that PB is considered in an instrumentalised fashion,

to project a concern for the opinions and involvement of civil society even when it does not play a deciding role. By virtue of its malleability PB can be instated in many different ways, some offering little to no room for actual influence of the participants, with the reins remaining in the hands of the initiators, able to steer the results in a beneficial direction. At what point PB loses its empowerment capabilities completely is hard to pinpoint as is the line between a PB genuinely intentioned towards societal or administrative progress and one paying lip-service to a Zeitgeist that favours participatory efforts or one that seeks added legitimacy for already decided development directions.

4.2.2 LOGICS

The choice of logic of a given PB is contingent on the intentions that underlie it as well as the compatibility with the current system, though it is possible to break with the latter if desired. The logic a PB subscribes to, or can be classified as, outlines the decisions most likely taken in its set-up and therefore has a significant impact as to what is ultimately achievable through it.

Cabannes (2021; 2018) distinguishes three types: political, good governance and technocratic (see 2.1.3 A Malleable Tool).

4.2.2.1 POLITICAL

A political logic is inspired by intentions of deepening democracy as well as social justice. It is concerned with deep-seated and systemic change, through a redistribution of political power and a change in spending priorities (Cabannes, 2021). It is a logic favoured by left or far left leaning governments and can be found on all continents, most prominently in the early years of Porto Alegre's PB process (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). Its radical nature keeps it from being widely adapted and it is not uncommon for PB's following a political logic to be disbanded or significantly altered if there is a change in government (Sintomer et al., 2012).

Given its focus on ideals of social justice a political logic generally offers the greatest range of motion and abilities to its participants (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018).

4.2.2.2 GOOD GOVERNANCE

As is made evident by the name, the good governance logic of PB draws from goals of strengthening local governance, efficiency and directing development. It underlies the kind of PB promoted by international organisations and predominantly put into action, especially in Europe (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018). While social justice and a deepening of democracy might be encouraged as well, the good governance logic stops short of committing fully to either. It understands itself primarily as apolitical and

largely in favour of the existent structures of power, providing an orderly and efficient alternative to conflict and disruptive mobilisation (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). Consequently, there is no significant transfer of power, with decisions often being consultative only and even where they are binding, the ability to regulate the process itself generally remains with the initiators. Processes conceived of through governance logic also tend to have less impact on the wider administrative structure surrounding it (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014).

With the influence of participants being reduced compared to PB following a political logic and considering the reduced interest in overarching change, the good governance logic is more susceptible to be intentionally or unintentionally motivated by goals of appeasement as well.

4.2.2.3 TECHNOCRATIC

The last of the three logics makes it clear that it has no vested interest in questions of deepening democracy, social justice or even strengthening governance relations. It is motivated primarily by goals of economic efficiency, perhaps with a small amount of assessing a preferred development trajectory, but remaining firmly consultative. Little power is afforded to participants, with most if not all decisions ultimately remaining with the administration or local government. This logic, explicitly lacking in ambitions of empowerment is less common, able to be found primarily in Germany (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018).

4.2.3 HIERARCHY

Regardless of the intentions behind or the logic informing PB, it is a “*form of democratization from above*” (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012, p. 6). It is the city that is in a position to initiate the process, even if it’s on the behest of other actors. This way PB is inevitably set up to achieve goals decided on by the city, well-meaning and potentially even radical as they might be. As such, power is, at least initially, granted, implying the possibility of it being potentially taken away again. Even if the intention is to “*deepen democracy and lessen the distance between political representatives and citizens*” (Ganuza et al., 2014, p. 9). The fact that one party has the ability to do so, while the other does not, brings with it an inherent power discrepancy. The provision of an arena, a tool or a path for change happens at the discretion of others.

4.3 IMPLEMENTATION

4.3.1 POSITION

4.3.1.1 PRIORITY AND PLACE IN THE LARGER SYSTEM

Depending on the commitment to and the expectations towards PB it can be allotted different levels of priority within the larger system of city or district. Beyond scale (see 4.2.2), a deciding factor both in terms of effectiveness and also in determining the character is its position within the administrative context.

The first question in this regard is whether the PB is integrated into the administrative structure or conceived of as a stand-alone process beyond the regular operations. A position outside of the established structures implies little to no intent on transforming governing, but rather to create a point of connection between administration and civil society (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012) all while keeping them separate. The PB being on the outside curtails the possibility of using it to meaningfully challenge or change the current organisation even if actors are given the possibility to decide on the nature of the PB operation itself.

With PB being meaningfully integrated into the work of other departments and the administration at large, what becomes relevant is how this integration happens in detail and what position it ended up in.

4.3.1.2 EXCLUSIVITY

Another question of PB's position within the system of the city is that of exclusivity. Whether PB is the sole point of contact between the citizenry voicing their interests and the authorities or one such path among many influences its status and its sway.

Exclusivity is an important factor when it comes to the empowerment potential of PB (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). On a basic level being the only option to pursue a given goal focusses power and gives decisions made within the process more resonance, as they do not have to compete with other endeavours. It also avoids redundancies. At the same time, blocking all other avenues does stifle the options available to the actors, which risks excluding efforts that do not fit the mould of PB, but that might still be important (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). In this way exclusivity acts as a vector for normalisation, at once making the democratic more orderly while at the same time requiring compliance (ibid).

Especially in contexts where participants do not hold sway over the structure and the conditions of the process, exclusivity shifts power towards the establishment or whomever holds the reins of PB. It also, perhaps to a lesser degree, favours unorganised citizens who wouldn't have found it easy to navigate other ways of engaging had they been left available (Ganuza et al., 2014).

Conversely, PB as one measure among many takes power away from its position because it can be subverted and bypassed, thereby curtailing the influence of those using PB to achieve some primary or secondary goal.

4.3.1.3 FUNDING

The concept of PB is adaptable in terms of scale. It does not require large sums of money to be possible, at the same time the results that can be achieved through the process increase with funding. This can encourage more people to partake as the potential benefits and the influence over the development trajectory of the place at hand become greater.

Funding can also be used as a gauge for the importance PB holds in the wider system of a cities administration. If large parts or as in the earliest cases the entirety of the investment budget are decided through PB it stands to reason that the process is a central concern and that the results will be treated with care. With all available resources being concentrated in one process, it requires everyone to meaningfully engage with that process. This establishes a privileged position for PB and ensures dialogue and deliberation between parties that might otherwise not have had to consider points beyond their own.

A small incursionary budget, conversely, might imply either low trust in the quality of the results or little to no intent on having the direction of development markedly impacted while still wanting to provide the participation for some reason other than shifting existing power dynamics.

Beyond the funds available through the process, the funds available to conduct the process are also worth consideration. A well-funded operation has a greater scope of action and can more easily adapt to specific needs and challenges.

4.3.1.4 STAFFING

Adequate responsibility being taken is critical for ensuring the success of any process, especially long-term ones such as PB, that potentially span not just years, but levels of scale and administrative departments as well. Both tasks as well as chains of command need to be clearly established and running smoothly. Uncertainties about competences and insufficient communication between the different players can hamper the workflow and ultimately the results and the impact of the process.

There are many ways of organising the administrative side of PB and which one works best depends largely on the local context as well as on the level of influence of the process on existing structures. In the case of Porto Alegre there was a central department responsible for matters of PB which is hierarchically stationed above all other municipal departments, illustrating both the station of the process in the

operation of the city as well as allowing for good organisational oversight. In addition, each department had to add a position of PB representative, to act as a point of contact as well as represent the specific department during the course of project development. These PB “ambassadors” were a resource for the participants to draw upon ensuring the creation of feasible proposals (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014).

4.3.2 BREADTH AND DEPTH

4.3.2.1 INSTITUTIONALISATION

PB can be implemented either in an isolated fashion or as part of a larger administrative reform allowing for it to occupy a central role in the municipality’s system. The latter being far more politically impactful than the former, with the former being more prevalent in the PB praxis after Porto Alegre (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012).

Ganuza and Baiocchi (2012) characterise the evolution of PB along this line. They see the dichotomy as political strategy versus policy device. Political strategy is the way it was conceived of initially, as a core around which to structure an institutional reform with the goal of a more democratic and equitable administration. As such PB isn’t introduced alone, but in connection with an organisational restructuring, new hierarchies and a fiscal reform to increase the available funds (ibid). These broader factors are largely overlooked in the international praise and adoption of the concept.

Instead it gets reduced to a policy device operating predominantly on what Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014) refer to as the communicative dimension. This describes the participatory elements and the structure of the yearly deliberative process. As such PB no longer holds the title of strategy, seeking no structural change but a reinforcement and aiding of current practices. In doing so PB is ridded of much of its countervailing character, opting instead for political neutrality.

Dangers they see in such as shift in priorities and position is first and foremost a disconnect from the political and empowering character of PB, such as effective agenda setting or effort towards social justice (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). PB that mainly operates in the communicative dimension can be understood as a technical solution towards goals set by a New Public Management framework, favouring the path of least resistance (ibid).

If PB is to utilised to its fullest emancipatory potential there needs to be a focus put on the empowerment dimensions of PB, that is establishing a connection to other administrative structures. In connection to Porto Alegre’s efforts they say *“[i]n addition to open meetings where citizens decided on priorities [...], a much-less visible but crucially important institutional architecture created the conditions for those decisions to be meaningful by linking them to the centers of governmental decision making.”*

(Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014, p. 31). To that end, they identify three structures. The exclusive conveyor belt means a transparent institutional link between popular will and government action that is also the only point of interaction (see 4.3.1.2 Exclusivity). Secondly, complex institutional arrangements in all parts of the administration are put in place to work towards PB (see 4.3.1.1 Priority and Position in the Larger System). Lastly, there is a forum of forums in which representatives of the process get to decide on the rules and investment priorities of the process, effectively self-regulating (see 4.3.3.3 Abilities) (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014).

4.3.2.2 REACH

The question of what can be or is allowed to be achieved through a given PB process is central to characterising it. It is one of the points by which different implementations vary wildly. Three of the main vectors are scale, timeframe and theme.

The factor of scale is usually dictated by the volume of funds that are dedicated to a given PB. The differences in terms of funding in general are discussed in more detail already (see 4.3.1.3 Funding), however there are also variations concerning the size of the realisable projects themselves. While some PB favour many smaller investments, others focus on a few big ones, that can impact both the process and its results.

The one aspect that is largely unchanged between PB is that in terms of timeframe one-time interventions and investments are dominant as opposed to long-term investments or projects that incur operational costs. This is due to the fact, that most PB funds derive from investment budgets and are not suitable for supporting running expenses, as other parts of city budgets are (Cabannes, 2021). This greatly limits the types of projects that can be initiated through PB and in turn the type of challenges that can be addressed. The inability to engage with structural issues that cannot be solved through one-time investments is a weakness present even in progressive PB.

The last vector to be discussed here is theme, which comprises both questions of which area within local jurisdiction projects can be proposed for, for example, street redesigns, housing, social programs etc. as well as which criteria submissions have to meet. Here it can range from everything the city can feasibly enact to very narrow sets of limitations.

Such limitations, necessary as they might be to keep the process functional, inevitably offer points of contention. As Ganuza and Baiocchi (2012, p. 7) put it: *“That is, through procedure, PB promises to make democracy more bounded, more fair, and more objective. But this, by definition, excludes demands, projects, and ways of making claims.”* The extent to which this point is argued varies. Some critics use this argument to challenge overly restrictive processes that concern themselves with nothing but beautification projects. Others take it so far as to say that the only truly

empowering, truly valid form of PB is one which allows through itself “*to mount a practical opposition to the state*” (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012, p. 10).

Delimiting what can or should be done through the process significantly changes what can be achieved through it and inevitably leads to ignoring or excluding important or at least valid concerns and distorting reality by the need to shape it in a way that it fits the mould of PB. Whoever gets to decide on the demarcation holds immense power and influence over the results.

4.3.3 PARTICIPANTS

4.3.3.1 PARTICIPATION DEMOGRAPHICS AND ACTIVATION

A problem most efforts towards more participation are faced with is the case that new measures are sought out and utilised primarily by those already participating in other contexts, not by those whose voice has gone unheard so far. Those tend to be the ones already heavily invested in the matter and hand and often also more socioeconomically affluent (Fung, 2015). In short it is the demographic that is most likely to find themselves reflected in election results, perhaps their personal network even extends into the administration or municipal government. If the goal is to attract people outside this narrow profile, specific efforts need to be undertaken.

If done well, PB can be a natural fit for attracting participants beyond the usual ranks. It is a rather straightforward process with clearly outlined possibilities, low barriers of entry and depending on the type of organisation, not a lot of effort necessary on the part of the participants. Often, participation is not limited the way elections often are, meaning that people with different nationalities or who are under the age of maturity may partake as well. The results are – ideally – also enacted quickly, building trust in the process and assuring sceptics of the usefulness of applying oneself again the following year. The iterative nature also facilitates a steady building of trust and learning (Novy & Leubolt, 2005).

It is possible for PB to not just compensate for existing disparities in participation demographics, but to turn them on their head altogether. The best example is Porto Alegre where there was not just an above average proportion of women participating, but “[o]ther traditionally underrepresented or excluded groups, such as the Black community or poor people, are well represented too.” (Novy & Leubolt, 2005, p. 2029)

In that way PB can be a powerful tool in the hands of those who traditionally do not have their voices heard or their needs met. As aspirational as the achievements of Porto Alegre’s PB may be in this regard, it is important to note that they constitute an exception and not the rule. The decisive subversion of expectations is made possible by a particular context. A strong gulf between wealthy and poor citizens was reflected

in both the spatial structure and the quality of the existing infrastructure as well as a clear commitment to principles of distributive justice. Wealthy people didn't partake because it was clear that they could not profit from it (Calisto Friant, 2019). Conversely marginalised people saw quick and significant changes in their immediate surroundings and were emboldened by it (Cabannes, 2021).

Most PB processes that followed, fail to replicate this pattern, however, at least to such a degree (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). It is worth noting, that many present PBs taking place in wealthier parts of the world with better basic infrastructure, cannot offer such substantial improvements, which might play into differing rates of activation across groups.

While many factors play into who participates in a given process, some are within the control of those who design it. In terms of PB that concerns the underlying set up, meaning whose needs and goals are given priority, for example, through a commitment to social and or distributive justice. It also concerns what steps are being taken to reach or activate a certain demographic, the most straightforward possibility in this regard being explicitly actor-based PB.

Reaching out to marginalised groups can be done in the context of general PB as well, through reaching out to people where they are at physically or by being language inclusive in promoting and conducting PB (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018). There is also the possibility of giving proportionally greater voting power to certain groups, for example by allotting them a smaller number of participants per representative if that is the way the process is structured (Cabannes, 2021).

Through exercising or not exercising the possibilities for reaching specific groups influence is assumed by those in charge of outreach, either to uphold established power distribution or to challenge it.

4.3.3.2 TENSIONS WITHIN 'PARTICIPANTS'

As made evident by the previous point on demographics, participants in PB as in other participatory processes are within themselves diverse, but even after marginalisation is acknowledged, additional levels of complexity remain. As Ganuza et al. (2014, p. 4) write: *“Opposition between state and civil society hides the difficulties that deliberative practices have within the latter.”*

For one a commitment to furthering the interests of marginalised groups is only as good as the actual efforts to include them. Cabannes (2021) refers to the prevalence of PB for vulnerable groups rather than with them. This can present itself in a hijacking of marginalised voices by those claiming to represent them, like NGOs or teachers

deciding for their students. If a certain group is focussed on it should actually be members of that group who are given a place at the table.

It is also deceptive to conceive of groups as monoliths. While many needs or interests might align or overlap that is not necessarily the case and there can be points of contention or opposing viewpoints within a group. As such it is misleading to assume that a representative of a certain group can or should speak for all members of said group, especially given the possibility of marginalised identities accumulating (Cabannes, 2021). For example, a queer member of a migrant community doesn't necessarily feel represented by the community's collective views.

More generally there is debate on whether or not singling out specific groups is actually helping them. Some argue that earmarking funds and making efforts to reach certain actors is necessary to effectively benefit them in view of established power distribution dominate every process unless specifically challenged. Others meanwhile say that such a practice only serves to further stigmatise or even ghettoise the affected populations (Cabannes, 2021).

4.3.3.3 ABILITIES

The range of actions open to participants varies from process to process. For the most part it is possible to submit ideas for projects, that may need to fit within thematic or structural boundaries. These ideas are developed into more detailed projects, sometimes with and sometimes without input from participants. The resulting projects are subsequently discussed, ranked or voted on in some fashion, depending on if the output is designed to be binding, advisory or serve as inspiration for local government (Sintomer et al., 2012). In the case of some politically oriented PB participants further get to oversee the evaluation of the process and decide on changes to it themselves (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018).

The level of input, steering power and ability to reach binding decisions is different in every iteration of PB. It is closely linked to the local context, the extent of the PB and the logic by which it is constructed. While every form of input creates relations power can be derived from, the extent of that power is expanded or curtailed by the abilities provided or made possible to be claimed.

It is especially the last point of being able to amend the process that is stressed as crucial in the literature (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; Cabannes, 2021; Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). It is argued (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012) that the full potential in terms of democratisation and empowerment can only be achieved if participants possess the ability to change the process themselves, that is to have institutionalising power. *“In short, for PB to act as vectors of democratization, citizens themselves must be able to*

define the rules of the game, rather than engaging in PB on the basis of rules defined by the authorities.” (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018, p. 81)

4.3.4 STEPS AND SETTING

4.3.4.1 SUBMISSION CRITERIA

Most PB processes place some level of restrictions on the submissions they allow. They come in different varieties, all both limit and enhance the capacity of possible change to some extent. On the one hand certain ideas or demands are excluded from being realised. On the other hand, this keeps the process from getting overwhelmed by inputs that would ultimately lead nowhere. It is a difficult balance to strike.

What requires consideration is the type of criteria being applied and which actors get to decide them. In terms of the different varieties, there are those dictated by the scope of the process. For example, no projects can be admitted that would require more funds than are available, unless there's the possibility of an extension. Another possible criterion is, that there cannot be projects that are beyond a municipality's jurisdiction. If the PB in question is conceived of as a thematically or actor-based PB that may also limit the possibilities for submissions. However also open PB may have criteria in place, such as requirements for social justice or redistribution, feasibility or public interest (Ville de Paris, 2022b). This last category of criteria requires the most discretion on the part of the enforcer of the criteria, which makes them the most subjectively influential.

In terms of who gets to set the bounds on submissions it is mostly the instance introducing the PB that gets to decide on its configuration, meaning – in most cases – the municipal government or the appointed administrative branch. There are alternatives as well, however, such as Porto Alegre, where the indicators for the allocation of resources were set democratically by the participants and not imposed by the administration (Novy & Leubolt, 2005).

4.3.4.2 PRESELECTION PROCESS

Processes with open calls for idea or project submissions most likely require some form of preselection, to filter out entries that are unsuitable to be treated further over the course of the process, in order to keep the scope manageable. Necessary as it may be to exclude some ideas early on, it affords influence to those actors or instances tasked with it.

The extent to which this power can be exercised depends on how much room for digression the aforementioned criteria allow for. The vaguer and situational the requirements are the more influence can be exerted by the preselection instance. A looser set of rules can be beneficial, as it might give more leeway to inexperienced or

ill-prepared participants by not having their submissions thrown out entirely on the grounds of technicalities. On the other hand, criteria such as ‘serving public interest’ rely on subjective interpretations that skew what is admitted as sufficiently important or suitable.

While the power that is created when deciding on submissions cannot be mitigated without omitting the step altogether, it is especially important to act transparently, so that decisions that were not reached through participatory means can at least be clearly understood by those they affect.

4.3.4.3 MODES AND SETTING

The physical organisation of the PB process also impacts its unfolding and subsequent results. Depending on the level of participation set-ups can vary wildly in terms of involvement and complexity. While some advising PB consist of a handful of steps taking place exclusively online, more ambitious variations have multistage structures with different types and sizes of forums, agorae, councils, representatives, votes and implementation events (Sintomer et al., 2012).

A variety of settings and formats can serve to attract a greater variety of participants while too much complexity can deter others. There is no universally applicable model and it depends heavily on the local context and the intended function. The same ambiguity is true for the decision between online or offline PB. Both options might lower barriers for some while raising them for others (Cabannes, 2021).

When it comes to PB set in physical spaces location is paramount. Long distances to be travelled or poorly chosen dates and times can impact the outcomes. The same can be said for symbolically or value-charged locations. If all forums are held in one part of the city over another that can send an unintended message, especially if it happens along lines of income, ethnicity or election outcomes. Some spaces also have negative connotations to certain groups who might abstain from participation of those grounds (Cabannes, 2021).

Another related factor is who is present at meetings. While the presence of government representatives can convey appreciation for the process, it can also serve to distract from the matter at hand or dissuade members of certain groups from participating. As Cabannes (2021, p. 457) writes: *“Such [disadvantaged] groups tend to associate – with legitimate distrust in many cases – the presence of politicians with obtaining poor people’s votes.”*

4.3.4.4 DECISION-MAKING

One of the most crucial steps in every PB is the decision-making. Who gets to make the final call on what will be enacted and how that call is reached, informs much

of a PB character and its ultimate impact. While some iterations treat the decisions reached by general votes or council decisions as final and binding. Others regard them as advisory. Yet others forego the decision-making step altogether and limit participation to the submission of ideas and the ability to comment on them, with the deciding power remaining in the hands of government bodies (Sintomer et al., 2012).

Granting the competence to actually decide on the budget to the participants is a demonstration of commitment to and trust in the results and quality of PB. It can also serve to motivate and embolden the people involved, if they know that what they do will have direct results (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018). It builds trust and respect between local government and the citizenry.

An example of the importance of valuing the sanctity of decisions reached through PB can be seen in Porto Alegre. Even though the local government would have had the right to veto or amend the investment budget as decided on through PB, they never made use of that right, at least during the initial period prior to 2004. The pressure to stay true to the decisions of the citizens was too great (Novy & Leubolt, 2005).

There are good reasons to favour such a committed approach. *“Binding PB is considered more powerful for building trust and long-term engagement. Moreover, it tends to be more sustainable and less often halted or interrupted for some years by the government or local administration (Dias, 2018)”* (Cabannes, 2021, p. 446).

The less weight there is to the decisions reached through PB the less power participants can gain through it. Their voices might be heard but not listened to, which reduces the incentive to apply oneself and diminishes the empowering potential of the process (Novy & Leubolt, 2005).

When the decision ultimately lies outside the process there is also the risk of the local government distorting the results in their favour, by selectively listening and acting in a way that benefits their cause. *“In this case, the government only accepts the proposals that are in line with their own plans- hence, participation only has a legitimizing function for decisions that have already been made before”* (Sintomer et al., 2012, p. 22).

4.3.4.5 EVALUATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

PB, not unlike other participatory processes relies on mutual trust between the authorities of local government and the administration on the one hand and the participants from the ranks of civil society on the other hand. Authorities and administration have to trust the participants to offer sensible input and results that can be reasonably implemented. Conversely participants need to trust the authorities to

actually enact the projects and decisions they worked hard on and are invested in, as realisation, for the most part, is out of the participants hands.

If the basis for this trust is compromised, the process may suffer, especially if there is no way of providing accountability. *“Breaking the rules breaks trust and the legitimacy of the whole process, things difficult to reclaim at a later stage. One consequence is that PB rules must be clear, well known and agreed upon.”* (Cabannes, 2021, p. 456)

Results need to be communicated clearly and visibly to incentivise further participation and failure to follow through needs to be explained if it cannot be avoided. Seeing as how much influence this a-posteriori reappraisal holds it is important to consider which party is charged with it, how different framings of events might benefit them and who has insight.

In some PB processes participants get to play a role in this stage as well, for example in Porto Alegre. In between the passing of the final budget and the start of the new cycle a Forum of Forums made up of members of participatory councils would evaluate both the process as well as its results. It would also decide on organisational changes if necessary as well as on the distribution priorities for the following iteration (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014).

4.3.5 RESULTS

4.3.5.1 PRIMARY

The immediate power PB holds for those who participate in it is the chance to influence in some way the future development of their lived environment. Depending on the nature of the process and its bounds roads can be paved, trees planted, social programs initiated and school supplies upgraded. All these things and whatever else might be agreed upon has an impact of the people who interact with it and on the development of the system at large. It also holds the possibility of kickstarting further changes down the line or setting a new precedent in terms of investment or development mentalities, as Novy and Leubolt (2005, p. 2028) quoted a PB delegate in Porto Alegre: *“for the first time in history, a mayor agreed to invest underground. Previously no one would have ever invested in things you couldn’t see.”*

4.3.5.2 SECONDARY

There are things to be gained for actors involved in PB that go beyond the primary often times physical results of the process, on the side of the administration as well as for the citizens taking part.

In terms of the administration, the structured and transparent procedures, especially of more involved PB initiatives, can be an effective measure in reducing or overcoming

issues of clientelism and corruption. This is the case in many Latin-American examples where the point of departure was a system relying heavily on networking and favour-trading to secure funding for projects. Through concentrating investments in a monitored and democratic process, PB is able to take the power out of the old way of doing things (Novy & Leubolt, 2005).

Even if corruption is no prevalent issue, PB can have positive impacts through changes to the organisational structure of the administration. Through linking different departments, either through an overarching PB department or through implementing PB as a cooperation of existing departments, communication and collaboration may be fostered (Sintomer et al., 2012).

In terms of the administration the last benefit of PB is a closer and less authoritarian relation between citizens and their local government, which can be beneficial for the both parties (Novy & Leubolt, 2005). This point is the central intention behind the good governance logic of PB dominant in European cases.

Naturally, it's not only the government and administration side of things that stands to benefit from participatory initiatives such as PB, but also the citizens partaking in the process as well. First and foremost, that can be said to happen through claiming their voice and having a platform to use it in. Being able to express their needs, interests and ideas coupled with the ability to have them enacted is one of the cornerstones of PB (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018). This is especially pertinent if the PB process in question is able to adequately include and promote the voices of marginalised people and groups.

PB can also be a space for communal as well as personal learning. On an immediate level that can entail the knowledge of how to draft and promote a proposal effectively (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014), how to take part in discussions and deliberations (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018) and how to weigh the merits of different projects. Being part of a budgeting process, also allows for insights into the structure of the local institutions, the abilities and limitations of local government and the behind-the-scenes work of keeping a city operational and developing further (Novy & Leubolt, 2005).

A PB process can also manage to impart knowledge beyond its bounds, such as thinking about issues from a collective or communal standpoint rather than an individualistic one. Novy and Leubolt (2005) refer to PB as a school of democracy in that regard. Once the possibility of taking action is raised, even if the PB process at hand is a limited one, the momentum might spread beyond it. In Baiocchi and Ganuza's work (2014) interviewed community activists tell of how they use their local PB not so much for the opportunities it presents them directly, but rather as a tool around which to organise more substantial change, by knowing how city budget works.

4. Framework

5

CASE BUDGET PARTICIPATIF DE LA VILLE DE PARIS

5.1 CONTEXT

5.1.1 POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION

Paris is the capital city of France, as such it occupies a unique position within the country. The French political tradition is reflected in many aspects of its functioning. France is a republic with a heavily centralised organisational structure, though there have been efforts towards decentralisation over recent decades (Uterwedde, 2017). Still, the underlying distribution remains, with Paris at the centre. In terms of political power-distribution, France is heavily oriented towards forms of majority rule both on the national level, with its quasi-presidential system, as well as locally with very strong mayors (ibid).

The office of mayor of Paris is actually a relatively recent one, having been reintroduced only in 1977 after slightly more than a century of no directly elected head of the city (Hidalgo, 2013). Since its reinstatement, the office has been held by four people; the current mayor is Anne Hidalgo (see 5.1.3 Anne Hidalgo).

The mayor heads the city council, where their party has an absolute majority. They also appoint deputy mayors who take charge of specific tasks or topics such as urban development, transport or education. In her current term Anne Hidalgo has appointed 33 deputy mayors. Through their mayoral cabinet the mayor also indirectly oversees the general secretariat which is the overhead for the 22 administrative departments (Ville de Paris, 2021).

Beyond the city-wide structure there is also a district-level. Paris consists of 20 districts, though the smallest four are joined into an administrative unit since 2020. Each district is also headed by its own mayor and district-hall, charged with local matters such as child-care, small-scale green spaces and sport sights. In most other matters the districts function as purely consultative, leaving them without much influence (Mairie du 17^e arrondissement, 2022).

Paris is home to only about 2 million inhabitants, however functionally it merged with its surrounding suburban municipalities into a metropolitan area counting around 12 million people (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, 2019). It is the administrative, economic and intellectual centre of the region and the country as a whole, with its own character seen as distinct from other parts of the country. Due to its heavily centralised nature, Paris is synonymous with all manners of elites, political, business, media or arts. At the same time it is subject to pronounced political and socio-economic differences, both within city-limits and in relation to its surroundings (Uterwedde, 2017). There is a political split into east and west, with the west being higher-income and politically conservative-leaning, while the east being predominantly lower-income and politically left-leaning. Though due to high costs

of living in general and processes of gentrification and displacement, lower-income and working-class residents are pushed further and further out of the city as a whole (McAvay & Verdugo, 2021).

5.1.2 DEVELOPMENT AND STATUS QUO OF PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTIONS

Up until the turn of the century direct citizen participation is not widely established in the French context. Most input from lay citizens on municipal workings coming is channelled through the work of associations. This “*urbanisme associatif*” (Gaydu, 2016, p. 62) operates primarily as an opposition against large scale development or modernisation projects, deemed at odds with the local residents.

A formalised avenue for input first takes shape in the 1980s when a law about municipal structuring introduces “*comités d’initiatives et de consultations d’arrondissements*” (CICA) on the urban district level. They offer the possibility to voice objections, ideas or initiatives, though they are decidedly aimed at discussion not decision-making (Gaydu, 2016).

The real shift in terms of participatory possibilities for Parisians comes in 2001 with the election of Bertrand Delanoë as mayor. Following several scandals involving the governing conservative RPR party the municipal election brings a loss in votes and also a change in leadership in several districts (Gaydu, 2016). The socialist party PS reaches a majority. Delanoë’s election marks the first left-leaning government the city has ever seen. One of the results is a strengthened interest in citizen participation (Fouillet, 2018).

In 2002 a national law on local democracy (*loi relative à la démocratie de proximité*, also known as the “*loi Vaillant*”) gets passed obliging every city with more than 80.000 inhabitants to create neighbourhood councils (*conseil de quartier*). Their exact structure and competences are left to the municipal districts to decide (Fouillet, 2018; Gaydu, 2016).

In Paris, there are 124 *conseils de quartier* spread across the 20 districts according to population distribution (Ville de Paris, 2022a). They are made up of elected officials, opposition representatives, associations and inhabitants, all on a voluntary basis. Generally, their character is consultative, with them being a forum for information, debate and propositions. They do have command over a small investment budget themselves, in addition to their budget for operational costs. In 2022, this totals 8.264€ per council (ibid).

Over the next decade and a half, further modes of participation get established, such as youth councils in 2003, student councils in 2009 or the council for nightlife in 2014

(Fouillet, 2018). With time there is also a shift towards digital participation, such as the application DansMaRue in 2013, allowing residence to alert city services about problems or concerns in their neighbourhoods via geotagged photos (Douay, 2016).

5.1.3 ANNE HIDALGO

Anne Hidalgo is Paris' mayor since 2014. She was born in 1959 in San Fernando, Spain, and immigrated to France at the age of two, with her family fleeing the war. She lives in Paris since 1984, working first as a labour inspector, before going into local politics (Hidalgo, 2013). Her political affiliation is the socialist party. She joined Bertrand Delanoë in his preparation for the municipal election in 2001 as well as running for a spot on the district council of the 15th district herself. Following Delanoë's victory, he appointed her his first deputy mayor for both of his terms. Hidalgo is Delanoë's political protégée, saying herself how much working with and learning from him shaped her political career and views (ibid). After Delanoë declines to run for a third term, Hidalgo is his natural predecessor for the election of 2014. In the meantime, she also takes on several other political offices in connection with the city of Paris. Hidalgo's focus is on topics concerning the environment, mobility, housing and participation.

In her function as mayor Hidalgo is a proponent of large-scale, ambitious projects, that garner national and international attention. The budget participatif is one of the earliest of such undertakings, others in the field of urbanism include a pledge to double the kilometres of bicycle infrastructure, the closing of the expressway on the right bank of the Seine to motorised traffic, plans to transform Paris into a 15 minutes walkable city or the complete redesign of the Avenue des Champs-Élysées (Shehata, 2022).

In 2020, Hidalgo is re-elected as mayor for a second term. At the 2022 French presidential elections she runs for the Socialist Party, reaching a mere 1,75 % of the vote in the first round (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2022).

5.2 HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

5.2.1 CONCEPTION AND STUDY

In the late 1990s and early 2000s the idea of Participatory Budgeting (PB) comes to France. The early implementations take place in far left-leaning towns inspired by the case of Porto Alegre such as Saint-Denis or Morsang-sur-Orge (Gaydu, 2016). The first PB within Paris is created in the 20th district in 2002 (Fouillet, 2018). It concerns road investments and is structured around the pre-existing neighbourhood councils,

which the district implemented in 1995, head of them becoming compulsory for large cities (ibid). Another district level PB follows in the 12th in 2011 (Douay, 2016).

As part of her bid for the mayoral elections in 2014, Anne Hidalgo, designated successor of sitting mayor Bertrand Delanoë, runs on a platform of stronger citizen participation, including the explicit campaign promise of instating a Paris-wide PB (Fouillet, 2018). She tasks communications consultant Jean-François Martins with authoring a report about a possible implementation of PB in Paris. The report draws on international examples as well as heavily referencing the version of PB practised in the 12th arrondissement (Martins, 2014). This might be in part because the man responsible for it, Jean-Louis Missika, is also campaign manager to Hidalgo (Gaydu, 2016). In March of 2014, one month before the municipal election, the report gets published and subsequently serves as a foundational block for the conception of the Paris PB.

However, there are some questions left open by the report that are addressed in a dedicated PB committee, mainly that of whether there should be PB on the district-level as well and if so, how comprehensive it should be implemented (Gaydu, 2016).

5.2.2 PILOT YEAR (2014)

The turnaround time between Anne Hidalgo's inauguration and the start of PB is rather short. Less than half a year passed between the two events, though it is questionable if the first iteration is even to be fully counted, due to its distinct character.

The proposal for the creation of a Parisian PB is discussed and ultimately passed by the city council between the 7th and 9th of July 2014. 20 million Euros out of the investment budget are dedicated to it and the voting period is set at the end of September, this time for one week same as in years to follow.

Given its tight schedule and its pilot status, the submission of ideas by the citizens is not part of the first trial. Rather there is a list of 15 projects provided by the mayor's office, to be voted on and ranked. This predetermined set of projects is a source of criticism against the undertaking, as the process only offers a platform to ideas supported by the elected party and because the projects themselves are rather vague and clear parameters as to their scope or localisation are not given (Douay, 2016). Furthermore, the reduction of the process to the vote alone is also a point of contention, with some going as far as calling it a mere "*démocratie Facebook*" (Douay, 2016), in reference to its push for online voting.

Regardless of its limitations, 40.745 people cast their votes, about 60 % doing so online via the website of the Budget Participatif rather than at the physical urns placed at public buildings such as district city halls. Just like in the principal PB that is to follow, every person living in Paris, regardless of age or nationality is eligible to vote.

A point of critique coming especially from the conservative opposition, saying that the disregard for voter rolls as well as the option to vote online as well as on sight makes it too easy to manipulate results via voting multiple times (Gaydu, 2016).

The mayoral office declares the results a resounding success, stressing that half of the online votes are cast by young people between 21 and 35 (Douay, 2016). It needs to be noted that almost a third of the votes were cast in the few districts that had themselves conducted PB initiatives, suggesting that people already familiar with the concept are more inclined to participate, than those to whom it is new (ibid).

In the end nine out of 15 projects win, the top one being about installing green walls on buildings. Although it can be said that the focus is less on the projects themselves and more about creating publicity for the full PB to follow the year after (Gaydu, 2016).

5.2.3 FIRST ITERATION (2015-2019)

2015 is the first full year of Parisian PB, though arguably it is not one case but 21, with one on the level of each district and one city-wide PB. The latter is given five percent of Paris' investment budget over the five-year span between 2015 and 2019, averaging out to about 100 million Euros each year. The districts are allowed to put up to 30 percent of their own investment budget towards their PB efforts, with the incentive that the city at large will match every Euro pledged (Gaydu, 2016).

The specific functioning of the PB will be discussed further in chapter 5.3, at this point, major amendments over the course of the five-year period will be outlined.

The first changes come after the first "regular" year of PB. With the PB year of 2016 there are two big changes. One is the creation of a dedicated fund of 30 million Euros for "*quartiers populaires*", meaning areas designated by the city as particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged and in need of greater attention. The other is the start of a thematic PB aimed at schools, outside of the territorially based district and city-wide PB (Fouillet, 2018).

The following year, in 2017, a further separate PB is issued, this time actor-based, targeting tenants of social housing in the city, known as HLM (Fouillet, 2018).

The last change of the first iteration comes in 2018 and is less substantial than those before it. Due to the prevalence of project submissions concerning the redesign of public areas, subsumed in the category "*lived environment*", such projects are no longer admissible in the PB cycle of 2018 and 2019 (Fouillet, 2018).

5.2.4 YEAR OFF (2020) AND SECOND ITERATION (FROM 2021)

The end of the first iteration of PB in Paris coincided with mayor Hidalgo's first term in office. In 2020 fresh elections were held, resulting in her gaining a second term. The elections and the possibility of a change in government may have been a reason in not conducting a PB in 2020. Another factor was a pronounced dissatisfaction in the core PB team over working conditions, which cumulated in the resignation of all but one members by 2020 (Arhip-Paterson, 2022).

In any case PB is picked up again in 2021, having undergone some changes. For one the available funds are raised from 5 to 25% of the investment budget (Ville de Paris, 2022b). There is also now a yearly theme for submissions at the city-wide level, as well as a modified voting system. Participants evaluate all projects on the ballot from strongly in favour to strongly against, rather than casting votes for a limited number of projects (ibid).

Given the changes as well as the sparse availability of data concerning the new iteration, this work concerns itself solely with the period of 2015 to 2019.

5.3 PROCESS

5.3.1 STRUCTURE AND ACTORS

The Paris PB is a place-based PB conducted on two scales, one being city-wide, the other being located in each of the 20 municipal districts. 5% of the city's investment budget is pledged to the process, coming out to 500 million Euros over the course of six years, with each year after the pilot year seeing a budget of roughly 100 million Euros. On the scale of the districts the exact amount available through the process is up to the district government, who can allot up to 30% of its own investment budget to the PB, with the municipal government matching whatever is put up by the district, doubling the available funds (Gaydu, 2016).

Over the course of the first iteration the PB sees a continuous increase in participation. While a little more than forty thousand people took part in the vote in the pilot year 2014, that number climbed to almost ninety-three thousand in 2016 (Moreau & Arhip-Paterson, 2018) and reached 143.489 in the last year of the first iteration 2019 (Cosnard, 2021). This is equivalent to roughly 6,5 % of the 2,2 million inhabitants of the city (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, 2019). Participation is not equally distributed, with eastern districts showing higher levels of participation (Moreau & Arhip-Paterson, 2018). Since its introduction in 2014 3.056 individual projects have been realised through the Paris PB (Ville de Paris, 2022d).

5. Case - Budget Participatif de la Ville de Paris




Figure 3: Facts and Figures; own illustration

The PB follows an iterating yearly structure (see Figure 4) consisting of a submission phase at the start of the year, January until February, an internal review as well as a refinement of the projects from March until July and a voting period of two to three weeks in or around September. The winning projects are included in the passing of the general city budget at the start of December and from then on implemented over the following months and years depending on the project. A more in-depth explanation of the steps is given in the following subchapters.




Figure 4: Process Timeline; own illustration based on www.budgetparticipatif.paris.fr

The responsibility for implementing PB is split between several entities (see Figure 5). For the most part it is part of the administrative apparatus of the city, with the core PB team being located in the Citizen Participation Office, which in turn belongs to the City Policy and Citizen Action subdepartment of the Department for Democracy. Other departments have roles to play in the review and development of the submitted projects. Also each district has workers, usually as part of the district mayor's team, that are responsible for their local PB (Arhip-Paterson, 2022).

The political responsibility is held by the mayor of Paris, in her role as head of the General Secretary as well as by one of her Deputy Mayor's charged with PB (Arhip-Paterson, 2022).




Figure 5: Administrative Structure relevant to Paris PB; own illustration based on Arhip-Paterson (2022)

5.3.2 SUBMISSION OF IDEAS

The submission is open to people of all ages and nationalities as long as they live in Paris. It can be done as an individual or as part of a group. Those groups can be formally established, like an association, but can also be informal collectives, i.e., friends, neighbours or parents in a school (Ville de Paris, 2022c).

The submission itself happens via the website of the PB and requires a citizen account with the city, giving name and address. Every project must be sorted by target area, either city-wide or on the district level. If a project is to be located in a quartier populaire, this has also to be stated at this stage (Ville de Paris, 2022c).

The project should be described in detail, with localisation, function and an estimate of cost, if possible. It also needs to be sorted into one of fourteen thematic categories (Ville de Paris, 2022c):

- Citizen Participation (Participation citoyenne)
- Cleanliness (Propreté)
- Culture (Culture)
- Economy and Employment (Économie et emploi)
- Education and Youth (Éducation et Jeunesse)
- Environment (Environnement)
- Health (Santé)
- Housing and Living (Logement et habitat)
- Prevention and Security (Prévention et Sécurité)
- Quality of Life/Lived Environment (Cadre de vie)
- Smart City and Digitalisation (Ville intelligente et numérique)
- Solidarity (Solidarités)
- Sports (Sport)
- Transport and Mobility (Transport et Mobilité)

The basic criteria every submission has to meet are to be proposed by someone living in Paris, to serve the public interest in the chosen target area, to be within the jurisdiction of the city, which while generally broad does exclude certain aspects such as universities, hospitals or national museums and lastly to be a one-time investment without incurring running costs that would need to come out of the operational budget of the city (Ville de Paris, 2022c).

In order to facilitate the creation of admissible projects there are workshops for idea-creation leading up to and concurrent with the submission period at the start of the year, generally spanning the month of February (Ville de Paris, 2022c).

5.3.3 INTERNAL REVIEW

The internal review has two main stages done by different departments of the administration. The first stage is the review of admissibility, checking for clear errors such as the general submission criteria not being met or gross incompleteness. It is split between three agencies. First the core PB team, located in the Department of Democracy, Citizen Affairs and Territories, checks for blatant errors in the submission, such as too little information, as well as making a judgement on the public interest of the project (Ville de Paris, 2022e).

Next up workers in the Department of Legal Affairs decide on whether or not the project falls into the jurisdiction of the city as well as if any legal matters fundamentally exclude the idea from being put into practice, for example questions of property rights or the constitution (Ville de Paris, 2022e).

The last step of the review of admissibility is the matter of investment versus operational budget, which is determined by the Department of Finances and Procurement (Ville de Paris, 2022e).

This first round of reviews is under a high level of time pressure, as every project is to pass through it within 48 hours. For every refusal at this level a notification including the points of failure is given (Gaydu, 2016).

The second stage of internal review is a feasibility study. For this stage the projects are distributed to the different administrative departments along thematic lines. Departments with a particularly high demand are that of road construction and mobility as well as that of green spaces and the environment (Gaydu, 2016).

In addition to those two stages of technical review, there exists as well a filtering mandate coming from the mayoral office. It takes place in two stages, one before the feasibility study, one after. The former is concerned with no project being in clear contradiction with the politics of the current municipal government, i.e., no projects that call for the creation of additional surface parking for cars. The latter is responsible for

checking for equivalent projects already being in the works, regrouping equivalent submitted projects and re-sorting them to the correct scale if city-wide or district-based fit better (Gaydu, 2016).

5.3.4 ELABORATION OF SUBMISSIONS

Once a submitted project is through the internal review stages, it enters into the development phase which can last several weeks. The key component of this phase are consultation workshops in which technical staff of the city fleshes out the idea with input from the project holder. It is possible to involve other actors into this process as well, which remains up to the responsible officials on the city or the district level to decide (Ville de Paris, 2022e).

Another step is regrouping similar projects under an umbrella term with which they will enter the voting phase to counteract the splitting of votes between projects with overlapping goals (Ville de Paris, 2022e).

The last instance before going to the vote is the examination commission either on the city- or the district-level. It is made up of elected officials, citizen representatives, mainly from neighbourhood councils or other instances of local democracy and civil servants from the respective thematic departments. On the district level the make-up and decision-making mechanics of these commissions can vary. In general, they are forums for discussions, with advisory rather than decision-making character, as the call as to which projects go up for a vote ultimately lies with the district mayor on the district-level and the appointee of the city's mayor on the city-level (Gaydu, 2016).

5.3.5 VOTING

Voting takes place over a two-to-three-week period at the end of summer, usually in September. In early iterations of the process, the voting was preceded by a so called "*Citizen Agora*", which was a central event in public space to showcase the different projects, promote the process as a whole and incentivise the public to take part in the vote to come. City officials informed on the thematic areas the PB covered, while project holders presented and campaigned for their project (Gaydu, 2016).

The vote itself, like the submission phase, is open to all ages and all nationalities. It can be done online on the website of the PB or analogue via ballot boxes put up all over the city. 2016 two hundred urns were put up. Each person may vote for up to ten projects, with half of the votes going to Paris-wide projects and half to those on district-level. While only one district can be chosen per person, it does not have to correspond to the place of residence, it could also be the workplace or another preference (Fouillet, 2018).

Once voting has concluded the projects are ranked by popularity and approved until the available funds are used up.

5.3.6 IMPLEMENTATION

In the course of the adoption of next year's municipal budget in early December, the winning projects get incorporated into the investment budget. From then on, they are considered projects of the city and get assigned to the responsible department, which conducts more in-depth studies of implementation and put the project into practice. Project-holders may be contacted over the course of this part of the process, though there is no requirement to do so, nor is there a basis for demanding to be included (Ville de Paris, 2022d).

At what stage of implementation a specific laureate project is, can be tracked via the PB website, which follows the project all the way through to implementation. It is possible for projects to be dropped during the implementation stage as well, though that is reportedly only the case for two to three percent of winning projects (Fouillet, 2018).

APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE CASE

6.1 INFLUENCES

6.1.1 IDEOLOGY

6.1.1.1 TYPES OF DEMOCRACY

France looks back on a long and varied democratic tradition that it takes considerable pride in. Democracy also underwent major changes in its character over the course of the centuries and the five republics that embodied it so far.

The current fifth republic is a system that is heavily oriented towards centralised power and a decisive majority rule. It was brought on in reaction to a more proportional system of distribution political power that was deemed too inefficient and prone to dead-locking to adequately respond to the challenges of post-war France (Uterwedde, 2017). The result is a system in which decision-power on most levels is effectively in the hand of one person, be that the president on the national level or the mayor on the local scale (ibid).

Another part of French political culture is the conviction that representatively elected governing bodies have an innate and exclusive ability to act towards the public interest at large. As opposed to other actors and institutions, be they from civil society, economics or other directions, that inherently advocate for particular interests which are seen as lesser motives and therefore should be given less say. The higher station of public interest with the governing body as its champion gives decisions of governing bodies a higher legitimacy on principle (Uterwedde, 2017).

This, in connection with the consolidated and person-centred approach affords the concept of a political mandate a certain sanctity. On the one hand it represents a great responsibility, on the other actions taken through it are – because of their inherent legitimacy – not to be interfered with by those who can only meaningfully act in their own and not the public at large’s, best interest (Uterwedde, 2017).

The backdrop of consolidated power and the ideas of who is and isn’t capable of working towards the public interest do not make for a system that is particularly well adapted for participation. Over the previous decades, starting in the 1990s, efforts were made to move away from an absolute majority rule towards decentralisation and participation, especially on the local level. However, political traditions are slow to shift and the underlying tenets are arguably still there.

“Nous sommes en retard avec la démocratie. Cette culture n’existe pas. L’enjeu de la participation n’existe pas en France. [...] Regarde comment la France est gouverné. Elle est gouvernée par un homme !”

[We are late when it comes to democracy. This culture doesn’t exist. The concept of participation doesn’t exist in France. [...] Look at how France is governed. It’s governed by one man!] (M. Bourdier, interview, 14 June 2021)

6. Applying the Framework to the Case

The national trends are reflected in the situation in Paris as well. There is a strong central municipal government, though over time the districts have been given greater leniency in terms of representation in the form of district majors. and when it comes to development, though they are limited to deciding matters of local interest, such as kindergartens and local parks (Uterwedde, 2017). A closer examination of how districts exert their power in the context of the participatory budget (PB) follows (see 6.1.1.3 Opposition).

What is important to note is that as France's capital with its own, at times contrarian, history Paris occupies a special spot in the democratic system. For one, like the two other major cities Lyon and Marseille, it is obligated to instate certain participatory measures, such as neighbourhood councils (Gaydu, 2016). For another it was, for historic, symbolic and power-related reasons, only allowed to elect its own mayor since 1977, after a century of being indirectly ruled through the national government (Hidalgo, 2013). Thus, even basic representative input on the development of the city is a relatively recent phenomenon on a political culture scale.

6.1.1.2 THE CITIZENRY'S ROLE IN GOVERNING

One aspect of political culture that France is renowned for is the expression of the citizenry by means of disruptive action, specifically protests, demonstrations and strikes. Whether this proclivity for political upheaval is actually a measurable reality, especially in relation to other comparable west- and central European countries, is somewhat contested (Giraud, 2010). however the idea of it is certainly present, both from the outside looking in as well as from within.

“Paris est rebelle” [Paris is rebellious] Anne Hidalgo writes in one of her political manifestos, *“Paris est la ville des révolutions, celle où se décide le sort de la France, souvent contre les opinions de la province”* [Paris is the city of revolutions, the one where the direction of France is decided, often against the opinions of the countryside] (Hidalgo, 2013, p. 20). The notion of the French and the Parisian people in particular as rebellious and anti-establishment is thus derived from France's central point of cultural identification and sought to be upheld as a point of pride. Invoking the various French revolutions, the Paris Commune as a brief window of radically progressive self-rule and a general resilience against what is deemed oppressive or unjust rule is a crucial cultural identifier (Hidalgo, 2013).

Civil unrest is also a political reality. Especially in the early decades of the fifth republic, when antagonism outside the system of government was the only way of having opposing voices heard, leading to the political opposition, as well as unions perfecting the use of protests and strikes to their political benefit (Uterwedde, 2017). As such the culturally ingrained forms of participation beyond elections are *“participation by*

6. Applying the Framework to the Case

rupture, things that do not accept to be within invited spaces” (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021) when efforts are made to create structured ways of citizen participation.

In this sense there is a benefit to a system of centralised power from the viewpoint of the opposition, reflecting Foucault’s views that power relations are never one sided and that strength on one side can enable a strengthened counter-position (see 2.2.1 Foucault’s Power as Relation) *“Tous les pouvoirs centraux sont très puissants [...] et ça marche dans les deux sens : beaucoup de pouvoir de manière top-down et beaucoup de d’évocation de contestation, battement. C’est la tradition.”* [All these central powers are powerful [...] and that works both ways: a lot of top down power and a lot of contention, of protest, of battling. That’s the tradition.] (M. Bourdier, interview, 14 June 2021).

There is also a pronounced disconnect and mistrust between citizens and the ruling class (Uterwedde, 2017). Local representation in the form of municipal governments and notably mayors enjoy a higher level of trust than national politicians (ibid). The more direct contact and visibility might have a role to play in that (Hidalgo, 2013). In any case, the local level is often identified as the most promising arena for reconnecting citizens to governance practices (ibid). Other instances are for example the new municipalism movements emerging from Spanish cities (Russell, 2019).

On the side of governing bodies, the prevalent attitude surrounding the initiation of participatory efforts such as PB is also somewhat paternalistically inclined, with language of *“leur donner les moyens de faire”* [giving them the means to act] (Hidalgo & Leiris, 2019, p. 14), *“permettre à cette énergie de se mettre en mouvement”* [allowing for that energy to be put into motion] (ibid, p. 107) or *“[...] leurs contributions, non à partir d’une page blanche, bien sûr, mais en partant du cadre que je fixe”* “letting citizens participate” [“... their contributions, not from a blank slate, of course, but from a framework that I set] (Hidalgo, 2013, p. 135), implying that participation is rather seen as a favour to be granted rather than an inherent right to be facilitated.

The cultural significance and pride in disruptive action, combined with a mistrust of establishment efforts leads to a hesitancy or dismissal of officially instigated forms of participation in favour of promoting one’s interests independently of the system: *“Je n’y [budget participatif] crois pas [...]. Je crois à ces qui se battent [...] ces qui se battent contre le politique, en proposent des choses nouvelles.”* [I don’t believe in it [the participatory budget] [...]. I believe in those who fight [...], those who fight against the political forces by proposing new things.] (M. Bourdier, interview, 14 June 2021)

6.1.1.3 ORGANISED AND UNORGANISED VOICES

With the official system largely and until recently almost completely inaccessible for individual citizens, there exists a strong culture of organised action. On the large scale

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that function is taken up for example by unions, while the organising on the local scale happens primarily through associations that often, if not exclusively, emerge as a direct response to a specific development project or planned action (Uterwedde, 2017). As a result, associations often operate on a small-scale, grass-roots basis and are heavily rooted in their local context (Nez, 2016). They often enjoy a high standing in society, especially the ones acting locally, while national or international organisations are by contrast seen as intruders, hijacking subjects, thereby hurting or displacing smaller local efforts (M. Bourdier, interview, 14 June 2021).

Regarding municipally initiated participatory efforts associations are regularly a key target group, though the response is far from universal. *“La ville de Paris propose plusieurs modalités de participation pour les associations [...] pour les associations parisiennes, la norme est la non-participation à ces dispositifs.”* [The city of Paris proposes multiple modes of participation for associations [...] for Parisian associations the norm is not to participate in these devices.] (Renault-Tinacci & Arhip-Paterson, 2020, p. 2) Only one out of five associations in the city take part in some kind of participatory scheme. Of those schemes the one with the highest level of participation is the PB, followed closely by the neighbourhood councils. Half of all associations who are active in the first place are being active in the context of PB (ibid).

The process of the Paris PB is open to associations, though their position within it is – at least nominally – not different from that of unorganised individuals (Gaydu, 2016). They are not given special rights in terms of submission or voting power, though it can be argued that they still effectively hold more power in both. Due to specialised knowledge, such as previous experience interacting with the administration and governing bodies, better resources in terms of formulating and promoting projects and more voting power, as members of the association can vote for their project (Fouillet, 2018).

This unequal distribution of abilities in practice, if not in theory, calls into question the ability of the Paris model of PB to meaningfully empower the unorganised voices who don't have a wide range of means for engagement beyond PB. Associations often times know to navigate the possibilities that exist outside of PB and how to acquire funds from other sources (M. Bourdier, interview, 14 June 2021) (see 6.3.1.2 Exclusivity).

The position of associations in relation to the PB is further complicated through, at times unclear, distributions of not only abilities, but also responsibilities. There is the general structure of city government and administration having a monopoly on decision power and also implementation on the one hand and lay citizens and associations as participants on the other. While this clearly divides functions of different

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actors, some associations get cast in a double-role as participants as well as facilitators (Renault-Tinacci & Arhip-Paterson, 2020).

Especially on the district levels, some PB have a phase of supported ideation and project creation before the official start of the PB calendar that is submission. These workshops are often organised or supported by local associations, sometimes at the behest of the district PB (Renault-Tinacci & Arhip-Paterson, 2020). While providing an arguably valuable service in supporting individuals to create viable submissions, this practice serves to add uncertainty over the equality or practical seniority of associations in comparison to other actors in the process.

Regardless of these special cases in some associations on the inside of the operation, associations can use PB for their own gains in multiple ways (see 6.3.5.2 Secondary Results).

6.1.2 SYSTEMIC FACTORS

6.1.2.1 CLASS

Paris, not unlike many of Europe's major cities, has its class inequalities manifested in an east-west division. It is a longstanding and quite pronounced localisation of socio-economic groups within certain areas, districts and quartiers (McAvay & Verdugo, 2021).

The east of the city is predominately low(er)-income and was, especially in times of heavy industrialisation, decidedly working-class. This socio-demographic distribution is reflected in the political leaning as well, with eastern districts being in the hands of socialist and left-leaning factions, in line with the current overall municipal government (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2020).



Figure 6: Map of quartiers populaires; <https://budgetparticipatif.paris.fr/bp/plugins/download/ Carte%20des%20qpop%20BP.pdf>

Though this distribution and clustering of specific ethnic communities can be seen in the lived reality of the city, it is not reflected in official data or research. This is due to a very rigid interpretation of one of the central values of French republicanism, that being *égalité*. The tenet of equality does not allow for preferential treatment of the basis of positive discrimination, which, given the reality of inequalities on the basis of class and more specifically ethnicity, can result in frustrating half-solutions.

“[...] because France does affirmative action, but they do it in a childish way. And that’s because of their bloody Republicanism, because their Republicanism imagines that [...] if we are French, we are all equal. That is not true.” (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021)

Consequently, while no one will go so far as deny the reality of racial inequalities, there is no groundwork for evidence-based politics or policies as there is neither a clear knowledge of where actions have to be taken, nor a basis for taking such targeted actions in the first place (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021).

PB is no exception in that. While the introduction of dedicated funding for *quartiers populaires* does indicate an acknowledgement of inequalities and the need for special considerations (see 6.3.1.3 Funding and 6.3.3.2 Tensions within ‘Participants’), conclusions over its effectiveness are difficult to draw and the socio-economic accuracy is not necessarily given (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021).

6.1.2.2 GENDER

Discussions and considerations relating to gender-equality are absent from the Parisian PB. Anne Hidalgo does acknowledge in some of her writing that:

“Nous n’avons pas tous les mêmes besoins, et ce n’est pas verser dans la discrimination que de considérer qu’à des situations spécifiques doivent correspondre des solutions elles-mêmes spécifiques [...] leur condition (de femme) les expose particulièrement, a fortiori dans l’espace public qui demeure largement conçu par les hommes, pour les hommes. [...] En tant que femme, évoluer hors de la sphère privée n’est jamais neutre.”

[We don’t all have the same needs and it is not discriminatory to consider that specific situations need to be responded to with solutions which are themselves specific [...] their condition (as women) makes them particularly vulnerable, especially in public spaces which are largely designed by men for men [...] As a woman, moving outside the private sphere is never neutral] (Hidalgo & Leiris, 2019, p. 84)

As such the awareness of the issue can be assumed to exist and aspects of gender sensitivity may well be present in other contexts of the municipal policy. As for the PB, they are either missing entirely or at the very least not made visible.

6.1.2.3 ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION

Due to its size, status and wide range of responsibilities the city of Paris has an extensive and complex administrative makeup. It is ordered into departments with distinct areas of influence and there exists only limited interplay between departments. The administration is in turn overseen by the city government in the form of the mayor as well as her team of vice-mayors, who are appointed to thematic specialisations (see 5.1.1 Politics and Administration).

The Paris PB is conceived of as a supplementary instrument alongside the regular functioning of the city. It is not the centre of a wider rearrangement of the administrative structures to specifically suit and support it, as it is in other cities. As such, it is obliged to work within existent bounds and is limited to coordination and mediation between departments rather than having departments work directly towards it (Gaydu, 2016).

While having a process that connects otherwise independent departments showed some indications of improved communication and higher levels of exchange (see 6.3.5.2 Secondary Results), others are more sceptical of the efficacy of the chosen approach. The main team of the PB is buried deep within the sub-department structure of the administration (see 5.3.1 Structure and Actors and 6.3.1.1 Priority and Place in the Larger System) and holds little influence. It is the backing of the mayor compels the other department to relinquish some of their decision power as well as their work force to the PB effort (see 6.3.1.4 Staffing). All in all, having to operate within an administrative system that is not designed for cross-cutting work, combined with a reluctance from the involved departments makes for a less impactful process overall (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021).

6.1.2.4 WEALTH

Paris is a wealthy city which facilitates it in enacting costly undertakings such as a PB on this scale. While there is a big risk being taken in absolute terms of 500 million Euros, relative to the remaining city budget that risk is if not none-existent then at least bearable. The same can be said for the ability to meaningfully impact the cities spending priorities through PB.

“En effet, même si le dispositif a une portée décisionnelle et non uniquement consultative, il ne concerne pas les 95% restants du budget d’investissement et 100% du budget de fonctionnement qui restent entre les mains de l’exécutif municipal. Ainsi, on ne discute pas des grandes orientations budgétaires de la ville.”

[Indeed, even if the device carries decision power and not only an advisory capacity, it doesn’t touch on the remaining 95% of the investment budget, nor 100% of the operational budget that remains entirely in the hands of the

municipal executive. As such, the large budgetary orientation of the city are not discussed.] (Douay, 2016)

The absolute wealth of the city shields it from the relative power of said sizable pot of money being used to direct the city into any direction it is not supposed to go in, according to the municipal government. While power for and through PB is implied through the scale of the funds, it doesn't necessarily exist in practice.

“Paris peut le faire, parce qu'elle a l'argent pour le faire.”

[Paris can do it, because they have the money to do it.] (M. Bourdier, interview, 14 June 2021)

6.1.3 MICRO POLITICS

6.1.3.1 STATUS

As previously discussed (see 6.1.1.1 Types of Democracy), the majority rule system of French politics provides positions like mayors with a lot of power. In the case of Anne Hidalgo as Paris' mayor, this priority position is further helped by her coming into office as the official succession candidate of former mayor Bertrand Delanoë (Hidalgo, 2013). Through having held a senior position of vice mayor in the previous terms, Hidalgo was able to start her first term with a close knowledge of the office and the administration. There was no need for large scale restructuring as might have been practical had her election constituted a shift in political direction. It enabled her to start quickly on her flagship projects. one of the first being the PB, kicking off its pilot year only three months after her inauguration (Gaydu, 2016).

Especially at first, it was Anne Hidalgo's PB as much as Paris' PB, if not more so. While the idea of PB, even of PB in Paris predates her, it was part of her electoral campaign with an implementation rooted firmly in her values and conceived of as part of her strategy for Paris (Hidalgo, 2013) (see 6.1.3.2 Political Calculation).

Especially at first it was also promoted in close connection with her person. The first slogan used to promote the city-wide PB was *“Madame la Maire, j'ai une idée”* [*Madam Mayor, I have an idea*] (Gaydu, 2016). It had to be used even in connection with district PBs which, while closely tied to the general PB, don't actually relate to the mayor of Paris (ibid).

Hidalgo's influence isn't merely related to publicity efforts, it is also reflected behind the scenes. The project was in large parts carried on her endorsement of the idea alone, as there is said to have been little political support beyond her. *“The mayor has been protecting PB for several years. There's a political appointee, Pauline Veron, until recently, and then: the desert.”* (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021)

This reliance and focus on the person of the mayor leads to some discontent in opposition-lead districts (see 6.1.1.3 Opposition) and also calls into question the longevity of the idea beyond Hidalgo's time in office. Should there be a shift in power it is highly doubtful that a successor would continue a project that is so strongly and deliberately tied to a rival.

6.1.3.2 POLITICAL CALCULATION

While the way the Paris PB is constructed is more in the line of a within itself largely apolitical good governance PB rather than a political one (see 4.2.2 Logics and 6.2.2 Logics) the heavy association with Anne Hidalgo and its place within her and her party's larger plans for the development of Paris as a whole makes Paris PB highly political on the outside.

It is necessary to understand the PB not just as a process that through itself produces tangible results regarding city development. At the same time, it serves as a vehicle for demonstrating a commitment to larger scale ideas of how the city should function. The existence of PB creates the sense of a progressive place that values citizen participation and a re-evaluation of heretofore established ways of power distribution.

“Ce qui est fondamentale pour la maire de Paris c'est que ça, le budget participatif, existe. Après, c'est [...] secondaire.”

[What is essential for city hall of Paris, it that the participatory budget exists. What comes after is [...] secondary] (M. Bourdier, interview, 14 June 2021)

If it is decided that participation is a crucial part of a desirable and morally competitive central European capital in the 21st century then PB serves to check that box, irrespective of what comes out of it. This focus can, to a certain degree, be seen in the communication around the PB, which focuses heavily on the direct and binding vote as well as the scale of available funds (Gaydu, 2016). It transmits a commitment and a willingness to the idea both to the citizens and in turn voters within the city as well as to the surrounding towns and the world at large. *“It's this image of being the leading capital of the world”* (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021).

Throughout the first phases of the process, even while the capacities in terms of people working on PB itself were slim (see 6.3.1.4 Staffing), members of the team are simultaneously tasked with promoting PB to other municipalities as the way to go. That is done with a rather self-assured and self-referential mindset of having *“nothing to learn and everything to teach”* (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021).

The Paris PB is a prestige project, not just what it is itself, but what its existence means for Paris and its place in the competition between cities (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021). This promotional aspect doesn't presuppose judgements on the

quality of the process itself, though it does warrant bearing in mind what else can be sought to be achieved through it.

One aspect having to do with political calculation that does have a direct influence on the functioning of the process itself is the reception of the PB within Paris as a flagship project of Anne Hidalgo. The partisan connotation influences the promotion, acceptance and influence of the measure on the ground, especially along the pronounced east-west-split between majority- and opposition-lead districts (see 6.1.3.3 Opposition and 6.3.3.1 Demographics and Activation) (Gaydu, 2016).

6.1.3.3 OPPOSITION WORK

The centralised French system of municipal organisation leaves generally little possibility for input in terms of the initiation of new projects or policies. “*Der Bürgermeister kann durchregieren*” [*The mayor can govern unobstructedly*] (Uterwedde, 2017, p. 46). The same is true for the implementation of PB as well. There is no need to garner support among the opposition to pass policies, therefore there is no need to actively involve them in the creation of said policies or cater to their demands or ideals.

“L’opposition a joué un rôle minime, elle s’est cantonnée à une position de critique ou de dénonciation des carences du budget participatif au lieu d’adopter une attitude plus constructive.”

[The opposition played a minimal role, restricting itself to a position of critique or denunciation of the shortcomings of participatory budgeting as opposed to taking on a more constructive attitude towards it] (Gaydu, 2016, p. 216)

While input of the opposition on the city-wide PB never goes beyond voicing critique, they do hold power over the district-level PB, as they are not just administered, but to a certain degree also designed, promoted and structured independently from the city-wide PB. While there is no absolute discretion on the part of district mayors, there is a certain leeway, which allows for it to be shaped to benefit a certain smaller scale goal and logic (Gaydu, 2016).

An important aspect that is up to the district to decide is how much of their own funds they will put towards the PB (see 6.3.1.3 Funding), with the incentive of the city to double whatever is made available through PB (Gaydu, 2016). That allows opposition-controlled districts to decide between a conservative and an opportunistic approach. Either putting forwards very little as to not support a project from the political rival that might be at odds with the own notions of ideal power distribution or alternatively committing a lot to it and with the additional funds implementing projects that are in line with their own convictions (ibid).

6.2 STRUCTURING

6.2.1 INTENTIONS

The intentions behind the Paris PB are closely linked to the convictions and ideals held by Anne Hidalgo and her idea for the development of Paris as a progressive, sustainable and socially conscious metropolitan hub. The specific issues PB is supposed to work towards addressing are a crisis of representation (Vassor, 2019), a perceived administrative sluggishness (Gaydu, 2016) and a lack of participation and agency for the citizenry (Vassor, 2019).

Firstly, being able to vote for a municipal and a district government every six years is deemed to be insufficient to satisfy the citizens desire to be involved in their cities' development, especially for a city led by a party on the left (Gaydu, 2016). There are certain ideals that come with that, such as regarding citizens as experts of their lived environment, giving them the opportunity to shape and adopt the spaces they inhabit, striving for a less rigidly hierarchical system in which especially marginalised members of the community can have their voice be heard and ideally also listened to (Hidalgo, 2013). PB, especially with its own left-leaning origins, fits those intentions.

“Moi, je pense que la ville voit ça comme une obligation, pas comme une politique. La ville de Paris, le parti socialiste, doit faire un budget participatif.”
[I think that the city sees it as an obligation, not as a policy. The city of Paris, the socialist party, has to do a participatory budget.] (M. Bourdier, interview, 14 June 2021)

As far as the types of intentions laid out in 4.2.1 Intentions are concerned, some apply to the reasoning underlying Paris PB as well, while others are not present.

The discrepancy that exists between the officially stated intentions and what can be seen reflected in practice makes it difficult to reach decisive conclusions on which intentions are and are not actually present. While an ideal might be stated it is not necessarily apparent in the process itself and even if it is, it might fall short of what could be possible to be achieved following it wholeheartedly.

6.2.1.1 DEEPENING DEMOCRACY

The expansion of the abilities of citizens within the system of the city is mentioned in the reasoning behind the Paris PB. The charter of the PB states “*contribuer à l’émancipation des citoyennes*” [*contributing to the emancipation of citizens*] as well as “*codécision*” [*codeciding*] (Ville de Paris, 2022b) as some of the ideals of the PB.

While the necessity of greater and more direct input from the side of the citizenry is put forth by the side of the initiators, notably mayor Hidalgo, there is no support for extending participation as far as feasible. While being a proponent of participation

Hidalgo is sceptical of the way it is sometimes touted as a universal solution and an easy fix.

“On entend aujourd’hui dans toutes les bouches « démocratie participative », comme si c’était un absolu, comme si c’était une réponse en soi, comme si ces mots avaient un pouvoir magique et qu’il suffise de les prononcer pour qu’ils deviennent notre réalité. C’est beaucoup plus complexe.”

[Nowadays, you hear everyone call for “participatory democracy”, as if it were an absolute, as if it were a response in and of itself, as if the words themselves had magical powers and it were enough to utter them for them to become reality. It is a lot more complex. (Hidalgo & Leiris, 2019, p. 97)

In her view, the jurisdiction of participatory efforts stops where that of the elected mandate begins, which helps to understand the tight hold governing bodies retain on the Paris PB.

As such the practical application tends more towards supplementing existent democratic structures, rather than deepening or fundamentally rethinking democratic points of access, as is generally implied in the categorisations of other similar efforts. PB remains at the side-lines of municipal operations and is not integrated into the day-to-day workings (see 6.3.1.1 Priority and Place in the Larger System). It also doesn’t hold an exclusive position over the distribution of participatory funds (see 6.3.1.2 Exclusivity) and there is a rather tight control on what is possible to be achieved through the process (see 6.3.5.1 Primary Results).

While the consideration for deepening democracy is there, the practice doesn’t point to a pronounced intent to see it through to its fullest potential. For example there is no institutionalising power granted to participants (see 6.3.2.1 Institutionalisation), nor is there a foreseeable shift towards what Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014) called the empowerment dimension of PB (see 4.3.2.1 Institutionalisation).

6.2.1.2 SOCIAL JUSTICE

The challenging of existent social and special priorities is present in the reasons behind the Paris PB. “*Renforcer l’égalité d’accès et de l’inclusion*” [reenforcing equal access and inclusion] (Ville de Paris, 2022b) are stated goals of the process. That is reflected in the decision of allotting specific funds to disenfranchised areas (see 5.2.3 First Iteration (2015-2019)), a wide array of modes of participation as well as supplemental offers for mobilisation and support (5.3.1 Structure and Actors). However, the accuracy of these efforts in reaching their target audience is unclear and there are doubts in how far social priorities are actually being challenged (see 6.3.3.2 Tensions within ‘Participants’).

6. Applying the Framework to the Case

There are also some aspects of social justice, such as gender sensitivity, that are missing from the process altogether (see 6.1.2.2 Gender).

6.2.1.3 DIRECTING DEVELOPMENT

Letting citizens set the course of development is one of the most prominently stated goals of the Paris PB. Versions of it can be found throughout its charter with phrases such as “*s’appuyer sur l’expertise et la créativité*” [building on [their] expertise and creativity], “*inventer, ensemble, une ville plus résiliente et plus solidaire*” [inventing, together, a more resilient and inclusive city] or “*Renforcer le pouvoir d’agir des citoyens*” [Strengthening the power of citizens to act] (Ville de Paris, 2022b). Consequently, the process is set up to be very open, both in terms of who can participate as well as what can be put forth (see 5.3.2 Submission of Ideas). It also results in a binding decision which is a show of commitment to the will of the participants.

At the same time, the construction and the implementation of the projects is in large parts relegated to the existing structures and not very accessible to individual citizens (see 5.3.3 Internal Review and 5.3.6 Implementation).

6.2.1.4 GOVERNANCE

Another key point of interest is the PB significance to the city’s governance. There is also a disconnect or distrust in the ability of the administration to enact change and to do so decisively. PB in turn is supposed to demonstrate that quick acting change is indeed possible, that political actions and promises do lead towards tangible results and that there is “*une vote utile*” [a useful vote] where consequences follow directly (Gaydu, 2016). There is also a general desire to connect the citizens with the official institutions, to give them insight into how they work and what they can do (Ville de Paris, 2022b). In a similar vein, transparency is stressed as well in order to establish trust and understanding. Lastly the PB is thought to be used to further decentralisation efforts in giving power over to the districts.

These efforts can be seen reflected in the implementation of the Paris PB, especially when it comes to the transparency of the process (6.3.4.5 Evaluation and Accountability). The low barrier of entry in proposing ideas or casting votes is also aligned with connecting citizens to the shaping of the city. However, again, it can be asked if that goes far enough, as deliberation in the elaboration of the projects is limited and involvement in the implementation for the most part non-existent (see 6.3.4.2 Preselection Process and 6.3.4.5 Evaluation and Accountability).

6.2.1.5 EFFICIENCY

Efficiency is not given express attention in the setting up of the Paris PB. While it stands to reason that considerations for efficiency are being made in the

implementation of the specific projects themselves, the process as a whole is interested in investment, not in austerity.

6.2.1.6 APPEASEMENT

One point that is not raised by the initiators of the project, but that is assumed to play a role by outside actors is in how PB is used by the municipal government to appease their voting base and convey a sense of power redistribution that is greater than it is in actuality. Scepticism to this end is present.

“C’est-à-dire le budget participatif c’est de l’animation. C’est un peu des marionnettes, quoi. Paris est riches, Paris s’offrir des marionnettes pour son milieu de réparent. Je ne dis pas c’est qu’il n’est pas intéressant, mais si tu veux, c’est, enfin, de la décoration.”

[That is to say, the participatory budget is entertainment. It’s a bit of puppetry, you know? Paris is rich, Paris can offer puppets to its constituents. I’m not saying it’s not interesting, but, if you will, it’s, well, decoration.] (M. Bourdier, interview, 14 June 2021)

While that degree of deception cannot be corroborated, a study of the process does reveal a very tight hold on the process by its initiators to the point that the results can be safely assumed to fall within what is deemed aspirational by the elected officials (see 6.3.4.2 Preselection Process). There is also an emphasis being placed on certain parts of the process, mainly its scale, the open submission and the binding vote. Other aspects, such as the weak deliberation, the lack of institutionalising power and the various methods of preselection, are deemphasised (see 6.3.2.1 Institutionalisation and 6.3.4.2 Preselection).

While this does not equate to an outright instrumentalization of the PB effort and especially not in a planned way, it does call to mind that projects of this magnitude carry political weight (see 6.1.3.2 Political Calculation).

6.2.1.7 PRESTIGE

The last point as far as intentions underpinning the Paris PB is concerned; its effect beyond its official purview seems necessary to consider. Again, initiating the process for the prestige it could bring is not an officially stated intention. However, the way efforts were made to promote the Parisian approach to PB nationally as well as internationally does imply at least an awareness of its potential benefit to the reception of the city. In a time of competition between various metropolitan hubs an effort of the scope of Paris PB can be considered a step in promoting the city as progressive and innovative in terms of soft location factors (see 6.1.3.2 Political Calculation).

6.2.2 LOGICS

When considering the three logics proposed by Cabannes (2018; 2021) for conceptualising PB, the Paris approach falls squarely into that of good governance. It is very much located within existing structures without any intention of significantly altering their order of operations (see 6.3.1.1 Priority and Place in the Larger System).

While some transfer of power is present, specifically through a binding vote, this transfer is done in a very controlled capacity, with clear and hard limits, offering no input on the structure of the process itself (see 6.3.2.1 Institutionalisation and 6.3.3.3 Tasks and Abilities). Instead, the focus is on providing orderly alternatives to conflict through giving citizens a predefined avenue of expression.

While there is interest in giving the citizenry the possibility of participation, there is no vested interest in that participation meaningfully impacting the direction of the city's action on a large scale. Some critics see this as contradictory to more classic PB approaches. *“Le budget participatif parisien est aux antipodes de la fonction classique de rupture du budget participatif, il s’inscrit au contraire dans la continuité de la politique menée par la mandature précédente.” [The participatory budget of Paris is the antithesis to the classical disruptive function of participatory budgeting; on the contrary it concerns itself with the continuation of the politics put forward by the previous mandate.]*

6.2.3 HIERARCHY

On its face the Paris PB is subject to the same kind of top-down mindset as most PB are. Regardless of how far the empowerment potential of citizens is extended, the possibility is granted and in Paris' case also controlled, from above. The process exists at the will of the municipal government and there would have been no way for the participants to initiate it themselves.

While the hierarchy between officials and participants as such is rather straightforward, there is nuance to be had in the relation between the levels of PB as well as in its origins. It isn't the first PB process taking place in the city (see 5.2.1 Conception and Study). Individual districts had their own schemes and experiments prior to the citywide launch of PB. Some, especially the one in the 12th, served as guide rails in developing the functioning of the first iteration. This drawing of inspiration and building on work done on a district level is considered by some to be an act of decentralisation (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021).

The other argument against a purely top-down reading of the Paris PB is the level of the district PB with their relative freedom of scope and implementation (see 5.3.1 Structure and Actors). The distinction between city-wide and district based

could have been limited to the public facing organisation or omitted altogether. Instead it is used to allow district governments a degree of individual control and self-determination.

This fashion of favouring decentralisation is in line both with general trends in French governance sensibilities as well as the ideals held by the Socialist Party of Paris under Hidalgo. She is a proponent of decentralisation as a way of bringing power closer to the people over extensive direct participation (Hidalgo, 2013).

6.3 IMPLEMENTATION

6.3.1 POSITION

6.3.1.1 PRIORITY AND PLACE IN THE LARGER SYSTEM

While PB occupies a central spot in the political narrative of Anne Hidalgo's socialist municipal government, this centrality is not necessarily reflected in its position within the administration. Instead of being located at the heart of operations, for example directly in the mayoral office as was the case in Porto Alegre, the Paris PB team is a subgroup of the Citizen Participation Office which itself is a sub-sub-section of the Department of Democracy, Citizenship and Territories. There is also one of the city's vice mayors tasked with overseeing the PB (Arhip-Paterson, 2022).

The PB team is not integrated into the administrative structure, but rather conceived of as a stand-alone entity which is tasked with organising and overseeing the implementation of city-wide PB. It is also tasked with coordinating with the district PB located within the respective district administrations, as well as with the other departments that have roles to play in the sorting, selection and development of project submissions by the public (Arhip-Paterson, 2022).

While the different departments are obligated to provide resources towards the implementation of PB they are not in a position to influence the functioning in exchange for their additional workload. Seeing as the departments are expected to handle the obligations coming through PB with their existing workforce and means, there is rarely the means for a strong, dedicated PB presence inside departments (Gaydu, 2016).

The system as a whole is not designed for cross-cutting processes, leading to unclear chains of command. There are also feelings of resentment towards PB due to the added strain it brings as well as the infringement on the department's sovereignty as which it's sometimes seen (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021).

6.3.1.2 EXCLUSIVITY

Exclusivity as a potential way of strengthening the position of PB within the system is not pursued in Paris. PB is one of a multitude of participatory efforts enacted both

on city and district level, as well as only one strategy to garner funding to a project coming for example from associations (M. Bourdier, interview, 14 June 2021). As such there exists no need to participate in the PB, at least for associations or other groups that know to navigate these auxiliary structures.

The result in terms of empowerment is ambiguous. While the existence of other avenues of funding makes it possible to enact projects that do not fit the mould of the PB, a two (or more) track system can introduce complications, confusion and ultimately take away from the importance of PB as a means of distributing funds.

The most relevant structure besides PB is the conseil du quartier or neighbourhood council, which has been in existence since 2002 and for a city the size of Paris mandated by federal law. The two forms of participation are actually interlinked in some ways, for example by members of the neighbourhood council being part of the commission that finalises the projects coming up for a vote (Gaydu, 2016) (see 6.3.4.3 Preselection Process).

6.3.1.3 FUNDING

The scale, in absolute terms of available funds through the Paris PB, is one of the most prominent aspects about this particular instance of PB. It serves to pay attention to the nuances behind the blank sum statement.

100 million Euro a year and 500 million over the course of the first iteration is a considerable amount for any city and demonstrates a willingness to offer the possibility of enacting projects that are farther-reaching than local small-scale interventions. At the same time the number needs to be considered in its context (see 6.1.2.3 Wealth).

“En engageant 5% à 10% de leur budget d’investissement sur le budget participatif, les collectivités publiques ne prennent pas de risques concernant les grandes orientations de leurs programmes.”

[By allotting 5% to 10% of their investment budget to the participatory budget, the public authorities don’t take risks regarding the large-scale orientation of their programs.] (Gaydu, 2016, p. 117)

As such, it is a show of faith in the output of the process and a sizable investment to be sure, but not a veritable shift of budgetary oversight in favour of the citizenry. A slogan used over the course of the pilot year is “*Prenez les clés du budget!*” [*Take the keys to the budget in hand!*] (Douay, 2016). However, as much as 500 million Euros over the course of five years might be, it is not the key to the way Paris is run.

6. Applying the Framework to the Case



Figure 7: Promotional material; <https://www.parisvox.info/2017/10/05/projets-parisiens-veulent-financer-ville/>

It indeed is an impressive number and one the municipal government made heavy use of in its promotion of the scheme, putting it front and centre of their communications. The claim of it being the biggest PB in Europe or even the world is often added (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021). This claim makes for good marketing, but is not shared by all experts in the field. “[...] they used interviews and films, to say that they were the highest in the world. And I was obliged to tell in interviews – and they were not happy with that – that that was not true. They were not the highest PB in the world.” (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021)

A lot of this controversy comes down to frame of reference. When speaking of absolute amounts Paris’ budget per year may very well be in fact the biggest – though doubts are raised whether all the money allotted actually got used over the course of the process, as accountability is sparse at best (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021) (see 6.3.4.5. Evaluation and 6.3.5.1 Primary Results). When taking into account other metrics, however, like funds per inhabitant or proportion of the overall budget other cities outperform Paris in terms of scale (ibid).

Beyond the politics of overall funding there are also implications of and influences enacted by way of funding within the process itself. One point where that becomes especially apparent is the relation between the municipal government and the districts. The choice of having districts decide for themselves on the size of their allotted budgets is a notable move towards decentralisation and influence being granted to the more local level, especially in a heavily centralised context such as the French one. At the same time the city government offering to match the committed funds serves as a motivator on multiple levels (Gaydu, 2016) (see 6.1.3.3 Opposition).

Another funding decision that embodies important considerations concerning the social impact of PB is that of instating a dedicated funding pot for quartiers populaires. While there is some debate over the accuracy of this measure (see 6.3.3.2 Tensions within ‘Participants’) there is overall agreement that it constitutes a clear

acknowledgement of and commitment to addressing social inequalities manifesting in urban spaces (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021).

The last point in need of addressing when it comes to funding concerns the internal affairs. There are tensions and apprehensions instigated towards PB brought on by tasking administrative departments with, in some instances considerable, additional workload (see 6.3.1.4 Staffing) without providing additional funding to meet those demands (Gaydu, 2016).

6.3.1.4 STAFFING

In his work Cabannes (2021) stresses the power of civil servants to either foster or hinder the success of PB through their work behind the scenes. This point also gets raised in connection with the Paris PB. Allegretti stresses the need to achieve balance between “*the machine, the political representation and the citizenship*” (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021). Without sufficient care being afforded to the workers tasked with enacting PB, the process itself cannot be given the care it requires. In many ways this is what happened in Paris.

From the nine people who came on board the core PB team over the course of its first iteration between 2014 and 2019, all but one quit by 2020 (Arhip-Paterson, 2022). The political overhead in the form of vice-mayor for local democracy, citizen participation and associations, Pauline Veron, also changed, leaving the second iteration after the year of pause and restructuring completely new. This large-scale reshuffling leads to a loss of institutional memory and expertise, which in turn serves to weaken the quality of participation as outsiders lack reliable and consistent points of contact and there is a feeling of the process “*being managed by passengers*” (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021).

There are multiple causes for this high fluctuation. For one the big vision of PB was, at least initially, not backed up by sufficient staffing. Whether caused by genuine miscalculation or a lack of commitment is hard to say definitively, but the fact of the matter is that in the first year a team of two (with two additional workers from the larger Public Participation group providing assistance on top of their regular responsibilities) was tasked with organising the entire city-level PB by themselves (Arhip-Paterson, 2022).

Though the personnel increased with time, periods of overwhelming workloads, especially around the submission and the voting phase proved very taxing for members of the core team as well as responsible workers within the affected departments (Arhip-Paterson, 2022). There was the expectation of rapid response times; within 48 hours of submission every proposal needed to have completed the initial screening which was spread over multiple departments. This left workers with having to process 50

to 60 proposals per day (Gaydu, 2016). These spurts of intense stress combined with phases of monotonous work lead to a very bad overall mood in the core PB team. *“Six of the eight people with whom I worked between 2017 and 2020 expressed their suffering at work to me, either in our interview or during informal daily exchanges. I have seen many of them crying at work.”* (Arhip-Paterson, 2022, p. 9)

When their concerns and suggestions for improvement were not taken into consideration, the workers saw no choice but to quit their positions on the PB team, which had gained an infamous reputation throughout the Paris administration as an inhospitable work environment (Arhip-Paterson, 2022).

As it largely fell on the personnel responsible for enacting the PB to also promote it to other municipalities and organisations, the already strained workforce was taxed even more (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021).

6.3.2 BREADTH AND DEPTH

6.3.2.1 INSTITUTIONALISATION

Beyond the matter of deciding (or advising) on projects and the use of budgetary funds, one of the main competences participants in PB can have is the power to change the rules of the process itself. *“[...] in the Paris PB I would say, it’s the same in most European countries and cities, is that the citizens are not setting up the rules. And this is the big divide between PB, because you have less empowerment, because it is, what is called institutionalized PB and not institutionalising PB.”* (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021)

Essentially the municipal government of Paris opts to keep the reins of the process in its own hands. Roles and abilities are theirs to give; parameters, priorities and selection criteria are theirs to decide (Gaydu, 2016). Though that still leaves options for expression and decision in the hands of the participants, especially in light of the binding character of the vote, it gives great leverage to the initiators to steer the process in a direction fitting their vision.

6.3.2.2 REACH

Being a place-based PB the Paris PB is very broad in terms of what submissions it allows. The main criteria are that the proposed projects fall within municipal competences and that they are self-contained without incurring significant running costs (see 6.3.4.1 Submission Criteria).

Resulting from the expressly institutionalised approach of Paris PB initiators, civil servants and elected officials involved in the process retain not just the ability to formulate the rules, but in doing so also influence which projects make it to the final voting

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phase (see 6.3.4.2 Preselection Process). The official explanation for this control over which ideas go forward is that a divergence, let alone contradiction of government lines, is not to be allowed in order to uphold the legitimacy of the results of the representative democratic institution of the elected municipal government (Gaydu, 2016).

Another interpretation is a reluctance to actually share in the decision power as is claimed to be the goal.

“Finalement, certains acteurs associatifs notent une contradiction entre l’objectif d’ouverture de la décision et le contrôle politique qui est exercé : « [...] Elle semble plutôt illustrer la difficulté pour certains élus de sauvegarder un « pouvoir d’action » dans un projet qui visait justement à se passer de lui. » [In the end, certain actors from associations note the contradiction between the objective of opening the decision process and the political control being exercised: “[...] It seems to rather illustrate the difficulty of certain elected officials to preserve their ‘power of action’ in a project that’s precisely aimed at doing away with that.”] (Douay, 2016)

6.3.3 PARTICIPANTS

6.3.3.1 PARTICIPATION DEMOGRAPHICS AND ACTIVATION

Seeing as one of the main intentions behind the Paris PB is the creation of a tool to enable and encourage those disillusioned with and disengaged from conventional politics to engage, it is these groups, primarily the Youth and young people, who are sought to be activated (Douay, 2016). Mobilisation of previously uncooperative parts of the population is challenging and the same is true for this process. *“Généralement les habitants qui participaient aux procédés participatifs sont déjà impliqués dans la vie associative de leur quartier.”* [Generally, the inhabitants who participate in participatory processes are those already implicated in the associative life of their quarter.] (Gaydu, 2016, p. 139).

There is also the question of who is even there to be activated, especially in terms of socio-economic status, with the high cost of living forcing people to live further and further in the periphery. *“PB in Paris is almost a bourgeois PB, because Paris is a bourgeois city.”* (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021) On top of that, as discussed previously (see 6.1.2.1 Class), other factors such as ethnicity cannot be studied let alone addressed properly. (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021).

One part of the activation of the Paris PB is the fact that there is no restriction in terms of age or nationality when it comes to participants (Ville de Paris, 2022b). The process is also open to those who don’t live in Paris itself, but work or study there. This rule acknowledges the lived reality of urban populations as well as the way in which metropolitan areas such as Paris function. It also serves to address one of the

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major shortcomings of most instances of representative democracy, which rely on voter rolls based on nationality, place of residence as well as age of maturity.

Not having these restrictions can serve to open the process to everyone who wishes to partake in it, even those who are denied other forms of public expression. At the same time, it is also a point of critique, coming mainly from the conservative opposition. They argue that formal voter roll combined with multiple ways of casting ballots opens up the possibility of manipulation or misrepresentation (Douay, 2016).

There is also the argument that formally opening the process to everybody doesn't automatically enable truly everybody to actually participate. There are still limitations in terms of language, access to and proficiency in technology

the ability both to understand the process and craft viable submissions (Fouillet, 2018). While some of these concerns are addressed (see 6.3.4.3 Modes and Settings) others, such as language, remain.

As discussed (see 6.1.2.1 Class), Paris is characterised by a rather pronounced east-west-divide when it comes to income, social class, ethnic background and ultimately political affiliation. This phenomenon influences the reception and functioning of PB as well. *“On retrouve une division Est-Ouest avec les arrondissements les plus aisés qui ont tendance à moins participer”* [One finds an East-West-Division again, with the more affluent districts showing a tendency to participate less] (Douay, 2016).

Both in absolute terms and considered in relation to the district population eastern districts have higher levels of participation (see Figure 8). The 13th district makes up 13% of the digital vote in 2016, which is about three percent of the population. In the 10th district four percent of the of the population vote digitally. This rate is much lower in western districts such as the 8th or the 16th where only 0,7 % and 0,6 % of the population respectively cast a digital vote for the 2016 PB (Moreau & Arhip-Pater-son, 2018).

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


Figure 8: Distribution of voters by population in 2016; Moreau & Arhip-Paterson, 2018

Multiple factors play into the higher rates of participation in the East rather than the West. For one, it's in the East that socialist-led districts implemented their own small scale PB schemes before the municipal effort in 2014 (see 5.2.1 Conception and Study and 6.2.3 Hierarchy), giving their respective populations greater familiarity with the concept and how to make use of it (Douay, 2016). Western districts lack this prior experience. Furthermore, there is more political backing coming from districts headed by the same party as the city government rather than the opposition, both in terms of overall platform and optics, leading to greater means being allocated in the supportive districts (Gaydu, 2016) (see 6.1.3.3 Opposition). Lastly, the demographic reality of an overall richer west and a poorer east influence both the needs and the possibilities in light of redistributive measures such as the funds for quartiers populaires which are almost exclusively located in the east (see Figure 8).

In order to foster greater participation among targeted demographics different, sometimes inverse measures are needed (see 6.3.4.3 Modes and Settings). The heavy use of digital services and technology is meant to make the Paris PB accessible, convenient and appealing to younger populations. In terms of the digital vote this strategy is successful, seeing as 41 % of the digital votes in 2016 were cast by people between 25 and 39, which is considerably higher than the 25% of the population they make up (Moreau & Arhip-Paterson, 2018). However, digital votes only counted for half of all votes cast in 2016 and there is no demographic data available for paper votes.

Geographic insight into the analogue votes is possible and shows greater resonance among marginalised communities, where reaching them directly is a key concern.

“La principale difficulté pour nos quartiers [populaires] est d’amener les habitants à voter.” [The main challenge for our [working-class] quarter is getting the inhabitants to vote.] (Douay, 2016)

The modes of activation are one of the aspects that evolved steadily over the course of the first iteration, with new supplementations of the process being added, such as the dedicated funding for low-income neighbourhoods or a broadening of analogue settings (Fouillet, 2018). However, many of the additional resources, such as involvement of advocacy groups for disabled people in the set-up process or preliminary workshops to create ideas and formulate submissions, are at the discretion of the districts. This leads to discrepancies between the quality of activation, deliberation and ultimately participation (Gaydu, 2016).

6.3.3.2 TENSIONS WITHIN ‘PARTICIPANTS’

As mentioned before (6.2.1.2 Social Justice, 6.3.1.3 Funding and 6.3.3.1 Demographics and Activation), after the initial year of full-force Paris PB in 2015 it is acknowledged that the scheme as it is set up currently does not address and might even serve to reinforce spatial and social injustice. While there is a difference between the level of participation in more affluent districts in the west and less affluent ones in the east, favouring the eastern districts (Moreau & Arhip-Paterson, 2018), it is noticeable that within the districts themselves, it is the actually the wealthier parts that profit the most. *“Ces effets de concentration des projets lauréats dans les quartiers les plus aisés apparaissent dont en contradiction totale avec les enjeux de justice spatiale qui sont mis en avant par la majorité municipale” [These effects of winning projects being concentrated in more affluent quarters stand in complete contradiction with the issue of spatial justice put forth by the municipal majority.] (Douay, 2016).* For example, in the 19th district only two projects in the 2015 cycle were located in parts that are considered in need of particular political attention, what would become the quartiers populaires from 2016 on and even those two are on the edges of these areas (ibid).

The introduction of dedicated funding is a clear signal of commitment to this issue and one that is far from self-evident in European PB. *“This is huge [...] this needs to be recognised” (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021).* However, while it serves to invert special priorities, it does not necessarily equate to addressing or reversing social priorities as well (ibid).

Even among quartiers populaires not all are created equal. They are at different stages of gentrification, which reflects in practice where areas with advanced gentrification end up participating more and achieving more successful projects even within the same district (Douay, 2016). The reason for that is that *“it is more the gentrified, than the truly excluded who participate, despite the effort” (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June*

2021). In order to actually reach marginalised populations, more targeted and precise efforts are needed.

6.3.3.3 TASKS AND ABILITIES

One of the biggest differentiating factors between PB is what participants are actually able to do within the process. The two major points of action for regular participants, be they individuals, associations or neighbourhood councils, are the submission and the voting phase. The submission is completely open as long as the proposal adheres to the criteria, but depending on the district prospective participants are on their own when it comes to the creation and formulation of their submissions. Some districts offer preparatory workshops, mostly conducted by local associations (Fouillet, 2018).

Once a submission is in the system it is largely out of the participant's hands. The following steps of pre-selection, co-creation and selection for the vote are dealt with internally (Fouillet, 2018). There is no process of deliberation. While the website does offer the possibility to like and comment on the submitted projects, these actions have no official bearing when it comes to the development of the project or its likelihood to be selected for voting (Douay, 2016). Actors in charge of these steps might take the feedback into account or they might disregard it entirely; what they choose cannot be ascertained from the outside.

In the stages between submission and voting the general population has no channels of involvement. There are differences for those who have submitted a project that is successfully making its way through the system. These project-holders are tangentially involved in co-creation and the selection for vote, though their position is advisory at best (Fouillet, 2018).

The next step that is once again open to all those interested in participating is the voting. This, next to submission, is the second focal point of the process. Over two weeks every resident regardless of age and nationality is free to vote for projects they support, both on a city-wide as well as a district-level. Voting is possible either online or on paper (Gaydu, 2016).

Once the voting is complete and the victorious projects are announced, general participation is finished. There is no involvement in the implementation nor in the evaluation and adaptation of the process itself. This lack of institutionalising power is a point of critique in the eyes of some experts (see. 6.3.2.1 Institutionalisation) (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021).

One aspect that is somewhat vaguely defined is the agency over and responsibility for submitted projects. On the one hand submissions are handed over to the departments for selection, processing and fine-tuning, especially through what is referred to

as co-creation. This involves the supplementation of necessary details to turn an idea into an implementable project. It also often involves changing, scaling or merging the idea with other similar projects (Fouillet, 2018). This process is done by thematically responsible administrative departments with little if any input by the original authors, to the point that some report not being able to recognise their project as their own after this stage (ibid). On the other hand, the project-holders are the ones who are responsible to promote their projects before the vote, even after they might have been altered significantly. *“Their position is thus ambiguous: are they simple authors or project holders? How much do they “own” their project?”* (Fouillet, 2018, p. 397). This dichotomy raised questions of authorial intent, creative control and the common good.

The different skills and resources needed to successfully and effectively complete the various steps open to participants is also the point where the formal equality between individual citizens and associations gets called into question (see 6.1.1.3 Organised v unorganised). The higher the quality of a submission is in terms of required information, precision, knowledge of municipal functioning and abilities or even formal preferences of the administration, the higher the chances are to be kept on (Fouillet, 2018). Associations who have experience in interacting with the city or its administration, who might have better access to specialised knowledge or who have plainly more time and energy to spare for the creation of a submission, therefore have better chances at success. They also have greater capacities for promotion and voter activation once the voting phase comes along, leading to a power imbalance between them and individual citizens (Fouillet, 2018). They also sometimes inhabit a double role as both participants and facilitators of the process as a whole (Renault-Tinacci & Arhip-Paterson, 2020), which might bring them into closer working relations with the actors responsible for organisation and decision-making.

6.3.4 STEPS AND SETTING

6.3.4.1 SUBMISSION CRITERIA

The submission criteria underpinning the Paris PB are overall very open. The process allows for the entry of ideas concerning a wide array of topics (see 5.3.2 Submission of Ideas). The only thematic restriction that is put in place is a ban on the wholesale redesign on specific public spaces. This is only because the first rounds of PB generated so many projects to that effect that the capacity to implement them is reached (Fouillet, 2018).

The criteria that do apply are of an operational nature, namely serving the public interest, being in the jurisdiction of the city and being part of the investment budget without incurring significant running costs. It is this last point that proves the most

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challenging to uninitiated participants, as they often cannot tell where the line between one and the other is situated (Gaydu, 2016). Support in the ideation process, as was gradually added by some districts in the form of workshops or dedicated associations, is found to help with lowering this barrier for lay people (Renault-Tinacci & Arhip-Paterson, 2020).

Like most of the PB process, the submission criteria are set exclusively by the initiators without the possibility of input from participants.

6.3.4.2 PRESELECTION PROCESS

The Paris PB process knows multiple stages of selection and alteration between submission and vote (see 5.3.3 Internal Review)

The initial contact of projects with the PB is handled by the civil servants of the core PB team as well as workers from the Department of Finances and the Department of Legal Affairs (Gaydu, 2016). At this stage projects are checked against the general criteria of municipal jurisdiction, public interest and potential running expenses. While these criteria are relatively straight-forward, terms such as public interest are ultimately subject to interpretation and thus influenced by the workers in charge. Furthermore, some submissions lack details or concrete information forcing auditors to make assumptions or decisions about submissions without an ability to confer with the authors on their intent (ibid). This need for individual judgement calls is aggravated given the exceptionally tight timeframe of the initial review, obliging workers to process 50 to 60 propositions per day (ibid).

In the end, a lot of leeway is left to civil servants, who even when acting with great care and consideration, lack democratic legitimation. *“Il amène à se poser des questions sur la légitimité des membres de cabinet et du Secrétariat général à les effectuer seuls, sans qu’il existe une possibilité de vérifier l’éthique et la réalité des critères objectives qui doivent les commander.” [It leads to questions about the legitimacy of members of the cabinet or the General Secretary to carry them out on their own, without the possibility of verifying the ethics and the reality of objective criteria that should govern them.]* (Gaydu, 2016, p. 203)

Preselection is undoubtedly necessary in a process the size of Paris PB. There is no way that many thousands of projects can be put to a vote of the general public. There are risks associated with it as well, mainly that of selective listening.

“Si les citoyens sont engagé à exprimer leur point de vue particulier dans le cadre d’un dialogue avec les responsables politiques, ces derniers font librement la synthèse de la discussion, pratiquant une « écoute sélective » des arguments qu’ils intégreront ou non”

[If the citizens are committed to expressing their point of view in a dialogue

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with politicians, the latter freely synthesise the discussion, ‘selectively listening’ to the arguments they will or won’t engage with.] (Yves Sintomer 2007, after Gaydu, 2016, p. 198)

This selective listening is taking place in Paris PB as well. For one there is the loosely defined application of public interest which leads to a broad range of motion. It becomes more obtrusively apparent in the condition that projects are not to contradict tenets of the elected city government in order to uphold the democratically expressed will of the citizenry (Gaydu, 2016). This inability to have contrarian submissions come up for a vote calls into question the notion of unhindered access to expression through the process. *“Elle semble plutôt illustrer la difficulté pour certains élus de sauvegarder un « pouvoir d’action » dans un projet qui visait justement à ses passe de lui” [It seems to rather illustrate the difficulty of certain elected officials to preserve their ‘power of action’ in a project that’s precisely aimed at doing away with that.]* (Douay, 2016).

In practice this keeping of the last word is achieved through the last step of preselection, namely the Ad-Hoc-Commissions both on city- and district-level designated to selecting projects to be put to the vote (Gaydu, 2016). On the city level their primary character is that of an open debate between representatives of the mayoral office, administration, citizen participation such as neighbourhood councils and a draw of project holders (ibid). While arguments can be brought and discussions can be had, the results are purely consultative and the final decisions nominally rests with the mayor herself, in practice probably with members of her staff (ibid).

On the district level this stage of the PB process is again up to the districts themselves, with different actors making up the commissions and with varying levels of adherence to their results. Formally, it is always the district mayor who has the final word, though they can elect to honour what their commission comes up with (Gaydu, 2016).

If interference is necessary, the important aspect is transparency. This transparency consists of knowable criteria, compelling argumentation, clear communication and ideally involvement of affected actors in the process. The levels to which this is achieved in the Paris PB varies according to the stage. In general *“pour chaque refus, les porteurs de projets, anonymes ou nom, reçoivent un message argumenté” [with every dismissal, the project holders, anonymous or named, receive an argued message]* (Douay, 2016). This is a good standard to hold the process to and while that works well for early stages, when there are precise checkpoints to be cleared, it doesn’t always hold true the entire way. Especially projects that make it to co-creation and the Ad-Hoc-Commissions to then be merged, changed or applied to different scales can lose their traceability.

6.3.4.3 MODES AND SETTING

Paris PB is at heart a very digitally-minded process that out of necessity picked up more and more traditional elements along the way. There are at once practical and symbolic reasons for both approaches, with the digital one being put front and centre for its thematic alignment with the modernity and change that PB is supposed to represent on the one hand but also because of its perceived neutrality and objectivity (Vassor, 2019). There is an ubiquity and self-evidence with which the focus on digital channels is approached, which works well below the threshold of perceptibility right up to the point where it doesn't. *“C'est bien là que se situe un problème : l'inversion des pouvoirs promise par la Ville de Paris est construite grâce à un outil numérique qui produit lui-même des rapports de pouvoir naturalisés parce qu'occultés par le fonctionnement technique.”* [That is where the problem lies: the inversion of power promised by the city of Paris is constructed through a digital tool that in itself produces naturalising power relations because they are obscured by the technical functioning.] (Vassor, 2019, p. 3)

The initial choice of favouring digital avenues is a response to the main target audience, namely youths and young adults (Douay, 2016). A digital PB is a new way of reaching them. It offers high centralisation with the website being a one stop shop for submission, information, discussion, voting and keeping up to date with implementation. A digital presence is relatively easy to set up and doesn't require a significant workforce to keep up, as well as being quick, easy and most importantly convenient to use. The process essentially becomes independent from time and space and can, simultaneously, be easy to overview and offer depth if desired.

What makes it difficult is that digital spaces often operate under a perceived neutrality and apoliticality that makes it difficult to argue that the practices and results are not in fact unencumbered by real world inequality (Vassor, 2019). One of these notions is that every group is equally likely to be reached through digital means as if class divides only exist in the physical world. In actuality that is one of the greatest drawbacks from focussing on online participation. Many people, disproportionately those living in low-income neighbourhoods, do not have access to technology readily available or the time or knowledge to seek out such offers online (Douay, 2016). Instead, they are best reached on the ground, in the course of their daily life. For PB this means a strong presence on the street by PB officials and associations, interacting with inhabitants directly, engaging them in exchanges, discussions and helping them find their way around the different phases. Such an approach also reinforced the spatial aspect of the process and fosters a sense of local character and connection. Over the course of the first iteration, paper votes surpass digital ones, with them making up 60% of all votes in 2017 (Moreau & Arhip-Paterson, 2018).

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A point of contention arises when the different mediums are subject to different treatment, as happened in 2015 when the online voting period was spontaneously extended for a week while mobile ballot boxes were collected as planned. Seeing as the target audiences of the two modes don't necessarily overlap, groups favouring digital voting enjoyed potentially greater influence on the results than those inclined towards physical voting (Douay, 2016).

There is also a strong symbolic character that factors into these matters as well.

“Le vote papier est voulu par la mairie qui y perçoit une forte dimension symbolique, en effet, le vote ne consiste pas seulement à glisser un bulletin dans une urne, il y a tout un cérémonial qui l'entoure [...] L'ensemble de ce processus participe à scénariser le vote comme expression collective.”

[Voting on paper is wanted by the city hall that sees a strong symbolic dimension in it, indeed, voting doesn't simply consist of sliding a ballot into an urn, it is a whole ceremonial surrounding it [...] the entirety of the process works towards framing the vote as a collective expression.] (Gaydu, 2016, p. 242)

While doing things digitally stands for modernisation, youth and being dynamic, remaining analogue has connotations of democratic rites, empowerment, tangibility, accountability and community (Gaydu, 2016). Effectively creating and communicating such associations is a vital part of creating a compelling narrative and elevating the status of a process.

6.3.4.4 DECISION-MAKING

Its binding vote is one of Paris PB's defining characteristics. Together with scale and the submission of ideas it is also one of the aspects that is focussed on in the communication surrounding the process (Ville de Paris, 2022b). The binding character of the vote makes it stand out when compared to other PB following a good governance logic, which often treat their results as recommendations. The commitment to respecting participants' expression is, however, somewhat dampened by the ample possibilities for selective listening, preselection and changes performed independently by the administration. There is also the possibility that a project, once it's voted on and actually goes into implementation, cannot actually be completed for reasons such as falsely estimated costs or other kinds of infeasibility, though this reportedly only happens in a small number of cases (Fouillet, 2018).

There are also parts of the voting process itself that can be perceived as flawed. For one the argument that having multiple forms of voting and no fixed voter-roll allows for voting multiple times resulting in manipulation or misrepresentation of the results (Gaydu, 2016). For another, organised groups have it easier to mobilise votes around their projects, thereby creating an unequal playing field which is detrimental to the quality of democratic nature of the process (Fouillet, 2018).

6.3.4.5 EVALUATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability can be conceived of on multiple layers and timeframes. The longer the distance the less precise it becomes in the case of Paris PB. In terms of immediate accountability during the course of the participatory process itself it is rather high, mostly through transparency and the thorough upkeep of the website. The traceability of submissions through the different phases and the stating of reasons for elimination might not allow for input from the side of participants, but at least a feeling of being up to date (Douay, 2016).

Problems start to arise after the conclusion of, in terms of Yves Cabannes (interview, 24 June 2021), the first cycle of PB and the start of the second, namely implementation and evaluation. The implementation of victorious projects happens internally within the established structures of the administration, with little in- and oversight on the side of citizens and even the PB team itself. *“I asked her [a planning student working with the PB team for her research] if she could give me a list of projects; she could not”* (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021). This is not ideal when faith in the performance of the system isn't high to begin with. Delays and changes after the fact lead to frustration and distrust (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021).

The last level of accountability in this context is that of an overarching evaluation or outside research. The Paris PB has neither. Where the former is concerned, the city didn't conduct an evaluation of the first term of PB, at least none that is publicly available or known to the consulted experts in the field. They also didn't do a baseline study nor a continual monitoring of the results of the PB (Y. Cabannes, interview, 24 June 2021). As for the latter, with the resources and workforce stretched thin as it was (see 6.3.1.4 Staffing) there is little to no capacity to accommodate outside qualitative research (G. Allegretti, interview, 4 June 2021). Both of these circumstances are further aggravated by the high turnover-rate in the PB team and the resulting loss of institutional memory.

Participants have no role to play in any of this (see 6.3.2.1 Institutionalisation).

6.3.5 RESULTS

6.3.5.1 PRIMARY

In order to conceptualise the primary results of the Paris PB, it serves to consider the categories under which projects are submitted and processed (see 5.3.2 Submission of Ideas). There are three stages to regard. The distribution in the initial submission stage shows where interests lie and also where participants feel confident in proposing ideas. Then there is retention after the preselection process, showing how well certain categories lend themselves to producing projects in accordance with

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the process. Lastly the winning projects again allow for the expression of citizenry's priorities.

The clear favourites both in the submission and the voting phase are the categories lived environment, environment, and transport and mobility. Those three make up more than half of all projects in 2015, with Cadre de Vie being a quarter of all submissions and 32% of winning projects (Moreau & Vasseur, 2016). This prevalence can be explained through an interest in one's immediate surroundings, reflected in descriptions evoking more appealing design, moving away from cars in favour of people centred roadways and greening in different forms (ibid). Another reason for those categories' dominances is their compatibility with the terms of the PB process. Street redesigns or the planting of trees are both easily localised, squarely in the jurisdiction of the municipality, easy to conceptualise as well as one-time investments.

A counterpoint are the categories of solidarity, housing, and economy and employment. These categories saw relatively low rates of initial submissions and the lowest rate of retention through the preselection process with just four percent of housing submissions being put to the vote in 2015 (Moreau & Vasseur, 2016). This is not reflective of the general attitude of Parisians towards these topics, with them being believed to be very important, but the difficulty of firstly; proposing solutions in the first place and secondly; doing so in a way that fit the criteria of the PB process. At least in the category of solidarity, concerning mainly projects aimed at providing resources for homeless people as well as some disability and elder care initiatives, a resonance in the population can be felt through the third highest success rate of a category during the vote (ibid).

Even projects or trends of projects that don't manage to traverse the preselection or voting phases can have an impact on the development of the city, as they serve as indicators for specific needs that in turn can be picked up on by the concerned administrative department (Gaydu, 2016). What needs to be considered, however, is the at times obtuse nature of implementation. Projects disappeared into the traditional structures of the administration with little to no citizen involvement and a lacklustre level of overview even from the official side (see 6.3.4.5 Evaluation and Accountability).

6.3.5.2 SECONDARY

Beyond the primary results there are ways different groups of actors benefitted from the PB in Paris beyond the concrete implementation of projects. On a general note, the large scale implementation of the Paris PB in connection with the promotional work surrounding it and the aim of establishing the city's scheme as a template fit for other European contexts resulted in a spread of PB initiatives across France (G. Allegretti,

6. Applying the Framework to the Case

interview, 4 June 2021). Cities in other countries, such as Vienna, can be seen structuring their PB efforts in a very similar manner to that of Paris (Stadt Wien, 2022), meaning that the approach gained traction.

There are also effects within the city itself, namely within its administration. Due to having to work transversally over previously rigid department borders, there is a reportedly better knowledge of the distribution of competences and responsibilities (Gaydu, 2016). The process encouraged exchange between agencies who were up to this point separate. “[...] *Pu dialoguer et rencontre chaque semaine des personnes qu’ils n’avaient jamais croisées auparavant.*” [Every week made it possible to interact with and meet people who have never crossed paths otherwise] (Gaydu, 2016, p. 178) This is also cited as a reason for better coordination, resulting in more efficient work by the administration as a whole (ibid). How much of it is born out of necessity to handle the staggering workload brought by PB (see 6.3.1.4 Staffing) is unclear.

Outside the administration, associations participating in PB also had the opportunity to extract some gains from it (Renault-Tinacci & Arhip-Paterson, 2020), mainly in three ways. For one, groups can participate in a regular manner proposing and promoting projects that are in line with their social interests. Such participation can further help them to establish themselves as contributors to public politics. For another, it is a tool for mobilisation. Associations can promote other projects outside the PB alongside their entries or to gain new members. Some mechanics, notably the consolidation of projects, can make this step hard sometimes. A project that is tied together with others cannot be used as a calling card that easily. Lastly, an opportunity for gain is through instrumentalization, by submitting projects that primarily serve the interests of the association itself, without concrete interest in the aspects of direct democracy of the process (ibid).

The group that saw the least additional benefits beyond the process itself are the unorganised, civilian participants. There are no signs of civic empowerment through the offered participation and no implications as far as what Novy and Leubolt (2005) call school of democracy. The limited capacity for deliberation, continual involvement in the life of the project and platforming, when projects get effectively divorced from their authors (see 6.3.3.3 Abilities) (Fouillet, 2018) mean that little political momentum can be derived from the process. The tight control over the evolution of submitted ideas and their preselection behind closed doors (see 6.3.4.2 Preselection Process) also limits the ability for subversive agendas to gain traction.

DISCUSSION

With the theory laid out, the framework constructed and subsequently applied to the case of the Paris PB, insights are possible. Firstly, conclusions from the study of the case are drawn. The basis for reaching findings on the underlying concept and subsequent use of power in the process of the Paris PB is made by laying out the different points in which power relations can be looked for in the context of the PB.

In terms of reaching conclusions about the role of power in the process the stand-alone points, while interesting in their own right, don't offer the whole picture. Most of the relevant insights come from inferring the shared trajectory of multiple points. To arrive at these overarching conclusions, it serves to take a step back and consider which points are interlinked, dependent on one-another or share a common destination if thought through. While a definitive causal link cannot be proven through the information available in the context of this work, thematic similarities do present themselves and can be used to theorise possible connections. Those can in turn be a starting-off point for further research.


In this work these overarching insights are constructed in two ways. Firstly, by using the levels of the established framework as guidance, through the theorising of networks of power in the Paris PB. Secondly by using Flyvbjerg's four questions of Phronetic Planning Research (PPR).

Following the treatment of the four questions of PPR comes a reflection on the accuracy and applicability of the framework itself, both in its capacity for outlining power relations in PB in general as well as in its application to the case of Paris.

As a last step, vantage points for possible further research are proposed.

7.1 NETWORKS OF POWER RELATIONS IN THE PARIS PB

7.1.1 A SUBVERSIVELY CONTROLLED PROCESS



The existence of ways to influence the choice of projects before the vote by the administration is a central aspect in discussing power relations present in the Paris PB. Their creation and the prompt to use them in an effort to keep admitted projects in compliance with the agenda of the city government suggests a desire to keep control over the results of the process. This can be seen in connection with claiming to want a tool for citizen empowerment while not following through with it in practice, at least not to the greatest extent possible.

This desire for a structured, controllable process can be understood in connection with influences from the larger political culture of favouring representative structures and an unfamiliarity with and weariness of participatory processes. Furthermore, the structured approach stands in opposition to the disruptive and critical attitudes characterising the established modes of citizen involvement, those being protest and opposition.

The implementation of the controlled process can be seen in the already mentioned modes of preselection. There the actors of the city and its

administration are either the only actors involved or the ones with the capacity for reaching binding decisions. Another form of control is the establishment of clearcut abilities for participants without any possibility of impacting or expanding upon them on their own accord. There is no institutionalising power given to participants. They cannot decide on the bounds or structure of the process.

The extent to which this level of subversive control impacts the results of the PB process cannot definitively be shown in this work. Overall, the projects coming up for a vote and being implemented align with the agenda of the city government, favouring green spaces, infrastructure for active mobility and social causes. Whether or not that is because the administration made use of its ability to actively preselect or adjust

projects, because participants identifying with these sorts of initiatives felt the most addressed or because of different reasons needs to be studied more closely.

While proving whether or not the possibilities for preselection were being used is beyond the scope of this work, their creation and existence alone, paired with an instruction to have projects not go against city policy, is an indication of intent in and of itself, regardless of its use. Also, the effect on the projects being realised is not the only ramification. Leaving the possibility for influencing the process behind the scenes, even if the possibilities aren't being made use of, plays into the suspicions of those seeing the process itself as an orchestration and a farce to garner sympathy.

7.1.2 A MODEL PROJECT WITH MISMANAGEMENT ISSUES



Another intention behind the PB that is evident through the way it is framed by the initiators is that of becoming an international role model and being perceived as the biggest and most influential PB in Europe. This can be seen in the amount of funding and in having representatives promote the approach to other cities and internationally. The inclination towards using PB as a prestige project can be understood in the context of having to compete with other cities of similar size in social and political perception in addition to purely economic considerations. As such the striving for status is a natural additional benefit to instating an ambitious endeavour such as PB.

Seeking international recognition and acclaim might also factor into the tendency towards a more controlled process. If the process is, at least in part, enacted to demonstrate both Paris' commitment to participation as well as its ability to conduct it in a smooth and productive way, keeping in control of the process and its general results can be advantageous. It offers greater chances at predictable outcomes than opting for a more

ambitious approach, farther from practised systems of power distribution and with greater uncertainty of outcomes.

At the same time that significant funding was allocated to be spent through the PB process and in order to promote it, operational resources, especially in terms of

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staffing, did not reflect that. PB was implemented very quickly to fulfil electoral promises and to show dedication, but was not given sufficient backing behind the scenes with only two civil servants being tasked with its organisation. Even after the pilot year with a steadily enlarged team workload was still overwhelming both in the core team as well as in the thematic departments. The latter were obliged to accommodate the work required through PB on top of their usual responsibilities without additional capacity. This led to significant dissatisfaction within the workforce. While the results of the process did not suffer noticeably, the mental health of the workers did. There were multiple reports of burn-out and a joint resignation of the core-team after the first iteration of PB.

Another aspect that stands in close connection with the overexertion of the staff due to insufficient planning is the lack of monitoring and evaluation. It remains unclear why it was decided to forgo detailed study of the process alongside its implementation. With little effort from the initiators and the inability of the staff to accommodate outside researchers in addition to their high workloads, little knowledge of the process was created. Most of that was quantitative in nature.

While not providing the means to create knowledge of a process is not the same as actively discouraging said creation is not the same, the end result remains. Namely, there is little objective and outside perspective on the efficacy of the approach, which goes against the notion of wanting to act as a model for other cities. On multiple accounts it seems that in the weighing up of outward perception and inward functioning, the former was prioritised.

7.1.3 A PIECE OF PERSONAL LEGACY



A trait of the Paris PB, especially in the early years of its implementation, is its close connection to the person of the mayor Anne Hidalgo. The project was part of her election campaign and one of the first in a long line of internationally renowned progressive urbanism incentives, with later efforts being among others the fifteen-minute city and a strong push for bicycle infrastructure. The ability for a head of government to wield significant influence and to enact prestige projects is in line with the French political culture and its person-centred approach to governing. As such it doesn't seem out of line that reports claim that the continuity of the effort rests in large parts on her personal endorsement of it.


The person-centred approach is apparent in the implementation as well, where early slogans read "Madame la Maire, j'ai une idée" [Madam Mayor, I have an idea]. They were to be used even on the scale of district PBs not directly affiliated with the mayor herself. The close connection between mayor and PB also comes into play with the need to control the process. A process by the mayor should

not produce results that are at odds with the mayor's policies. However, as discussed above the impact that has on the actual results is not within the scope of this work to confirm or deny.

Districts affiliated with her party have significantly higher rates of participation than those affiliated with the opposition. It needs to be acknowledged that several factors correlate in this observation, as political affiliation goes along with wealth and socio-political background. Also, there is reluctance on the level of district governments in participating with a process so closely associated with their political opponent.

Styling the PB so much as Hidalgo's PB rather than a neutral effort of the city can be seen as both help and hindrance in terms of its staying power as well. For one, having the mayor's direct support behind it shields the process in an otherwise sceptical if not hostile administrative apparatus. For another, it seems unlikely that it would survive a change in government, seeing as it is so clearly aligned with the efforts of one party.


7.1.4 REDISTRIBUTION TO A POINT



Counteracting structural inequality is an aim at the forefront of the creation of PB and also apparent in the intentions behind the Paris PB. Using the process to advance a more equitable distribution of funding and participation is apparent in the structuring of the process, most notably in the creation of the dedicated funding of quartiers populaires as well as in the choice of modes used to reach potential participants.

While the socio-economic context of the city makes such efforts necessary, if social justice and redistribution are to be pursued, the context of French political culture is also what hinders its effectiveness. The strict adherence to republicanism and the rejection of concrete and data-led affirmative action stands in the way of political will for equity. The result is that while a considerable and important effort is being made, it can only be made in approximation. Specific areas are reached geographically, but not necessarily the groups who are meant to be reached.

7.1.5 AN EFFORT IN DECENTRALISATION



While there is, even with the concessions to controlling the process, a redistribution of power towards the citizenry as participants through the process of the Paris PB, another, less noted, but arguably no less significant, redistribution took place concerning the relation of districts to the city as a whole. The French system is heavily centralised and there is little need for concessions to opposition of lower levels of government in order to enact policies. As such an entirely city wide, or alternatively entirely city controlled, PB would have been possible in Paris.

However, Hidalgo is concerned with furthering decentralisation, as she is a champion of the local as the most immediate and significant level of governing. This effort towards decentralisation and affording power to the individual districts is reflected in the PB by way of deciding how much of the district funding is to go towards PB, incentivised by a one-to-one matching through the city, as well as leeway in the implementation of district PB in terms of modes of activation and the ability to control preselection.

Consequently, districts have the ability to enact specific modes of activation for certain populations. Through promotion and preselection they may also influence the projects coming up for a vote to a certain degree. How much this degree of independence actually factored into the differences in participations between districts and in the projects enacted on a district level would need to be studied more closely.

7.2 THE FOUR QUESTIONS OF PPR

7.2.1 WHERE ARE WE GOING IN PLANNING?

There are several overarching trends that are suggested by the close study of the Paris PB when it comes to how power relations are utilised and how they are produced.

There is the matter of striking a balance between giving, sharing and keeping power within the process. The political and cultural context in which the effort takes place is satiated with a history of top-down sensibilities, paternalistic attitudes from the elected officials towards the wider population and a limited belief in the intrinsic efficacy and fairness of participatory efforts. While attitudes are changing and a belief in the citizen as a source of insight and as an expert in their lived environment is becoming increasingly prevalent, a reluctance in actually handing over decision power remains.

This reluctance is reflected in the discrepancy between the ideals that are stated and what is actually put into practice, with multiple levels of checks, possible points of intervention and thereby keeping the last word with the initiators of the process.

What results is a sense that participation is allowed only as long as it doesn't stray too far from what was intended to happen by those in traditional positions of power.

This is achieved through subtle and incremental interventions that don't overshadow the stated intention of giving the citizenry the chance to out their demands through open and easily accessible submissions and decide for themselves on what should be done via a binding vote. It is between those two steps that most of the retaining of control takes place, through preselection, the development of projects largely within and through the established administrative structure and ultimately by reserving the right to the last word on what goes out to the vote by the mayors on the city as well as the district level.

By extension, this unintrusive keeping of control furthers a reworking of a formerly radical strategy for citizen empowerment and self-determination into a tool suitable for a good governance logic, by involving citizens without disrupting established structures. This tendency is one that can be observed from the moment PB leaves its origins in Brazil and is by no means exclusive to the Paris iteration.

The lack of citizen involvement in deciding the process and its bounds themselves keeps much of the transformative potential of PB away from participants. While they can enact changes, for example to social or spatial priorities, they are required to do so in a predetermined setting and in an orderly manner that is rather different from the culturally established forms of participation that revolve heavily around opposition, disruption and self-organisation. The image that remains is rather tame.

Another trend that is suggested by the study of the Paris PB is the harnessing of the public image. While the results coming out of the process are central in understanding

the impact of the effort, the existence of the process in and off itself is utilised by the initiators, both internally and externally.

Internally this can be understood through PB as part of a larger political narrative and a measure towards a progressive ideal of what cities should offer and how society should be structured. This political connotation can be seen not least in the association with Paris' mayor Anne Hidalgo as one of her signature projects of transforming the French capital. This intertwining of the two results in a boost for the process by way of her political backing. At the same time, the outright connection hinders it in gaining traction in opposition-lead parts of the city that do not seek to support a rival's project. Putting the mayor centre-front as the person who had and who champions the idea makes the process ostensibly political. This goes against the overall good governance logic the Paris PB operates under, which is largely apolitical.

Externally the results suggest that PB is used as a point of prestige to stand out in the global competition of major cities. The instance on the process being portrayed as the largest of its kind and as a touchstone for what PB can be in a progressive, European context, with a focus on promotion and presentation, suggests a desire to be seen not just as another entry in the extensive list of PB implementations, but also as a model for other cities.

7.2.2 WHO GAINS AND WHO LOSES THROUGH WHICH MECHANICS OF POWER?

The main stated focus of any PB is what it affords to the participants taking part in it. In the case of Paris, they gain a way of putting forth their ideas and the possibility to cast binding votes on where a part of the investment budget is to be spent. Furthermore, they gain a more transparent system that doesn't require extensive knowledge of funding or administrative structures to navigate. What they do not gain is a substantial way of shaping the process of PB itself or expanding its bounds on their own accord. The only way for them to enact influence beyond the scope that is afforded to them by the initiators is by raising topics in such a way that they get added to the regular working of the government or administration, effectively demonstration political support for them outside of regular elections.

Some groups, namely the residents of quartiers populaires, stand to benefit from the Paris PB even further by receiving specific attention and funding as well as efforts in outreach. Again, it is not them bringing this about actively. Also, while special attention is paid geographically, this does not necessarily reflect in who is actually reached, as the approach is still place- and not actor-based.

On a less immediate level the municipal districts gain through the PB as well through decentralisation of power. They are given range of motion in how they want to run

their part of the process as well as how much of their budget they want to pledge to it. In a centralised system like the French this constitutes a significant shift in ability.

Lastly, there is the city government, with mayor Hidalgo and arguably the image of the city itself. Besides, or rather through, giving some degree of decision power to participants, political capital is gained, as an image of a modern, progressive and inclusive urbanism can be invoked. In the same vein, there's also international attention and recognition. All the while the risk is held down through keeping control over the course of the preselection, elaboration and implementation portions of the process. If anything, by making sure that only projects in line with the government's course can make it to a vote, any results more or less explicitly endorse said course.

7.2.3 IS THIS DEVELOPMENT DESIRABLE?

On its most basic level both the practice of PB in general as well as the Parisian case stand for trust in the ability of the citizenry to have valuable insight and input into the development of their surroundings. For all its imperfections, Paris PB is a process that is open beyond the constraints of traditional elections. There is commitment to transparency in the form of argued feedback and an up-to-date website. There is care being taken to challenge spatial priorities through allotting specific funds to quarters populaires and there is a binding vote that is respected by the city government.

All these points need to be acknowledged and their weight in challenging traditional distributions of power recognised. At the same time, there are less desirable tendencies both in the way the process is handled concretely and in what it stands for.

As far as the process itself is concerned, there are two points that stand out. The first is the use of the process as a tool for political gain. That, in and of itself, is not an issue. Every project initiated by a politician exists at least in part to serve the renown it can generate. In the case of Paris that concerns the outside view of Paris as a whole as well as the mayor Hidalgo. Her name and the weight it holds help the process.

Some go so far as to say that it's the only thing keeping it around. At the same time, it's a hindrance. Tying a process meant for everyone to one person and her politics all but forces her opponents to oppose it and potentially jeopardises its staying-power in the event of political change.

The second point is the matter of putting on a process with the stated intent of making it the biggest in the world, without the willingness to put adequate resources behind it. This results in burning out the people who work and genuinely care for it all while not being willing to listen to their concerns. Disregard for the well-being of the people tasked with a project the political leadership stands to profit from is very disconcerting. Not only does it put undue burden on the civil servants, it also risks the

quality and long-term sustainability of the process in the name of looking quick, agile and impressive out front. It is the responsibility of anyone in a position to bring about a process to do so without causing undue stress or even harm.

In terms of overarching significance, the biggest issue is the rift between what is set out to be achieved and what is actually possible in the process. Holding on for control behind the scenes and reducing the political influence possible to be wielded through the process takes away from the image of what PB can be. Ultimately, it's a weighing of the benefits of more participation against the drawbacks of that participation being controlled to a certain degree. In the case of the Paris PB freedom of action for participants is still given, but critics can't be faulted for accusing the process of alluding to offering more possibilities for change than it actually does.

7.2.4 WHAT, IF ANYTHING, SHOULD WE DO ABOUT IT?

There are lessons to be taken away from the study of power in the process of Paris PB, ones that may well be applicable to other similar processes. They are relevant to everyone implicated in such an endeavour, whether that be as an initiator or planner who gets to make decisions on its nature, as a participant who seeks to navigate it or as a spectator observing from the outside.

Firstly, if the stated intentions behind a process invoke ideals of empowerment or power redistribution, the implementation should reflect that. Participants should be trusted with the ability to meaningfully impact the process as well as the results, even in ways not previously expected or preordained by the initiators.

A way of ensuring that would be more deliberation rather than behind the scenes adjusting along the way. For the Paris PB that could mean that the commissions for finalising the project lists wouldn't be merely advisory with a single person having the ability to make the last call. Similarly, while efforts towards transparency like the ones seen in the Paris PB are necessary and commendable, the next step is a possibility of input in these steps rather than just information after the fact.

Next, if a process is expected to fill an important role in the governance and participation structure of a city, it needs to be given the means to be conducted properly. Resources for the departments as well as for the people that are expected to carry out the work are essential for a smooth working, stability and institutional memory.

There also needs to be an upfront attitude towards outside influences and the weight they hold. Mitigation is only possible if there is acknowledgement of the situation, careful study of the issues and deliberate and specific actions being taken. The funding for the quartiers populaires is an important step in that direction, but not accurate enough to fully address the problem of systemic social inequalities.

As far as the influence of the Paris PB beyond the city itself is concerned, a more decisive attitude towards evidence-based actions might serve as well. If the city wants to act as a role model it should invest in more comprehensive monitoring and evaluation so that others are able to make informed decisions on whether or not to follow its course.

Lastly, some general observations about the nature of power in the Paris PB can be kept in mind. Power doesn't need to be upfront and clearly discernible to be present. Instead, it favours subtleness, appearing in the repercussions of every decision made. In the same vein, it isn't limited to big displays either. A dozen tiny decisions and tweeks that in themselves don't have big results can accumulate into a force driving the outcomes in a certain direction. Everyone and everything are subject and source of power relations and it serves to keep that in mind whenever one finds themselves in a position to make a decision one way or the other.

7.3 OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE CHOSEN APPROACH

Finding a way of comprehensively representing a process as potentially expansive as PB in a structured and workable way is not an easy feat. For one, deconstructing a process as well as its outside influences and repercussions into its components is challenging. There is the risk of overlooking essential pieces and even with everything considered detangling them is a delicate balance to strike. Leaving points too big or creating groupings that are too broad doesn't allow room for individual aspects to unfold and become clearly visible. At the same time, trying to split things that are intertwined or even dependent on one another can make fleshing them out later on more difficult.

For another the arranging of the separated components is to be consider. What structure, levels and groups are used in the construction of the framework influences what conclusions can be most easily drawn from the results as it shapes the way each point gets looked at and understood in its context. Different backgrounds, referenced works and personal preferences are likely to result in different frameworks. In the end, however, there is no one right way of structuring the framework. Many other arrangements can be equally valid, even if they result in a slightly different end result.

What matters, ultimately, is that the chosen framework meets certain criteria. It needs to be concrete enough to provide support and structure in working with the case at hand. There needs to be a balance struck between offering enough room for every point deemed relevant to be considered with adequate attention and being simple enough to be comprehensible without the risk of any point falling through due

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to excessive complexity. Ideally, the framework is intuitive enough to make patterns and connections visible.

The biggest take-away from actually applying the framework in a search of an understanding of power in the process of the Paris PB is that the filled framework is not the endpoint of its application. Rather it's the starting point for effectively seeing and interpreting the individual points of power that are made visible by the framework into broader conclusions on the process as a whole.

There are other insights made clear by the application of the framework to the case as well. The relevancy of any given point can only be judged at the end, at the interpretation stage. Small aspects that are not necessarily notable on their own can add up to a bigger picture. This was the case with how the city of Paris effectively kept control of the PB and its results, while projecting a different picture outwardly. It happened not at a single point, but through an interplay of small and subtle choices at multiple points and levels. In the same vein, points that initially appear significant can feature in the results to a lesser degree. Early on, the absence of comprehensive evaluation of the process seemed like a crucial aspect, but, while still relevant and noteworthy, didn't feature in the conclusions drawn to that extent.

In a similar fashion, the character or content of any point or group may also be subject to change through the practical application. Some points might not be present at all, as was the case for considerations of gender sensitivity in the Paris PB. Other points might be there, but in a different way. In the outline of the framework, hierarchy is considered mainly as the relation between the officials of city government and the citizenry, while it comes to mean the relations within the official side, namely between the city and the districts, in the applied framework.

Some aspects also prove to be more substantial than initially thought. That is the case for the importance of the various steps of preselection in keeping the reins of the process with the city as well as in the significant role the person of mayor Hidalgo played both in the conception and the reception of the PB. There is also the option for heretofore unnoticed points to become apparent through the application. The role of prestige and competition with others around it as an intention behind the creation and the character of PB isn't part of the outlined framework for considering PB, but is vital in understanding the case of Paris.

Overall, the application worked well. As the case of the Paris PB was the starting point of this research, the framework was influenced at least in part by that prior familiarity. In practice, modifications are still necessary and this would apply to the study of any other case through the means of this framework. The framework is a starting

point and a tool in reaching insights out of which conclusions can be constructed. To that end it served its function in this work well.

7.4 FURTHER RESEARCH

There are multiple possible points of departure for expanding on this work, both in keeping with the case of the Paris PB and in departing from it. Given the choice to offer as comprehensive an overview of power in the process as possible, concessions for depths needed to be made. On any level of the framework, every group and every point more substantial work is possible. One point where that is especially true is that of the results and their impacts. This work concerned itself mainly with the process and its structure, without an in-depth analysis of the projects it produced.

The networks of power that are suggested by the application and interpretation of the applied framework are also points that warrant closer study. Especially when it comes to the causal links between the levels and to the results of the process as a last consequence, a closer study and more information would be necessary to establish the validity of the implied assumptions.

Beyond the case of Paris, a comparison between it and a city following a similar approach, for example Vienna, might yield insights into similarities and points of departure as well as conclusions on what parts of the process of Paris PB are judged as desirable internationally.

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ANNEX

RELEVANT EXCERPTS OF THE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS

GIOVANNI ALLEGRETTI 04.06.2021 VIA ZOOM

Giovanni Allegretti (GA) | Theresa Rihs (TR)

GA [06:25]: I think, here, that is the first limit that the participatory budgeting in Paris has to face is related to the French political model. The French political model is very centralistic and very centralised way of governing. The electoral model of big cities is based on arrondissement, the election of people in their arrondissement, to their parts of the thematic sectors of the municipality, is not fitting with the participatory processes. They want to be transversal. It tends, the system, I mean, the electoral system, the political science system, that presides through the architecture of anything, including participatory processes in Paris, it is opposite of what you need when you want to create a cross-cutting system, because it tends to separate and juxtapose different but equal members on specific issues, that when they go out from their issues, they are not looked at as in any positive way, but look like invaders, that are invading your area and that's a big problem of PB everywhere.

[08:13] PB, except in the places where the mayor has it in his or her office, and this is the case in Porto Alegre, when you don't create an office strictly linked to the mayor and PB relies on a, let's call it thematic counsellor, so a person of the Executive Council, which is in charge of specific themes, this can be very, very difficult challenge, because every time you enter into an issue that is not yours, you are accused of invading a territory of another person and that for me is the origin of the creation of a sort of tense relations between the responsible of participation and the process which puts a lot of stress especially on the technical people, the civil servants, because it obliges them to do the work of other's departments which tend to close themselves. Paradoxically it's maybe more easy to conduct the thematic participatory budgeting of Paris, the one in the schools and the one in the, in the HLM, in the social neighbourhood area, because they can concentrate on their relation between the team of the budget and specific thematic teams. They don't touch all the knowledgeable of the municipality, they don't impose the stress of trying to negotiate something that for the other is marginal, and for you, in your office, is central, as PB. This is something structural, that is the first limit of PB.

[10:29] Obviously, the other element of French culture, that exists in this PB is, that it is quite top down. For example, it's hyper protected in this sense. You can imagine, for example, the factor of being mainly online. I say, mainly, because in the dimension of the spin-off, of the participatory budgeting, the one with children in schools and the one of social neighbourhoods, the online dimension was diluted with meetings and these kinds of things. It's in general, you can define it as a hybrid model of participatory budgeting, but I think its fingerprints as the online fingerprint never changed so much.

[11:12] And this online fingerprint was a landmark, a sort of indicator of this tendency of being a controller of the system. For example, in Madrid or Barcelona the participatory budgeting, the online part had a strong relation with the community of civic actors, that were the systems that were called "Council" and "Decidim", which were two platforms which were open platforms, born in European projects. They had to be open and free and they could be used by other cities, they could be reused and they had the community of actors, that was continuously improving them.

[12:15] The system of Paris, even if it is a public system, is kind of a proprietary platform, in the way that is conceived. I am not talking necessarily of the issue of property and in technical terms, I'm talking about the conception. The conception is centralized and it is top down. It is a typical conception of a city that has the money to do this, to do its own system, but is not building it to share generously with the round-about cities. The way in which Paris communicates its perfection with other people, other cities, especially in the

round-about, especially those, who have elements in common, who could be –. There are cities like Grenoble, in which PB exists at municipal and at metropolitan level. The metropolitan PB is something, that has the need to dialogue with other cities in the metropolitan area.

[13:29] Paris is very centred, I would say centripidus; tends to be the centre of everything and the others are eventualities. And I think that in a system – I'm looking to the world system of participatory budgeting, which is a place of interchange where, for example in Portugal, we have an association of participatory municipalities, which are continuously interchanging methods and civil servants, are learning from each other. They are building events, training events, in which they can learn from the other, they're even doing cooperation in development with southern countries where they learn from the other even, in PB.

[14:22] I think that the system in Paris has been very self-referential, which did not make it evolve a lot. More than evolving I think Paris added modules. This un-evolving system in some moments became a barrier and in the last year – I mean I don't think that it is the pandemic, that is the problem. The real problem, at least, how it was declared by the mayor in the newspaper, was that they couldn't follow the rhythm of proposals they had approved, and so the implementation was very slow and this was frustrating people, frustrating the municipality, that would like to have a return in electoral terms from PB and now the decision of reducing PB ambitions from next year on. This comes from the same limit of neoliberal unlimited growth. PB cannot grow limitlessly, because there are practical problems of human resources they never took really in charge.

[15:56] In my view, PB works – PBs work, when there is a balance between the work you do with citizens, the work you do with politicians and the work you do with civil servants; the machine, the political representation and the citizenship. These three elements have to be balanced and Paris is in a situation in which it has a lot of movements in the city, so lots of even sceptical movements, that know that politics are self-referential and have different ways of contact with politics, which are under the name of, I would say, participation by rupture. So, protest, pressure, this kind of things that do not accept to be inside the invited spaces.

[16:58] On one side there is this very tense human environment and that explains why PB was put together with the voluntariat, the benevolent association. The vice-mayor in charge of PB was also in charge of a lot of other things in civil society. In order to try to keep the two things together, but didn't manage, in reality, in my view.

[17:30] There has been a very interesting conference on the twenty-third of November, I can send you the program, so you can see the titles and the people who are working on these things, because I have been in all of the conferences and there were people working exactly on the position of civic groups towards participatory budgets. There was a classification of the sceptical, of the enemies and the co-opted, so those that say: I don't believe in it, but let's use it as a way to enter into contact with the municipality, an instrumental use of PB, as a way to reinforce the advocacy capacity of participatory budgets.

[18:20] A big component of politics has not been dealt with in the most serious way. The mayor has been protecting participatory budgeting for several years. There was a political appointee to participatory budgeting, Pauline Veron, until recently, and then: the desert. Sometimes some legs in the arrondissements, the arrondissement system is also linked to the general system of Paris, because the counsellors are elected in the arrondissements, but that was another component, that was not very strong. PB was not located in the mayoral office, but the mayor was the only protector of PB. The majority of other politicians were, in my view, almost on the border of boycotting. In the best cases, were not taking care of it, and the third component has been almost ignored, which is civil servants. Nobody worked the civil servants towards concentric core groups in the sense that you must have a core group, obviously, in the department dealing with participation, but you need people which are receptive and fast intervening in all the other areas of human topics where PB can incise, where it can take on decisions.

[20:04] It worked well, when there was a single relation between PB people and a single department, as there was even a quasi co-management with that department, as in the case of PB for social neighbourhoods which, as you know, had a sort of bridge with the general PB, because there was for several years, the need of

spending a part of PB money in social neighbourhoods. In these years, there was a stronger relation between social neighbourhoods and PB department, that then became stronger, with the creation of a specific PB for the common spaces in the HLM areas.

[21:09] What does it mean, normally, to take care of a team? Being careful of their fears, their over-burdens, their psychological stress. All these things were not done. You continuously had people going out and out and out and out from the PB team and people were moving and changing all of the time, and we need to have stability. You have a big risk, because personal memory is fundamental in PB.

[21:45] There was a study coordinated by Yves Cabannes recently at Musia University about why people do not participate, and the first answer was: communication is too complex and the second answer was, I think it was the second problem: we talk with people who are not permanent enough, we have the impression that the PB is managed by passengers, that are going there and then disappearing. This does not give people the impression to be incising into institutions. And I think the ignorance of this problem, which I can translate into small words: PB workers were not considered as participants.

[22:36] When I think about participants in a construction of a PB, I think about people, but also about workers, because workers are also citizens. And they can have enthusiasm and they can direct votes or evaluation towards a single thing instead of another. They can be gatekeepers, so you have to take them into account, and when you ignore them as actors, as meaningful actors of the system, you make mistakes.

[23:06] That, I think, are the things that have been weakening the PB of Paris in time, which does not mean that the PB of Paris has not been very important for the world and for France, because after Paris started a PB, a network of almost 100 municipalities was created. This year, the national meeting of French PBs as 800 participants online, in reality PB in Paris had a visibility and a political commitment, which is to be declined in sense of absolute money put in PB. Paris was, after the Brazilian cases, the most expensive PB in the world, both for the organization and for the money that was at stake, but, as you know, that doesn't mean that PB in Paris was particularly rich. There are municipalities around the world, which are smaller and spend much more than Paris, in PB. But 500 million was astonishing and it was news, it was making news. Especially because Madrid, in the same period, entered into a sort of competition with Paris. The visibility made very good service to PBs in France, all over France, especially in the metropolitan area of Paris. But it was not able to create a permeability, that could improve Paris PB.

[24:45] Paris PB acted as a sort of self-sufficient animal. Something that has not anything to learn from the other, but always thinks, it has a lot to teach to the others. And that was another problem, because they were always in events speaking and talking about the PB in Paris. And they were reducing the reduced number of the people they had in their department, because some have to be every day somewhere talking about it.

[25:25] This generated, obviously, a sort of imbalance also in the studies done on PB. Because, of course they had no energy to help the people to study. People worked on the open data in a very numeric way, based in a lot of cross-referencing of numbers and obviously with numbers, you can destroy everything, because in the end, not the number of participants, not the value of money, not the number of projects really happening in Paris, are sufficient for generating a final assessment of a good process. This factor, that they were not having any more time to help studies to be more qualitative to discover surprises, made the image of PB in Paris blur in time.

[26:34] I wanted to focus different dimensions, because I think these dimensions are all interlinked.

[26:39] Now, as a person interested in the area of planning, what could you do? In my view, there are still some under-observed things. Let's say the participatory budgeting of Paris in terms of the one in HLM is something that is not totally new, there is Toronto, for example, there has been Courtier (?) years before, with Logi-Park doing PB in social housing areas, so it's not totally new, but it's understudied. In order to emerge more I suggest to study things that are understudied. Something of this understudied is that how the obligation of PB to have a part devoted to social neighbourhoods was a good bridge for the next project, which is the HLM PB. You could transit from a general PB to the sectoral PB, passing through this rule: how

important was this rule for distribution, for concentration? But how did it work in practical terms? How much –? Because PB in Paris is almost a bourgeois PB, because Paris is a bourgeois city.

[28:35] The issue is that the ladies who do projects, you can see them physically, you understand soon, that they are middle or middle to high class movements. In a city so large that, although being a rich city, because the poor, the poverty, is downloaded to the nearby municipalities, there are bags of poverty in Paris, in the HLM areas. The question is how was Paris able to go beyond its bourgeois dimensions or more specifically, in another way –. For example, you could wonder, because you work with people, who are more sceptical of politics, normally, in poor areas. Did Paris – one of the questions – do an extra effort? For example, to implement the things fast, because these people only believe the things they see, like St. Thomas, you know?

[29:46] While a group of older ladies, who want to feed the pigeons – I’m taking a real project here, in Paris – could wait or could do pressure in order to get their thing; in the social area, they don’t do this, so what kind of extra effort did the municipality of Paris put in trying to secure true *fidélisation* (retention) of its potential audiences in the poor areas through, for example, working in a different way on implementation and on monitoring?

[30:28] I don’t know, that there were people monitoring. Because – this is very French, very centralized. You co-decide in the maximum case. Then you leave it to the traditional way of doing policy, the implementation. In other countries, it is common to have people’s involvement in monitoring, because the people, they don’t believe that things will happen, then. They just think they are promises. Even PB is doing promises. Are they happening? No. We know that in Paris many things were not happening or were not happening soon. What kind of a rearrangement of these two points, the machine and the political will, that have been working in an area where they were not granting their participation in PB but had a specific, let’s say, positive discrimination or affirmative action.

[31:33] The question is, is the way that – because France does affirmative action, they do it in a very childish way. And that is because of their bloody republicanism. Because their republicanism imagines that – sorry, but I come from an area of positive discrimination which sees a lot of problems in the French way of behaving, which is: if we are French, we are all equal. That is not true. Because person who has an Arab name will not find his or her job as easily or someone who has a veil will not find a job as easily as a blue-eyed person. The fact, that they cannot do any research with race or ethnicity involved – they cannot even have data in the census – doesn’t allow do evidence-based politics and policies. In PB, it is the same: if you don’t analyse the problems of the people in the periphery, you will not build a strong process, you need for helping these people to believe in what they naturally do not believe in. So, even PB needed other acts of positive discrimination or affirmative action. But I doubt that they happened. And I think that is a good question you could do to yourself, is how was positive discrimination for this neighbourhood declined it in PB? Did it touch the technical staff? Did you have participation in the construction? Were workers prepared to dialogue with people, where they are controlling what was happening? Are those changes that are needed to make a PB function, especially in poor areas, where they put in place or was everything a general scheme that was fractally happening in the same way at every level without taking into account the specificities of the place?

MARC BOURDIER 14.06.2021 VIA ZOOM

Marc Bourdier (MB) | Theresa Rihs (TR)

TR [00:00] : Alors, je suis en train de faire mon thèse et aujourd’hui, le sujet c’est plusieurs la réaction et comment le budget participatif est vue dans la population mais aussi dans la cercle des gens qui travaillent sur l’urbanisme et dans cette champs. Il y a l’information de la ville de Paris bien sûre, mais ça c’est dans une angle assez positif, bien sûre, parce que la ville le faire et la ville veut le présenter un beau image, mais j’ai déjà lu des vues de la critique contre le budget participatif et la façon de laquelle il était fait et aussi j’ai entendu quelque chose sur le changement dans le budget après la dernière élection municipal alors j’ai des questions sur ça et peut-être s’il y a des informations politique, municipaux, comment c’était vue à Paris et

s'il y a des choses sur terrain, des réactions et tout ça. Si vous pouvez parler de votre expérience avec le budget participative ça serait très utile.

MB [02 :36] : C'est tout ? Pour le moment c'est tout ce que tu veux ? On commence la conversation. Je n'ai pas d'expérience avec le budget participatif. Je n'ai pas d'expérience. Mais c'est une bonne illustration. Ça dire ça ne m'intéresse pas. Pourtant tu sais que ces sont des sujets qui m'intéresse beaucoup, la démocratie, donc, je n'ai pas confiance. Je n'ai pas confiance dans cette politique-là. La discussion que nous avons là, c'est la discussion qui rentre dans le débat entre démocratie représentative et démocratie participative. Mais ce n'est pas comme ça, à côté que ça s'passe. C'est celle-là qui est dans celle-là. C'est-à-dire que c'est une démocratie participative proposé par la démocratie représentative. Il reste encore la contrôle de la démocratie représentative. Le cadre est là. Très importante. Nous sommes une république ici. On n'est pas une démocratie. La France est une république, pas une démocratie, pour moi. C'est une tradition. Tous les pouvoirs centraux sont très puissants. L'état en niveau du pays et après tu descende dans les différentes échelles. La mairie, dans la ville de Paris. Très puissante, très puissante.

[04 :37] et ça marche dans le deux sensés : beaucoup de pouvoir et de top-down et beaucoup de révocation, de contestation, bottom-up. C'est la tradition.

[04 :58] Après, la ville de Paris est une ville riche. Donc, elle peut se permettre de proposer le budget participatif parce qu'elle a l'argent pour le faire. Donc, je crois que c'est cent millions d'Euros par an. Cent. Millions. D'Euros. Par an. C'est beaucoup. Ce qu'il faut bien regarder c'est ça -. Si tu veux, il y a à deux choses qu'il faut regarder, mais ça tu le sais peut-être déjà : quelles sont les propositions, non, ça tu ne peux pas le savoir, que ce qui est financé concrètement ? Quelles sont les projets - normalement bah, ceci c'est tout simple tu es citoyen, tu peux aller sur le site de la ville de Paris, tu proposes et après il y a des commissions qui disent okay, oui, non, oui, non. Donc ce qu'il faut voire c'est non pas qui propose, parce que ça on ne sait pas, mais quelles sont les projets qui sont retenues ?

MB [08 :24] : Comment essayer d'avoir une opinion critique sur ça ? Il faut, à mon avis, inverser la question. C'est-à-dire il faut pas regarder si on est pour ou contre le budget participatif il faut bien inverser la question. Quelle est le problème à Paris aujourd'hui ? Donc ça tu inverse la chose, c'est-à-dire quelles sont les problèmes spécifiques à Paris aujourd'hui et comment ces problèmes là on peut le retrouver dans le budget participatif ?

[09 :06] Et ça, tu vas toute suite comprendre qu'il y a un décalage. C'est-à-dire le budget participatif c'est de l'animation. C'est un peu des marionnettes, quoi. Paris est riches, Paris s'offrir des marionnettes pour son milieu de réparent. Je ne dis pas c'est qu'il n'est pas intéressant, mais si tu veux, c'est, enfin, de la décoration. C'est normal. Parce que nous sommes une république, parce que c'est la ville de Paris. Alors, après bien évitement toutes les personnes qui soutiennent la mairie actuelle sont favorables à des choses comme ça et disent que c'est très bien que les habitants participent. Mais ils participent pour des choses qui n'ont pas beaucoup d'intérêt.

[10 :01] Ils ne sont pas des choses fondamentales. Ce qui est fondamentale pour la maire de Paris c'est que ça le budget participative existe. Après c'est donc, c'est ça, c'est secondaire.

MB [15 :49] : Cette type de politique. Je pense que fondamentalement quand une équipe municipale a été élu elle considère qu'elle doit tout décide, y compris le budget participative [rire] tous vient d'en haut et redescend. Les vrai revendication d'en bas et qui remontent, c'est pas vrai. C'est sûr qu'il faut comprendre la situation politique parisienne. Tu as des loyers qui grimpent, les prix pour le mètre carré qui montent aussi, petite a petit tous les gens qui n'ont pas beaucoup d'argent sont objets de quitter Paris. Ça ? Le budget participatif ? C'est pour ceux qui restent ! Ce n'est pas fait pour ces qui partent. Les plus pauvres partes, et donc, ça c'est pour les plus riches, si je peux caricature un extrême.

[16 :55] Et ça, tu le devine, parmi nous tu as très bien senti les choses. Où est-ce que ces vont qui quittent Paris ? Pas à la première couronne, parce que ça c'est déjà plain. En Montreuil, l'année dernière on a bien compris que les gens qui en travaillent ce n'étaient pas les plus pauvres, non plus. N'est pas ? De coup ils sont aller plus loin

[17 :20] Je n'y crois pas. Ils veulent d'un processus démocratique ect. Je crois à ces qui se battent. Là, c'est intéressant, ces qui se battent contre le politique, en proposant des choses nouvelles, comme ce que sur que nous avons travaillons l'année dernière. Je ne crois pas à cette -. Pour moi c'est une farce, un pantomime, une pièce de théâtre, de comique.

[18 :00] C'est beaucoup d'argent quand même, non ? Je sais que c'est pas tout à fait ce que tu t'attends, mais de moi, je ne peux pas dire plus.

TR [18 :17] : Non, vraiment je ne suis pas très surprise. Oui, j'ai lu tous les choses sur le budget. C'est fascinant, parce qu'il y a des autres villes ou il y avait des budgets participatifs assez bottom-up, alors j's'pas, Barcelona, des villes de Brésil et tout ça, mais à Paris : on a l'idée de le faire, mais la ville le faire, pas la population. Je pense que c'est fascinant, même si c'est pas très participative.

MB [19 :15] : Oui, oui mais bien sûre ! Tu as raison. C'est intéressant à cause de ça. Même si c'est un echec, c'est intéressant. Ou même si c'est pas intéressent, c'est intéressant, parce qu'il n'est pas intéressent.

TR [19 :30] : Alors, une chose qui m'intéresse aussi, c'est le changement de la position de la ville. Je pense qu'il y avait une façon du changement parce que on m'a dit que presque tout l'équipe du budget participatif a quitté après la dernière élection, il y avait des très grands changements dans l'équipe et aussi dans la statue du budget participatif dans la ville. Je suis très intéressé de ça parce que c'est pas assez claire de l'extérieur, on trouve beaucoup sur le début, les premières années on trouve cet étude-là, mais j'ai pas trouvé rien sur une évaluation après le première période, ça ce me semble étrange parce que est-ce qu'il y a une façon d'évaluation ou pas ? Beaucoup d'argent et un processus très grand, alors il faut une évaluation, non ? Mais j'ai pas le trouve je voudrais savoir s'il y en a ou pas et si la ville elle-même pense que c'était un succès ou pas.

MB [21 :39] : On ne saura jamais si la ville pense que c'est un succès, moi je pense que la ville vit ça comme une obligation, pas comme une politique. La ville de Paris, le parti socialiste doit faire un budget participatif ! Après, l'évaluation, c'est surtout un peu compliqué, l'évaluation, parce que si on parle évaluation on doit regarder dans l'argent et là on faut pas toucher. Là, on est en plein campagne électorale maintenant, l'année prochaine sont les élections, c'est un peu compliqué.

MB [25 :15] : En plus, dans le budget participatif il y a deux choses : il y a budget et il y a participatif. Et ça ce sont les deux qu'on rencontre. On a un peu d'argent pour faire des choses qui font plaisir aux autres mais si tu regardes juste participatif, là il y a des processus beaucoup plus lourde, mise en place par la loi nationale que les villes, donc Paris, doivent appliquer.

[25 :58] Je me rappellerai toujours comment ça s'appelle, éco quartier, tu as sans doute écouté parler de ça l'année dernière. C'étaient des opérations énormes de participation des habitants, éco, développement durable, économie, société, environnement. Et c'est là qu'on a vu les tensions. Il y avait un éco quartier juste à côté de l'agence dans le XIIIe. la conséquence était la destruction du tissu associative par la participation. C'était fou. Quand le processus se démarre, les petites associations de quartier étaient sollicités, mobilisés et des grosses associations nationales ils sont venus et ils ont fait une opération avec la mairie. Greenpeace, des trucs énormes. J'ai vu, je connaissais, j'ai vu un jour arrive à l'agence Greenpeace, qui m'a dit : on va s'investir au quartier. Mais qui vous êtes, vous ? On est pas du quartier, non, mais ça vous intéresse ? Alors ce participation-là ? Qui participe ? Ça c'est très important. Est-ce que c'est individu ? Est-ce que c'est structure ? Est-ce que c'est association locale ? Est-ce que c'est association nationale ? Est-ce que c'est lobby ?

[27 :35] Il y aurait peut-être quelque chose d'intéressant à faire, mais c'est pas facile, les mairies des arrondissements et la mairie de Paris publicisent régulièrement des revues, et il faut peut-être regarder dans les articles qui sont publiés par la ville de Paris, mais qui sont écrit par le parti d'opposition à la ville de Paris. Maintenant je suis dans le XVIe, et le XVIe est dirigé par un parti d'opposition à la Mairie, donc là, ils sont contraires, ils sont exactement le contraire. Il y a pas assez, il y a pas assez ...

MB [31 :00] : C'est très compliqué. En tout cas, ce qui est sûr c'est qu'aujourd'hui en France il y a quatre pouvoirs et ça, c'est vrai. Il y a le privé, l'économie privé, il y a l'état, il y a les collectivités locales et il y a la société civile. Ce qui t'intéresse ce celle-là : la société civile. La société civile s'organise en associations et elle a des projets. L'année dernière on a retourné à Montreuil on a rencontré des nouvelles personnes, qu'est-ce qu'ils font ? Les gens ont des projets ils ont trouvé des endroits et ils cherchent d'argent. Qu'est-ce qu'ils font ? Ils font, pour trouver de l'argent, ils essayent de frapper à la porte de tous les endroits, mairie, le département, la région, l'état, tout qu'il y a quelque chose qui est possible pour leurs projets et hop on le cherche. Et ça marche. Ce système-là il est en place, mais il n'est pas spécifique au budget participatif. C'est pas vraiment un budget participatif, c'est plus des initiatives populaires et associatif qui cherchent des budget pour en avoir réaliser.

[32 :56] : Par exemple il y a beaucoup de structures publiques, ville, département, région, grand Paris, petit Paris, moyen Paris et tout qui ont un peu d'argent pour justement ça. Ils lancent des appels d'offres, comment on a vu l'année dernière à Montreuil, ce s'appelle des appels à projet. La Mairie de Montreuil dit : Proposez-nous des projets. Et là les gens qu'on fréquentait l'année dernière, l'association des Murs-à-pêches, il répond régulièrement et généralement à la mairie il ne marche pas très bien, alors on cherche de l'argent d'ailleurs. C'est d'appel d'offre, pas budget participatif mais d'appel d'offre.

[33 :50] Le budget participatif c'est une de possibilités pour l'argent de faire quelque chose, mais c'est plus intéressant quand les initiatives vont d'en bas, on a vue des choses passionnantes, on a retourné à Montreuil un peu comme l'année dernière et puis on a fait un autre projet à Montreuil, mais avec des étudiants de master. On travaille sur un truc vraiment fou, ce s'appelle les territoires de l'alimentaire en projet. C'est de la folie, mais c'est passionnant. Il y a une équipe qui travaille sur la sole, une autre équipe qui travaille sur l'eau portable, une autre équipe qui travaille sur la réintroduction de la production alimentaire dans les villes, il y en a un autre qui travaille sur le compost. C'est passionnant.

[35 : 27] Et là on rencontre des gens qui sont incroyable, des gens imaginatives, des gens qui font des choses, mais ils ne s'intéressent pas le budget participatif. Ils vont à la mairie directement disent : Alors, voilà, Madame, le projet est-ce que vous pouvez nous aider ? Et la mairie dit oui/non, c'est pas grave, on faire aller voire -.

MB [43 :38] : Mais ça tu le sais, quand tu améliore les infrastructures dans une ville, et bien il y a des gens qui partent. Quand tu améliore la qualité de la vie dans une ville, dans la république française, ça veut dire que y a des gens qui vont être exclu de cette amélioration-là. Mais quantitativement l'amélioration elle est là ! Après y a toute les question de la voiture dans la ville, l'augmentation du nombre de euh.. Tout ce que tu as dit ! Pour tout ce qui concerne ça, ce qui t'intéresse, je pense que Paris est en retard. A cause de mauvaise habitude, de querelle de démocratie. La culture de la participation n'existe pas en France, c'est pas vrai.

[45 :00] Nous somme en retard avec la démocratie, cette culture n'existe pas. L'enjeu de la participation n'existe pas en France. C'est pas vrai, c'est pas vrai. Regarde comment la France est gouvernée. Elle est gouvernée par un homme ! Insensé ! On est en XXIe siècle ! Qui va à la télévision pour dire la semaine prochaine il faut mettre un masque, tu te rend compte où on en est.

TR [45 :30] : Oui, la culture c'est fascinant parce que quand j'étais à Paris j'ai parlé avec les autres gens dans le cours et j'ai demandé s'il y avait dans l'université, des cours sur la participation et tout ça et on m'a dit :

Alors, non, bien sûr que non. Et il fallait que j'explique le concept de la participation et j'ai dit : Mais ça, c'est l'urbanisme, il faut de la participation, non ? Et ils m'ont dit : Non. Ça c'était fascinante parce qu'en Autriche cette modèle de demander des opinions des gens mais pas vraiment les respecter dire « oui, je vous écoute, mais on décide. Nous sommes la ville et nous décidons », ça c'existe aussi, mais il y a la volonté de change, lentement, mais il y a la volonté de changer. C'est une culture différente.

YVES CABANNES 24.06.2021 VIA ZOOM

Yves Cabannes (YC) | Theresa Rihs (TR)

TR [11:34]: Basically, one of the big critiques that I heard was that, actually, the manner in which is set up, is very rigid very top down, not really accessible in a way that shares the power. You can vote, but you cannot influence the process itself. I was wondering what was your take on that. Because you mentioned that as one of the important parts of making a PB socially progressive or actually –

YC [12:45]: Okay, so all this, I tell you the following. Again, it is written so it's easier to know. What is very clear in the Paris PB, I would say it's the same in most European countries and cities, is that the citizens are not setting up the rules. And this is the big divide between PBs because you have less empowerment because it is what is called institutionalised PB and not institutionalising PB.

[13:34] For me, that is one of the divides. Which goes in the sense that you are saying.

[13:49] The second element to strengthen your point, that you might want to access, is something that they are very clear and keen upon. To improve, I had discussions with them on this and they were quite clear, is that, as many PB, again, very much in institutionalized countries like the old Europe, is that the second cycle. I don't know if you're familiar with that. The first and the second cycle of PB. The second cycle is the one of implementation that starts once the money is approved until the project is finalized.

[14:44] On that, they haven't been very strong, to say the least. In participatory planning and design, on the one hand, and on the control of the implementation. The project a little bit escaped from the hands of the people. The implementation being in charge of the city itself. I would say that this is very much a European culture. Most of the projects even in Lisbon, I just finished the book yesterday, in Lisbon, the implementation, which is supposedly a more socialist country, the process is just the same. Very little oversight capacity from the people for the second cycle. And, as in Paris the projects, some of them are quite big. It is even more in the hands of decision makers and outside the realm of the participants.

[16:05] I do think that, if you consider the cycle one, which is the priority and the decision-making, I think that, through time, in a relatively short time they have been able to be much closer to the wills and expectations from people in a good number of arrondissements. I tell you something, which is very rare actually and that we discussed a lot with the team, with colleagues and with Estella, in her work, is that one of the projects which was voted, which was one Million Euros, was something precisely for local associations working with people to help grassroots or local citizens to formulate their projects.

[17:28] The critique has to be understood in the following way, is that there were very little genuinely grassroots proposals, relatively reduced. It was more citizens initiatives not necessarily from the low-income neighbourhoods. Paris took quite an innovative approach to support NGOs and associations to be able to support local people to formulate their project, this is relatively unique.

[18:05] That is one; number two, what is relatively unique is that Madrid said they were going to do it, not sure they did, is that, out of the 100 million euros which were announced, but not necessarily spent. 30 million were or the low-income neighbourhoods. On top. They had two entries, to really make what is called spatial inversion of priorities. Can you imagine? This is huge. I don't know many places where you have that. This has to be recognized. This is an important element.

[18:55] Then you can discuss, back to Estella, the debate that there are a couple of others and I've been working on that and that is: what is a low-income settlement, in Paris? What is a low-income neighbourhood and, as a matter of fact, what not only Estella but others have been showing, is that as you have a process of gentrification, in these low-income neighbourhoods - but it relates, it's a methodological work that relates, which, even in a planning school, it is quite an interesting topic, which is: how you define a low-income neighbourhood?

[19:35] If these neighbourhoods are being gentrified, it's more the gentrified who are going more or less, who are more likely to work with the platform, better connected, with a higher capacity of formulating projects, a higher formal education level, that are going to be on the forefront for the proposals.

[20:08] I was living in one of the low-income neighbourhoods in Paris, in the 13th. I lived there some years when I was in Paris. I asked to visit old projects in a recent work, a little research, and I was amazed because you had African descendants' community, Maghreb descendants' communities or even Maghrebains, foreigners and you have a huge Asian community in the 13th and truly social housing, poor people etcetera.

[20:56] What is emerging, is a sort of more green, co-ops for food, things which are super interesting, but for more a new vision of society but not tackling the lowest income people, in the pockets of poverty. It shows, that's why I put the debate between the links of inverting social properties and inverting -. And inversion of priorities of social and spatial, showing that if you invert spatial priorities with 30 million euros in some region it doesn't mean that it will reach the poorest of the poor or the excluded in these areas, especially because it's a gentrified city or a city which is in the process of gentrification.

[21:55] It doesn't relate to Paris itself. It relates to the gentrification, which is another issue. This is worth, in my opinion, discussing. Is PB able to make a counterpoint to gentrification? And how project should be designed, PB should be designed, in order to empower really the excluded groups?

 YC [26:35:] For example, I asked Estella when she was accepted in the team, which is very, very rare, I asked: could we have the project list of those which are implemented? She could not. Because, even for the team, it was not that easy because the project, when they were implemented, were in other directions, even to get this information was not easy.

TR [27:05]: That actually is a point that surprised, or I guess interests me, because with the first term of Anne Hidalgo's mayorship, with the first cycle concluded, and now this new version, with this new team, it took place again, but I couldn't find, and I don't know if it's just an error in my research or it's just not there, a conclusive evaluation. Some sort of "okay, we have this big project, we had those 500 million euros. What that actually came out in the end?" Because I sort of expected something like that to have been performed or to be done by the city, but it doesn't seem like it. And I was just wondering if you could tell me something about that maybe.

YC [28:22]: Yes, I can tell you, sure. I can speak about that. I always told them. Okay, you have 500 million euros, but truly how much have you spent? Because I can tell you that from the cities, I know, some of the projects are incredibly interesting, incredibly good. And they have not been even highlighting them, those which are good from those which are not good, being clear about that. There hasn't been a real evaluation, it's missing. And now that the whole team left. Because they were exhausted. They work too much. It was too demanding. So, they left. So, the memory is lost.

[29:28] And it's not the only city I know where this happened. That is why I document so much. I keep everything in order to be able to -. Estella's work for this is one of the most honest and informed works, I know. Because she's one of the few who was inside and did that or my work, which was accepted by them. The one on "another city is possible" and then I invited them to participate in another comparative study and they could not, because they were too much in the action they did not have the capacity to document.

[30:07] The guy, I selected for you, he was in charge of the documentation and the research, so he's the best-informed guy you can find. There is no – I can tell you – there is no better person informed on the first phase. The only issue is ethical, because now he's very critical, because he left, like all the others. It's an ethical thing, in terms of research. How can he be? He was part of it for five years. And now, he makes a critique, but a critique of someone who left. But he's very well informed.

[30:55] I'm going to have a meeting with the new team. I know they wanted to see me. I always ask them and told them: look, you really need an external team to do this evaluation. It is not done.

TR [31:11]: Is it lack of political will, is it just in terms of no resources or is there any reason behind it? Is it a cultural thing? I don't know, I honestly can't really gather, why you wouldn't evaluate a project of this size.

YC [31:33] [laughs]: That is a very, very good question: why they didn't do it. They were running and I spoke with them, some of them I knew for 20 years, when they were students. Can you imagine doing this and there is no memory? No memory. They were saying, it is true. They were running after the implementation, because it was so ambitious, so big to spend 100 million in one year in PB. Very big.

[32:24] If you pass the whole pack of project to other parts of the administration, they will do it business as usual, with all the same rules. You lose a lot in this second cycle. So what could be done? Now, I don't know if it's possible to do it or not. I want to speak about that with Coleen, the new boss: Look, set up a team. I'm ready to be part of it, with others, to really –. It's not about evaluation, it's about monitoring.

[33:11] You need a base study usually and monitor every year, to see the tendencies. You don't do it after, you do it before. How is it today? How will it be next year? Etcetera. And not! Because no baseline survey, that's true. Because it is very much political too. Anne Hidalgo made it one of her flagships. You're very right on that.

TR [30:15]: I mean, at the end of the day, the verdict I suppose came out in favour, because they continue it. After this one year of pause, they picked it up again, so I suppose there is still political will behind it, but I don't know, if it's just a wrong impression from the outside, but I sort of get the feeling that it is not that much front and centre anymore, than it was when it was first implemented. Like a point of pride, more or less. But maybe that is the wrong impression.

YC [34:31]: Theresa, I think that is more nuanced than that. You need to appreciate that Paris is 20 districts. It's a little bit like Vienna. Hidalgo, when she started that, she didn't start it from the blue. She started, because it had started in some districts, like three districts in Vienna, but with a different perspective. It was not like in Vienna, that Vienna selected three. It was not that way.

[35:16] Some districts started as district PB without the support –. The district PB in Paris, they have probably more resources than the districts in Vienna to make a PB. Some districts, they decided to set up PB, with very interesting approaches. The 12th, the 11th, the 13th, my district.

TR [35:49]: Wasn't the 20th also, didn't it also have a PB?

YC [35:53]: Yes, I don't know if they were before, I'm not sure, but you can make this archaeology. What happened is that she built PB on the basis of these district PBs. It was somehow from decentralization to the top. It is not top-down, in that sense it is different from the Vienna model, where you have a strong willed, very interesting, very innovative, but now they have to look for districts. It is the same in many of the big capitals.

[36:35] In Paris, it was different.

[36:37 – 36:49 technical difficulties]

YC [36:49]: It was built with a sort of accumulation of practice from the districts. So much so, that one of the important Ladies in the political thing had a practice of PB.

[37:11] Number one, number two: what is pretty unique of PB in Paris – and I think it makes it different from others, from similar cases – is that when the district was continuing to put money into to PB, the municipality was multiplying this money. Supporting the decentralization PB. Supporting district PB. This, in terms of decentralization, is important, because you have some of the district, which has been doing better than others. Even if, at the end of the day, it is not essentially or the social inclusion, it can be for the gentrified.

[38:11] This is a single aspect of the building of PB. This is why it's so important to build longitudinal studies. As she jumped on that, as she did that, as her flagship and wanted to have this hundred million a year, etc, and they used interviews and films, to say that they were the highest in the world. And I was obliged to tell in interviews – and they were not happy with that – that that was not true. They were not the highest in value PB in the world.

[38:51] It's this image of being the leading capital in the world. Some cities have been investing per inhabitant more than they did or announced to do. This capital sort of culture was important to give these high numbers. And then Madrid said, we'll do the same; 100 million a year. But I don't know where the money is in Madrid.

[39:22] Both were –. One was socialist and the other was very much pro citizens, and all that.

TR [39:37]: Yes. You already mentioned quite a few points. I don't know if that this is a question, you can easily answer but what is, in your opinion, the biggest challenge in the way that Paris set up its PB? You mentioned that the team was quitting, because they were so overworked, but are there some fundamental flaws in the way Paris chose to set up its PB? Or would you say that they actually did a decent job of enacting a PB

YC [40:35]: As I'm very much always going back to the original PB I think that participatory budgeting, which is not only voting for project, but which is voting for people, setting up a PB council per district and a PB council at the city level could have much more empowerment capacity. And to be a counter-power, and this was never discussed.

[41:17] In that sense, it's very different from what you had originally with PB in Brazil, where you do not vote only for projects, but you vote also for people, for delegates and the delegates, they will elect a council. This could be very interesting. The setting up of the rules could be like that, could be done by people.

[41:49] Another level is to have much more oversight committee for project implementation. Another aspect which is more an aspect I worked upon, which is the inclusion of the excluding. Which is a big work, which has been published now, a big study, which will be published by the UN, which is: How to include more, to reach out to those who are not –. Which are not the usual included, being migrants, refugees, LGBT, youth, etc, etc., the elderly. It depends.

[42:41] What do you need to perceive is that, coming from London, what is very clear is that in France, you do not have statistics on ethnic –. You don't have any ethnic data. Because it is the Republic, so we are all equal, supposedly. But it doesn't show diversity. We're all equal. Between a recently refugeeed person that arrives or a second-generation individual in the 20th... wow, it has nothing to do with a white male, who is the second generation from [unintelligible]. You don't have that data. Which is very different from England where you have ethnic –. I'm working now, for example, with a student on ethnic categories, which is at least a way to understand the excluded, where they live. It is impossible, you don't have this data, so how on earth can you build a strategy?

TR [44:05]: Yes, of course, if you don't know –.

YC [44:07]: Where they are, who they are.

TR [44:11]: You can't counteract something if you refuse to believe that it exists.

YC [44:17]: I mean, nobody will say that it doesn't. But show me where they are. You hide this. It's not easy to get this sort of discussion in France. Because they say: it is not. Okay, it's not, but if you do not do that, how are you going to include? Specific, proactive work. So, you go to the 13th which is probably the most diverse and rich, because when you say Arabs. Arabs? There are many nationalities.

TR [44:58]: Yes, it's a whole subcontinent basically.

YC [45:03]: It's a subcontinent, you have 2 billion Muslims, etc, etc, it is stupid to just say Arabs. This is useless. You say Africans, how many languages, do they speak? How are you going to approach them? Some of them speak hardly French etc. This is not recognized. It's a structural issue, which is not a Parisian issue. It is a French Republic

TR [45:38]: Yes, when we insist that everybody is the same and we do not see that, perhaps, in reality, that is not actually reflected.

YC [45:49]: Many of the problems that you have is because of that, because Paris is inheriting a big issue, which is the Jacobite, which is to say: we are all equal, yeah, some are more equal than others. When you have this argument, it goes nowhere. I wanted to ask that, because if you don't have that, how are you going to work?

[46:17] I have, in Lisbon for example, in this one, it was decided to work with the excluded, with migrants and refugees, and then, if you know who they are, where they live, you can work with them. We had forums specifically for them and this worked. How are you going to reach out? Muslims aren't just Muslims, there are so many religions. But if you want to work with the leaders of a mosque, if you want to be inclusive, it's not the way, you need to know better. You see, this is a structural problem.

[46:57] Gentrification in cities and it is all over Europe. And you need to make people pay attention to that. And they tried to. Genuinely. With this 30 millions going to low-income neighbourhoods. But it's not enough.