DIPLOMARBEIT

VENEZUELAN FORCED MIGRANTS IN BOGOTÁ:

DIGITAL PLATFORM LABOR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EVERYDAY URBAN LIFE

ausgeführt zum Zwecke der Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Diplom-Ingenieurin

unter der Leitung
Ass. Prof. Dr. phil. Dipl. -Ing (FH) Sabine Knierbein
E 280 / A1
Arbeitsbereich für Stadtkultur und öffentlichen Raum (SKuOR)

eingereicht an der Technischen Universität Wien
Fakultät für Architektur und Raumplanung

von
Theresa König
01109305

Bogotá, 21.10.2020

ABSTRACT

The socio-economic and political crisis in Venezuela has resulted in millions of involuntary migrants. Many of them cross the border to the neighboring countries and have the objective to work, often migrating towards urban areas. Bogotá, the location of this research, is one example with a particularly severe trend of rising numbers of Venezuelan migrants. With the challenge of making ends need, many of them do not have any other chance than to accept a job in the informal labor market, in which digital labor platforms have gained more and more importance during the past years. Their experiences and actions can have a significant alteration to urban life and, in doing so, the socio-spatial conditions of a city. This study attempts to establish a link between these phenomena and thereby contributes to the understanding of marginalized groups' everyday life experiences. With an ethnographic approach and different qualitative research methods, including narrative semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and ride-alongs, it analyses two cases of Venezuelan forced migrants working in the gig-economy via digital labor platforms . One case looks at Rappi food deliverers, and the second one at Webcam models. By that, it allows a profound insight into daily struggles, routines, and thoughts, finally interpreted using theoretical concepts of migration, urban studies, and work. The findings, such as the identified work schemes in their daily lives, reveal diverse uses of public and private space, connected with discrimination in public life. For Rappi delivery workers, their constant presence in urban public space is a form of appropriation of contested space. In both case studies, immersive structures of physical reproductive labor on different geographical levels can be identified. However, for Webcam models, emotional labor also plays an essential role through intense contact with their clients. What is more, the analysis exposes exploitive work environments that show both formal and informal labor characteristics. The insights embedded in Latin American countries' struggling economies give an idea of the vulnerable situation many migrants and citizens face when trying to enter the labor market. Overall, especially the rather particular details within each case study demonstrate the richness of studying urban life patterns and emphasizes its necessity for further research.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die sozioökonomische und politische Krise in Venezuela hat zu Millionen unfreiwilliger Migrant_innen geführt. Viele von ihnen überqueren die Grenze zu Nachbarländern mit dem Ziel Arbeit zu finden, wobei sie oft in urbane Gebiete migrieren. Bogotá, der Untersuchungsort dieser Diplomarbeit, ist ein Beispiel für besonders hohen Zahlen an venezolanischer Migrant_innen. Mit der Herausforderung, sich ihren Lebensunterhalt zu finanzieren, bleibt vielen keine andere Chance, als einen Job auf dem informellen Arbeitsmarkt anzunehmen, wo in den letzten Jahren digitale Arbeitsplattformen immer mehr an Bedeutung gewannen. Deren Erfahrungen und Handlungen können das städtische Leben und damit auch die sozialräumlichen Bedingungen einer Stadt erheblich verändern. Die vorliegende Analyse versucht, eine Verbindung zwischen diesen Phänomenen herzustellen und trägt damit zum Verständnis der Alltagserfahrungen marginalisierter Gruppen bei. Mit einem ethnographischen Ansatz und verschiedenen qualitativen Forschungsmethoden, darunter narrative semi-strukturierte Interviews, teilnehmende Beobachtung und 'ride-alongs', analysiert sie zwei Fälle venezolanischer Migrant_innen, die über digitale Arbeitsplattformen in der Gig-Ökonomie arbeiten. In einem Fall geht es um Rappi-Lieferanten_innen und im zweiten Fall um Webcam Models. Dadurch wird ein tiefer Einblick in alltägliche Herausforderungen, Routinen und Gedanken ermöglicht, die schließlich mit Hilfe von theoretischen Konzepten um Migration, Stadtforschung und Arbeit interpretiert werden. Die Ergebnisse, wie z. B. die identifizierten Arbeitsschemata in ihrem täglichen Leben, zeigen vielfältige Nutzungen des öffentlichen und privaten Raums auf, die mit Diskriminierung im öffentlichen Leben verbunden sind. Die ständige Präsenz von Rappi-Lieferant_inne im öffentlichen Raum ist eine Form der Aneignung des umkämpften städtischen Raumes. In beiden Fallstudien lassen sich immersive Strukturen körperlicher Reproduktionsarbeit auf verschiedenen geographischen Ebenen identifizieren. Für Webcam Models spielt aber auch die emotionale Arbeit durch den intensiven Kontakt mit ihren Klienten eine wesentliche Rolle. Darüber hinaus werden in der Analyse teils ausbeuterische Arbeitsumgebungen aufgezeigt, die sowohl formelle als auch informelle Arbeitsmerkmale aufweisen. Die Einblicke, die in die krisengeschüttelten Volkswirtschaften lateinamerikanischer Länder eingebettet sind, vermitteln eine Vorstellung von der verwundbaren Situation, in der sich viele Migrant_innen und Bürger_innen in Bogotá befinden, wenn sie versuchen in den Arbeitsmarkt einzutreten. Insgesamt zeigen vor allem die speziellen Details innerhalb der Fallstudien die Fülle der Untersuchung städtischer Lebensmuster und unterstreichen die Notwendigkeit für weitere Forschung im Bereich des urbanen Alltagslebens.

RESUMEN

La crisis socioeconómica y política en Venezuela ha dado lugar a millones de migrantes involuntarios. Muchos de ellos cruzan la frontera hacia los países vecinos, con el objetivo de trabajar, a menudo migrando hacia zonas urbanas. Bogotá, lugar de esta investigación, es un ejemplo con una tendencia particularmente grave de aumento del número de migrantes venezolanos. Con el reto de poner fin a la necesidad, muchos de ellos no tienen otra opción que la de aceptar un trabajo en el mercado laboral informal, en el que, las plataformas laborales digitales han ganado cada vez más importancia durante los últimos años. Sus experiencias y acciones pueden tener una alteración significativa en la vida urbana y, con ello, en las condiciones socio-espaciales de una ciudad. Este estudio intenta establecer un vínculo entre estos fenómenos y, por lo tanto, contribuye a la comprensión de las experiencias de la vida cotidiana de los grupos marginados. Con un enfoque etnográfico y diferentes métodos de investigación cualitativa, incluyendo entrevistas narrativas semi-estructuradas, observación de los participantes y recorridos, analiza dos casos de migrantes forzados venezolanos que trabajan en la gig-economy a través de plataformas de trabajo digital. Uno de los casos se refiere a domicilarios de Rappi, y el segundo a modelos Webcam. De esta manera, permite una profunda comprensión de las luchas, rutinas y pensamientos diarios, finalmente interpretados utilizando conceptos teóricos de la migración, los estudios urbanos y el trabajo. Los hallazgos, como los esquemas de trabajo identificados en su vida cotidiana, revelan diversos usos del espacio público y privado, relacionados con la discriminación en la vida pública. Para el caso uno, los domicilarios de Rappi, su constante presencia en el espacio público es una forma de apropiación en el espacio urbano impugnado. En ambos estudios de casos se pueden identificar estructuras inmersivas de trabajo físico reproductivo en diferentes niveles geográficos. Sin embargo, para los modelos Webcam, el trabajo emocional también juega un papel esencial a través del contacto intenso con sus clientes. Es más, se exponen a entornos de trabajo explotadores que muestran características laborales tanto formales como informales. Los conocimientos incorporados a las economías en dificultades de los países de América Latina dan una idea de la situación vulnerable a la que se enfrentan muchos migrantes y ciudadanos cuando intentan entrar en el mercado laboral. En general, especialmente los detalles bastante particulares de cada estudio de caso, demuestran la riqueza del estudio de los patrones de vida urbana y enfatizan en la necesidad de seguir investigando.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRO- DUCTION

1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 CONTEXT

The phenomenon of migration has played a significant role in every period in the history of humanity. It is caused by unfavorable conditions faced by individuals or a community and their assumption of a safer and better life elsewhere. The decision to migrate can be voluntary, when the person in question decides, without pressure, to change their place of residence to improve their quality of life. Alternatively, it can be of forced nature, triggered by a threat to their integrity, which causes an existential need to flee and protect their lives or families (International Justice Resource Center, 2020). Forced migration is increasing as we face the largest number of displaced people worldwide, with many looking for sanctuary in urban areas. First, this is connected to a general trend of hyper-urbanization, and second, cities are particularly attractive for migrants as there are more and more diverse job opportunities available than in less densely populated areas, among other reasons (Muggah and Abdenur, 2018, p. 2).

Just over a decade ago, Venezuela began to experience an unprecedented socio-economic and political crisis that severely affected the standard of living of its population (e.g. Organización de los Estados Americanos, 2019, p. 25 ff.). Approximately five million nationals left the country – a measure which inevitably was not taken voluntarily (Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 2020b). However, most Venezuelan forced migrants are not considered refugees under international law. Together with strict national entry requirements and difficulties obtaining legal documents, it raises the possibility for many to take informal migration routes (Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 2019, p. 4). In Colombia, the country with the highest number of Venezuelan migrants, around half do not hold a regular status (Farné and Sanín, 2020, p. 12).

Most Venezuelan migrants in Colombia live in large cities, such as Bogotá, or towns close to the Venezuelan-Colombian border (Proyecto Migración Venezuela, 2019, p. 2). This is not a surprise since the initial motivation for migration was to seek work opportunities that allow for dignified living conditions – an aspect large cities often offer. However, the search for a job in the formal labor market can be challenging and alternative options to overcome poverty have to be found. Hostile environments, where survival is their daily goal, and informal, low-wage labor is their only way out, became a reality for many Venezuelan migrants (Banco Mundial, 2018, p. 67 f).

Due to digitalization as a significant facilitator for new work and life patterns, the options in that search are not restrained to traditional professions. The obvious challenge of applying to a vacancy within the formal labor market has popularized digital labor platforms, without government regulation, as a quick income source (van Doorn, 2011, p. 902). Many such labor platforms communicate the possibility of entrepreneurship for their users; however, this can cause friction with the platform's capitalist growth goals and result in labor exploitation (Choudary, 2018, p. 8). These new forms of work also change the social dynamics for those who enter them since they occur in different spaces, at different times, and are aimed at different audiences. "They represent a new kind of political geography, and specifically, a new kind of sovereignty, one that potentially transcends the local and national" (Bratton, 2016 as cited Rodgers and Moore, 2018).

1.2 RESEARCH AIMS

1.2.1 RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH

The aim of the thesis at hand lies in the analysis of Venezuelan migrants' everyday lives working in different digital labor platforms. Firstly, Venezuela's socio-political crisis is still ongoing and under-researched in terms of its effects of forcefully emigrating Venezuelans on urban life patterns in neighboring countries. Secondly, the emerging field of digital labor is enjoying a growing number of studies. However, a focus on users' daily practices is often missing. In this regard, the relevance of this research is twofold.

Challenges and daily practices of migrants in urban areas have been the topic of diverse investigations. Concepts around urban citizenship are handling the possibility to participate in urban life for all people living in a city, not depending on their legal residency status. Municipalities are becoming more and more relevant for the integration of migrants compared to the nation-state. The body of literature about migrants' possibility to participate in public life is large (e.g. Miraftab, 2011; Blokland et al., 2015; Cohen and Margalit, 2015); nevertheless, local focuses in Colombia and Bogotá have not been explored in detail until now. On the one hand, the phenomenon of massive immigration is new in Colombia (in the last decades). On the other hand, the migration crisis in Venezuela increasingly affects Colombia in diverse aspects of public life throughout the last couple of years. Therefore, it has gained a growing interest in academic research as well. There exist many official reports and investigations facilitated by international and national institutions or workgroups of universities (Banco Mundial, 2018; Bermúdez et al., 2018; Castillo et al., 2018, 2019; Mazuera-Arias et al., 2019). However, also investigations regarding the labor market integration of the Venezuelan population in Colombia have been done (ACRIP and Fedesarrollo, 2018; Maruland Melo et al., 2018; Farné and Sanín, 2020). Still, less is known about migrant's behavior in their daily lives, focusing on their work routines, and particularly those working on digital platforms.

For example, van Doorn (2017) points out the importance of researching the structures within the work-life of people working in digital labor platforms. He also especially calls for a focus on the worker's perspective, away from the planner's view:

> *I am obviously not against the idea of experts trying to make sense of complex issues that need to be tackled with care and from a variety of different perspectives, but when discussing platform-mediated labor issues should not we start by asking how these issues impact the everyday lives of people who actually work on/through these platforms? What is there to learn from their perspectives, their experiences, their needs, anxieties, and aspirations? And who does this 'their' refer to anyway? Instead of – or in addition to – presenting survey results, why not give these workers a microphone and a place in the debate? (van Doorn, 2017, p. 908 f)*

Precisely this is what I decided to do with this research by focusing on the daily struggles of migrants working in different forms of digital labor and providing them a possibility to show their perspective. Subsequently, my research can serve as a profound insight for fur-

ther planning. However, within this aspect, I will further focus on two specific cases, which are particularly relevant for the context of Venezuelan migrants working in Bogotá. On the one hand, the delivery platform "Rappi" shows a high percentage of Venezuelans working with it due to easy entry requirements for regular migrants. On the other hand, the industry of adult Webcamming; Colombia is the country with the second-largest number of people working in this industry, which provides – even for irregular migrants – easy access to start working.

Regarding the existing research around the case studies' specific topics, different bodies of literature can be found. First, digital platforms' studies often focus on big players such as Uber or Airbnb or general aspects (OECD, 2016; Stanoevska-Slabeva, Lenz-Kesekamp and Suter, 2017; Choudary, 2018; Pollio, 2019; Zhu and Iansiti, 2019). However, delivery platforms, specifically from an urban studies perspective, have not been researched very comprehensively until now. The case of Rappi, in a Latin American context, was only researched few times academically (Rodriguez Higueras and Mantilla Agredo, 2017). The University of Rosario conducted a broad study of the workers' socio-economic situation (Observatorio Laboral LaboUR, 2019). Nevertheless, countless newspaper articles have shed light on the phenomena.

Likewise, the case of Webcam models has internationally not yet been researched in detail. Still, some namable investigations focus on this form of sex work, and they provide a profound basis, which helped me gain necessary insight into the phenomena (Jones, 2016; van Doorn and Velthuis, 2018; Bays, 2019; Velthuis and van Doorn, 2020). However, even if the industry is big in Colombia, the academic research conducted is not that broad. Still, some university writings (Zapata Berrio, 2012; Arango Arango and Londoño Moreno, 2016; Fajardo Guevara and Mesa Lorza, 2018; Hernández Bellón, 2018) exist, and many newspaper articles are handling the topic in a rather superficial manner.

Be that as it may, no in-depth research on their daily practices has been conducted, for neither of the cases nor with a focus on migrants and even less in Colombia. With my research, I am trying to fill a gap between studies on digital platform labor and its connection to migrants' everyday life due to limitations on the labor market.

1.2.2 PROCESS TOWARDS RESEARCH QUESTIONSO

The first questions I formulated at the beginning of this research process lead later on to the analysis of two specific phenomena, the cases of Rappitenderos and Webcam models. The general topic of Venezuelan migrants' everyday life in Bogotá was set and led me throughout the investigation. However, the focus on the two cases developed out of growing interest and informal conversations that resulted in the realization of the analytical possibilities and theoretical connections I could make based on the sources' information. The question-driven research developed into a source driven research, as I allowed to shift focus throughout the process. Johnson et al. (2004) point out that "[r]esearch, good research, does not always work in such a question-led way. The source may be found by the researcher or find the researcher first" (p. 75).

I first gained interest in conducting research for my Master Thesis in Bogotá while studying abroad for one semester at the National University of Colombia (UNAL). I received the opportunity to experience city life in Colombia's capital, observe public space interactions, and talk to people about their daily realities. This was also when I first got to deepen my

interest in the topic of migration and learn about Colombia's relation to it. I decided to focus on migration from Venezuela as the effects can be seen in many different aspects of urban life, and it is a current and ongoing phenomenon where I felt the opportunity to contribute to an emerging and growing field of study. When attending an anthropology class focusing on Latin America's daily urban realities, I decided to research specific groups' daily lives, particularly Venezuelan migrants' urban realities in Bogotá. Lastly, I connected those ideas with urban studies concepts such as the right to the city and urban citizenship, as well as the underlying legal frameworks.

However, when I started my research at the end of 2019, I developed further, from my starting questions to focusing on the work situation and explaining two specific labor types in detail. Early on, I was sure about investigating Venezuelan migrants' daily lives who work in the delivery service application Rappi. Only further on, I gained interest in also focusing on another type of work, which, preferably, is accessed online as well. In this context, I came across the work of online Webcamming and its relevance for Venezuelan migrants in Colombia. I decided to focus my research on these two types of work, Rappi delivery service, and Webcam models. In this process, I first looked at the legal framework of migration in Colombia as well as the personal history of the participants, including the reasons for leaving, the migration route, and their experiences after arrival. Due to the fact that both types of jobs are facilitated by the increasing digitalization of the labor market, the theoretical approach to online platforms also becomes relevant. Lastly, these jobs' spatial aspect is essential as one is highly dependent on urban movement, while the other is not. For this reason, this research also looks at the implications of their everyday life practices in urban space in the context of, for example, public and private space and the role of the virtual space.

In line with the perspectives outlined above, this case study research aims to answer the following research questions:

- **How do digital labor platforms (Rappi and Webcamming) influence everyday life for Venezuelan forced migrants living in Bogotá?**

- **What barriers, if any, affect their ability to exercise their basic rights and participation in urban public life?**

- **How fair are the work conditions in digital labor platforms, and how are they affecting their structures in everyday life?**

- **How are their daily practices influencing traditional divisions between private/reproductive and public/productive space?**

1.3 RESEARCH METHODS AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

1.3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH

Thoughts on space and post-disciplinarity

While investigating for this study and throughout my university career, it always seemed essential to define one's understanding of space for a specific project. Still, looking at many

phenomena in urban space, no clear distinction can be made, and a constant change of perspective is necessary for analysis. Within this research, I looked at individuals' everyday life structures; therefore, a connection to the concept Lefebvre (1974) calls "The production of space", in which he entangled lived, perceived, and conceived space dialectically while analytically distinguishing the socially produced space from the physical space, comes naturally. However, in my research, I combine diverse perceptions of space, jumping from one scale to another. From the binaries and in-between the private and public space, which are socially constructed, to the virtual and physical space's technical views, different approaches will be used. The digital space can, for that its worth, facilitate actions in physical space and overcome long distances in an instance. As pointed out by Knierbein (2011), the importance shifts away from dichotomies when analyzing urban culture, as one should not only focus on a singular understanding of space and neither one specific discipline from which standpoint to research the phenomena from (p 81 f.):

> *This is about the mosaic of social worlds, viewed under a magnifying glass of unconventional ethnographic approaches. These focus on the micro level of social life patterns in their fullness and allow for the investigation of the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of lived space. It is also about multidimensional approaches to complex processes of urban production between the dimensions of spatial observation (e.g., between micro-, meso-, and macro focus; between conceived, perceived, and lived spaces; between material and symbolic dimensions), where old dichotomies and linearities are seen as ambivalent and dynamic fields of tension and at the same time as obstructive, overlapping, or penetrating processes. (Knierbein, 2011, p. 86)*

She connects this approach of the mosaic of social worlds to post-disciplinary approaches in investigating urban culture, to grasp their diverse, complex meanings. Methods and approaches should depend on the aspects of the urban phenomena studied and "[…] demands for crossing boundaries, a diversity of perspectives, and substantive rethinking by way of horizontal creative thinking. […]" (Knierbein, 2011, p. 96).

This research's focus lies in its qualitative analysis; however, to some extent, quantitative data plays an essential role in explaining specific concepts with statistical numbers in regards to underline certain information. Within its empirical design, there can be identified different approaches and methods that result in a mixed-methods design with the aim of a comprehensive understanding of the researched phenomena. That being said, due to the study of everyday life, an ethnographic design seemed adequate, as it supports the underlying intentions of investigating the two cases in-depth, focusing on ordinary practices. This is also mirrored in the used methods, as ethnographic research often builds on the researcher "immersing" them into a setting, which "emphasizes the use of cultural settings as data source […] and argues that the best – although not the only – way of generating knowledge of these is for a researcher to get right inside them" (Mason, 2002, p. 55).

Case study

On how to structure the gathered information to make sense and build the basis for interpretation, I chose a case study design. According to Yin (2003), "the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events […]" (p. 2). Therefore, it allows me to take an in-depth look at the participants' personal history and its implication for urban life in Bogotá. He also points out that in order to receive a diverse set of insights within a broad phenomenon (like migration), it is advisable to choose a multiple-case study over a single-case study (Yin, 2003, p. 53 f.). Given the focus on two

types of work, my research design is built on a multi-case study with a holistic approach. Although Yin (2003) also emphasizes the importance of replication (but not sampling) of a case in order to make them comparable (p. 46 f.). Nevertheless, Creswell (2007) contradicts by saying that the replication of a case study would typically not be the case for qualitative research, as the contexts always differ (p. 74). Therefore, and due to the limited scope of this Master thesis, I embed my case studies in the same context, which is Venezuelan migrants living in Bogotá and working in the field of digital labor platforms. Even if the cases' specifications considering their working conditions and implications for daily life and urban space differ strongly, they show similarities in their context and background. This being said, by conducting careful examinations with different research methods, I am confident to provide a profound picture of Venezuelan migrants' everyday life experiences in Bogota.

1.3.2 RESEARCH METHODS

The main data collection process was between January 2020 and July 2020. I adopted an iterative process when analyzing the information gained by adopting the study methods. Triangulation of methods and sources allowed me to look at a topic from different angles and ensure the alignment and verification of findings (Yin, 2003, p. 98).

Literature review

The literature review built the foundation of the research, based on which I formulated questions that would guide me through the process of conducting interviews and observations for the research. Apart from theoretical concepts, I included reports and statistical information, planning documents, and read other researchers' work with approaches similar to the one of my thesis. In this process, I specifically looked for investigations bound to different disciplines or such which transcend a positioning. By organizing and later coding important text parts of the secondary literature in programs such as Mendeley and atlas. ti, the process from finding and first reading the documents towards the references in this thesis was facilitated.

Narrative semi-structured interviews

The main method in my investigation is the narrative semi-structured interview. On the one hand, this is because it allows examining specific topics that might not arise without explicitly asking for them. On the other hand, it supports the researcher to keep the interview development open and gives the participants the chance to talk at length about their experiences. In doing so, I used the questions as guidance through the interview rather than a fixed frame. This ensures the conversation to develop based on the insights that emerge, thus gives the possibility to handle specific topics in-depth or leave out others that turn out irrelevant (Bryman, 2012, p. 471 f.). I conducted a test interview and adjusted the questions accordingly.

I gained access to interviewees with the help of the "snowball system" (Przyborski, Wohlrab-Sahr, 2010, p. 72). After speaking to one of my professors, I could organize the first interview with a Venezuelan Rappitendero. This person then introduced me to other potential participants. Moreover, I also asked Rappitenderos on the streets directly and, when they were interested, conducted interviews during their work breaks. The first contact of a Webcam model I received from a friend, and as well got referred to other models. Later, as finding more interviewees became difficult, I joined the Facebook group "Venezolanos en

Bogotá" and made a post to look for potential participants. This idea arose as I had learned that Webcam studio owners are often searching for new models in such groups.

Usually, the interviews took between 30 and 90 minutes and were all audio recorded. The interviews with Rappitenderos were mostly held outside and were followed by taking field notes. However, interviews with Webcam models only party took place by meeting in person. Due to the quarantine restrictions caused by the COVID-19 outbreak in the spring and summer of 2020 (thus also during my field research), I could no longer continue with personal meetings and instead conducted the interviews with applications like Skype or Whatsapp.

Ride-along

I also applied a rather distinctive qualitative research method within my investigation, similar to walking interviews, which are held while walking with the study participant through a specific part of the city, known or unknown to the subject (e.g. Carpiano, 2009). However, I did not walk along, but instead rode along on the bike, with some of the participants working in Rappi to analyze their routes and experiences in public space. Wegerif (2019) applied similar research methods, including driving with participants in different transport modes, such as bus, truck, motorbike, and bike. He points out that this way facilitates an in-depth look into his participants' social and working life and the critical aspect of transportation. Moreover, participants might join several hours of interviewing and observing while continuing their daily activities more easily than a standard interview (p. 5 f.). Also, for me, this meant to be able to understand the routes, experiences, and opinions better while driving along. Lastly, I took field notes in the form of voice records and tracked each ride with a GPS-tracker in order to mark every stop on a virtual map.

Participant and direct observations

Apart from field notes, I also found myself in the role of a participant or direct observer (Yin, 2003, p. 92 f.). On the one hand, I observed the daily situations while being with Rappitenderos in public space. On the other hand, I could observe many situations of Rappidenderos appropriating public space. For the case of the Webcam models, I got the chance to directly observe a Webcam studio with a study participant who worked there; participant observations were not possible due to their intimate work conditions. Furthermore, I took photos of encounters in public space; however, I decided not to disclose any pictures that show people's faces up close. Instead, I used drawings for some of the captured situations to protect participants' and residents' privacy rights.

Mapping

In some interviews, I tried integrating mapping exercises but quickly realized that it did not fit the participants' schedule. However, with some (Rappitenderos), I discussed and marked some topics over a map of Bogotá. Furthermore, I summarized the information I gained through interviews, general field notes, information collected during ride-alongs, and observations, to further map them myself. Through the combination of many methods, I nevertheless gained sufficient information to demonstrate in maps and floor plans. They either consist of physical locations the participants named, combined with thematic maps of Bogotá, or demonstrate perceptions connected to locations they mentioned in interviews or ride-alongs. The Webcam studio's floorplan was built after visiting a studio and combined with information participants gave me about such a studio's layout. These maps are another

type of interpretation of the information they shared rather than their exact marks on a map
Coding of interviews and analysis

All of the interviews were conducted in Spanish, as I felt comfortable understanding the conversation and asking follow-up questions. However, I received help from an UNAL student to transcribe the interviews in order to ensure the correctness of particular expressions and the understanding of dialects. After the transcription of the interviews, I coded them in the program ATLAS.ti. I first used open coding techniques by using the questions' main topics, and subquestions asked in the interview as guidance. I then looked for specific patterns, similarities, and contradictions (Saldana, 2009, p. 5). By collecting similar codes in groups, I gained the structure for further analyzing each group's individual codes in connection with each other (ibid., p. 9 f.).

The focus lies on the study of participants' histories and perceptions, which is why I chose a descriptive framework to organize each case study's chapters and logic by the code groups that resulted from the interview topics (Yin, 2003, p. 114). By coding and organizing phrases of the interviews, I build the foundation of the analysis of this thesis; however, by triangulation with further methods, I concluded this thesis's findings. First, they were concluded with the produced maps and information I gained through informal conversations and observations. Secondly, aspects that were important for the understanding but not discussed in the interviews, I added by researching secondary literature and connected the formerly mentioned theories. Thirdly, specific information that was topic in various interviews I fact-checked to guarantee the correctness of dates, functions, and legal issues.

1.3.3 LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

My position as a researcher can be seen as quite conflicting; nevertheless, I am aware of this position and see research, at least to some extent, embedded in the researcher's values and principles. First, I conducted all interviews in Spanish and am writing this thesis in English; however, my mother tongue is German. Although my Spanish language skills suffice to have maintained conversations, I consulted someone to transcribe the interviews to ensure understanding and avoid misinterpretation. Furthermore, I might not be aware of specific ideas and shared knowledge within the Latin American population due to cultural differences. I always tried to communicate those limitations and was open to learning about new concepts. Second, I recognize that the information I gathered is due to situational experiences and only show specific parts of a larger picture; still, I seek holistic explanations by triangulating methods and sources.

Diener and Crandall (1978) point out four main areas for ethical principles one has to keep in mind during a social analysis: "1. whether there is harm to participants; 2. whether there is a lack of informed consent; 3. whether there is an invasion of privacy; 4. whether deception is involved" (as cited Bryman, 2012, p. 135 ff.). Before every interview, I made sure to follow these rules by telling the participants the idea and use of my research, asking for permission to record, and ensuring that the information used will not contain their names, pictures, or specific details. This is especially important to ensure their safety.

Also, I tried to conceal sensitive information throughout the analysis or present it not to be hurtful to the participants but rather to help them understand their situation in a broader context. That being said, I also conceive it as crucial to show certain aspects that might seem

unreasonable to mention for some; however, I found it important for the specific context. I am talking specifically about the details that concern the virtual sex work that Webcam models are doing. There is a certains stigma around many practices; nevertheless, I think they present topics one should be able to talk about in society. Therefore, I decided to include direct quotations in the analysis to provide a real understanding of their daily realities and not just tiptoe around delicate topics.

As already mentioned thoroughly, I focus upon my study participants' daily realities and conceptualize their struggles in a broader picture of migration, urban life participation, and labor condition. I do not attempt to compare those two case studies, but instead, I seek to explain their specific characteristics.

1.3.4 STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS

The outline of the thesis is organized as follows:

Chapter 2 concentrates on migration, highlighting theoretical concepts, the socio-political situation in Venezuela, and Colombia as the host country for many Venezuelan migrants.

Chapter 3 draws on distinctive literature from the academic field of work, especially in contemporary times, handling concepts such as informality, reproductive labor, and digital labor platforms. Chapters 2 and 3 are serving as a theoretical and conceptual framework for the following empirical analysis.

In **chapter 4**, the two case studies of Rappitenderos and Webcam models are discussed thoroughly.

Chapter 5 concludes the empirical section by discussing the main findings and contextualizing them in consideration of the theoretical framework.

Chapter 6 reflects the used theory and methods and implications for planning, and the importance of everyday life research.

"Research, good research, does not always work in such a question-led way. The source may be found by the researcher or find the researcher first."

(Johnson et al., 2004, p. 75)

18

MIGRATION

2

2. MIGRATION

This first theoretical section of the thesis will focus on the aspect of migration (2.1), and more specifically, on push factors for people leaving Venezuela (2.2) and further the immigration towards Colombia in the scope of the theoretical access to essential services in Colombia and the actual situation of Venezuelans living in Bogotá concretely (2.3).

2.1 MIGRATION AND URBAN CITIZENSHIP

First and foremost, I want to clarify specific terms and concepts regarding migration and its effects on urban areas. Chapter 2.1.1 handles the differentiation between refugees and other migrants and legal conditions for migrants in their host country, such as the access to services and the possibility to gain citizenship. Chapter 2.1.2 explains the trend towards urban migration and urban studies theories around the right to the city and urban citizenship.

2.1.1 TERMINOLOGY OF MIGRATION AND FORMAL RIGHTS

Migrant and Refugee

It is crucial to distinguish between and outline the definitions of migrants, displaced people or forced migrants and refugees to provide an understanding of the terminology of people who are migrating for specific reasons. Different interpretations depend on the organization defining them and countries vary in their recognition of refugee statuses.

The International Justice Resource Center (2020) distinguishes, on the one hand, between forced and voluntary migration, as in those who are displaced and therefore forcefully have to move and those move voluntarily to improve their living situation. On the other hand, they differentiate between international and internal migration (International Justice Resource Center, 2020).

There is no clear demarcation regarding the definition of forced or displaced migrants and refugees since the legal definition leaves room for interpretation. According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, accounting for one of the most important milestones in the discourse of refugee protection, a refugee is someone who has a

> well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. *(International Justice Resource Center, 2020)*

Regarding the definition of a refugee, according to the UNHCR terminology, reasons including looking for work or education, seeking family reunion as well as fleeing from extreme poverty or natural disasters do not characterize them as refugees. Still, in everyday linguistic usage, the word migrant is often used as an umbrella term for voluntary and involuntary migration, which can be dangerous because it bears the risk of diminishing the need for particular protection of some individuals (UNHCR, 2016, p. 1).

Nevertheless, it needs to be stated that international human rights laws still protect migrants who do not fall into the category of refugees. Therefore, the term forced migration is the merger, which includes all different types of displacement, internationally and nationally. It

can be used for people who have been forced to leave their homes due to conflict, environmental disasters, and extreme poverty or hunger. Even though the term can help describe migration movements and its reasoning, it is not a legal concept, such as the laws around refugees. The UNHCR prefers to refer to mixed groups of forced migrants and refugees as "refugees and migrants" as it showcases refugees' specific needs (UNHCR, 2016, p. 2). In my thesis, I am using the term forced migrants, as most Venezuelan migrants in Colombia are not considered refugees, but I still want to highlight the involuntary and existential need to leave the country for many.

Rights for migrants

As mentioned, all people, and therefore all migrants, regardless of their legal status, are protected under international human rights law. There can be found numerous guidelines outlining migrants' protection under human rights law and other treaties. Due to the limited scope of this Master thesis, this chapter gives a brief overview.

The United Nations (UN) formulated principles for the protection of migrants in vulnerable situations, determining them as "persons who are unable effectively to enjoy their human rights, are at increased risk of violations and abuse [...] regardless of whether the original movement was freely chosen, or may be related to a migrant's identity or circumstances" (Global Migration Group, 2016, p. 5). Further, I will focus on principles that are connected with the living conditions of migrants.

The principle to "Protect the human rights of migrant women and girls" is especially important and comes from the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. It aims to protect all women and girls, specifically considering those who suffered rights abuse and discrimination in order to support them after traumatic experiences (Global Migration Group, 2016, p. 45). The following principle calls for "safeguarding the right of migrants to an adequate standard of living", which encompasses the provision of basic necessities in shelter facilities and the specification of certain guidelines for eviction or relocation measures as well as for basic living conditions. According to this principle,

> an adequate standard of living implies: • Adequate and safe food sufficient in quantity and quality to satisfy an individual's dietary needs, including the specific dietary needs of pregnant women, nursing mothers and children • Safe drinking water and culturally acceptable sanitation • Adequate and appropriate clothing • Adequate housing • The continuous improvement of living conditions *(Global Migration Group, 2016, p. 49)*

Another important aspect is to "ensure that all migrants enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health" (p. 47), "protect the right of migrants to education" (p. 53), and to "uphold migrants' right to information" (p. 55). The principle "guarantee the right of migrants to work, in just and favorable conditions" is especially crucial for this research as it includes policy guidelines to ensure the right of migrants to access the labor market and, therefore, an opportunity to gain a decent standard of living. In this regard, they shall not suffer from discrimination or different treatment than nationals. Again, this principle emphasizes the protection of female migrants who, more often than their male counterparts, work in the informal sector and therefore, are not protected by national labor law. It is also recommended to establish complaint mechanisms to ensure the opportunity to communicate if rights are violated (Global Migration Group, 2016, p. 52).

As mentioned, these are condensed guidelines, referring to international law, guidelines, and principles of different sources. Although international human rights law applies to all human beings, it also happens to stand in contradiction with national law depending on the country, region, or subject of the case. Therefore, in the case of a violation of international human rights law, the exercise of liability claims for individuals or groups can be extremely difficult.

The International Red Cross (n.d.) list as a priority the "Guarantee that migrants, irrespective of legal status, have effective access to essential services" (p. 2). To obtain this goal, the organization recommends "that states address barriers to obtaining services from public providers, including restrictive rules, but also informal barriers, such as information gaps, language issues and prohibitive costs" (ibid). In the short-term, humanitarian assistance is of great importance to support a government during that period. However, in the long-term support of migrants, they recommend especially to provide services that benefit social inclusion (International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, no date, p. 2). An essential step towards inclusion can be made through formal citizenship, which only comes further after migrating. As Vink (2017) notes, citizenship can but does not have to be connected with integration. He also emphasizes the heterogeneity of migrants and different motivations in gaining citizenship of the host country (p. 26).

In this study, I will not focus on citizenship as the legal concept because, for most Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, citizenship is not the primary goal but instead on migrants' legal status in the form of temporary permits. The aim is to shed light on how the possible residential permits for Venezuelans to stay in Colombia can be, on the one hand, enabling and, on the other hand, restricting, as I will explain further on. In sum, it can be said that despite international law setting standards for a decent life and opportunities for migrants, it does not guarantee that the host country complies with these rules to a sufficient extent. That emphasizes the need for a careful examination of migrants' life and working situation and their opportunity to participate in social life. Finally, this is of particular importance in countries where the rule of law, fundamental rights, and socio-economic opportunities are determined by high rates of inequality, which is the case in Colombia.

2.1.2 URBAN MIGRATION, URBAN CITIZENSHIP AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

Urban and labor migration

Displacement has been a push factor for people everywhere to leave their homes; more concrete, at this time, there is the highest number of displaced people worldwide (Muggah and Abdenur, 2018, p. 2). At the end of 2019, there were 26 million refugees, 4.2 million asylum seekers, 45.7 million internally displaced people, and (defined separately) 3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad (UNHCR, 2020). Especially displaced people are looking for sanctuary in urban areas, which can be linked to an ongoing trend of hyper-urbanization. Now around 55% of the world's population is living in cities, but compared to the 1950s, the share was only less than 30% (Muggah and Abdenur, 2018, p. 2). Since many are migrating towards cities, they require help from the local government regarding essential services, which makes it show how global challenges are often plays out on the local level (Doomernik and Ardon, 2018, p. 92).

For many, the main reason to migrate to another country and leave their home is the search for a better life and work. When it comes to finding a job at their new residence location, migrants are often facing the risk of labor exploitation. Employers repeatedly take advantage of migrants' precarious situation, which forces them to accept any work at a low cost without labor benefits. Many forced migrants already have reached working age and need work to support themselves and send money to their families. They are usually not familiar with the country's labor legislation or migrants' rights, putting them into a less favorable bargaining position (Stefoni et al., 2017 as cited Maruland Melo et al., 2018, p. 17 f). Nevertheless, joining work life for people having faced the exclusion from social life and the labor market can provide them with considerable opportunities since they can gain not only necessary economic means but also political, social, and cultural engagement. This form of participation allows them to build a network and participate in collective actions, leading to social integration and personal growth (Maruland Melo et al., 2018, p. 16).

Urban citizenship

As many migrants decide to stay in cities, it makes them the focal point for integration and shows the importance of local, compared to national authorities. Also, regarding migrants' access to essential services, cities are often more responsive and supportive than the nation-state that is usually responsible for legal matters. This can have different reasons, for example, that local governments are confronted with direct demand for attention out of necessity. (Wood, 2018, p. 10 f).

> *The politics of the city have a very different character to the ideological politics of the nation. [They] are about making things work - you've got to pick up the garbage, you've to keep the hospitals open, it doesn't matter if the immigrants are legal or illegal - they have children who get sick and who have to go, to school, they ride buses, they drive cars. If you asked a mayor, 'Do you think immigrants should be allowed in or not?' they'd say 'They are here.'* (Barber, 2013 as cited Wood, 2018, p. 4)

Miraftab criticizes the discourse of formal citizenship as the essential factor for or against inclusion. Looking at the steady numbers of internationally migrating people who choose to move away from home in the search for socio-economic opportunities and bearing the risk of living a life without citizenship over a life with legal rights in their home countries (Miraftab, 2011, p. 1). Legal citizenship being not (the only) way of integration after migration, there is more and more literature about citizenship apart from the nation-state. This could be as a member of the world community due to international human rights or, for example, the European Union and rights it comes along with for its citizens. Some local governments started granting certain rights for people living in their municipalities regardless of their legal status, under the name of urban citizenship. That means that when it comes to the actual rights regarding the living situation of migrants, an interplay between different government levels is relevant (Oomen, 2017, p. 57).

At the same time, there is an emphasis on the migrants' initiative to make their new city their own. "[T]he expectation of social well-being has shifted from formal, top-down and national to informal, bottom up and transnational processes and practices. To fulfill their expectations of a dignified, humane livelihood, people take their interests in their own hands" (Miraftab, 2011, p. 2).

Undocumented immigrants, legal or illegal residents of squatter settlements, favelas and townships have, in certain instances, taken charge of the local spaces they inhabit. They make their own living space and livelihood not because of, but often despite the state's institutions and laws. (Miraftab, 2011, p. 1)

Right to the city: the appropriation of space and participation in public life

According to Henri Lefebvre (1996[1968]), the idea of the right to the city was about an emerging right as a response to the harmful effects of capitalist market impositions on the urban landscape with a collective approach that would allow the reinventing of the urban as a place of possibilities and rights for everybody. Different authors, such as Mark Purcell (2014), build on this idea of the right to the city, interpreted and expanded it. Worldwide, many urban movements and charters are concerning the right to the city, also including such with a focus on gaining legal rights.

In his interpretation of Lefebvre's right to the city, Purcell primarily focuses on the appropriation of urban space and participation in urban life:

To appropriate something is to take it to oneself, to make it one's own. In claiming a right to the city, inhabitants take urban space as their own, they appropriate what is properly theirs. Property rights, for Lefebvre, are an expropriation of urban space. They take what properly belongs to inhabitants of a community and arrogate it to property owners, to those who bought land in the marketplace. [...] the city belongs to those who inhabit it. (Lefebvre 1996, p. 129 as cited Purcell, 2014, p. 149)

In this context, he refers to the difficulties regarding the use and exchange value. In this sense, appropriation is a sort of reorientation of the role of the city and its space, to think of it as a space of encounters, interactions, and social connections.

The other necessary part of gaining the right to the city is participation. But as Purcell points out, there are complications with political involvement, as not many citizens can participate, and if so, only do it punctually. However, as not all citizens can politically participate fully, the discourse of participation is characterized by its complexity, thus needs careful examination (Purcell, 2014, p. 149 f). Lefebvre instead calls for "real and active participation, the pervasive activation and mobilization of inhabitants" (1996, p. 145 as cited Purcell, 2014, p. 150). In this process, inhabitants become more conscious about their surroundings, interactions, connections, and issues emerging in the urban space because of capitalism. "They come to see participation not as speaking at a public hearing or serving on a citizens' panel, but as the living struggle for a city that is controlled by its inhabitants" (Purcell, 2014, p. 150).

Concepts like the right to the city and urban citizenship are meant for all inhabitants of a city. However, there is an inevitable tension between the newcomers and established residents over "who has the power to make place out of space, who contests this power, who wins, who loses, and with what effects?" (Smith and Guarniz, 2009, p. 618 f. as cited Cohen and Margalit, 2015, p. 669). Also, the literature around the right to the city categorizes migrants as a marginalized group and the established residents as a collective group of people who "have" this power (Smith and Guarniz, 2009, p. 618 f. as cited Cohen and Margalit, 2015, p. 669).

Bayat (2010), on the other hand, does not look at typical larger collective movements but

focuses on daily actions that can be overly ordinary but also an expression for struggle and the necessity for basic living conditions. He describes those more quiet approaches of many individuals, also as non movements or "quiet encroachment of the ordinary", in his studies in the Middle East as:

To secure paid work, these migrants take over street sidewalks and other desirable public spaces to spread their vending businesses, infringing on and appropriating popular labels to promote their merchandise. [...] These masses of largely atomized individuals, by such parallel practices of everyday encroachments, have virtually transformed the large cities of the Middle East and by extension many developing countries, generating a substantial outdoor economy, new communities, and arenas of self-development in the urban landscapes; they inscribe their active presence in the configuration and governance of urban life, asserting their 'right to city'. (Bayat, 2010, p. 15)

In sum, it can be said that the right to the city emphasizes the collective struggle as much as individual contexts. This is in line with the practices of approaching the right to the city emphasized in this thesis, such as looking for better economic opportunities and its daily struggles in public and private space it comes with that might challenge urban orders.

2.2 MIGRATION FROM VENEZUELA

In this chapter, the focus lies on the situation of forced migrants from Venezuela. 2.2.1 gives a general overview of the events that resulted in the current crisis of the country. Further, in chapter 2.2.2, specific reasons Venezuelans name to leave the country and different destinations and migration routes are in the spotlight. In total, this subchapter aims to build the framework based on which the living conditions and consequent choices can be better contextualized.

2.2.1 THE POLITICAL AND LIVING CONDITIONS IN VENEZUELA

The current socioeconomic crisis in Venezuela is the result of a steady weakening of its economy, covered up by the government but revealed through its effects of immense poverty of the population, hyperinflation, and a lack of buying power, generating a humanitarian crisis (Bermúdez et al., 2018, p. 5). The economic and political roots resulting in the status quo go way back. Yet, the scope of this thesis only allows giving a summary of the events that particularly worsened the situation within the past years. I consequently do not dive into the complexity of particular economic and political aspects, and instead, focus on the effects it has had and has for the Venezuelan people.

Development of the crisis

In 1999 Hugo Chavez took over the Venezuelan presidency, and one of his biggest goals was to reduce inequality in the country, which he managed through different social policies and privatizations. Some of the government's measures, for example, the implementation of price control to ensure low prices for essential goods, meant difficulties and sinking profits for businesses (BBC, 2020). One of his government's key strategies was to provide privileges to cooperatives and small businesses over bigger multinational ones, which resulted in direct control of the state over economic activities. While he received international ack-

nowledgment for his socialist ideas, critical voices also claimed the execution to be authoritarian (Romero, 2018). His first nine years in government were characterized by a big oil boom that kept the economy stable and strong, but also a deepening of state control in the economy. Although he was re-elected three times, it is said that the crisis started already in 2008. When in 2013, Nicolás Maduro became president of Venezuela, the weakening of institutions and the increasingly fragile economy became more evident. The economy has experienced extreme losses, which can also be connected to a substantial decline in oil production in the country and resulted in an increase of the unemployment rate from 7.4% in 2015 to 27.1% in 2017 (ACRIP and Fedesarrollo, 2018, p. 3). The decline in Venezuela's oil production was influenced by the oil price collapse in 2014 and growing supply from other countries such as the US. The weakened oil prices came with insufficient maintenance of the facilities and a worsening economic climat in the country, and further was intensified by more and more US sanctions towards Venezuela (Smith, 2020).

Inflation was rising from 121.74% in 2015 and 438.12% in 2017 to extreme 65,374.08% in 2018 and 19,906.02% in 2019 (Statista, 2020). Put simply, "the economic catastrophe began with government price controls and plummeting oil prices, which caused state-run oil companies to go bankrupt. The government then started printing new money to cope, thus prices rose rapidly, unemployment increased, and GDP collapsed" (Statista, 2020). Venezuela's hyperinflation is considered the worst worldwide since the second world war. Even though the government tried to solve the problem through successive monetary reconversions, they never achieved it. It has resulted in a loss of purchasing power, which means that each day people could afford less amount of the same product with the same amount of money. The hyperinflation became so high that the currency has lost its ability to be seen as an exchange medium or unit of account. Therefore the dollar, or at the Colombian border Colombian pesos, can be used as a form of payment (Mazuera-Arias et al., 2019, p. 8). The Venezuelan researchers' De los Santos, Avila and Caledera (2018) explain the socioeconomic crisis as follows:

The recent actions of Nicolás Maduro's government have produced a complete rupture of the constitutional thread, of the democratic order and of the political institutionality of the republican tradition in our country, plunging the population into a humanitarian tragedy of deep economic, social and political proportions that the totalitarian regime refuses to recognize and correct. Venezuela has irremediably descended to the authoritarianism of a system of government, which, in spite of the popular rejection, pretends the perpetuity in power. (translated from Spanish, De los Santos, Avila & Caledera, 2018, p.10 as cited Fancy and Mejía, 2019, p. 10)

Nicolás Maduro became elected president with a lead of only 1.6% in 2013 after his mentor Hugo Chávez had died. Six years later, in 2018, it was time for reelection, and Maduro won again due to boycotting opposition parties by forbidding them to run, putting them into jail, or made them flee the country. The poll was not held in fair or free conditions, which made the National Assembly, which is controlled by the opposition, to not recognize the presidency. Under the Venezuelan constitution, the Assembly declared the National Assembly leader, Juan Guaidó, as president. Still, already since 2017, decisions made by the National Assembly have been ignored by Maduro, accompanied by his creation of the National Constituent Assembly, a countermeasure and made up only by people loyal to his government (BBC, 2020).

Effects

The humanitarian crisis can be divided into the health crisis and the insecurity of access to alimentation. The crisis in alimentation is yet the biggest the country has experienced and is affecting people unequally. Especially children face fatal effects, as many are undernourished. Due to a change in government programs in 2017 regarding food distribution, people loyal to the government are being prioritized, thus exacerbating the inequality in society (Organización de los Estados Americanos, 2019, p. 25 ff.). At the same time, the situation of public and private health services is precarious due to insufficient medical resources and inappropriate conditions in health facilities. As a result, it has become almost impossible for Venezuelans to receive medical attention. The deterioration of public cleaning services and contamination of drinking water caused diseases such as malaria to spread (Mazuera-Arias et al., 2019, p. 8). Access to basic services has already been a struggle for many when it peaked in 2019, with a shortage of electric power in almost the whole country for more than four days. Electricity, internet, and phone signals were dead, school and work were put on pause, and the metro in the capital Caracas came to a halt. This resulted in big protests, as the lack of access to essential services meant a disruption of not only the economic but also the social infrastructure for most Venezuelans (Organización de los Estados Americanos, 2019, p. 35).

During the recent period, violations of human rights through persecution, repression, and residents' social control have been a significant problem and received far-reaching international attention. There have been 14,986 politically motivated arbitrary detentions between 2014 and mid-2019. There are reports of killings, torture, persecution, and forced disappearance of civilians ordered by the government. Many of the victims are indigenous people, protesters, and journalists, among others, or anyone who speaks out against the government. Maduro has established an authoritarian regime characterized by inhumane mechanisms of control over social programs to access housing, food and health, and the privileged treatment of beneficiaries who support him (Organización de los Estados Americanos, 2019, p. 28 ff.). An increase of violence, not least due to the hopeless situation of many, is another reason for the forced migration of Venezuelans. There has been a rise in crimes and homicides, along with alleged disruptions against the public order. The number of homicides in the 2010s has doubled in comparison to the 2000s. The violence is connected to the existence of guerrilla organizations, such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), especially in regions close to the Colombian border, but as well to the special force (Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales) of the Venezuelan police (Organización de los Estados Americanos, 2019, p. 32 ff.).

2.2.2 REASONS FOR LEAVING AND MIGRATION DESTINATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Migration patterns

It is important to emphasize that Venezuela has been a receiver of immigrants during the last century, rather than having its people emigrate. In fact, it was the country within Latin America, where others would migrate to search for a higher quality of life. As will be explained in more detail further in chapter 2.3.1, during the drug war in Colombia, many Colombians came to Venezuela to seek refuge, and Venezuela was known to be welcome to their neighbors in need (Castillo y Reguant, 2017 as cited Bermúdez et al., 2018, p. 8).

Starting in 2005, the Venezuals emigration rate has been rising, reaching its first heights in 2015 due to the growing internal struggles with the numbers of emigrants increasing steadily. Moreover, the emigration process is categorized as a "generalized migration crisis", meaning that people from all socioeconomic groups are emigrating, not depending on factors such as education, job, or marital status. Still, given that a large proportion of those emigrating is young, it is said to cause a loss of labor force in the coming years and decades. It could result in misalignments in terms of the country's demographic structure with far-reaching sociopolitical consequences (Bermúdez et al., 2018, p. 9).

Reasons for leaving

Taking a closer look at the reasons for why people would leave Venezuela in recent years, two investigations stand out: Both took place at the border between Táchira, Venezuela, and Norte de Santander, Colombia, one in April 2018 and the second one in April 2019, and focused on indicators such as socio-demographic patterns and reasons for emigrating. In total, more than 27,000 people participated, of which 55% were male and 45% female. Moreover, more than 75% of those interviewed were young adults, while those younger than 18 years were not included (presumably out of deference to their vulnerability). About half of them were single, and in both survey periods, a surprisingly large number had a university degree (49% in 2018 and 59% in 2019) (Bermúdez et al., 2018, p. 10 ff; Mazuera-Arias et al., 2019, p. 16 ff). This suits the picture of migration patterns in other parts of the world, that of higher educated people emigrating earlier than those with a lower level of education and of young people often migrating to support their families at home financially.

In both years, the highest percentage of around 60-70% said the most important psychological reasons for leaving were experiences with violence and insecurity and high levels of stress about what is happening in the country. These were followed by hunger, family reunification, anxiety about the future, and health issues connected with being unable to obtain treatment. Regarding economic reasons, around 85% of the respondents named the search for better work opportunities, and about 70 % to support their family. Other factors are maintaining their quality of life, not seeing a future in Venezuela, unemployment, and not being able to pay their rent (Bermúdez et al., 2018, p. 16; Mazuera-Arias et al., 2019, p. 25 f).

One point which can make it difficult for Venezuelans to leave their country is the application for a passport as the process can take up to a year and requires the payment of a fee between 1,000 and 6,000 US$. This is especially troubling since those fees can be connected to corrupt government officials processing identification documents. Furthermore, the vast majority of Venezuelans cannot afford these prices (Organización de los Estados Americanos, 2019, p. 43).

Numbers and Destinations

In comparison, the war in Syria caused 6.3 million internally displaced people between 2011 and 2017. The war in Afghanistan, which started in 1978, reached the same number of 6.3 million international refugees and migrants within eleven years until 1990. Regarding the crisis in Venezuela, the numbers of emigrants already reached 4.0 million only within four years from 2015, meaning that the migrant flow in terms of speed is similar to the refugee crisis in Syria (Organización de los Estados Americanos, 2019, p. 18). Unlike in Syria, the socio-economic developments caused people to emigrate shows the alarming levels of the crisis in Venezuela.

In August 2020, there were worldwide 5,098,473 international migrants and refugees from Venezuela registered by the authorities of different countries. It should be noted that the actual number is expected to be higher, given that the numbers reported may not include all irregular migrants and are thus based on estimations. Of the reported cases, around half are staying with some form of resident permit, 817,105 have pending asylum applications, and only 112,468 are recognized refugees. The highest number of recognized Venezuelan refugees found asylum in Brazil (38,359), and in Spain (35,243), they are by far accepting the most asylum applications from Venezuelans worldwide (Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 2020b).

In the aforementioned study, migrants crossing the border to Colombia were asked about their planned destination. In 2018, 38%, and in 2019 18% wanted to stay in Colombia. The remaining preferred other countries, such as Peru, Ecuador, or Chile. In 2019, Colombia was the third most desired country of destination after Peru and Ecuador. (Bermúdez et al., 2018, p. 17; Mazuera-Arias et al., 2019, p. 27). Therefore, many migrants coming to Colombia used it as a transit country or at least planned to do so. Until September 2018, 75% of the people who entered Colombia from Venezuela again left the country at the border of Ecuador, most of them within less than three days (Consejo Nacional de política económica y social, 2018, p. 34).

As a reaction to the growing numbers of Venezuelan migrants in different Latin American countries, the individual countries started to change their entry requirements for migrants and refugees. These requirements have to be in line with international treaties (if ratified) while also being influenced by national politics. As mentioned above, the difficulties in connection with obtaining a passport are resulting in lacking identification documentation and, consequently, in complications to fulfill the national entry requirements. Additionally, a global increase of anti-migration propaganda stigmatizes the discourse and thus impedes the migration process even more. If people willing to migrate feel that they cannot comply with the requirements in both asylum laws and society, there is a higher tendency for them to take irregular routes followed by higher risks for safety and vulnerability (Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 2019, p. 4).

As illustrated in Figure 1, by far, most migrants are currently staying in Colombia (1,764,883 in May 2020). It also shows that most Venezuelans migrating are staying within Latin America and are rarely traveling overseas, except for the U.S and few other countries.

Figure 1: Absolute numbers of Venezuelan migrants in Latin America; Own representation based on Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (2020b)

2.3 IMMIGRATION TO COLOMBIA AND LIVING CONDITIONS IN BOGOTÁ

In this chapter, I will firstly discuss the migration history and immigration policies of Colombia (2.3.1), followed by the different destinations of Venezuelan migrants within Colombia (2.3.2), and finally, focus on the access to essential services of Venezuelan migrants in Bogotá (2.3.3).

2.3.1 HISTORY AND RECENT IMMIGRATION POLICIES BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA

Migration history between Venezuela Colombia

Before moving to the next chapter, I want to briefly shed light on the long migration history between Colombia and Venezuela. Until the early 2000s, migration from Colombia towards Venezuela was more common than the other way around. In general, Colombia was used

to high emigration, not immigration, which caused the influx of migrants from Venezuela during the last years to be especially challenging (Minsalud, 2019, p. 8). Starting in the 1970s, Venezuela experienced more and more migration from Colombia due to the growing oil industry and the economic opportunities developing from it, whereas most migrating Colombians stayed in Venezuela in regions close to the border. Continuing in the 1980s, the effects of an economic boom in Venezuela, together with structural changes and the growing internal conflict in Colombia, brought more migration towards Venezuela. This trend continued until the end of the 1990s with even more migrants and displaced people emigrating because of the economic crisis and the intensified effects of the armed conflict (Ramírez, Zuluaga, & Perilla, 2010, p. 27 as cited Calle, 2017, p. 9).

The migration of Venezuelans towards Colombia did not only result in a short time. With the presidential ship of Hugo Chávez and its government in the early 2000s, many companies moved with their economic capital to Colombia. The numbers rose slightly in 2003 through significant layoffs of workers of the Venezuelan state-owned oil company, caused by workers' participation in strikes against the government, out of fear of losing the currency and the government's expropriations. These entrepreneurs and especially highly-skilled workers in the oil industry migrated first. Although, the higher numbers of migrants from Venezuela towards Colombia only started in 2015. The Venezuelan government deported 22,000 Colombian citizens who were in the country irregularly and formerly flew from the armed conflict earlier. Also, as a measure against violence and smuggling, they closed an important border crossing point between the two countries for several months. (Castillo et al., 2018, p. 6 f). As soon as the border was reopened, about 400,000 Venezuelans came to Colombia to get products of basic needs in only two weekends. The number of Venezuelan migrants continued rising, with another peak in 2017 when more and more Venezuelans looked for better living opportunities in Colombia due to the growing difficulties in Venezuela (Consejo Nacional de política económica y social, 2018, p. 15 f).

How did Colombian migration policies change?

In the year of 2014, the Colombian government first formulated the Plan Frontiers for Prosperity (Plan Fronteras para la Prosperidad), indicating actions to take from different governmental entities to deal with the growing number of migrants close to the border between Venezuela and Colombia (Minsalud, 2019, p. 9). This formulated response of the Colombian government to the migration rise can be divided into different steps. In 2015, in response to the 22,000 Colombians' return, the state focused mainly on the institutional presence and humanitarian attention at the border zones. This implied controls at the border, the monitoring of migration flows, and the establishment of emergency health care services. In 2017, the Colombian government introduced different forms of permits to manage the procedures of people with varying reasons for migration. On the one hand, it installed the Border Mobility Card (Tarjeta de movilidad fronteriza, TMF) for short time stays up to one week in border regions. On the other hand, it introduced the Special Stay Permit (Permiso especial de permanencia, PEP) to grant a regular status for new residents for two years. The PEP allows Venezuelans access to work, health, financial services, and education, and it can be renewed after the expiration of the two years (Banco Mundial, 2018, p. 18f).

In 2018, through the Plan of Response to Migration from Venezuela, the government focused on border security, creating the special migration group (Grupo Especial Migratorio short GEM), consisting of different governmental entities. The group was ordered to control the execution of TMF and PEP while also making sure public spaces are being watched, smuggling prevented, and separated minors provided for. The Administrative Registry of

Venezuelan Migrants (Registro Administrativo de Migrantes Venezolanos short RAMV) was created to register irregular but also regular migrants entering Colombia to characterize the population and shape public policies accordingly. The Colombian government's response also focused on protecting migrants and returnees' human rights, in the sense of increasing access to education, health, and social protection. Also, there was a growing trend in installing centers to help migrants, non- and governmental. Finally, also people only registered in the RAMV could access the application process of the PEP, which is especially important as irregular migrants without a passport could as well be regularized (Banco Mundial, 2018, p. 18f).

From the 1,764,883 migrants and refugees from Venezuela staying in Colombia by May 2020, about 43.4% are in regular and 56.7% in irregular conditions. Out of those with regular status, 612,449 have the PEP (Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 2020a). The high number of migrants in a condition of irregularity can, at least in parts, be explained by the limitations in the issuance of documents, such as birth certificate and passports by the Venezuelan Government and the cost to obtain them. That consequently affects the access to permits like the PEP and thus the access to the labor market and social services, as well as the transit process to migrate to other countries (Banco Mundial, 2018, p. 16).

2.3.2 NUMBERS AND DESTINATIONS IN COLOMBIA

Following, I will present different regional concentration and specific conditions of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia. The change between 2017 and 2019 of the numbers of regular and irregular migrants from Venezuela in Colombia can be seen in Table 1. Analyzing the numbers from the year 2019, the number of irregular migrants started rising faster than those of regular migrants, which resulted in more than half of the total number of migrants being in irregular conditions. However, further into 2020, the numbers first rose until an all-time high of more than 1,800,000 Venezuelan migrants but then started to decline because many were regressing to Venezuela due to the pandemic of COVID-19 (Migración Colombia, 2020).

Time period	Regular	Irregular	In regulation process	Total
30 junio 2017	263,331	153,000	-	416,331
30 june 2018	381,735	45,896	442 462	870,093
30 september 2018	573,502	218,098	240 416	1,032,016
31 december 2018	695,496	479,247	-	1,174,743
31 march 2019	770,975	489,619	-	1,260,594
30 junio 2019	742,390	665,665	-	1,408,055
31 august 2019	750,918	737,455	-	1,488,373
31 october 2019	719,189	911,714	-	1,630,903
31 march 2020	784,234	1,025,638	-	1,809,872
31 april 2020	763,544	1,024,836	-	1,788,380
31 may 2020	763,411	1,001,472	-	1,764,883
31 june 2020	762,857	985,859	-	1,748,716

Table 1: Regular and irregular migrants in Colombia; Own representation base on Farné and Sanín (2020, p. 12); Migración Colombia (2020)

Figure 2: Absolute numbers Venezuelans in Colombian departments; based on Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (2020a)

In Figure 2, regional concentrations in absolute numbers are demonstrated. Regarding numbers of may 2020, 19.67% of all Venezuelan migrants lived in Bogotá, 11.35% in the department Norte de Santander, 9.24% in Atlantico 8.82% in La Guajira, and 8.77% in Antioquia (Migración Colombia, 2020).

Figure 3: Cities with highest numbers of Venezuelans (absolute and proportional); Own illustration based on data from DANE (2020); Migración Colombia (2020)

The dispersion, not only per department but in cities, is shown in Figure 3, where the municipalities with the highest numbers of Venezuelans (above 20,000) are compared with their percentage of Venezuelans per inhabitants. On the one hand, it shows that highly-populated cities in the country, such as Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellin, and Cali, are hosting many Venezuelan migrants. On the other hand, between those urban centers, there are also smaller municipalities, mostly located at the border or the Caribbean Sea, that not only host many Venezuelan in absolute numbers but also the percentage of Venezuelans in regards to the local population is higher than in any other part of Colombia. Villa del Rosario, Maicao, Riohacha, and Arauca, followed by Cucuta, show the highest share of Venezuelans per inhabitant. It should be noted that these numbers can change over time, but there is generally a higher concentration in bigger cities and regions close to the border to Venezuela.

Most migrants reach Colombia by land and initially stay close to the border, where the aforementioned cities are the most common arrival points. The easy access by foot also results in many migrants without identification documents reaching Colombia and staying at least for some time at border towns. This results in high population growth, and a large share of migrants without legal documentation is causing a rise in informal work and insecurity. It also limits the cities' capabilities to provide essential resources and services in hospitals, schools, and the labor market. Consequently, migrants often depend on solidarity acts in society (Banco Mundial, 2018, p. 67 f).

As depicted in Figure 3, Bogotá is the number one municipality destination for migrants, followed by Cucuta. Simultaneously, in Bogotá, by far, the highest number of PEPs were issued its first two cycles until 2018. More than half of all people who received the PEP live in the capital; however, it is followed by other large metropolises within the country, such as Medellin, Barranquilla, and Cali. Comparing this to the Venezuelan population living in different municipalities, it indicates that the legalization process for most migrants is initiated in the country's large cities in contrast to smaller border towns (Consejo Nacional de política económica y social, 2018, p. 40).

Bogotá, with around 7,5 million inhabitants in its city area and 11 million in its metropolitan area, is by far the largest city and economy within Colombia (Population Stat, 2020). Bogotá, as do most large metropolises, thus provides most opportunities to find a home and a job, and therefore also to support their families back in Venezuela. Despite many migrants having a high level of education, the most significant share still has to work in informal jobs and/or are facing obstacles in the regulation process for not having the necessary legal documents (Banco Mundial, 2018, p. 69).

2.3.3 ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL SERVICES IN BOGOTÁ

Following, I will shortly shed light on general policies regarding migrants in Bogotá and then focus on Venezuelan migrants' actual daily rea lities in the city.

The approach in Bogotá aims at protecting and caring for the fundamental rights of Venezuelan migrants and is the responsibility of the Secretary of Social Integration and Security, Coexistence, and Justice. Their policies intend to ensure access to public services like education, health, and social inclusion; and prevent risks of abuse, exploitation, and human trafficking. However, it should be noted that most of these services are only provided to those who own a passport or PEP, which means undocumented migrants are being excluded from most essential services. Regarding the main challenges Venezuelans face, Bogotá's mayor

office focuses on the vulnerability of these individuals. On the one hand, it monitors sexual exploitation by human trafficking networks by focusing on Venezuelan sex workers and brothels. On the other hand, it aims to address the experiences of xenophobia of Venezuelans; however, not having presented specific strategies (ACRIP and Fedesarrollo, 2018, p. 27 f).

Housing

According to the study mentioned above, 96% of the Venezuelans crossing the border to Colombia state they have a place to stay in the city they were heading towards, be it with friends or family members (Bermúdez et al., 2018, p. 18). Another study from 2019 confirms that these networks of family and friends are a reason for Venezuelans to choose Colombia as a destination, with 37% stating this. Moreover, 45% said they were initially staying with acquaintances of the family. According to this study, most people rent an apartment and live with two to five people in one space, presumably given that more than half migrated with the nuclear family. Lastly, about half of them said it was hard to acquire housing in Bogotá (Proyecto Migración Venezuela, 2019, p. 7).

The limited income opportunities for most migrant households (approximately 70% earn less than two minimum salaries per household) forces most migrants to live in informal settlements in appalling conditions, mostly located in the periphery of the city (Consejo Nacional de política económica y social, 2018, p. 62). Simultaneously, insufficient access to temporary housing results in the occupation of public spaces, which again leads to more insecurity and vulnerability. For both informal settlements and public space, access to basic sanitation services is highly restricted, causing additional health risks (Banco Mundial, 2018, p. 23).

Health

The access to health care in Colombia is provided through the insurance system, based on a contributory or subsidized service by the General system of social security in health (SGSSS) or through care by occasion in the public system financed with available supplies. To register in the SGSSS, one has to have the ability to pay the rates and work in formal employment or meet the requirement of vulnerability for people who cannot afford the fees. Migrants have to have regular residency status and identification documents like a passport, PEP, or foreigner identity card (cedula de extranjeria). In 2018, about 3% of all Venezuelan migrants in Colombia were inscribed in the SGSSS (Consejo Nacional de política económica y social, 2018, p. 47). People with a TMF only had guaranteed health care for emergencies, which is also the case for irregular migrants in the Colombian territory. At the same time, there also have been advances as to secure health care for all migrants, even in non-emergency situations, based on the principle of non-discrimination under international law. In particular, the Colombian government created a response plan for the health sector, addressing migrants lacking access to basic health services (Fancy and Mejía, 2019, p. 10 ff.). This plan is directed to all migrants but specifically to those from Venezuela, including Colombian returnees, to formalize actions already taken and respond in the health sector with dignity regarding human rights. Also, to ensure the adoption of a comprehensive health care strategy in border zones and those most affected by the migration (Minsalud, 2019, p. 9).

Even though in Colombia, access to health services is a fundamental right for all people in the territory, a study shows that in 2019 89% of migrants were not included in the insurance system. Apart outlined above, reasons are the costs being associated with joining or not having the necessary documents (Proyecto Migración Venezuela, 2019, p. 5).

Education

Between 2015 and 2018, the Ministry of National Education changed requirements to enable children and adolescents from Venezuela, regardless of their migratory status, to attend school. They can register in the educational system (Sistema de Matriculas Estudiantil, SIMAT) with their foreigner identification card, the PEP, or if they do not have an identification document with a number given by the Secretary of Education to inscribe in the system. Still, if they do not have any of these valid identification documents, they cannot get issued a certification of their studies. At the same time, students do not have to legalize documents of former certificates in Venezuela as these can be validated through evaluations by the new schools themselves for classes up until tenth grade. This means that irregular migrants are faced with the problem that they can study but cannot get certified. The process of recognizing higher education degrees is long, and often they cannot obtain the necessary documents relevant to this process. Many migrant graduates do not have any proof of their studies or qualifications, causing further blockades when entering the labor market (Consejo Nacional de política económica y social, 2018, p. 50 ff.).

Since the beginning of 2018, all Venezuelan children can register in school, but only 25% of Venezuelan children in Bogotá attend school. A study shows that most participants said it is due to lacking documents and not being able to cover the costs (Proyecto Migración Venezuela, 2019, p. 6).

Table 2 shows the distribution of the highest obtained education between Colombians and Venezuelans of working age and is displayed over the period from 2014 until 2019. What stands out is that, as formerly mentioned, high educated Venezuelans with a university degree started migrating earlier on as in 2015, the percentage was at 16% and sunk until 2019 to 10%. However, compared to the share of Colombians with a university degree, Venezuelan migrants are relatively higher educated throughout the years.

Time period	None		Basic education		Highschool degree		Technical degree		University degree	
Nationality	Col	Ven	Col	Ven	Col	Ven	Col	Ven	Col	Ven
July 14 - June 15	8.3%	4.5%	49.3%	34.7%	26.5%	32.3%	8.3%	12.4%	7.6%	16.0%
July 15 - June 16	8.4%	5.1%	48.0%	42.9%	27.7%	28.6%	8.2%	8.3%	7.8%	15.1%
July 16 - June 17	8.2%	4.3%	46.8%	39.3%	28.6%	33.6%	8.2%	10.4%	8.2%	12.4%
July 17 - June 18	7.9%	3.3%	45.9%	34.7%	29.4%	41.6%	8.4%	9.5%	8.5%	10.9%
July 18 - June 19	7.8%	3.8%	45.2%	39.3%	29.7%	38.8%	8.3%	7.8%	9.0%	10.3%

Work

There are no comprehensive public policies to organize and regulate the access to work for the Venezuelan population in Colombia. The option which Venezuelans have, who want to work in Colombia, is to apply on the one hand for the PEP, which allows them to work, or on the other hand for a work visa, which derives from a formal work contract (Unit for Disaster Risk Management, 2017, p.7 as cited Fancy and Mejía, 2019, p. 14 f). The percentage of young Venezuelans of working age (under 35) is by far higher than that of the Colombian population. It demonstrates the strong influx of potential labor force in the Colombian labor market (Bahar, Dooley and Huang, 2018, p. 5).

Time period	Unemployment rate		Occupation rate		Participation rate	
Nationality	Col	Ven	Col	Ven	Col	Ven
July 14 - June 15	8.9%	12.3%	58.8%	63.5%	64.6%	72.4%
July 15 - June 16	9.1%	11.3%	58.8%	56.7%	64.7%	64.0%
July 16 - June 17	9.2%	15.4%	58.6%	56.4%	64.5%	66.7%
July 17 - June 18	9.4%	15.2%	57.9%	65.0%	63.9%	76.6%
July 18 - June 19	10.0%	15.2%	57.1%	63.0%	63.4%	74.3%

Table 3 shows the relation of participation in the Colombian labor market of Colombians and Venezuelans. It can be noted that the unemployment rate is high for both groups, but for Venezuelans, it is throughout the years around 5% higher than for Colombians. Simultaneously, the occupation rate and the participation of people of working age in the labor market are higher for Venezuelans (Farné and Sanín, 2020, p. 14 f). Also, the rate of people working in informal conditions is higher for Venezuelans than Colombians, but this will be discussed in detail in chapter 3.1.4. Finally, Venezuelans have worked on average 50 hours per week compared to Colombians with 44 hours (Farné and Sanín, 2020, p. 16 f).

A study from 2019 focused on the Venezuelan migrants' situation in the labor market in Bogotá. Figure 4 shows that only 35% had the necessary permits to work formally, and 93% could not work in the field of their former profession. 36% of them could not do so because they did not have the necessary documents, and 16% because of the cost of obtaining those documents. Only 36% had a source of income in the previous month, and of those, 57% were working in informal jobs or as street vendors. Around half worked under 8 hours, most between 6-8; the other half more than 8 hours a day. Only 11% were earning more than 900,000 COP (around 200 Euros). 66% were sending up to 100,000 COP to their families in Venezuela and 33% more than 500,000 COP (Proyecto Migración Venezuela, 2019, p. 4 f).

Figure 4: Venezuelans working Bogotá; Own representation based on Proyecto Migración Venezuela (2019, p. 4 f)

Conditions of the labor activities

Piecework (temporal and independet, without a contract) — 50 %
Contracted permanent employment — 18.8 %
Contracted for the provision of services — 17.4 %
Street vendor — 7.2 %
Contracted emporal employment — 3.6%
Others — 2.2 %
Doesn't know / Didn't respond — 0.7 %

Daily hours dedicated to work

4-6 hours — 8.7 %
6-8 hoours — 40.6 %
8-10 hours — 35.5 %
More than 10 hours — 15.2 %

Monthly income

0-400,000 COP — 23.2 %
400,000 - 900,000 COP — 62.3 %
900,000 - 2,000,000 COP — 9.4 %
2,000,000 -5,000,000 COP — 2.2 %
Doesn't know / Didn't respond — 2.9 %

Economic transactions to Family in Venezuela

0-50,000 COP — 21.3 %
50,000 - 100,000 COP — 44.9 %
100,000 - 500,000 COP — 31.5 %
500,000 -1,000,000 COP — 1.1 %
Doesn't know / Didn't respond — 1.1 %

One can see from these data that Venezuelan migrants have a particularly hard, often have to work precariously and informally, and therefore are at greater risk of being exploited and suffer from stigma. Those struggles in access to essential services and the search for can also influence the general capacity to participate in public life. This overview of the theoretical concepts of migration and Venezuelan migrants' particular situation in Colombia has been discussed thoroughly and builds the conceptual background for further analytical analysis.

WORK

3

3 INFORMAL WORK ONLINE

The following section handles the topic of work and how certain concepts of space are connected with it. In chapter 3.1, I will discuss different theories and ideas surrounding work in the context of gender and formality. In chapter 3.2, the focus is laid on work online in various types of platforms and space concepts that can be linked with it.

3.1 THEORIES OF WORK

The chapter is parted into the following segments. First, I will discuss contemporary types of work (3.1.1), followed by a discussion of the notion of gender in public and private spaces (3.1.2). Third, I will explain the concept of formal and informal work (3.1.3) and its forms in Colombia and Bogotá (3.1.4).

3.1.1 WORK DIVISIONS IN CONTEMPORARY TIMES

Diverse work

I want to shed light on the concept of labor, which many tend to think of as only paid work. Unpaid work, however, is often invisible in society and not categorized as real work. In an ever-developing world, new types of labor are emerging, and others are disappearing. In the scope of this thesis, I focus on such modern types of work, which up until now are not clearly conceptualized or sufficiently analyzed. Therefore, it is especially important to look at what separates various forms of work and, at the same time, what those transactions or boundaries represent. Delivery service and Webcamming are prime examples of such intermediate labor, as they are paid work, but they are also a labor of care and show informality patterns.


Figure 5: Diverse Economies Iceberg; Community Economies Institute (no date)

The "iceberg of diverse economy", shown in Figure 5, points exactly at those invisible types of work with only types of wage labor above water, hence visible. Building on this concept, McKinnon and colleagues (2018) argue that only "wage labor, producing for a market, in a capitalist firm "(p. 8) is seen as "the economy", while in reality, this type of economy is only a small portion of different economies. Many people working in "invisible" labor can feel that bias through low or inexistent pay, discrimination, or economic disadvantages.

Transactions	Labor	Enterprise
Market	*Wage*	*Capitalist*
Alternative Market	*Alternative Paid*	*Alternative Capitalist*
Sale of public goods	Cooperative	Nonprofit
Ethical "fair-trade" markets	Self-employed	State enterprise
Local trading systems	Reciprocal labour	Green capitalist
Alternative currencies	In-kind	Socially responsible firm
Underground market	Work for welfare	
Co-op exchange	Indentured	
Informal markets		
Barter		
Nonmarket	*Unpaid*	*Noncapitalist*
Household flows	Housework	Housework
Gift-giving	Family Care	Family Care
State Allocations	Neighbourhood work	Neighbourhood work
State appropriations	Self-provisioning Labour	Self-provisioning Labour
Gleaning	Volunteer	Volunteer
Hunting fishing gathering	Slave Labour	Slave Labour
Theft/poaching		
Indigenous exchange		

Table 4: Divers economy types; based on Gibson-Graham (2006, p.71 as cited in McKinnon, Dombroski and Morrow, 2018, p. 11)

Gibson-Graham (2006) provides a framework for categorizing and analyzing different types of work with each different version of transactions, labor, and enterprise (Table 4). This leaves us to define if a specific kind of work is being conducted on the market, a wage is paid, and if it is capitalist or not. Therefore, it facilitates a more theoretically founded labeling and understanding of the labor market as a whole and the individual parts it contains (McKinnon, Dombroski and Morrow, 2018).

Labor or care

Another typology of work distinguishes between productive and reproductive labor (Fraser, 2016). The term reproductive labor refers to the labor of care. This encompasses any work done for people who cannot work and need care, paid or unpaid. The reproductive sphere is traditionally connected to the home, while the productive sphere occurs in the workplace. "The reproductive sphere was understood as encompassing the set of concrete activities undertaken to reproduce the (masculinized) wage labour: cooking cleaning, childcare [...]. The productive sphere, by contrast, represented those activities which produce goods and services: welding, programming, sewing [...]" (Hester and Srnicek, 2017, p. 2).

However, the distinctions should not be made solely due to the specific practice, depending on the social context they can be found in both spheres. This leads to the definition of social-reproduction, which can be linked to space in between those two, as reproductive labor in the public sphere (Hester and Srnicek, 2017, p. 2). Looking at this through the lens of gender disparities, de Oliveira and Araiza (2000) argue that "[...] sexual division is a sociohistorical construction susceptible to transformation and that the scope of reproductive

work goes beyond the domestic sphere to play a central role in the processes of reproduction of the labor force at the societal level" (translated from Spanish, p. 651).

This non-waged social-reproductive labor goes hand in hand with productive labor, as it is essential to its existence and functioning. The nurturing work of reproductive activities is building the foundation and backbone of economic production. That separation of work has come with industrialization and capitalism as the importance of production grew. The division between productive and reproductive labor and the connecting of reproductive labor connected to love and productive labor to money is heavily gendered (Fraser, 2016, p. 102). Fraser describes its emergence as follows:

> *In this way, capitalist societies created an institutional basis for new, modern forms of women's subordination. Splitting off reproductive labour from the larger universe of human activities, in which women's work previously held a recognized place, they relegated it to a newly institutionalized 'domestic sphere' where its social importance was obscured"* (Fraser, 2016, p. 102).

She further points out the instability of such a codependence: Capitalist production, she argues, cannot sustain itself without reproductive work. This becomes clear when capitalist growth becomes dangerous to its social counterpart and leads to a destabilization of reproductive procedures and risks the social structures necessary to maintain capitalism itself (Fraser, 2016, p. 103).

3.1.2 GENDER IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPACE

History

In literature, there has historically been made a separation between public and private (space and sphere), which is similar to the distinction between productive (public) and reproductive (private) labor. Bahrdt, 2006[1961] pointed out that to define the "urban", a strict distinction between the private and the public is essential. What cannot be defined as one of the two, be it a hybrid or a misbalance, is less important and imposes problems for metropolises. This line of thought is accompanied by a general trend of binaries in research around urban space (as cited Vaiou and Kalandides, 2009, p. 11).

The binary categorization of the public and the private has a long history. Hanna Arendt first focused on the public by describing it through the Greek polis. Here, the public is seen as the political, the private as the home. Public space, she argues, exists only where "men act together in concert", meaning the interactions and discussions between individuals are creating the public itself. Jürgen Habermas adopted this phrase and included social and cultural components of participation to define the public. He demonstrates that the public sphere is made up of multiple publics, meaning that for each contested topic, there exists a public with a theoretical say for everybody who is affected by it. Despite this difference of what the public entails or whether we should think of it as plurality, both authors use clear distinctions between public and private. They were faced with feminist criticism for failing to include large groups of people in their analysis (Vaiou and Kalandides, 2009, p. 15).

Murillo (1996) sees the public as to where work and the political take place but makes an analytical distinction between the private and domestic. The domestic space is where reproductive activities, affection, and care for the family occur. Private space is where one

takes care of themselves individually. The home is, therefore, the private space of the people living there but at the same time a place for reproductive labor, work which most women do without pay. Murillo points out that, therefore, the home is the private space for men, often not connected to any obligations of work, while for women, the home is foremost related to the domestic labor of reproduction (Murillo, 1996 as cited Luque Velarde, 2012, p. 19/25).

Feminist Critique

The separation between men and women and the public and the private is often justified using biological features and the typical female role of the mother. Feminist perspectives throughout the end of the last century challenged this distinction, especially as women have been entering the productive workforce. Particularly, women found themselves representing both roles of domestic and paid work, which demands a rethinking of the binary typology of public and private or productive and reproductive work. „The need to respect differences and choices and to re-evaluate traditional hierarchies of what counts as important remains an important feminist issue" (Buikema, 1995; Friedan, 1992 as cited in Sima 2017:64). Other feminist critics have noted that „[...] the public is the side which holds a prominent position and presupposes a community of equals who participate actively in it, excluding those who do not conform to the norm in terms of gender, class, sexuality, ethnicity, age" (e.g. Benhabib 1998; Landes 1998 as cited Vaiou and Kalandides, 2009, p. 15).

Binary and bridges

As gender roles and the distinction between public and private blur, how can we conceptually bridge the binary between the public and private sphere? „A degree of distinction [...] between private and public spaces, is essential for living in society. The controversy is usually about how these two areas are defined, distinguished from one another, and separated by what sort of boundary" (Madanipour, 2010, p. 9). For example, Law (1999) points out how the work-trip, from home to work, demonstrates a link between the public/productive and private/reproductive space and sphere and thus challenges the strict binary separation. It encourages us to look at what lies in between (p. 571). Many other examples that bend the binary can be identified. This is especially the case as new forms of productive work emerge: from online work from home to institutionalized paid reproductive labor; the distinctions blur. Vaiou and Kalandides (2009) studied such border-crossing of outsiders, i.e., the appropriation of public space by groups that have traditionally been excluded from these spaces, such as migrants, (migrant) women, or stigmatized groups in semi-public spaces (p. 12 ff.). „The dividing line, as well as the content of each side of the binary, is a matter of continuous re-negotiation towards more publicity, as a means of empowerment and emancipation." (Vaiou and Kalandides, 2009, p. 16)

Within this thesis, I use these concepts to conceptualize and analyze the links and boundaries between productive and reproductive labor and public and private space and its theoretical meanings. The ideas discussed above serve as a frame for understanding how the daily structures within work online are shaping the understanding of these transition spaces.

3.1.3 FORMAL AND INFORMAL WORK

Informality

To explain the concept of informality and how it has become increasingly present in the last decades, I again draw on Asaf Bayat (2019). Global restructuring in the 80s and 90s has had two main consequences in developing countries, integration and, on the contrary, informalization and social exclusion. He argues that

> [...] through the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program, has led to the erosion of much of the social contract, collective responsibility, and welfare state structures. Thus, millions of people in the global South who depended on state provisions must now rely on themselves to survive. Deregulation of prices on housing, rent, and utilities jeopardizes many poor people's security of tenure, subjecting them to the risk of homelessness. (Bayat, 2010, p. 43)

In the 90s in Latin America, formal employment was sinking drastically due to the shift toward market economies. This development hit especially the middle class, who were faced with the risk of becoming poorer and having to rely on informal labor and housing markets. Informalizations and exclusion were not new, but global restructuring was accelerating them. „Slum dwelling, casual work, under the table payment [...] are no longer just the characteristics of the traditional poor but also are spread among the educated young people with higher status, aspirations, and social skills — government employees, teachers, and professionals" (Bayat, 2010, p. 44).

Labor informality

"Informality has a harmful effect on workers' rights, including fundamental principles and rights at work, social protection, decent working conditions, and the rule of law" (International Labour Organization, 2018, p. 1). The International Labour Organization (ILO) counts 2 billion people worldwide who are working in informal conditions. They do not want to connect poverty and informal labor directly but note that the risk of living in poverty is higher for those who work in informal conditions. Moreover, informal work is usually not a choice but a result of a lack of opportunities in the formal sector (International Labour Organization, 2018, p. 1).

Informal employment is often referred to as work that is not covered by formal regulations and goes „unreported", which leaves workers unprotected. Yet, there is no exact definition; separate entities focus on different working conditions, such as wages, hours of work, and work environment, or differentiate between larger and smaller firms or if someone is self-employed. Moreover, the informality of work depends strongly on distinctions made by countries, i.e., economies themselves. Finally, these different regulations of informal and formal labor between countries make it difficult to find measures for informal labor that allow us to compare different countries (Bernal, 2009, p. 147).

The ILO has developed such a typology of the formal sector and employment, which allows us international comparisons. The two graphics in Figure 6 and 7 show how this process is laid out (International Labour Organization, 2018, p. 7 ff.). It displays that many of the categories may not be able to fulfill depending on the country, for example, using the registration and bookkeeping as an essential factor for the formal sector. In this scheme, employees without social security, for example, are automatically categorized as informal employ-

ment. Also, not being granted paid sick leave also is a component for informal employment. However, considering that in many countries, social security, or more specifically, sick leave is not obligatory; it can disort results compared to state calculations.

Figure 6: Categorization of the informal sector; based on International Labour Organization (2008, p. 9)

Figure 7: Categorization of informal employment; based on International Labour Organization (2008, p. 11)

Using this procedure, the ILO identifies 2 billion people in informal employment, which amounts to 61.2% of the total employed population (International Labour Organization, 2018, p. 13). Latin America has average levels of informal labor compared to other continents (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Informal employment (including agriculture); based on International Labour Organization, (2008, p. 13)

Gender and informal work

In the following section, I will focus on the gender aspect of labor informality. „The inter-section of gender and informality is significant, with a high concentration of women in informal work and with women tending to be concentrated in the more economically vul-nerable and insecure forms of employment" (Coles, Macdonald and Delaney, 2018, p. 95). Worldwide, the share of informal work for men is 63% and 58% for women. However, it should be noted that the influence of large countries such as China and Russia weighs heavi-ly if we look at total numbers and that in lower-income countries, often, a higher percentage of women work in informal labor. The portion of women working in informal domestic work is three times higher than for men. Moreover, around 30% of informal work done by women in low- and lower-middle-income countries is considered family work, which is usually unpaid (International Labour Organization, 2018, p. 20 f).

3.1.4 INFORMAL WORK IN COLOMBIA AND BOGOTÁ

The national statistics department (DANE) of Colombia defines informal work when at least one of the following factors applies:

- **Individual employees, domestic workers, workers, day workers, and wor-kers who work in establishments, businesses, or companies that employ up to five people in all their agencies and branches, including the employer and/or partner.**

- **Family workers and other unpaid household workers in businesses of five workers or less.**

- **Employers in businesses of five workers or less.**

- **Self-employed workers who work in establishments of up to five persons, except for independent professionals. (Observatorio Laboral LaboUR, 2018, p. 3)**

They even go further to define forms of strong and weak informality. Work is considered "strong informality" if it does NOT meet one of the following criteria:

- **Individual employees, domestic workers, workers, day workers, and wor-kers who work in establishments, businesses, or companies that employ up to five people in all their agencies and branches, including the employer and/or partner.**

- **Family workers and other unpaid household workers in businesses of five workers or less.**

- **Employers in businesses of five workers or less.**

- **Self-employed workers who work in establishments of up to five persons, except for independent professionals. (Observatorio Laboral LaboUR, 2018, p. 3)**

They go further to define forms of strong and weak informality. Work is considered "strong informality" if it does not meet one of the following criteria:

- **To belong to the contributory or special health regime as contributors and not as beneficiaries.**

- **Be contributing to a pension fund or be a pensioner.**

- **Have a written employment contract (either fixed-term or indefinite).**

- **Earn more than 95% of the minimum hourly wage. (Observatorio Laboral LaboUR, 2018, p. 4)**

On the other hand, to „not" be considered as an informal worker, being an independent, domestic or general paid worker, one of the following factors have to be correct:

- **He or she is affiliated (as a contributor and not as a beneficiary) with the Social Security Health System, either under its contributory or subsidized regime.**

- **He is affiliated with the subsidized health system in its special regime. (Obser-vatorio Laboral LaboUR, 2018, p. 4)**

In the international statistics of the ILO, Colombia has 60% informal employment as the share of total employment (55.9% in the informal sector, 3% informal employment in the formal sector, and 1.8% in households). Men have a percentage of 61.9% and women of 58.8% when agriculture is included. Without agriculture, the total share sinks to 55.4%, for men to 54.2% and women 56.9%, which concludes that predominately men work informal-ly in agriculture. (International Labour Organization, 2018, p. 87). Also, it hints at women working, as formerly mentioned, more in unpaid family work.

Contrary to data by the ILO, statistics conducted by DANE looking at the last years, the rate for informal employment for men laid between 43 and 47% of women between 48 and 51% - in 23 metropolitan areas (DANE, 2020, p. 1). This could potentially be connected to DANE's definitions of not being that strict and adaption to national specifications in the labor market. Also, for their official numbers, DANE uses only references to metropolitan areas and does not include rural areas. Rural rates of informality usually lay around 85% (Quemba, 2018, p. 32), which can also explain the difference the ILO makes in regards to include agriculture or not. Also, the calculation of DANE comes to a percentage of 48% in the year 2017, but taking a calculation of informality including the membership of pension as a factor, and assuming that the contributor of the pension also contributes to health, 62% would be considered informal work (Quemba, 2018, p. 24).

Further, Bogotá has, compared to other cities in Colombia, a relatively low rate of labor informality, with 41,7%, only Medellin and Manizales have lower rates. As mentioned in chapter 2.3.2, cities close to the border, such as Cucuta, the city with the highest share of 71,4%, have higher informality rates (DANE, 2020, p. 5).

In Table 5, the rates of Venezuelans and Colombians working in the Colombian labor mar-ket are compared by different definitions of informality. Almost 90% of Venezuelans are not covered by social security systems, connecting this to the informality rate regarding

the pension system's contribution. Similar numbers can be found for rate depending on the insurances for labor risks. However, the rates in 2014/15 were similar to those of Colombians. The change can be described through the growing numbers of Venezuelans working in bigger, probably formal companies, only not through formal conditions of social security. Also, the irregular residency status and/or difficulties consulting documents also results in higher rates of Venezuelan migrants working In informal conditions (Farné and Sanín, 2020, p. 21 f).

Time period	Informality rate Size of establishment		Informality rate Pension contribution		Informaity rate Labor risk insurence	
Nationality	Col	Ven	Col	Ven	Col	Ven
July 14 - June 15	60.4%	56.8%	64.4%	61.7%	66.1%	63.2%
July 15 - June 16	59.7%	58.5%	63.1%	72.0%	64.5%	70.6%
July 16 - June 17	59.9%	62.2%	62.4%	77.7%	63.5%	75.7%
July 17 - June 18	59.8%	70.9%	61.8%	88.3%	62.9%	87.2%
July 18 - June 19	58.9%	71.4%	61.2%	89.4%	62.1%	88.2%

The national survey carried out by DANE shows interesting factors around gender and reproductive work. Figure 9 shows that the average (in 2016-2017) of time spent working in jobs recorded in the National counting system of women is 7:35 hours, while this is 9:14 hours for men. Simultaneously, women spend around 7:14 hours daily, and men only 3:25, for work not recorded in the system, such as reproductive work (DANE, 2018, p. 7).

Figure 9: Daily time separated by activity groups in Colombia 2016-2017; based on DANE (2018, p. 7)

Table 6 takes a more in-depth look into the division of reproductive work by gender in Colombia. In most, if not all areas, women are responsible and put more time into managing the household. Women, compared to men, spend on average more than twice as much time on the following household tasks: „provision of food for household members", „Maintenance of clothes for household members", „cleaning, maintenance and repair for the home" and „passive care (to be aware)" (DANE, 2018, p. 8).

Work activities not included in the System of National Accounts	Woman		Men	
	Participation	Average time (hh:mm)	Participation	Average time (hh:mm)
Provision of food for household members	74.4%	02:03	24.9%	00:58
Maintenance of clothes for household members	38.0%	01:15	9.1%	00:44
Cleaning, maintenance and repair for the home	68.9%	01:20	34.2%	01:01
Groceries shopping and administration for the home	23.6%	00:55	20.7%	00:55
Care activities with children under 5 years belonging to the household	16.3%	01:29	10.5%	01:21
Physical Care of Household Members	20.9%	01:23	3.8%	00:43
Supporting Household Members	8.6%	01:22	3.6%	01:09
Voluntary	3.0%	03:03	1.8%	02:36
Passive care (to be aware)	35.4%	07:07	16.1%	05:55
Transport	13.6%	00:26	12.3%	00:26

Looking at the different ways to categorize work, between informal and formal, productive and reproductive, paid or unpaid, it can be hard to find the specific description for every type of work. Also, differing standards and definitions leave room for interpretation. If we see formal labor as work where someone has a contract, is insured, and pays taxes, many jobs do not fall into that category. Jobs on digital platforms, even if they have formal characters, would not be formal as often no insurance or taxes are paid. I, therefore, categorize these as new types of informal work. They might be digital and seem organized but still face similar stigmas surrounding them.

3.2 WORK IN ONLINE SPACES

The focus of this chapter lies in online work, highlighting elements of the platform economy in section and its effects for workers in urban areas in 3.2.1. Section 3.2.2 follows with the spatial aspects regarding online presence in the context of everyday life and embodiment of space.

3.2.1 THE SHARING ECONOMY, LABOR PLATFORMS, AND THE GAMIFICATION OF WORK

Since the start of the 21st century, there can be observed a strong trend of digitalization coming along with significant transformations in diverse areas. Digitization nowadays influences most parts of our everyday lives and changes our value creation processes and perspectives on work. "The changes in technology, the economy, consumption and work [due to digitization] go hand in hand" (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2017, p. 21). The impacts on work have two sides: the change of production processes and business models and changing working conditions for employees. Digitization impacts their workflows intensely, especially regarding workspace and work time (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2017, p. 19 ff.).

Sharing economy

To understand the scope of online platforms, I first want to touch ground with the concept of the sharing economy. The term itself is not clearly defined and is often treated as equivalent to the collaborative or peer-to-peer economy. The term sharing "reflects the emerging of new values where instead of buying and owning goods, consumers want access to goods and want to pay for the experience of temporarily accessing them" (Bardhi & Eckhard, 2012 as cited Stanoevska-slabeva, Lenz-kesekamp and Suter, 2020, p. 11). The differentiation between non-monetized actions on sharing platforms and capitalist labor platforms is essential. The OECD uses the term „peer platform markets" given the fact that this form of economy usually involves transactions of payments. It also differentiates between providers, consumers, and the platform to connect them (OECD, 2016, p. 7).

Digital labor platforms

Thinking of digital platforms, big names such as Facebook, Uber, and Airbnb come into mind. Rodgers and Moore (2018) mention the term platform urbanism, emphasizing the idea of platforms as a form of infrastructure. Not only are platforms overlapping in different ways but also becoming infrastructures when historically considering their technical development (Plantin et al., 2016 as cited Rodgers and Moore, 2018). At the same time, platforms have a highly spatialized side. „They represent a new kind of political geography, and specifically, a new kind of sovereignty, one that potentially transcends the local and national" (Bratton, 2016 as cited Rodgers and Moore, 2018).

> *At the core of the platform's ecosystem are the parties using the platform to engage in value-creating interactions; however, the ecosystem may also encompass other actors, such as data partners or industry actors who do not directly participate on the platform. In the specific case of labor platforms, platforms connect workers with consumers of work. The platforms also provide the infrastructure and the governance conditions for the exchange of work and facilitate the corresponding compensation. A platform's overall goal is to enable producers and consumers to find each other, engage in the exchange of goods and services for money, and in some cases build lasting commercial relationships. (Choudary, 2018, p. 1)*

Pollio (2019) underpins this view when analyzing platform labor with the example of Uber in South Africa. His interpretation grounds on the concepts of people as infrastructure, following the theory of Simone (2004), to explain how assets of drivers are used for company goals. „In the case of Uber, it is not only drivers who become the supply: the platform also incorporates their networks, through which, according to my interlocutors, cars are sourced, officials are bribed to release driving permits, neighbourhoods are 'assigned' [...]" (Pollio, 2019, p. 7).

While digital platforms are often seen as opening up new possibilities of labor, disregarding physical and (in some cases also) legal boundaries, voices are urging to be cautious when assigning labor platforms an entrepreneur-empowering function. Big players of the platform economy like Uber are often using this narrative to speak about their workers as entrepreneurs who have their own business by using the infrastructure of the platform. However, studies show that these companies are first and foremost interested in growing their market shares by whatever means necessary. The friction between the companies' economic growth and the empowerment of workers carries the risk of labor exploitation (Choudary, 2018, p. 8).

> *[B]usinesses like Uber [...] should be conceived of as platform labor intermediaries that, despite their self-presentation as tech companies, operate as new players in a dynamic temporary staffing industry whose traditional business-oriented approach is being augmented by a more austere and zero-liability peer-to-peer model that leverages software to optimize labor's flexibility, scalability, tractability, and its fragmentation. (Peck & Theodore, 2013 as cited van Doorn, 2017, p. 901)*

This type of platform economy still lacks legal frameworks and regulations, which is why platform owners can decide to change terms of service whenever they choose to, not necessarily to the worker's benefit. The worker, defined by the owners as a user, is continuously at risk of having its account closed as the owner can decide (almost) randomly and without liability to do so if the user does not comply with the work agreement (van Doorn, 2011, p. 902). This also means that such platforms are often not bound by a legal framework regulating labor law and thus usually do not have to fear legal consequences.

In the scope of this thesis, I will focus on labor platforms that can also be categorized as part of the gig economy. Doorn (2018) describes the gig economy as a form of on-demand service labor commonly on digital platforms. However, it presents more than just a labor platform, as is shift the focus from employment to individual gigs, which are defined by their shortness, flexibility, and insecurity of continuity. Meaning that the upcoming platforms for services such as delivery, transportation, or home care are understood as a symptom of a larger structural shift in the way people are making a living. Delivery services, as such, I will present in my investigation, are prime examples of low-income gig labor, which at least to a certain extent already got academic consideration. However, the example of Webcam modeling shows a form of the gig economy that might not be as visible, yet it presents a growing type of platform service labor (van Doorn and Velthuis, 2018, p. 177).

Gamification of work

In the context of the growing influence of digital platforms, the topic of gamification comes into play as well. In general, the concept is not restricted to this type of work, but it seems to be of increasing importance since the early 2000s within online activities. It is an umbrella term to describe the influence on behavior, making work and other services feel like a game and guide specific steps by rewarding the right decisions. This game mechanism could be steered through „achievements (Experience points, Levels, Bonuses etc.); exercises (Challenges, Discoveries etc.); synchronizing with the community (Leaderboards, Collaboration etc.); result transparency (Experience bars, Continuous feedback etc.); time (Countdown, Speed etc.); luck (Lottery, Random Achievements etc.)" (Dale, 2014, p. 82). While the term is connected to behavioral change and gaming, there are also voices preferring terming it as motivation for employee engagement.

> *Game mechanics describes the use of elements such as points, badges, and leaderboards that are common to many games. Experience design describes the journey players take with elements such as game play, play space and story line. Gamification is a method to digitally engage, rather than personally engage, meaning that players interact with computers, smartphones, wearable monitors or other digital devices, rather than engaging with a person. The goal of gamification is to motivate people to change behaviours or develop skills, or to drive innovation. Gamification focuses on enabling players to achieve their goals. When organizational goals are aligned with player goals, the organization achieves its goals as a consequence of players achieving their goals. (Dale, 2014, p. 84)*

The theory distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, with the former referring to the desire for personal growth or learning experience and the latter to the reward or punishment in a monetary or materialistic form or other mechanisms that can be translated into it (Dale, 2014, p. 86 f). Regarding extrinsic motivation, there have been found complications, as „[m]oney has a way of changing the context of a situation; too little is insulting and demotivating; too much is stressinducing and kills creativity" (Dale, 2014, p. 88). This comes into play as many platforms use different mechanisms connected to economic rewards, which make their work seem more playful and gratifying; however, they can distract from exploitation they might be exposed to.

3.2.2 EVERYDAY LIFE AND EMBODIMENT IN VIRTUAL SPACE

Everyday life

With the background of work online, I want to turn back to spatial concepts to point out the importance of daily practices between the physical and digital space.

Connecting to the theory around public and private space, I want to draw on everyday life studies. In literature, private and public space is often strictly separated, but there are also researchers going beyond that binary. For example, Vaiou and Kalandides (2009), who analyze gender and public space, challenge the definitions by looking at practices of "outsiders" in public or semi-public spaces. For example, a migrant woman, who in their investigation, is considered as an outsider, doing practices in public space that would usually be considered for the private space. Such everyday practices and embodiment in public space are a form of testimony of presence and challenge the borders between binaries of the private and the public. „[T]he lines of division which are implied in the binaries, are contested and crossed in different ways through the everyday practices of embodied individuals who, in their turn, do not fit in strict categorisations" (p. 18).

As the focus of this thesis lies in Venezuelan migrants' daily lives and interactions, seemingly random and modest practices can still encompass structures that influence the spaces of and implications for the individual. Henri Lefebre (1947, 1961, 1981) studied everyday life and analyzed daily practices to understand and describe bigger systems, such as the influence of capitalism within structures of everyday life.

> Everyday describes the lived experience shared by urban residents, the banal and ordinary routines we know all too well - commuting, working, relaxing, moving through city streets and sidewalks, shopping, buying and eating food, running errands. [...] The concept of everyday space delineated the physical domain of everyday public activity. Existing in between such defined and physically identifiable realms as the home, the workplace, and the institution, everyday urban space us the connective tissue that binds daily lives together. (Crawford, 1999, p. 8 f)

As simple and mundane daily practices might seem, analyzing them can be difficult. To do so, Lefebvre (1971) structured his study of everyday life based on the distinction between „the quotidian, the timeless, humble, repetitive natural rhythms of life; and the modern, the always new and constantly changing habits that are shaped by technology and worldliness" (Lefebvre, 1971, p. 25 as cited Crawford, 1999, p. 10). Within his in-depth studies, he focused on the victims of everyday life and their routines in urban life. He saw that

specifically women, who mostly have been and still are in charge of the housework, as well as teenagers, immigrants and low level employees, but that they are all affected differently from each other in time and type (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 127 as cited Crawford, 1999, p. 11). Crawford (1999) describes these differences in everyday life between victims or, in general, between city dwellers as the social geography of a city. People can have differing views, perspectives, and experiences in the same place and with the same objects. She gives the example of a shopping cart that a mother shopping for groceries might use and thinks about differently than a homeless person. On the one hand, these differences make the everyday life of urban dwellers heterogeneous; on the other hand, social exchange is encouraged through having similar experiences. She defines the most interesting everyday urbanism as existing in places where diverse forms of everyday life coexist and interact (Crawford, 1999, p. 11).

These everyday (communal) practices are also the base of nonmovements, as mentioned in section 2.1.3. Considering action of socially excluded groups in contested space, Bayat (2010) provides similar examples as mentioned by Lefebvre: women, immigrants, and youth are the groups with the most heterogeneous experiences. Nonmovements are „[…] the collective actions of noncollective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations" (Bayat, 2010, p. 14).

Embodiment in virtual space

Further, I want to focus on the importance of everyday practices, not in physical but virtual space. To find a short and straightforward explanation, „the virtual can be understood as an immanent and immaterial form of agency or potential: effectively but not formally or materially existing within the interstices of everyday life" (van Doorn, 2011, p. 533). The terms of virtual and digital space are often used interchangeably when talking about online presence; both are separated from experiences in physical space. Here I want to show an example of online presence in digital virtual spaces such as social platforms, where users are present in the physical space, but their experiences online are part of their everyday reality. Through text messages, videos, or images exchanged online, their virtual presence takes a material form.

> This suggests a convergence of the virtual and the concrete in digital space, in which the 'immaterial potential' of the virtual is materially actualized in the form of digital objects (textual, pictorial and cinematic). In this sense, the performative practices in digital spaces such as weblogs resemble everyday physical experiences in their simultaneous incorporation of virtual and concrete elements to make sense of daily life (van Doorn, 2011, p. 534).

Apart from that, „[...] these digital spaces are interspersed with material traces of embodiment in the form of various textual, pictorial and cinematic artefacts that are employed to articulate gender and sexuality. In this way, everyday (inter)actions are materialized in digital space" (van Doorn, 2011, p. 538). There can also be found links to the virtual with the embodiment and gender.

Despite the apparent paradox, then, it can be concluded that the virtual plays a consti-
tutive role in the materialization of gender, sexuality and embodiment in digital (as
well as physical) spaces. What these online practices generate is a convergence of the
'virtual image' of embodied memory, which is immanent to past, present and future
experiences of everyday life without having any concrete properties, and the 'digital
image' that materially incorporates this virtual image into a shared collection of archi-
ves. In this way, the temporal nature of the virtual image is spatialized and embedded
within the mutable infrastructure of these digital archives (van Doorn, 2011, p. 542).

Still, when talking about the presence in virtual space, experiences are often separated from the ones in the physical space, as interpreting them as less real. According to Jones (2016), this perception should be questioned while suggesting not to overlook some factors. Physical contact differs in the sense of possibilities, security, and feelings compared to interactions in the virtual space, but deciding which are more real or concluding about their effects based on simple differences can be misleading. In her studies about Webcam performers, she sees that just because their interaction lack physical contact, users still engage face to face, meaning it is also part of the real world for those individuals. Following this thought, the virtual context can be why people chose those interactions over physical encounters (Jones, 2016, p. 231).

The discussion of the intertwining of physical and virtual space and online everyday life follows in the section of the case studies of delivery service workers and WebCam models. Following authors like Crawford (1999), van Doorn (2011) and Jones (2016) and based on the perspective of analyzing small patterns in daily structures, online and offline, I am confident to come to conclusions supporting existing interpretations of structural phenomena.

4

EMPIRICAL FIELDWORK

4 EMPIRICAL FIELDWORK

The following part concentrates on two specific types of gig-labor in online platforms. The qualitative methods, as mentioned in 1.3, were adopted to develop these two case studies. Both parts are built mainly on narrative semi-structured interviews, combined with participant observations and triangular methods in including other investigations and newspaper articles, to ensure the correctness of named events and experiences. However, these chapters' focus lies in demonstrating the workers' experiences and how they perceive certain situations. In chapter five, the results and findings will be discussed in detail, to conclude with theoretical concepts examined in chapter two and three.

Figure 10: Rappitendero during ride-along—own photograph.

4.1 CASE STUDY RAPPITENDEROS

The process of transcribing and coding the information from the interviews was necessary to analyze them first within the structure of formerly laid-out topics. Further, they were reorganized regarding the development of the following chapter. Within each code, I was looking into similarities and differences in the experiences of the interviewees.

4.1.1 RAPPI IN BOGOTÁ

I want to start with a general discussion of Rappi as a company, essential aspects discussed in public about their status, and the digital platform's basic functions.

Rappi in Colombia and its international success

Rappi was created by three young entrepreneurs, Simón Borrero, Sebastián Medina, and Felipe Villamarín, in Bogotá with only five more employees, handing out donuts in exchange for downloading the app (Semana, 2018). The app was launched with a rather specific niche within delivery platforms, as they specialized in grocery orders. However, they developed the app fast into a platform where one can order a wide range of goods and services. Rappi was early on seen as one of the fastest-growing start-ups within Latin America and already in 2018 gained through their value of 1 billion US dollar the status of "unicorn" (Endeavor, 2018). They were the first tech company in Colombia who gained that status, making them play in a league of giants in the digital platform world (Semana, 2018). However, the company's founder always showed an interest in growth, as they have the goal to be the first "super app" within Latin America and sell many products and services on a platform monopoly (López Linares, 2019).

Within four years since their beginnings, they expanded into six Latin American Countries and state that overall they have 100,000 Rappitenderos working in the platform (Bandeira, 2019). Sources reported that in March 2020, around 25,000 people worked for Rappi within Colombia (Patiño, 2020), and in August 2020, already 50,000 (Forbes, 2020b). In 2019 they counted 15 million users in all of Latin America (López Linares, 2019).

In regards to whether Rappi's work is considered informal labor or not, the ministry of labor expressed that Rappi contracts are not informal; they are independent contracts that the worker makes with […] the platform, which implies that on the part of the platform, there is no need to pay social security and pension […]" (translated from Spanish, Becerra Elejalde, 2019). In the national development plan, it was foreseen to regulate digital labor platforms until the end of the year 2019. However, in 2020, discussions in focus groups, including government officials and representatives of different digital platforms, were being held. Within this plan, one step that has been initiated was to legalize work by singular hours to boost employment in changing settings due to changes by new technologies (El Tiempo, 2019). To the question if contracts between the platform and their workers/users are informal or independent, the CEOs of Rappi answered:

Rappi's business model has the great benefit of offering Rappitenderos an alternative to generate complementary income to other activities. […] the model allows you to work flexibly and not daily. The Rappitendero decides to connect and disconnect when and where they want. Putting this into a contraction model like the ones that exist now does not apply because no company would support having so many employees with long low operation spaces during the day. (translated from Spanish, El Tiempo, 2019)

They go further, explaining that Rappitenderos are not workers but rather users. As the company, they are not their employer neither, as they can not generate demand within the app. They say the platform functions as a connector that brings together two different types of users. "A user who is willing to make a convenience payment in exchange for a product or service, with a user who connects to the platform to take orders to generate an income" (translated from Spanish, El Tiempo, 2019).

However, there are strong critics against this opinion, as the benefits platform labor generates easily overshadowed by the promotion of informal work and precarious work situations for many. Diego Guevara, a professor of the National University of Colombia, points out:

> Many of the people who work on platforms like Uber, Cabify, Rappi or Mensajeros Urbanos do it full time, and this job is their only source of income. However, they are not entitled to the minimum labor protections and guarantees outlined in the Constitution. It seems that with the rise of these platforms, the conquests achieved in the world of work more than 100 years ago were lost (translated from Spanish, Hernández Bonilla, 2018).

Therefore, and even considering the definitions and categorization Rappi or the ministry of labor present, critics still see and point out informal aspects to this work. One goes even as far as to say that those labor platforms encourage the informal economy where they operate instead of formal labor (Gómez, 2019). I can and will therefore call Rappitenderos throughout this study Rappi's workers, as the connection becomes clear when observing aspects of their work conditions.

Venezuelan Rappitenderos in Bogotá

Initially, Rappi was a job easily accessed by Venezuelan migrants because to sign up in the app, they only needed to be legally in Colombia and have their working permit (PEP). Although the company's changing regulations at the beginning of the year 2020 made the once easy access for Venezuelan newcomers harder. However, in all cases, only Venezuelans who are staying legally in Colombia can work through the app.

Therefore, in Bogotá, it is usually assumed that a Rappitendero is Venezuelan, as most people working on the platform come from the neighboring country. However, Rappi itself does not publish any numbers regarding the background of its workers. There are estimations that between 80 and 90% of Rappitenderos are from Venezuela (Tapia Jáuregui, 2018). In a survey asking 318 Rappitenderos in Bogotá, 67% were Venezuelans, and 2% Colombian returnees (Observatorio Laboral LaboUR, 2019).

As mentioned in a BBC article, critics believe that Rappi may benefit from the Venezuelan migration crisis, as many people who need jobs find it through the platform. However, they often accept lower pay than Colombians, which can lead to the assumption that it is a significant incentive for the platform, as they enabled access for Venezuelans easily. Officials of Rappi defend this presumption, as they say, they are happy to accept Venezuelan workers, but not because they want to pay them less and that their success is dependent on them (Bandeira, 2019). "Some experts, however, think the crisis helped fuel Rappi's fast growth. Globally, migrants often make up a significant proportion of the gig economy. But in Colombia's case, it saw a sudden influx that abruptly altered the labour pool." (Bandeira, 2019).

There can be found opposing reasoning and effects on the work of migrants in online platforms. However, through the work in Rappi, many migrants found a job, that even if it was low paid, many other forms of informal and formal employment are not at all accessible and if, conditions might be worse. However, my focus lies particularly on those troubling working conditions. Still, one has to put this phenomenon in the perspective of an often unbalanced and exploitive labor market, as is the case in Colombia.

Functions and Levels

When Rappi started operating, only the delivery of supermarket products was available but was fast extended by restaurants. Those two options are still the most used in the app, even if they expanded their palette step by step by including pharmacies and convenience stores. Next came the "what you want" option, where people could ask for specific products, transport something, withdraw money, or do other favors (López Linares, 2019). Still, standard deliveries of products are the most common. Nonetheless, functions, such as "Rappi favors" to bring goods from one place to another or "Rappi cash" to withdraw money for a client, distinguish the app from many other food delivery apps.

Also, those food deliveries and special orders are not dispersed in time. Depending on the weekday and or the hour of the day, there can be strong fluctuations. Also, workers cannot access more complex orders since their start on the platform, as there are six levels which they reach after time working in the app. In level one, only deliveries paid directly by credit card are available, but already in level two, they can carry out deliveries paid in cash. In level three, they can also access orders which have to be paid directly in the restaurant or supermarket. The more complex orders, like "cravings", asking to buy something specific in a store, can be accessed in level 4. In level five, "Rappi favors", and, finally, in level six, "Rappi cash" is enabled.

4.1.2 LIFE IN VENEZUELA AND THE MIGRATION TO BOGOTÁ

Before concentration on working conditions and spatial aspects of the work in Rappi, I want to shed light on the background of the Rappitenderos I interviewed. I will shortly explore their migration history and beginning in Bogotá, as well as their living situation.

Personal information, Life in Venezuela

Most of the study participants were between 20 and 35 years old, except for one 49 years old. Further, out of eight interviewees, there was only one woman. Their educational background was mixed, but half attended university, even though not all could finish. The jobs they worked before leaving Venezuela were also heterogeneous: from a psychologist, air traffic controller, bus and taxi driver, student, cook, waiter, and informal vendor. Most came from the department Zulia in Venezuela, which is a neighboring zone of Colombia. However, some also lived in other parts of the country.

The situations they found themselves in before leaving in many cases included working multiple jobs and still not having enough money. For most, the housing situation was fixed and did not impose any problems since they lived with family or even owned a house. Some even own properties and left those empty, which opens the government's possibility to take a census of the uninhabited houses and even expropriate them. At the same time, they experienced problems accessing food, electricity, water, internet, mostly due to rising prices.

This situation seems fitting, as explained in chapter 2.2.2; further, I will name reasons that led to the decision to leave (as also mentioned in 2.2.3). Those push factors were the loss of work or studies, which often resulted in not sustaining their life anymore. Some said they left when they could not afford essential goods anymore or tried migrating when they still hed sufficient means for their travels. Most had to sustain their family — young children or older parents — and therefore felt they had to leave to guarantee their food security.

I DID NOT WANT TO COME TO THE POINT WHERE I CANNOT GIVE MY CHILDREN ENOUGH ANYMORE; I DID NOT GET TO THAT POINT, I ANTICIPATED IT, AND I LEFT EARLY. (Rappitendero 3, 2020)

Migration Venezuela - Bogotá

Looking at the histories of migration the interviewees had, there can be seen many differences and specific trends. All traveled by land and bus, some directly to Bogotá, and some stayed in other cities on the coast for some time. Almost all knew someone in Bogotá before coming here, a friend, acquaintance, or family who was already staying here. This was often a factor in choosing to stay in Bogotá since they could rely on some help. Still, some were not sure they would stay in Bogotá for long, though they might just stay for some time and continue their travel towards Ecuador, Peru, and Chile. Half of them were traveling alone, and half were migrating together with family or friends. Some were coming to complete parts of their families, and some said parts of their family came after. However, some were also the only ones from their family staying in Bogotá. On the one hand, some mentioned that they found a place to stay directly or were staying at a friend's place for some time. On the other hand, it seemed that those first days were some sort of hardship, and did not want to talk about it in detail.

ONE ARRIVES HERE WITH MANY EXPECTATIONS, AND THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS TO GET A JOB. IN THE BEGINNING, WE WERE SCARED BECAUSE FOR THE FIRST TIME WE WERE ALONE, FOR THE FIRST TIME I WAS SO FAR AWAY FROM MY FAMILY AND WITHOUT KNOWING ANYONE, THE ONLY SUPPORT WAS MY FRIEND, WHO RECEIVED US. (Rappitendero 1, 2020)

All participants stayed between one and almost four years in Colombia at the time of the interviews, meaning they arrived between 2016 and 2019. Furthermore, all entered Colombia with a valid passport, and at the point of the interview, everybody possessed the PEP, and some had already extended their two-year period. As mentioned, only people with a valid PEP could start working with Rappi. In an interview, I was also told that Rappi permitted the excess to work in the app to Venezuelans with the PEP and only accepted a valid visa and a foreigner's ID (Cédula extranjería). Also, not having a Colombian ID prevents them from accessing many things, such as getting credit, buying some things, or accessing services. In Colombia, even for small transactions, one always has to state their ID number.

I WISH FOR A BETTER DOCUMENT THAN THE 'PEP', BECAUSE IT DOES HELP YOU, BUT IT ALSO HAS MANY LIMITATIONS. IF WE HAD A CÉDULA DE EXTRANJERÍA, IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER BECAUSE MANY PLACES SAY: "CÉDULA COLOMBIANA OR CÉDULA DE EXTRANJERÍA" (Rappitendero 3, 2020)

Finding housing and work

As mentioned before, many had at least one contact in Bogotá, which resulted in them living with them or assisting them while looking for housing. If they had to find something on their own, it was difficult since some residences are asking for a guarantor or they were experiencing discrimination in the process of the housing search. Almost all pay their rent monthly, though their living situations differ greatly: student housing, a family in an apartment, with their partner, roommates, or alone, and on the street.

"AH, BUT YOU ARE VENEZUELAN?", AND I SAID "YES", TO WHICH THE GENTLEMAN REPLIED: "NO, I DO NOT RENT TO VENEZUELANS." (Rappitendero 3, 2020)

Housing prices vary significantly in Bogotá due to the conditions of the buildings and the city's area. Those differences are represented in the country's stratification system, which targets the redistribution of public services utility fees, depending on the housing location. All zones, which can consist of single buildings up to whole neighborhoods or districts, are categorized with a number between one and six, where strata one, two, and three have to pay lower rates for public services and five and six higher ones.

The higher strata's excess pays for the substitution of the lower (DANE, no date). Figure 11 shows that strata one and two are mostly located in the south and west, as well as smaller neighborhoods in the center and the north of the city. Strata three and four are defining significant central and western parts of Bogotá and partly in its north. However, strata five and six are almost exclusively situated in the cities north. That creates strong segregation throughout the city, only enabling housing to people with lower economic means in the city's periphery.

VENEZUELANS LOOK FOR THE AREAS WITH LOWER STRATA. (Rappitendero 2, 2020)

As can be seen in Figure 11, all interviewees live in different neighborhoods of the city: Suba, Bosa, Chapinero (alto), Teusaquillo,


Residential location
Moving process

Strata 1   Strata 4
Strata 2   Strata 5
Strata 3   Strata 6

Puente Aranda, Tunjuelito, Ciudad Bolívar, Salitre, and Fontibon. All live in housing located in lower strata, be it in the city's periphery or relatively in the center of the city – if they had the luck of finding housing of lower strata there. Also, almost all changed their housing after some time, either because they earned a more stable income or were not satisfied with their living conditions.

> *SO I ANALYZED THE SITUATION, AND I SAW THAT HILL OVER THERE,*
> *AND I SAW THE MOST HUMBLE HOUSES, AND I DEDUCED THAT IT*
> *WAS MORE ECONOMICAL. IT HELPED ME TO DO MORE EXERCISE,*
> *FOR EVERYTHING, IT IS AN INCREDIBLE EFFORT TO GET THERE, BUT*
> *I MOVED TO A PART VERY EVERYBODY IS VERY RESPECTFUL, AND*
> *THEREFORE I DECIDED TO STAY. (Rappitendero 2, 2020)*

Apart from finding suitable housing, the search for an income was the first goal after arriving in Bogotá. To start, all of the study participants worked something else before they started working in Rappi. The variety of work was mostly in the sector of gastronomy and commerce, many in informal condition: in restaurants (4), store for phone accessories, bakery, informal vendor (fast-food, empanadas, coffee) (3), construction work, bike-taxi, and door-to-door medicine vendor. One person working in a restaurant mentioned earning 22,000 Colombian pesos (5 Euros) a day, close to the minimum pay in Colombia.

Most first heard about Rappi through word of mouth from friends, described as a job where they could start fast and earn much money (compared to their former jobs). Furthermore, it was valid for all that they only had to sign up in the app, do a short training, and started working. However, they had to obtain their own bike, which considers a small investment in their future work. Still, many did not start working full-time in Rappi right away, instead continued in their former jobs until they decided to quit their job altogether and only work in Rappi. Reasons were higher earnings with Rappi and the freedom to choose their schedule without having to report to a "boss ".

> *PBECAUSE IT WAS THE EASIEST JOB TO GET INTO, YOU DID NOT*
> *HAVE TO GO TO AN INTERVIEW BUT ONLY DO A TRAINING AND GOT*
> *ALREADY ACTIVATED TO START WORKING. (Rappitendero 6, 2020)*

4.1.3 EVERYDAY LIFE OF A RAPPITENDERO

Payment mechanisms and economic objectives

Rappitenderos can connect to the app whenever they decide and then have to wait for their first request. The earnings for each delivery should depend on the delivery distance and the type of delivery, as more complex orders pay more. The distance only includes the travel from the seller to the client and does not include the travel toward the first destination and the distances from the client back to commercial areas. More complex orders are ones where there is a significantly high number of products from a supermarket. On their blog, Rappi explains their calculation for the extra earnings for complexity. A Rappitendero on a bike earns 0.5 COP more each meter up until 4 km, but extra meters can no longer be included (Soy Rappi, 2020). In Figure 12, the factors of distance and complexity are explained and also the statement that if they accept more orders, they will, in return, receive more as well, a topic I will touch on later.

Figure 12: Tips how to earn more provided by Rappi; Soy Rappi (2020)

Most Rappitenderos try to set goals as to how much money they want to earn daily or within a week. They reported earning on a weekday between 30,000 and 80,000 COP and the weekend between 50,000 and 100,000 COP. At the same time, it has to be noted that sometimes only few orders are being offered to them, and they, by far, can not reach their goal. However, an average of between 10 and 14 deliveries on weekdays and between 18 and 24 can be achieved on productive days.

They report that in earlier days, the minimum earnings for a delivery, for short distances, was between 4,000/3,800/3,500 COP and now only 2,000/1,800/1,500 COP for one delivery (depending on whom you ask). Many interviewees noted that they do not believe the fare depends on the distance since they only earn the current minimum price, even when they have to bike long distances.

> *ORDERS ARE NO LONGER WELL PAID, BEFORE THE MINIMUM ORDER*
> *OF 1 KM COULD COST YOU 4,000 OR 5,000 COP, NOW AN ORDER CAN*
> *COST YOU UP TO 1,000, 1,500, 1,100 COP, AND ARE ORDERS OF 2 KM OR*
> *3 KM. (Rappitendero 7, 2020)*

Considering the minimum wage in Colombia is 877.802 COP (226.60 USD; 194.77 EUR) (Ministerio de Trabajo, 2019), in an Interview of BBC with Borrero, one of Rappi's CEOs, he says:

> *People think that we are looking for a way to make more money, to pay less to our*
> *couriers. But we have a waiting list, we didn't have to pay more than the minimum wage*
> *to people. We want to be a company that creates opportunity to people in Latin America,*
> *we want to help the continent to grow. (Bandeira, 2019)*

He explains that Rappitenderos are being paid an average of 2,5 the minimum wage in Latin America and mentioned that the changes in prices are connected to the inclusion of the distance and delivery type. He says it translates to "US$1.00-1.25 for restaurant deliveries, or up to US$4.00 for a more complicated task" (Bandeira, 2019). Comparing those earnings to those Rappitenderos can make effectively, they might be higher than the minimum wage, but still not as high as Borrero mentioned. Rappi is paying their workers more than in other gig-economy firms. Still, when considering their pricing policies and mechanisms, it becomes clear that many do not reach much more than the minimum wage if they do not work long hours every day of the week.

To reach their goals, many try to fulfill their deliveries in as short of a time as possible by cycling fast and sometimes even dangerously. At the same time, they try to analyze the best time for deliveries during the day and days of the week; still, there are different strategies

adopted by each person. Also, which will be discussed later, many try to work in areas where they expect more and higher tips from the clients. In the app, there is an option to tip the Rappitendero; however, many think that the tips do not always reach the driver, as they have noticed. Therefore, many prefer tips in person and not through the application.

Official Rappi sites clarify that 100% of payments from clients go to Rappitenderos without taking a commission. Furthermore, they say that the price the client sees might vary from what the Rappitendero receives, but still, the totality of what clients are paying are transferred to Rappitenderos (El Tiempo, 2019a).

As explained, the prices which are receiving Rappitenderos should be defined through the distance and type of order. Apart from that, there are also "extra" earnings in specific moments. That economic incentive in the pricing mechanism for certain hours influences when they work since some hours become economically unattractive. Still, they feel as if they can decide on their own. Methods that influence behavior like this, in theory, are also called surge pricing (Choudary, 2018, p. 23).

One such moment is when it rains, which plays a significant role for delivery drivers. Bogotá experiences heavy rain quite often, but people still want their products delivered. Rappi sends their workers a message informing them that they can earn more now because few Rappitenderos are connected. Usually, it would be 2.000 COP more for each delivery during rain; some doubt that those extra earnings are always paid since total earnings still are as low as 2.900 COP at some point during bad weather. Therefore it becomes clear that those unjust mechanisms only work partially, as many decide not to work.

IT IS RAINING HARD AND THEY: "CONNECT, THERE IS A HIGH DEMAND FOR ORDERS, YOU HAVE THE RAIN RATE" AND IT IS A LIE. THEY STILL ARE AT 2,900 COP, WITH ALL THAT RAIN, SO THAT IS NOT FAIR BECAUSE IF THE CUSTOMER DOES NOT WANT TO GET WET, WE DO NOT EITHER. (Rappitendero 3, 2020)

Figure 13: Functioning of the application provided by Rappi; Soy Rappi (2020)

In Figure 13, SoyRappi explains the mechanisms of how a Rappitendero can be successful. Those "extra" earnings come into play when the weather is bad, but also when there is high demand and not that many Rappitenderos connected. The app uses features that are connected to the gamification of work, as mentioned in chapter 3.2.1. Already, in general, the usage of the app is similar to the characteristics of games. However, when Rappi wants to motivate their workers extrinsically with the chance to earn more money, they send out specific daily goals. This can be, for example, the possibility to earn 10,000 COP extra if one

finishes five orders within two hours. On the one hand, this motivates them to try to work more, but on the other hand, some feel they can not influence their chances through working more. Sometimes they do not receive an order quickly and have to wait between 15 minutes to an hour for a delivery. It even happened that sometimes someone who finished a delivery a couple of minutes ago gets sent a new one, right beside someone waiting for half an hour.

Generally, a Rappitendero can decline an order regarding limited information about it, such as the distance and expected earnings, but thinking that if they do it often, it will influence their rating from Rappi. Regarding the individual orders, the client can rate the service of the Rappitendero from one to five. Those ratings, the frequency of connection, and the decline rate of orders influence how many and when a user gets a request. At least they feel like those are the indicators, as it gives them incentives to work more constantly to influence their request possibly. Within the application, a score that changes daily represents those factors. Also, in Figures 12 and 13, official sites of Rappi confirm the influence of the acceptance rate.

Furthermore, a series of restrictions come into play when they fail to comply with orders or delivery time. Rappitenderos have to accept most of the received orders, even if they are not the most convenient. When they continuously reject more, the Rappitendero begins to receive fewer orders until he is suspended temporarily or permanently (Gómez, 2019).

THEY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE ALREADY MANY OF US, SO IF YOU DO NOT WANT TO ORDER, SOMEONE ELSE WILL DO IT. AND THERE WILL ALWAYS BE SOMEONE WHO NEEDS THE MONEY AND DOES IT, SO THEY DO NOT MIND LOWERING THE PRICES.
(Rappitendero 6, 2020)

It is clear that the prices Rappitenderos have sent to their phones have been steadily sinking over time. Furthermore, it is not clear how they calculate the prices exactly and how much the distance and type of delivery play a role. Overall, Rappi's pricing policies are by no means transparent and force Rappitenderos in unfavorable pricing schemes they typically would not support. They are victims of unsymmetrical information and therefore make up their own strategies to work with. As mentioned in chapter 3.2.1, the terms of conditions of platforms can easily be modified and disadvantage the conditions for the workers. This is exactly what happens when the application changed the pricing over time, not involving Rappitenderos opinions.

Weekly routine and daily schedule

Now I want to focus on weekly and daily structures within the life of a Rappitendero. Everyone is happy to choose their schedule, as they enjoy the freedom of not being told, at least directly, when to work. As mentioned before, changes in prices and general demand are influencing their choices. There are certain similarities in the schedules but also differences depending on personal preferences or duties, which influences their time management and decisions. It is interesting to think about the perception Lefebvre thought of when analyzing everyday life. He analyzed that there are two different types of time: on the one hand, circular rhythms of nature like day, night, and year; and on the other hand, linear time like our work schedules and leisure, repeated across days, weeks, months and years (Crawford, 1999, p. 12).

I WORK FROM MONDAY TO MONDAY, THE DAY I DO NOT WORK, I AM WASHING, COOKING, ORGANIZING, CLEANING, AND THAT IS IT.
(Rappitendero 7, 2020)

The average Rappitendero works six days a week and rests one; some also work every day or sometimes less, if they worked more before or have other plans. Days typical for resting are Monday or Tuesday; weekends are usually busy with high demand resulting in many working hours on weekends. Friday and Saturday night, there is more work during the night due to the possibility of ordering alcohol in stores that are open 24/7, which also makes being out on the street safer.

AT RAPPI THERE ARE ORDERS TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A DAY, YOU WILL HAVE ORDERS AT WHICH EVER TIME YOU ARE WORKING.
*(Rappitendero 4, 2020) (4.2)*

Figure 14: Daily schedule of Rappitenderos; own representation

In the graphic above (Figure 14), the individual daily routines can be seen. It could be a representable Friday as aspects from night work of the weekend, but also common structures during either weekday and weekend are demonstrated. There is high demand around noon (12-15) and in the evening (18-22), which is valid for the weekend and weekdays equally. Some try to eat all meals at home, bring food along, and eat outside on the street. Their different strategies represent each of their personal struggles and aspirations. Their mundane repetitions depend strongly on their living situation; if they live with their family or partner, what services they have at home, economic dependence, and discipline.

I START AT QUARTER TO TWELVE OR TWELVE O'CLOCK, UNTIL FOUR, WHEN I PAUSE FOR LUNCH, TO REFRESH MYSELF FOR A WHILE, AND TO REST. AND THEN AT ABOUT FIVE THIRTY OR SIX, DEPENDING ON HOW THE DAY IS GOING, I RECONNECT UNTIL TEN AT NIGHT. TODAY FRIDAY I WILL MAYBE STAY UNTIL TWELVE BECAUSE IT MOVES MORE, AND SATURDAY IT IS THE SAME. (Rappitendero 3, 2020)

Withing the investigation, I recognized four main strategies. The first two are, to a higher degree, influenced by security issues in planning their routine:

- One, starting early in the morning, maybe taking a break before lunch, continuing at noon but finishing before it gets too dark because of security reasons.

- Second, starting around noon, taking a break in the afternoon, and working in the evening, and finishing before midnight because of security reasons.

- Third, starting early and working all day until night, taking breaks whenever there are no orders, and finishing when tired.

- Fourth, as well as working during the day, focusing on working at night (on the weekends), sometimes until dawn, to serve the alcohol night market.

Interestingly, the only woman I interviewed was the only person who preferred to work at night and was not concerned with security issues. Also, she was the only person working on a motorbike, which can influence security levels positively. The work on a motorbike is considered saver, as the driver is not that vulnerable to robbery.

As far as there can be identified differences and routines in common, I want to point out one specific case and approach within my research, which could also explain the everyday practices of other Rappitenderos I did not talk to. The case concerns homelessness and sleeping or resting in public space. His conditions seem to influence his work style, as he is working each day to first earn money directly for food, and what he earns more is extra earning. Apart from that, he is working every day, as he noted to rest at night, but still being connected to accept deliveries eventually.

I WORK EVERY DAY NORMALLY; ALMOST ALL RAPPITENDEROS DO NOT REST; THE ONES WHO REST DO SO BECAUSE THEY DO NOT NEED IT..

MANY WORK THIS WAY IN RAPPI UNTIL THEY CAN NOT GIVE ANY MORE AND FALL ASLEEP WHEREVER THEY CAN BECAUSE THEY FALL FROM EXHAUSTION.

WHEN I WORK, THE FIRST MONEY I MAKE DURING THE DAY IS FOR FOOD, TO ENSURE THAT I HAVE LUNCH, DINNER, AND BREAKFAST, TO ENSURE THE THREE MEALS THAT ARE AT LEAST 20,000 COP HERE IN THE NORTH [MORE EXPENSIVE PART OF THE CITY], THEN YOU KNOW THAT WHAT GOES BEYOND THAT IS ALREADY PROFIT THAT YOU HAVE.

SOME COME AND STAY THREE DAYS HERE, EVEN THOUGH HAVING THEIR PLACE TO LIVE, THEY COME AND STAY THREE DAYS STRAIGHT TO ONLY WORK.
(Rappitendero 6, 2020)

Even if this history points out a particular case within my research, he mentioned that many Rappitenderos are working like this; it even seems like the norm for him. Also, this form of working in Rappi is present in newspaper articles. El Espectador reported that some Rappitenderos who live in the southern periphery of the city come on Thursday to stay until Sunday to work the most time possible during the weekend. Therefore they do not regress home within those days but instead decide to rest in their pauses, like Rappitendero 6, in front of stores or shopping centers. They know specific places where they also can charge their phones and clean themselves for a small fee (Ojeda, 2018). Also, Rappi installed "pit stops" in 2019, stations throughout areas with high demand, where Rappitenderos can use the toilet, charge their phone, heat food, and rest. They can also ask for information and help if needed. However, the service functions between 6 am and 10 pm (Soy Rappi, 2019).

Excess time and money

Even if the bike is essential for their work, the form of transport to get from home to their work zones should not be assumed. Those who live close to where they work usually come directly on their bicycle. If they live further away, many use garages to store their bike overnight if they choose to travel home by bus. This depends on their mood, the weather, and how exhausted they are that day. As mentioned, many live in the periphery of the city and have to travel each day to the cities economic center. These distances can be far and take them up to an hour on the bike. Many noted that they do not use their bike in their free time but still do not use many other forms of transport; busses are only used if necessary, for destinations far away.

I HAD TO PAY FOR TRANSPORTATION, FOOD, RENT, SERVICES, PLUS THE MONEY I HAVE TO SEND TO MY PARENTS IN VENEZUELA EVERY MONTH (Rappitendero 7, 2020)

Free time is seen differently by the Rappitenderos I interviewed. Almost all do not have that much free time, as they focus all their time on working. As well, through their low income, they feel like certain activities are not available for them. Still, some have specific hobbies or spend their time with friends and family outside. Those living with family or, more specifically, with children, plan their free time around them, like picking them up from school or kindergarten and planning activities together. Another interesting point is that all seem to have mostly Venezuelan friends. They also know Colombians and would have them as friends; it is still easier to connect with Venezuelans.

WHAT ONE MOSTLY DOES IS TO SEND TO THE FAMILY; I SEND SOME TO MY GRANDMOTHER, MY MOTHER, MY BROTHERS AND I HAVE TWO CHILDREN, A GIRL AND A BOY. (Rappitendero 4, 2020)

In chapter 2.2.2, I mentioned people's dependence in Venezuela on economic support of singular or several family members abroad, sending money to support them. That is no different from the Rappitenderos I talked to. Everybody was sending money to family members, be it parents, children, brothers, sisters, or grandparents. One parent mentioned not having seen their kids for a long time but still prefers to send money than to spend it to visit them. They usually pay for their daily and monthly necessities and the rest of the money they send to their families. However, many said they are also trying to save money to afford travel to other places. Still, none managed to save up enough as there seems to be a dilemma between what they want to spend their money on, what they can afford, and who depends on them economically.

4.1.4 ZONES OF WORK

Zones of high demand in interplay with residential zones

As mentioned in chapter 4.1.2, an explicit strata system segregates Bogotá on a small-scale when talking about housing. Initially, the strata target the prices households have to pay for public services. Generally, buildings that are not used for housing are not stratified (Secretaría Distrital de Planeación, no date), but they are still influencing the prices commercial establishments have to pay in and area. The prices of daily goods can also change due to the strata a store is located in, which is especially relevant if we compare the stratification map of Bogotá to the map Rappi provides to its workers of areas of high dema¬nd (Figure 15). The demand heat map works in real-time and should help Rappitenderos know where there is high demand for their service. Even though spots for Rappi deliveries are situated throughout the city, the app does not cover its south. There are specific concentrations in the cities north and east, from the historic center, through Chapinero up to Usaquen.


Figure 15. Strata in Bogotá and interactive demand map provided by Rappi; Screenshot from Rappitendero and Secretaría Distrital de Planeación (2017)

Distances the drivers have to take for one delivery vary significantly. Deliveries of shorter distances are usually paid less than longer ones, but the pricing mechanism is not transparent. Still, the distance shown in the app is the direct physical distance between the two places and not the length of the route they have to take. Usually, farther distances are assigned to motorcycle users and shorter ones to bicycle users. However, there are also exceptions depending on how many users are connected to the application. Those long distances are essential since some destinations are situated in residential zones, far away from commercial centers, where Rappitenderos could go quickly from one order to another. Some mentioned complaints about this disparity in distances, saying that the amount they earn from trips of greater distances should be double since they have to travel back to commercial zones for better chances of receiving new orders.

*REGARDLESS OF THE DISTANCE, WE STILL MAKE THE DELIVERY, WE
DO IT AND DRIVE BACK, IF SUDDENLY ON THE WAY ANOTHER ONE
COMES IN, THEN WE DO IT, BUT WE ALWAYS COME BACK TO THE
STARTING POINT. (Rappitendero 5, 2020)*

Many Rappitenderos decide on one specific zone of work, where they try to remain while On the one hand, those residential zones covered by the app's can cause problems regarding the payment connected with the distances. On the other hand, many workers live far away in the urban periphery, which means they have to travel great distances to and from their work. That is especially true for Bogotá because there does not exist an adequate public transport system, seeing as the city only uses busses. Bogotá is the city where people spend the most time in traffic, with a number of 191 hours each year, along with significant congestion problems (Intrix, 2019).

As mentioned, some zones are continuously showing higher demand, which makes them more attractive to work at. Therefore, almost all Rappitenderos choose a preferred zone of work, as shown in Figure 16. There are many other smaller areas in different central parts within the city, where many Rappitenderos work. However, those are the only ones I investigated for my thesis. Still, it becomes evident that those zones are situated in the urban centers — where demand is high, a Rappitendero can expect sufficient orders. Therefore, they have to travel far to reach those zones since only a few live close, as explained in

Chapter 4.1.2. Thus, Venezuelan migrants, who are mostly living in the urban peripheries, are supporting the center of Bogotá economically.

Rappitenderos perception and forms of work

Many Rappitenderos decide on one specific zone of work, where they try to remain while doing deliveries. Most feel that working with Rappi helps them navigate the city and are frequently asked by people in the streets for directions. However, this is especially true for specific neighborhoods in detail, where they try to stay during their work.

*I KNOW WHERE EVERYTHING IS, SERIOUSLY, THE COLOMBIANS ASK
US RAPPITENDEROS FOR DIRECTIONS. I KNOW BOGOTÁ BETTER, OR
AT LEAST THE AREA WHERE I WORK. (Rappitendero 2, 2020)*

They have firm opinions about their own and other neighborhoods, which they perceive as not that favorable. Sometimes they decline orders if they feel the address is too far from their zone, as they will inevitably have to come back afterward. Here, I lay out the factors which are determining the decision on where to work:

- **First, the general density of orders at times they want to work.**
- **Second, they choose zones where they feel secure to work at their preferred time and day.**
- **Third, some include their expected tips in their decisions, as they can earn more with each delivery.**
- **Fourth, they prefer to work near friends or people they know, exchange their experiences, and spend time with them while waiting.**
- **And lastly, which also influences where they decide to work in the first place, they choose to work in zones where they know the streets or feel like the addresses are easier to reach. Bogotá has many pedestrian bridges throughout the city that can separate whole neighborhoods and make travel longer and harder. This factor is highly subjective and demonstrates their experiences working and where they feel comfortable.**

What follows is a more in-depth look into some of those aspects and how they affect their daily actions and decisions.

Group building

*RAPPITENDEROS WORK IN GROUPS. FOR SAFETY AND BECAUSE
WE ARE 'PANAS' (VENEZUELAN WORD FOR FRIENDS).
(Rappitendero 2, 2020)*

Having mentioned the factors on which Rappitenderos are choosing their work zone, there is one rather emotional factor. Many, if not all, Rappitenderos are working, to some degree, in groups. That means that they meet up at specific central spots within their zone, where they relax during their deliveries to talk to their work friends and wait for new deliveries. Those spots are chosen strategically, considering first if they are located near concentrations of restaurants, a park, or a supermarket that is open 24/7; and second, if the location is secure, to some extent comfortable and convenient, and where they will not bother stores, restaurants, or people passing by.

Walking through the streets of Bogotá, one can often see groups of Rappitenderos hanging out together in small to large groups. There have been voices of critics about delivery workers, especially Rappitenderos, occupying public spaces, such as parks or, as mentioned in front of restaurants and shopping centers, to rest. From Bogotás mayor, there have been ideas of concentrating those groups in specific public places and eventually capitalizing on their used spaces. However, they also point out advances Rappi has made with its implementation of the pitstops (El Tiempo, 2019b).

NORMALLY WE FORM GROUPS OF CONFIDENCE, ONE ALREADY KNOWS THAT WITH THAT PERSON, I CAN FALL ASLEEP NEXT TO, AND I AM GOING TO BE SAFE. WE, SEVEN OR EIGHT PEOPLE, SLEEP ON TOP OF EACH OTHER. AND IF SOMEONE REACHES AN ORDER, HE WAKES UP AND DOES IT; THUS, ONE SLEEPS ACTIVE IN THE APPLICATION.
(Rappitendero 6, 2020)

Those groups of Rappitenderos are built through friends who already knew each other or met at the beginning of working with Rappi and continued meeting up at a specific spot. Therefore, for some Rappitenderos, their group of friends from before can influence or eventually decide their future work zone. In general, the exchange of experiences and news is crucial for people working with the application. Each time they meet someone from their group at their spot or on the street, they talk about their recent deliveries, problems with the app, but also about their personal lives. However, those groups do not mix too much; many different groups can even be found within just one park. Specific approaches to work and personal differences determine those social connections or distances. Apart from the contact in physical space, they also create groups in Whatsapp to communicate more efficiently. One Rappitendero explained to me why they do not speak too much with other workers nearby, explaining that many Venezuelans are doing bad stuff and so they do not feel comfortable with doing so. He also blamed "them" for the bad image and xenophobia many Venezuelans face.

NO, I MEAN, WE KNOW EACH OTHER, AND WE GET ALONG WELL, BUT IT IS NOT LIKE WE SPEND ALL OUR TIME TALKING TO THEM. SO WE SIT DOWN HERE, AND IF SUDDENLY ONE PASSES BY, ONE GREETS AND TALKS TO THEM. IT IS NOT LIKE WE HATE EACH OTHER OR ANYTHING, NOT THAT, BUT EVERYONE IS ALREADY USED TO THEIR AREA.
(Rappitendero 5, 2020)

Security

Their feeling of security or danger is one of the most critical determinates, as it often connects to personal experiences or ones of their friends. Still, all have a different perception of security and where and when it would be dangerous for them. Also, most say it is dangerous

to work at night, so they do not work then or try to remain in groups when it gets dark. They are afraid that someone will steal their bicycle, phone, and cash, as everybody knows that they have those things with them for work.

One security issue that all had in common is that almost no one wants to work in the historical center, which is towards the south of the city, because they say it is too dangerous. Interestingly, more than one person mentioned a specific place at Carrera 30 Calle 6 where they or someone they knew experienced a dangerous situation and therefore categorized it as a no-go zone for deliveries. They connect this fear to the fact that many people in those areas are living on the street, and passing by on bike makes them more vulnerable. Nevertheless, their perception differs a lot, as will be seen in the examination of two zones and the opinions of groups working there.

I HAVE NEVER WORKED IN THE CENTER, IF I PASS BY, I DEACTIVATE FROM THE APP BECAUSE IT IS VERY DANGEROUS.
(Rappitendero 2, 2020).

Interestingly, the only women I talked to worked in the most "dangerous" zone in the cities western center and preferred to work at night until dawn. Also, her male friends told her that she has to be more careful while working; still, she chooses to work those hours, as the demand is high for people with a motorcycle working at night to overcome longer distances for alcohol orders. She said that she knows it is not a traditional work that women do because you have to be "strong". However, she wanted to do it because she knows that she can earn more money working in delivery than working other jobs. Also, she does not work too much in groups or specific zones because the motorcycle's condition does not allow those settings.

WHEN YOU CHANGE TO A MOTORBIKE, RAPPI IS DIFFERENT; FOR EXAMPLE, YOU CAN HAVE A SPECIFIC ZONE WHEN YOU WORK BY BIKE BECAUSE THE ROUTES ARE MAXIMUM 3 KM. HOWEVER, WHEN YOU WORK BY MOTORBIKE, THEY SEND YOU ORDERS FOR 9 KM, 10 KM, EVEN ONCE I GOT A 17 KM ONE, IT WAS FROM SALITRE TO USAQUÉN, SUPER FAR AWAY. WITH A MOTORBIKE, YOU MOVE THROUGH MANY DIFFERENT AREAS, ALMOST ALL OF BOGOTÁ.
(Rappitendero 7, 2020)

Further, I will focus on two specific work zones connected to two groups I interviewed within my research. One part of the interviewees work mostly in Parque 93 and the other part in Galerias. Also, one person (the only woman) works more independently in the west of the city, mostly strata three. They each find certain aspects in their zone attractive and the reason for them to work there. However, I want to note that those two areas are functioning as examples the demonstrate different aspects of deciding where to work and not as an analysis of the specific place. Where there is a demand for Rappi deliveries, there will be groups of Rappitenderos.

Parque 93

The zone of Parque 93 can be classified as a more general and high scale commercial zone within the city. It is situated in the locality Chapinero in the sector Chico and is mostly stratified as strata six and partly five. The area is highly popular for many Rappitenderos, as there are many restaurants, bars, and supermarkets. Also, there are many more zones with

high demand towards the north and south, making it easier to travel between different zones.

NO, I DO NOT LIKE IT SO MUCH [MORE SOUTH] BECAUSE, BESIDES THE FACT THAT THE ADDRESSES ARE COMPLICATED, IT IS MORE DANGEROUS. INSTEAD, HERE IT IS ALL THE TIME PROTECTED BY THE POLICE, AND THEY PAY WELL, SO THAT IS WHY I HAVE ALWAYS WORKED HERE. (Rappitendero 6, 2020)

Figure 18: Perception of urban space of Rappitenderos working in Parque 93; own representation

	Routes ride-alongs
	High tips
	Secure
	Dangerous
	Preferred zone of work / known place
	Difficult environment (streets and people)

In Figure 18, the formerly mentioned factors become spatialized through the perception and explanations of the Rappitenderos I interviewed and drove-along with on their daily work routine. The factor of high tips was always mentioned in the north of the city, as there are higher strata and people with higher incomes, from which they generally get more tips. Their perception of security and more dangerous places shows that for them, almost everything more south than Calle 60 is already perceived as not preferable to work at due to security issues. Also, people working in the north say they feel more secure because there is more police presence than in the center and south. Specifically, the eastern part of the zone shows accessible streets to follow, which many like.

I LIKE IT BETTER HERE; I FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE BECAUSE OF THE DIRECTIONS, THE STREETS, AND THE SAFETY. HERE, FOR EXAMPLE, ONE TIES THE BICYCLE TO A POST, AND NO ONE TAKES IT AWAY, BUT THERE IT IS CHOPPED UP AND ROBBED. (Rappitendero 4, 2020)

This chapter describes certain communal hardships and challenges, many Rappitenderos or Venezuelans face while living in Bogotá and working on the delivery platform. They are aspects regarding their work conditions, but also shared personal struggles.

Galerias

Galerias is a sector and barrio in Teusaquillo, located centrally between the historic center and the north and mostly contains strata three and four. It is a commercial zone that has many stores, supermarkets, and a shopping center. Still, it would instead be considered a zone of moderate demand within the application. The price segment of the products available is quite average, as both lower and medium prices can be found. However, high-end restaurants and stores are mainly not located in this neighborhood.

I STAY IN GALERÍAS, THERE IS A CARULLA [LARGE SUPERMARKET], AND I STAY IN FRONT OF FALABELLA, WHICH IS A SHOPPING CENTER. I JUST SIT THERE WITH SEVERAL MORE; WE ARE A RAPPI GROUP. HERE [PARKWAY] THERE IS ALSO A BIG GROUP, AND I USED TO WORK HERE, BUT I DO NOT KNOW… I LIKE WORKING THERE [GALERIAS] BETTER. IT IS MORE COMFORTABLE. (Rappitendero 1, 2020)

Figure 19: Perception of urban space of Rappitenderos working in Galerias; own representation

|	Routes ride-alongs
	High tips
	Secure
	Dangerous
	Preferred zone of work / known place
	Difficult environment (streets and people)

Figure 19 shows the perception of Rappitenderos working in Galerías. They point out the advantage of working here, since it is more laid back than the higher strata neighborhoods. It is also situated more in the city's geographical center, which makes travel towards work from the south more attainable. They chose to work in Galerias since they experience it as secure, someone they knew already worked there, or they just feel comfortable.

HE ABSORBED ME IN THE WORLD OF RAPPI […] AND SHOWED ME THE AREA WHERE HE WORKED. HE TEACHED ME THE AREA'S SPECIFIC LOCATIONS AND HELPED ME GET TO THE SHOPS OR ADDRESSES WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE PHONE AGAIN. (Rappitendero 2, 2020)

Feeling comfortable in their work zone, they also have a specific perception of other nei-ghborhoods. For example, higher scale zones in the north can be perceived as not too wel-coming, as Rappitenderos are also experiencing discrimination for their presence in public space. Also, towards the south (historical center), they decide not to work, as they feel it would be too dangerous. That shows the differences and similarities in security perception, as the center is mostly considered dangerous for almost all. However, Galerias is perceived as more dangerous to those working in the north because it is already more south than where they work. At the same time, the north is perceived by those working more central or south as not that comfortable or fear more discrimination.

I STARTED IN ROSALES, THE SEVENTH WITH SEVENTY, BECAUSE THERE IS A HIGHER STRATUM, AND THEREFORE MANY CREDIT CARD ORDERS ARE SENT OUT, WHICH IS THE ONLY OPTION AT THE BEGIN-NING IN LEVEL ONE. (Rappitendero 3, 2020)

4.1.5 CHALLENGES OF A RAPPITENDERO

This chapter describes certain communal hardships and challenges many Rappitenderos or Venezuelans face while living in Bogotá and working on the delivery platform. They are aspects regarding their work conditions, but also shared personal struggles.

Discrimination

NOTE THAT I HAVE NOT GONE THROUGH THAT; BUT THERE HAVE BEEN PEOPLE WHO SHOWED SOME DEGREE OF XENOPHOBIA TOWARDS ME. NEVERTHELESS, I HAVE NOT HAD AN ATTACK AS HAVE OTHER ACQUAINTANCES OF MINE, WHICH ARE PEOPLE WHO TODAY ARE FULL OF ANGER AND RESENTMENT. BUT I AM NOT, I FEEL VERY BLESSED AND SINCERELY FORTUNATE. (Rappitendero 7, 2020)

All experienced discrimination or xenophobia but let it affect them differently. As most said: they try not to pay attention. Also, the perception of what each one experiences as discrimi-nation depends enormously on each person. Some told me specific histories of encounters and divers reaction strategies: from ignorance and understanding to defense. They are dis-criminated against because of their accent or using specific phrases or words that identify them as Venezuelans. Therefore, many felt as if they are being treated differently on a day-to-day basis.

A MAN WAS RUDE TO ME, AND WHEN HE HEARD THE ACCENT, IT GOT WORSE. (Rappitendero 3, 2020).

Another factor affecting discrimination against Venezuelans is the treatment as an equi-valent of Rappitenderos. Therefore, working on the platform Rappi, they also experience direct discrimination for someone assuming they are Venezuelans. For example, in some restaurants, they cannot enter or, depending on the zone, have to leave their backpack outsi-de a shopping center. They would also experience xenophobia through commentaries in the streets from strangers or from restaurant employees, ranging from generalizations of them stealing or being uncareful.

IN THOSE SHOPS, WE ARE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST; FOR EXAMPLE, THEY MAKE US SAY IN THE APPLICATION THAT WE ALREADY HAVE THE PRODUCT AND SHOW IT TO THEM SO THAT THEY HAND OVER THE DELIVERY. AND THEN THEY SAY: "VENEZUELANS DO NOT DELIVER COMPLETE ORDERS OR THEY STEAL THEM", TO WHICH I RESPOND THAT I AM NOT A THIEF AND HE ANSWERS: "BUT THEY HAVE A REPUTATION FOR THAT".(Rappitendero 2, 2020)

Challenging working conditions

Further, I want to touch on some problems Rappitenderos are having with the service of the application. There are certain tricks Rappitenderos could theoretically use to steal money or products from the platform while they are doing a delivery. However, if the service team finds out, they will probably get blocked forever from working on the platform. One par-ticipant told me about an incident of fraud. Not only was the person blocked from the app, but many Rappitenderos who were working geographically close, as in all Rappitenderos regularly working at Parque 93, were blocked as well for one whole week. In general, there can be many problems with communication and help to come from the service team.

They know that the app's support service team often does not reply if there is a problem with the delivery. If they decide on their own what to do in the moment of a problem, they might get blocked for not doing anything wrong. For example, if they are conducting a deli-very of supermarket products and some products are not available, but they have problems with deleting the product from the list. They have to wait a long time for a response and even get rude messages from the Rappi service team, ordering them to save their problems themselves. Alternatively, suppose they feel like the customer is trying to do fraud. In that case, they could either cancel the order – and therefore not receive any orders for at least an hour – or wait for the service team, maybe the same time to respond or fulfill the delivery and be suspected of participating in fraud and then be blocked.

Also, as mentioned before, most Rappitenderos do not have too much trust regarding the platform's pricing mechanism's transparency. Officials of the application say they the full price of the delivery is for the individual driver. That does not collide with tips not showing, supposedly higher earnings in special hours, and steadily sinking prices since the app's start. Here I also want to note that as mentioned in section 4.1.1, Rappi was assumed to build their success on Venezuelan migrant workers. There is the argument that the app may not pay Venezuelans unfairly compared to Colombians, but the steadily sinking prices (especially considering general inflation), after a fast-growing workforce of Venezuelan migrants, are troubling (Bandeira, 2019).

Since all Rappitenderos had to have the PEP, all Venezuelans working in Rappi are staying in Colombia legally. Still, since Rappi identifies them as users (El Tiempo, 2019a), they are usually not socially insured or pay taxes through working in the app. Some individuals might decide on health insurance if they have special conditions, such as a family or motor-bike insurance for accidents. However, many do not have the means to pay for insurance with the money they earn through the application, and even more, if they are not obligated, they probably will not do it. However, since 2016, Rappitenderos are insured for accidents that happen while they are delivering an order. Meaning that if they are not connected or carrying out a delivery (which does not seem to be specified), they are not covered. Also, officials from Rappi noted that 100% of reported accidents were covered (El Tiempo, 2019a).

If someone had smaller or more significant accidents on the street with their bicycle or motorcycle, the app's insurance would naturally cover the incident. One person I interviewed had an accident on their motorcycle, which could not be covered by the delivery app as it happened on her way to work and she was not yet connected. However, she had luck since her insurance of the motorbike paid parts of the damage. Another person told about an emergency involving their young child, which they dealt without paying in the hospital, which can be related to the attention in emergencies I mentioned in chapter 2.3.3.

There are reports of Rappitenderos who had accidents while carrying out a delivery but still could not claim their insurance for accidents. In one specific case, the delivery that was in course during an accident was later deleted, and therefore the worker could not insist on his right. Also, in another accident, the Rappi support system just noted that the person was not insured anymore, even though he paid between 3,500 and 6,000 COP each week (Malaver, 2020).

To summarize, most are happy working in delivery, that they do not have a direct boss to report to and can choose their working hours - if they are troubled by something, they disconnect from the app. Also, almost all enjoy being outside during work and getting to see a lot of the city. Furthermore, the most significant advantage is still that they feel like they can earn a lot if they work a lot. On the other hand, their earnings are decreasing steadily, but if they stop working for Rappi, the company will always find new people and therefore do not listen to the complaints they formulate. They know it is not a safe job in regards to fair pay and insurance. However, other work options are scarce, especially in the formal labor market. Also, some work as well in other delivery apps to try to access more orders. Nevertheless, some only work in Rappi as they are used to it and afraid they could get blocked because Rappi will find out.

Protest of Rappitenderos

Regarding those unfavorable working conditions, there have been several protests by Rappitenderos. During the study period at the beginning of 2020, a protest against the sinking prices Rappitenderos were experiencing was organized in Bogotá. However, most interviewees said they were not participating physically but tried to show their support in not connecting in the app this day. In general, they have different reasons for not participating in protests or political events. During national strikes against the Colombian government, none wanted to participate. They either are not interested in politics or said they fear prosecution as they fill the outsider's position within political events in Bogotá. Often Venezuelans were misused by the police or media, demonstrating them as bandits and raiders within protest movements (Vega, 2019).

However, protests concerning the app's working conditions were not new, as many Rappitenderos still demonstrated their concerns in public space. In October 2018, Rappitenderos were protesting outside the Rappi office in Bogotá against unfair work conditions, more specifically the inability to influence pricing decisions within the app. Also, in other countries, such as Argentina, similar protest movements arose (Ojeda, 2018). Continuing in July of 2019, around 100 Rappitenderos burnt their companies backpacks in front of the Rappi's office in Bogotá to protest against inhumane conditions and for a change in insurance regulations, making the company take responsibility for their health in case of an accident (Portafolio, 2019).

The formerly mentioned protest in march 2020 resulted, again, due to their poor working

conditions. The broader range of tasks is not paid appropriately, and therefore they are being pushed into gigs that are unpreferable for them. On the one hand, the protestors were occupying public space and, on the other hand, not connecting to the app and forcing bypassing, working Rappitenderos to cancel their deliveries (Canal RCN, 2020). That also concludes why Rappitenderos I interviewed said that they were not participating but were not connected to the platform and wanted to support them like this. In August 2020, affected by the pandemic, a strike resulted from the blocking of Rappitenderos' accounts, low-pay, and a point system that sets impossible targets for deliveries (Forbes, 2020b).

Stay, move on, or go home?

MY BEGINNINGS HERE WERE A LITTLE HARD, BECAUSE I KNOW ELEVEN COUNTRIES, I HAVE TRAVELED A LOT, BUT I HAD NEVER TRAVELED TO WORK. I WAS ALWAYS A TOURIST TO SPEND MONEY, BUT NOW IN VENEZUELA, WE ARE IMMERSED IN A CRISIS THAT WE CAN NOT GET OUT OF. I PREFER TO BE HERE NOW. I WORK IN RAPPI. I AM A DELIVERY DRIVER.
(Rappitendero 6, 2020)

Their opinions about Bogotá and Colombia are parted as some feel integrated, even adapted the accent, and blend in between Colombians. Nevertheless, some say they miss their home and think the city is too big and that people are sometimes not nice. It seems as if they are happy to be here and survive with the money they earn, still there is some dissatisfaction, as many are not used to being a migrant with a low-quality job.

MY IDEA WAS TO GO TO CHILE, I WANTED TO COME HERE, MAKE MONEY AND GO TO CHILE, OR IF NECESSARY, RETURN TO VENEZUELA BUT WITH CAPITAL THAT I COULD INVEST IN VENEZUELA, BUT SOMETIMES THINGS COME NOT AS ONE PLAN. (Rappitendero 7, 2020)

Colombia is the most accessible country to migrate to from Venezuela; people speak the same language, and they share a long history. However, many, if not all, mentioned an interest in moving to another country, such as Peru, Chile, Argentina, or Spain. Still, this seemed more like a general idea than an exact plan. As mentioned before in 4.1.3, there is a dilemma between earning sufficient money to live a good life, sending money to their relatives, and saving money for further plans. Many came with a plan to make money and then continue their travels to another place or even return home with enough money. Some would go back to Venezuela if the situation gets better; at the same time, some say they do not think it will change soon, so they do not plan on it.

BUT ONE ALSO MISSES HIS LAND, BUT TO RETURN IS NO MORE POSSIBLE. THE PLACES ARE BROUGHT TO LIFE BY THE PEOPLE WHO INHABIT THEM, THOSE WHO ARE THERE, AND MOST PEOPLE ARE GONE, HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY. (Rappitendero 3, 2020)

Work in times of the pandemic

In March 2020, the quarantine due to the pandemic of COVID-19 started in all of Colombia. It was the longest worldwide, as it lasted until the end of August, with some exceptions to work for specific economic sectors opening up gradually since June. The changes in everyday life restrictions affected many people, but delivery service workers were experiencing

them profoundly different. They were one of the few who could continue working throughout the whole quarantine, even more, they experienced a high rise in demand in groceries and food delivery, as restaurants were allowed to continue working only for deliveries. From official sites of Rappi were communicated guidelines for the encounters with clients and provided hygiene articles in their office. However, how strict those recommendations are followed cannot be ensured, since it still depends on the restaurant and supermarket restrictions as well.

> *THEY RECOMMEND THAT YOU ARE ABOUT ONE METER AWAY FROM*
> *THE PERSON AND TO HAVE NO DIRECT CONTACT. (Rappitendero 4, 2020)*

What also comes with a higher number of orders is the rise in potential workers for Rappi. Many tried to attain a job in delivery with the loss of other jobs as they saw the growing market. Already two weeks after the quarantine started, there were 25,000 Rappitenderos working and 45,000 in a waiting list to register for the app in all of Colombia. Rappi tried to support vulnerable restaurants and health works by lower fares and donations (Patiño, 2020). The growing interest also had influences on the people already working in Rappi since the number of orders was rising. However, on the other hand, there were now more people working on the platform, which sometimes made less available for one person each day. The experience changed a lot between days as sometimes there were many orders and on others almost none, depending on how many people were connected to the application.

On weekends supermarket deliveries were rising by 70% and pharmacy deliveries by 28% (Neira Marciales, 2020). Rappi is also known for trying new technologies, such as deliveries, through robots for distances in the last mile as an answer to minimize physical contact during the pandemic. However, this happened only in the form of a pilot project in Medellin (Forbes, 2020a). Matías Laks, Rappi's general director, highlighted that they have "decided to operate at a loss during April and May", to invest in society, as well as to support the country's growth with more than 15 million USD of negative profits, "instead of taking advantage of the increase in demand to generate more income" (Neira Marciales, 2020).

Physical support for people nearby

I want to touch on delivery apps, such as Rappi, as a form of virtual connection that makes encounters in physical space possible. As we see through the functions and the impacts it had in the pandemic, it can help many people who cannot leave their homes for different reasons. Before the pandemic, one might not have thought about the importance of that, that many people would avoid short walks to a supermarket, pharmacy, or restaurant. With a Rappitendero who is assigned to one's order, one has interactions of asking questions and having special requests – and usually, they are happily accepted. This form of personal contact goes beyond just a simple delivery. Also, thinking that a Rappitendero is doing your weekly groceries in a supermarket, looking for the right product, communicating if there is a specific brand not available, lining up for, and bringing it to your doorstep seems like something highly personal. Especially since groceries are presenting something one uses and consumes in their daily lives, it can mirror someone's life to some extent.

Giving that everyday part of doing groceries, going out to a restaurant, buying pharmaceuticals or even clothes, and bringing them home can free one of certain responsibilities of their daily life. However, those are specific advantages that only people with high economical means can access. First, not everyone can afford food from restaurants, and supermarket deliveries are usually more expensive. Second, only higher-end supermarkets are available

on the app, as well as in some areas of the city the app does not work or provide many options. Third, this release of daily errands for some is built on the backs of people in vulnerable situations that do not earn enough for their work.

Borrero gives a good example talking about the advantages of the app, which ironically describes as well those disparities:

> *Think of a young couple with their first baby or a successful 35-year-old executive; for these people Rappi changed their lives because they were spending two hours of their Sunday doing grocery shopping. Now with Rappi they have a network of shoppers to choose the perfect avocado and take it home for 3,500 pesos. The 'rappitenderos', those who deliver to their homes, are young people who don't have the resources to pay for their studies or who barely earn the minimum wage in their current job, and Rappi connects them with those users who require the service. (translated from Spanish, Semana, 2018)*

Apart from the easy access through the PEP, there might be a reason why mostly Venezuelans are working in those delivery apps. Migrants are vulnerable and, therefore, easier to take advantage of in work situations, as explained in chapter 2.1.2. Still, Colombia's labor market already has high percentages of informal labor, and many sectors are pervaded by exploitation and corruption..

4.2 CASE STUDY WEBCAM MODELS

In this chapter, I will focus on the daily structures and struggles that surround the day to day of Venezuelan Webcam models in Bogotá. Similar aspects arose between these case studies and the aforementioned case study regarding the life of a Rappitendero. In particular, emotional factors regarding the study participants' mental health were explicitly relevant. The process of coding the interviews was conducted similarly while responding accordingly to sensitive topics.

Figure 20: Webcam model at work, edited, original by Busto (2017)

4.2.1 WEBCAM MODEL BUSINESS

Rise of online sex work worldwide and in Colombia

Prostitution and webcamming at first sight seem to be very similar fields; however, there are specific aspects where they differ substantially. Although both consist of providing an explicit sexual service using mostly female bodies, the webcamming format does not involve direct physical contact with the user, unlike prostitution. This reduces their state of physical vulnerability, which is why more and more women prefer online sex work over physical sex work (Sales, 2020). Harcourt and Donovan clearly (2005) express this distinction:

> Direct sex work refers to direct genital contact (as when an escort has penetrative sex for a fee); indirect sex work refers to sex work where there is no genital contact. Therefore, adult webcamming is a new form of indirect sex work and is a unique development (as cited Jones, 2016, p. 231).

In Colombia, the impact and popularity of this form of work have been extensive. To the extent that Colombia is the country with the second-highest number of practicing models, after Romania, with a total share of 33% (Sales, 2020). According to figures from 2017, the industry in Colombia had a base of approximately 25,000 people (Portafolio, 2017), increasing only a year later to 40,000 (El Tiempo, 2018), which also presents current estimations. Regional concentrations are mostly in urban areas throughout Colombia, with Bogotá and Medellin hosting more than half of all webcam models (Sales, 2020).

The Webcam industry is subject to a mixed form of regulatory formality and informality, as each company and studio is managed differently at its managers' convenience. In Bogotá, only 20% are legally constituted, which means that approximately most are operating without any type of legal regulation or control (Sales, 2020). This lack of organization makes it easy for someone with sufficient capital to create their own studio. However, a decree passed in 2019 has imposed an income tax charge of 11%, resulting in the potential collection of more than 50,000 million COP a year. According to Oscar Arias, the director of the Colombian Association of Electronic Commerce for Adults, this measure has positive effects on the industry. It reduces the appearance of new clandestine studios and professionalizes the existing ones. Furthermore, it aids the minimization of models' vulnerability (Serrano, 2018). However, as the numbers show, many studios and individual workers are not paying taxes and continue to work without legal regulation. Whether the income tax and social security for the models are paid still depends on the studio in question.

Rising numbers of Venezuelan Webcam Models

Although Venezuelans are not the predominant population in the webcam industry, unemployment and currency devaluation have been steadily increasing their representation. The minimum monthly salary in Venezuela being roughly 250,531 VEF, which is 0.57 USD, but the capital required to supply basic food in the same period was 1,738,150.55 VEF (Busto, 2017). It is evident that there is an imbalance between income and the cost of living. Adult entertainment platforms generate profits in foreign currency, which creates a fairly high-profit margin and, in turn, an opportunity to overcome economic hardships. "Due to devaluation, the dollar is increasing daily. In one month, a dollar can double its cost, so having this money is much better than earning bolivars" (translated from Spanish, Bustos, 2017). This trend likewise concerns Colombia as a country with already high numbers of Webcam models. Both Colombian national and Venezuelan migrant Webcam workers are

finding an opportunity for fast money.

In Colombia, the online sex work industry grew rapidly, and unlike for any formal or common jobs in the country, it does not require any type of experience or level of education to start working in this job. In the last decade, the unemployment rate in Colombia has been increasing, which was inconvenient when facing the massive migration of Venezuelans since it increased the demand but not the labor supply, pushing these new citizens into all kinds of informality in order to survive.

Different pages and functions

Angela Jones (2016, p. 229) describe this form of work and its implications as follow:

> *Webcam models should be seen as sex workers who 'perform erotic labor in a highly competitive capitalist marketplace,' which is 'similar to many other forms of [feminized] service work because it involves providing good customer service' and 'often requires managing both one's own emotions and those of clients.' This erotic labor generally takes place in public chat rooms, where models engage in conversation as well as various levels of sexual play, and in private rooms to which viewers can gain access by tipping a certain amount of tokens.* (as cited van Doorn and Velthuis, 2018, p. 178)

These types of interactions between Webcam models and clients can occur on various webpages. There are big platforms that work internationally and serve a broad audience; however, smaller pages for niche services are present as well. On traditional social media sites, such as Instagram, Facebook, Skype, and Whatsapp, interaction can also start, and payment is made separately via international bank transactions.

The most significant webpage, which all participants named, is "Chaturbate", which serves a large audience, comprises the classic structure of a public chatroom site, and allows private communication. Some said that compared to other sites, Chaturbate is relatively calm, as users are not asking for "hard-core" stuff, but also someone said that half of the Webcam models are in the public section of the platform already naked. (It is a big personal decision, combined with the shaming of other decisions if someone already is getting rid of their clothes in public, or only in a private chat with a user, but will be discussed further in 4.2.4). Others that have been mentioned were "myfreeaccount", "snaptube" and "cam4". Users of "cam4" were reported to demand more vulgar content from the models, however, this was connected with higher pay.

> *'CHATURBATE' IS MORE ABOUT SPEAKING IN ENGLISH, THEY CARE MORE ABOUT TALKING, YOUR CHARISMA, THAT YOU ARE ALL PRETTY, TELLING THEM THINGS, AND DO NOT CARE SO MUCH ABOUT NUDITY. BUT 'CAM4' WAS THE PAGE WHERE YOU CAN MAKE THE MOST MONEY, BUT IT IS SUPER VULGAR. WHAT MATTERS IS THAT YOU SHOW YOUR BREASTS, THAT YOU MASTURBATE AND THAT YOU COME. EVERYTHING IS MORE SEXUAL. (Webcam Model 1, 2020)*

However, there is also a growing market for phone apps, as most of the formerly mentioned sites are usually accessed through a computer. One participant mentioned applications named "pigo" and "coco", which are video message platforms not designed particularly for explicit content. Furthermore, a new platform named "Onlyfans" is growing rapidly. It offers a similar service to Instagram, the differences being that nudity is allowed, followers

pay a monthly subscription, and may buy additional products like pictures. Online sex workers use it either as a primary platform or as a side revenue source separate from their main platforms (Bernstein, 2019). The preferred platform can change rapidly due to changes in the industry and the experience and personal focus of a model..

4.2.2 LIFE IN VENEZUELA AND THE MIGRATION TO BOGOTÁ

Below, I give a brief background regarding my study participants' situation, why they left Venezuela, and why they decided to come to Bogotá.

Personal information and their life in Venezuela

All study participants came from different Venezuelan regions, with one person from Cúcuta, the Colombian border town. Although models in the online sex industry are usually predominantly female, out of the five interviewees, two were men. One man was working as a model and the other only as a model for a short time, then transferring to the Webcam studio's organization. All women worked as models, one of them in addition to working as a monitor in a studio. I shall explain this further in Chapter 4.2.3.

All of them were between the age of 20 and 24 at the time of their interview, meaning they migrated between 17 and 21. Their academic backgrounds were relatively similar as they all attended university. Two participants could not finish due to Venezuela's struggles, while one person came to Bogotá to study. Many did not have a career yet since they were still in school or university before leaving. However, one person worked as a receptionist and one in informal trade; one person was already working in a webcam studio in Venezuela, which relocated to Colombia due to difficulties with the Venezuelan electricity grid.

> *WHEN I RETURNED TO VENEZUELA, IT WAS EVEN WORSE. THERE WERE NO LONGER ANY BUSES OR TAXIS, THERE WAS NO ELECTRICITY SOME DAYS AND NO LONGER ANY INTERNET; ONE WENT TO THE SUPERMARKET, AND THERE WAS NOTHING (Webcam Model 2, 2020)*

Their reasons for leaving their homes are all generally connected to Venezuela's socio-economic situation. Many could not finish their studies, did not have a job, and consequently not enough money to sustain themselves and their family. However, another new aspect was an abusive relationship with their parents in two cases and them leaving home, at least also, because of that. Still, many contain a connection to parts of their families, as some still live in Venezuela.

Migration Venezuela - Bogotá

As aforementioned, all participants left Venezuela relatively early, between two and five years before the interviews took place (between 2015 and 2018). Apart from one person, all made the journey by bus and stayed in Cúcuta, the Colombian border town, for a substantial time (between six months to two years). In Cúcuta, the situation was mixed: one person moved with their whole work team; one person migrated with a bigger group of friends, one person alone without any contacts. Some still experienced hardships finding a job and had to work in informal conditions in whatever job they could find or sell things on the street. .

Cúcuta had an economic boom about 20 years ago thanks to the commercial exchange with

Venezuela. By then, the Venezuelan currency was overvalued, and the cost of living was much higher, which greatly benefited the growth of the city (Dinero, 2001). No one imagined that the economy would plummet in the following years and that the city would sink into scarcity, forcing micro-entrepreneurs to seek job opportunities in the informal sector. In Cúcuta, mentioned in chapter 2.3.2, the percentages of Venezuelan migrants and informal labor (3.1.4) are extremely high compared to other Colombian cities. Because of this, the Webcam industry took off. In the last few years, Webcam studios grew from a few hidden in obscurity to over 200, mostly informal (La Opinión, 2019). All study participants who stayed in Cúcuta and who had not already entered the industry, started working as Webcam models in the town.

The necessity of acquiring residency status for certain forms of work was an additional push-factor into the modeling industry for the participants. In general, one does not have the obtain the PEP or other specific documents to start Webcamming. It is only necessary if certain studios require it. One person who had the economic means, came legally with their passport and subsequently obtained their PEP. One other person is married to a Colombia returnee, giving them Colombian citizenship. Another person came informally, without a passport, and was asked by a studio to get their passport and then their PEP. Another person only possessed the TMF but has overstayed the legal one week limit allowed by the TMF and has resided illegally in Colombia for three years.

All but one stayed in Cúcuta for some time and then moved on to other places, including Bucaramanga, Villavicencio, and Santa Marta, before moving to Bogotá. This means that some had not resided in Bogotá for long at the point of the interview or even already moved to another place outside of Colombia. Arriving in Bogotá was, for the most part, a relatively positive experience as everybody knew someone — they either stayed with friends or family. Pull-factors influencing their move to Bogotá were to obtain an education, specific offers to work in a studio, or the idea to build a studio here and profit from greater economic and personal opportunities.

> *HERE IN BOGOTÁ IT IS EASY TO GET A JOB, WELL SOMETIMES A*
> *LITTLE DIFFICULT, BUT IN CÚCUTA THERE IS NO WORK, AS IT IS A*
> *BORDER TOWN. SINCE EVERYTHING IN VENEZUELA HAS HAPPENED*
> *MANY BUSINESSES HAVE GONE BANKRUPT, THE BARS DO NOT WORK*
> *IN CÚCUTA. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)*

Finding housing and work

> *FINDING HOUSING FOR A VENEZUELAN IN COLOMBIA IS HORRIBLE; YOU*
> *NEED TWO GUARANTORS AND A LAWYER, AND AS A VENEZUELAN, THEY*
> *STILL DO NOT ACCEPT YOU. FURTHERMORE, WHEN YOU ARE A WEBCAM*
> *MODEL, THEY DO NOT ACCEPT YOU EITHER. IT IS A MORAL THING, AND I*
> *UNDERSTAND IT; I DO NOT JUDGE EITHER. HOWEVER, IT IS LIKE YOU HAVE*
> *MONEY, AND YOU CANNOT DO ANYTHING WITH IT; IT IS SUPER FRUSTRAT-*
> *ING. UNTIL MY OWN BOSS GAVE US A FLAT THAT HE HAD AND WE COULD*
> *RENT FROM HIM. (Webcam Model 2, 2020)*

Personal contacts often do not offset the difficulties imposed by anti-Venezuelan discrimination when attempting to secure longer-term housing. Furthermore, working as a Webcam model can put into additional stigmas. As a result, many live directly in the studio where they work or in housing organized by their employer. After working for a reasonable amount of time on a platform, they can probably afford their housing and therefore, can move if they manage to find something new.

Apart from living in the studio, participants also reported that they lived with their family, others with friends in a small apartment, and shared houses with around 25 to 30 people, where they have their room but had access to only shared facilities.

> *SHARED KITCHEN, PATIO, BATHROOM, ALL SHARED; IT WAS DIFFI-*
> *CULT BECAUSE YOU DO NOT KNOW ANYONE. YOU ARE NOT IN AN*
> *ENVIRONMENT WHERE YOU MAKE FRIENDS, AND IT IS LIKE PEOPLE*
> *OF VARIOUS AGES DOING DIFFERENT THINGS, SO IT IS VERY STRANGE.*
> *(Webcam Model 3, 2020)*

As already discussed in chapter 4.1.2, Bogotá and its stratification results in diverse housing prices throughout the city. In Figure 21, the location of their housing and eventual moving process is shown. Some live in the urban periphery, however, more live in central areas and subsequently move to the periphery, while others moved in the opposite direction to get closer to their workplaces.

Many already worked as Webcam models in other parts of Colombia before coming to Bogotá. Half of the participants resumed work as models or in their studio's organization only after arriving in Bogotá. However, one person before worked as a nanny outside of Bogotá, another typical job in the reproductive space. Jobs they were working in before and after working as Webcam models were informal vendors of coffee, nannies, call center employees, restaurant workers, in small stores, as vegetable sellers, and in car parks.

Still, their beginnings in working as Webcam models were different. I report their stories below: One person heard about the online sex industry, got interested, and started an investigation of their own. After that, he started modeling, as well as organizing his studio. Another person heard about it from a friend who was working in the industry and got interested. She looked up the opinions and experiences of others online and decided to participate in it. Furthermore, one woman started to work in a Webcam studio by age 16, which is illegal, but did not seem to import the studio's owner


Residential location
Moving process
Strata 1   Strata 4
Strata 2   Strata 5
Strata 3   Strata 6

I RESEARCHED ON THE INTERNET ABOUT WEBCAM MODELS, AND I SAW MANY POSITIVE THINGS: LIKE THAT, YOU EARN GOOD MONEY, YOU ONLY HAVE TO WORK SIX HOURS, YOU CAN EARN UP TO 300 USD PER DAY AND IN MY MIND, IT WAS LIKE WOW, THIS IS WHAT I NEED IN MY LIFE. (Webcam Model 1, 2020)

Others, however, were more resistant to the idea at first. Even after looking at the studio, some are unsure; nevertheless, they decided to try it anyway. Often this decision to still try it comes out of an acute need for money to survive or travel further. The starting income already is far higher than they could expect from any other job.

A FRIEND TOLD ME THAT I SHOULD WORK AS A WEBCAM MODEL, AND I DID NOT KNOW WHAT IT WAS, SO I SAID NO AT FIRST. BUT THERE WAS A MOMENT WHEN I REALLY NEEDED MONEY OR I WOULD HAVE HAD TO LIVE ON THE STREETS. THEN I WENT TO THE STUDIO AND SAW ALL THAT AND WAS LIKE: "OH SHIT, WHAT IS ALL THIS, I AM NOT GOING IN, I DO NOT WANT TO, I CANNOT", YOU KNOW, MY MORAL WAS LIKE: "NO". SO I STARTED SELLING MORE COFFEE ON THE STREETS, AND THEN I CALLED THE GUY, AND HE TOLD ME THAT I WAS PERFECT FOR THAT AND THAT IS IT, I STARTED. (Webcam Model 2, 2020)

One more experience is really different from the others, in the sense that it occurred naturally. One man started to model as a hobby by age 17 and developed this passion into an income by charging clients money for likes and being an influencer. However, women from different places started writing to him, asking to see explicit photos and videos. With this, he got the idea to start charging for this type of content and began his side work in this exchange.

MANY FOREIGN WOMEN WROTE TO ME ON INSTAGRAM, FROM CHILE, MEXICO, PANAMA, EVEN FROM CANADA. WE STARTED TO GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER, AND I SENT PHOTOS TO THEM, AND THEY SENT ME MONEY. (Webcam Model 4, 2020)

4.2.3 WEBCAM STUDIOS AND EVERYDAY ROUTINES

Organization of a studio

Almost all of the webcam models I talked to worked at least at some point in a studio specifically for Webcam models. There are no exact numbers, but according to different estimations, there are between 2,000 and 6,000 studios in all of Colombia. (Corté Bernal, 2020; Parrado Beltrán, 2020; Sales, 2020). Given its specifications, Webcam-based sex work is easily pursuable from one's home. Only one person I interviewed never worked in a studio and participated in different work forms depending on which platform they worked on. Many first get in contact with this job possibility through a recruiter or a friend who is working in a studio. A Studio's biggest asset is the infrastructure and services that they can offer to the models. For people without economic capital, this seems inviting since the equipment needed for high-quality content is costly. Many may leave the studio if they earn enough. However, some, out of fear of complication, dependence, if they feel comfortable and enjoy the organization network, do not leave at all.

Those studios are operated either by a single "entrepreneur" or through the coordination of a bigger network of studios. There are large groups or business firms in charge of small studios. Their task is to take care of all technical and administrative aspects such as hiring and training new models or maintaining facilities (Grupo Bedoya Estudios, no date). The possibility of creating their own business is considered by many as a lucrative investment idea. To the formal operation of a studio, the manager must pay the appropriate taxes and make sure to comply with national regulations for hiring and decent working conditions of their employees (Busto, 2019). Still, this requires capitalizing upon a form of work that people (mostly women) could theoretically independently pursue. This business owner can fulfill different positions within the studio's organization, as he (yes, they are mostly men) can operate directly in the studio's daily operations in a specific function or merely fulfill the owner and business manager's role. Other positions guarantee the studio's function, such as the monitor, whose function I will explain later, and cleaners.

Studios typically are located in smaller or bigger houses but can also be located in apartments. There are usually between 5 and 30 models working in a studio. They try to benefit from all the space in the house by separate bigger rooms into smaller ones. The studios' location is not limited to specific zones within the city, and different locations offer specific benefits and drawbacks. In the urban periphery, they can probably expect lower costs for the property. However, depending on the capital involved and the owner's desires, studios may nonetheless be located centrally. These higher prices may be expected to be afforded through the profits accrued via the models' labor.

Figure 22: Residential location and workplace of Webcam models; own representation

Legend:
- Residential location
- Workplace
- Working from home
- Living in studio
- Daily commute

As shown in Figure 22, differing patterns of connection between where the participants lived and where they worked. Some have to travel far, however, many try to live close to the studio where they work and move house if they can afford a closer residence. Another option for Webcam models is to live directly in the studio, as aforementioned. The owner of a studio situated in Chapinero Alto said he wanted to provide housing and work for the women in a good neighborhood with high strata (explained in 4.1.2), usually five or six but a minimum of four. The studio is an apartment with around eight women working and living there. The studio owner provides them with food, cleaning services, and the infrastructure required for their work.

*THE WOMEN LIVE THERE, THEY ARE GIVEN ACCOMMODATION, FOOD,
CLEANING, AND EVEN THEIR UNDERWEAR IS BEEN WASHED.
(Webcam Model 4, 2020)*

Functions

Most participants would have never started if it was not for the studio looking for people to work there. The fact that they can start working there within one day and do not have to make investments from the beginning is a clear incentive. Their beginnings in a studio start like any other formal job — with an interview. The questions are adapted to the conditions of work and include their limits and the studio's rules. They try to find new people through different forms of advertisements in social media, newspapers, or mouth to mouth. If an existing employee brings someone new to the studio, they can even earn part of their earnings, such as 5%.

*HE ASKED ME WHY I WANTED TO WORK THERE – LIKE A LITERAL
JOB INTERVIEW – HE ASKED ME MANY THINGS ABOUT ME, AND
THE KEY QUESTION WAS: "WHAT DO YOU THINK, WHY SHOULD YOU
WORK HERE?" SO I TOLD HIM THAT I FELT COMFORTABLE WITH MY
BODY, THAT I CONSIDER MYSELF BEAUTIFUL, SENSUAL AND I FEEL
THAT I AM A QUALIFIED PERSON FOR THAT JOB. HE ASKED ME WHY
I WANTED TO DO THAT JOB, AND I SAID IT WAS BASICALLY FOR THE
EASY MONEY. (Webcam Model 1, 2020)*

Infrastructure is a key factor that influences models to work within a studio — it provides the equipment which facilitates their work. This includes a room, a computer with a good camera, a strong internet signal, and sometimes a wireless keyboard for comfort. Further provisions include alimentation throughout the day, usually one meal, a room to rest, and special rooms for different uses. In some studios, the models, apart from working, can also choose to live there. This indicates a particular form of transit between their work and living space.

*THE STUDIO HAD 20 OR 30 ROOMS, ALL VERY SMALL AND DECORATED
IN DIFFERENT COLORS, WITH AN ARMCHAIR OR A BED OR WHATEVER,
WITH PICTURES, CUSHIONS, AND A COMPUTER TABLE. THAT WAS IT,
AND THE CAMERA. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)*

As mentioned, studios are usually in a house or apartment, often reusing residential buildings. Depending on the house's structure, large rooms are partitioned to multiply the available space. Figure 23 provides the structure of a real studio house, concluded with information from participants in my research. There is usually an entrance space, where the monitor is situated, and an open kitchen for all, and together with a zone for resting, they make up the common areas, marked grey. The rooms are decorated and installed with items and equipment reflecting their different uses and the models' needs and personalities that work within them. These decorations are often rather generic, playing on tropes including "cute", "grunge", "sexy" etc. If the models reside in the studio, they can usually design their own space or are allowed to adapt it. However, if they do not live there, a valuable amenity is an additional room for resting, as models who work a night shift may sleep onsite. The structures of studios reflect a blend of the classic facilities of an office whilst incorporating notable domestic elements adapted to the workforce's requirements.

As the studio provides the models the infrastructure required to work, they also receive a large part of their incomes. The studio usually takes 40% of the model's income. However, this percentage can vary depending on the model's earnings (they sometimes only take 30% if the model already is earning a lot). If the model breaks the studio's rules, they will potentially subtract a percentage of their earnings. This financial relationship comes with many problems, as the models often work without a work contract and depend on their boss's goodwill. Some reported better treatment following higher earnings, but the contrary is also true, and some reported that the Studios percentage was increased following the model's increased earnings. "Telework" is an alternative option in some studios, which only takes 20% of the earnings to cover organizational costs and profits if the models work from home. As formulated bluntly from the perspective of a Webcam studio owner

IF THEY COMPLY WITH THE GOALS, THEY ARE GIVEN 60%; IF THEY DO NOT COMPLY WITH THE GOALS OR DO NOT WORK ENOUGH, THEY ARE GIVEN 50%. BECAUSE NOT ALL WOMEN ARE GOOD AT THAT JOB, SOME PEOPLE SERVE, AND OTHERS DO NOT. SOME MODELS ARE PROFITABLE, AND OTHERS LEAVE ONLY EXPENSES. IF YOU CALCULA-TE THAT, THEY DO NOTHING WITHIN THREE WEEKS AND YOU PROVI-DED LODGING AND PAID OPERATIVE EXPENSES. (Webcam Model 4, 2020)

Rules

Fluctuations in payment are connected to the conditions that studios impose upon models. Each studio rolls out their specific goals and rules, but these usually concern the times they have to work, how much they have to earn in a session, or forbidding specific actions in front of the camera. Most studios also apply a rule to prohibit the models from giving out their personal information, which sometimes includes their social media accounts or the studio's address. Within the shift options, they can freely choose when they want to work and sometimes work longer hours to accumulate over time. To what extent this is allowed depends on the studio. Some show a relaxed approach regarding those hours if they see the model is earning enough. However, some studios will pressure models to work additional hours even if their earnings in standard shifts are already substantial.

I HAD TO GIVE 40% AND IF I WAS DOING WELL 30%, AND WHEN I WAS DOING WELL THEN I WAS ALREADY EARNING MORE. BUT THEY GIVE YOU GOALS YOU HAVE TO REACH, YOU HAVE TO MAKE AN AMOUNT OF TOKENS. FOR EXAMPLE, 2,000 TOKENS, WHICH SOUNDS LIKE NOTHING BUT IS VERY ¬¬DIFFICULT BECAUSE A MODEL THAT IS DOING VERY WELL IN A DAY CAN MAKE 7,000, BUT A NEW MODEL CAN MAKE 500 NO MORE, AND THAT REPRESENTS ALMOST NO MONEY. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)

Chef / moonitor

The models who work there must report to a person to ensure they comply with the studio's rules. They frame it as if it is like any other boss-employee relation. This depends on the studio and is not accurately generalizable. Many owners of the studios are male, may be Venezuelan migrants or Colombian nationals. As mentioned before, some bosses do not regularly attend their studio and can be described as one or several men who see themselves as prominent businessmen since the initial capital they have is quite high and allows them to enter the market. This creates an image of power and authority that, in some cases, leads

to illegal acts related to the physical and psychological abuse of models (BLU Radio, 2019). It is usual that these characters have a good relationship with all the studio's staff and try to create a balanced atmosphere between comradeship and professionalism, which is necessary for the models to feel comfortable and reflect it in front of the cameras.

One participant mentioned the boss coming by every two weeks in their expensive car and talking in a pretentious manner. However, some are directly connected to the studio's daily operations and have a position closer to a production manager. This type does not envision the studio operation as a simple provision of space and infrastructure for independent models, but rather as a place to curate and direct the staging of their imagination and "expertise".

THIS IS LIKE PRODUCING THE SHOW, TELLING THEM THAT THEY HAVE TO DANCE; IT IS LIKE SELLING A FANTASY. (Webcam Model 4, 2020)

As men mostly inhabit those positions, and the models' gender is typically female, confused, and disrespectful relations can develop. Seeing those "private" moments of a model as a form of production is often seen as interfering in the model's personal space and impeding their relationships and experiences with clients.

However, the position of the monitor is regularly fulfilled by women or by men. This may be the owner establishing through production their influence on their models' performances. In the case where the monitor is a woman, other structures of interference may be applied. Some give the models total freedom to do as they please, and mostly monitor their interactions for security reasons and provide assistance. That can include handling abusive clients or providing assistance in producing material in the English language.

IN THIS STUDIO, AS THEY WERE ONLY GIRLS, IT WAS A FRIENDLY ATMOS-PHERE. THE ADMINISTRATOR HAD ALSO BEEN A MODEL, AND WHEN THEY SAW THAT I WAS NO LONGER WELL, THEY ASKED ME IF I WANTED TO CONTINUE, AND IF I NO LONGER WANTED, THEN I COULD LEAVE. THEY DO NOT NEED TO HAVE A GIRL THERE BECAUSE THERE ARE MANY WHO WANT TO BE WEBCAM MODELS. SOME STUDIOS CARE ABOUT THE MODELS, IT WAS VERY RELAXED THERE. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)

One former Webcam model subsequently worked as a monitor in another studio. She indicated that she enjoyed work more if the studio was managed by women and desired to apply this approach by helping out models in the monitor's role. She also pointed out that sometimes she would feel pressure from a monitor she worked under. Building on this experience, she tried not to pressure the models and worked instead to support them. She knew the feelings and insecurities that can often accompany this type of work.

SO I INTRODUCED MYSELF, I DID AN INTERVIEW AND I STARTED AS A MONITOR. MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, BECAUSE MY WORK AS A MODEL DID NOT SATISFY ME MUCH, I WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT OTHER THINGS, ABOUT FIXING MY PAGE, THE CAMERA, THE ROOM, THAN ABOUT WORKING ON IT. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)

It is essential to mention that this research indicated that in no studio studied, anyone was forced to do something specific. However, instead, it was imposed through informal means and psychological pressure. Participants also reported that they had been told that they did

not have to do anything they do not want to do. This ambivalence and lack of clarity do suggest the potential for abuse and exploitation. However, this train of thought must be followed with caution. It is case dependant, and no single structure facilitating exploitation or abuse could be identified. The main focus lies on what the model is willing to do; demands and orders are repackaged as comments and advice. This study does not cover all studios in Bogotá. However, it would appear that since the studios' earnings are directly connected to the quality of the performances of their models, which are in turn built upon the character and well-being of these models, too much pressure applied across the workforce is not in the interest of the studio as a business. Furthermore, no models mentioned problems when leaving a studio (apart from an unwillingness to pay days that were still missing).

In general, working in a studio can have positive aspects for many models. Some enjoy access to the required infrastructural and organizational amenities and also enjoy reporting to a boss. Daily structures of walking to their "office" and separating their workplace from their home are also favorable for many. Another aspect is the company of other women, which comes from the working community in a studio. This is also important as many start working in a specific studio though knowing someone who is already working there. As I will further explain, their social life surrounds heavily on the people they meet and the social structures encountered through studio work.

> *I LIKED HAVING A BOSS WHO MOTIVATES ME, SO YOU HATE IT, BUT HAVING A BOSS WHO TELLS YOU THAT YOU HAVE TO DO YOUR JOB AND ABOUT YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES. IN THIS JOB, YOU DO NOT HAVE ANY OF THAT; YOU HAVE ALL THE FREEDOM YOU WANT. SO IT SUPER IMPORTANT TO HAVE A LEADER BECAUSE IF YOU DID NOT HAVE SOMEONE LIKE THAT, EVERYONE WOULD DO WHATEVER THEY WANTED. (Webcam Model 2, 2020)*

Taking these elements into consideration, it should be underlined that different studios demonstrate various forms of infrastructure provision, work structure, and potential patterns of exploitation. Some studios manage to focus their work on their models' physical and emotional well-being and emphasize the importance of "fair" pay (minimizing fines for mistakes) and employee support. Nevertheless, in many, if not all, studios, at least one form of exploitation can be found. This claim is drawn from a number of concerns arising from the testimonies upon which this research is based. First, the percentages studios take from models' earnings are over-inflated. Second, some rules, and informal structures through which rules are communicated limit models' possibilities to grow and find their own success. Third, emotional abuse in the form of comments and pressure regarding models' work can profoundly harm them, and capitalizes upon the commodification of models' bodies. This last factor can play a significant and abusive role in the already chauvinist field of sex work.

From one perspective, one has to see the advantages that digitalization and the virtual space of sex work bring to the experience of work. The whole transaction becomes more secure, as no physical contact is needed. This is a significant advance regarding the vulnerability of sex workers in public space. From another perspective, studios and their owners are similar to "pimps," taking advantage of vulnerable people who do not have the means to organize themselves to work on these platforms themselves. Conversely, the studio structure potentially brings greater organization, security, and "normalcy" through models' participation within traditional work schedules. However, it is just as easy to indicate that similar exploitation and power mechanisms can dominate these working environments; however,

structured they may be.

It is important not to oversimplify online-sex work studios and paint them totally in light of abuse and exploitation. From available testimony, to paint them as such is inaccurate, and many find a great deal of support, both infrastructural and emotional, within their studios. Indeed, the experience of working as a Webcam model profoundly depends on the attitudes of individuals within the studio towards different aspects of their work. It can be empowering for many if they enjoy doing that work and bring them to a point where they can be economically stable, which for many, without that job, was not possible.

Weekdays, daily routine

I formerly described in detail the conditions which come from working in a Webcam studio. However, not all study participants worked in a studio or also decided to work a split schedule between their studio and their home. Some who work from home even try to stay online all day and do everything in front of the camera.

The longer they are connected, the more possible viewers they can gain as their chance to move to the front page grows. In a studio, there are normally shifts throughout the whole day: morning (8h-14h), noon (14h-20h), evening (20h-2h). The shifts decided for themselves or with a studio are between 6 and 10 hours and serve different audiences. Those viewers are mostly men from other continents when looking from a local Colombian perspective. They try to connect to their projected audience in that audience's evening. This means: (Colombian time) the morning is for an Asian and Australian, the afternoon for the European and the Evening and Night for North American audience. One can easily see that the targeted clients are mostly located in the global north.

The type of audience and time schedule implies a certain stereotype one has expected to be confronted with, as it has been explained to me. For example, in the US, a strong Latina fetish can be found, which many webcam models try to serve. For an Asian audience, cute or grungy styles are of greater importance than their nationality. Coming from Venezuela or Colombia is already a significant part of the Webcam models appeal to many members of their audience, so some try to find their niche within certain prejudices.

However, webcamming is a growing business in many different parts of the world and is not restricted to the global south. Furthermore, models can block users from certain countries from seeing their page. Many block the place they come from or where they live. Therefore, Colombia and Venezuela are blocked for most Venezuelans working in Colombia. In addition to national bans, specific regions, such as cities, can be blocked separately. This allows models to engineer black spots to protect themselves and to engineer their ideal audience.

> *YES, I WAS BLOCKING COLOMBIA, VENEZUELA, AND ECUADOR, BUT NO MORE. ANYWAYS, ALMOST NO LATIN PEOPLE VISIT THOSE SITES; THE USERS ARE USUALLY NORTH AMERICANS, EUROPEANS OR ASIANS, BUT THERE WAS ALMOST NOBODY FROM DOWN HERE. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)*

Figure 26: Daily schedule of Webcam models; own representation

I ONLY SLEPT IN MY FREE TIME, BECAUSET IT WAS VERY HARD. I WENT FROM STUDYING TO WORK, THEN I LEFT AT NIGHT AND ARRIVED HOME AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK AT NIGHT. I HAD TO DO WORK FOR THE UNIVERSI-TY AND SOMETIMES I DID NOT SLEEP, IT WAS VERY, VERY HARD. WHEN I LIVED HERE [MORE CENTRAL] IN BOGOTÁ IT WAS MUCH BETTER, I GOT HOME EARLIER, BUT IT WAS THE SAME, THERE WAS ALMOST NO TIME TO WATCH MOVIES OR GO OUT. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)

Their daily structures are shown in Figure 24, and it comes clear that their schedules are very different. The above-described options for work shifts are represented, but also more open approaches, working all day or only punctual some hours. Depending on their other obliga-tions, such as family, university, or other work types, the models try to choose the best time of the day to work. However, often they can also work two shifts in one day. This allows them to take an additional day off, usually in addition to one general day off. Still, sometimes this behavior can also be punished, as mentioned, by subtracting the percentage they will earn.

MY LIFE WAS NEVER A ROUTINE; IT WAS ONLY A ROUTINE WHEN I SAID, I NEED THIS AMOUNT OF MONEY, AND I WAS GETTING WISE. BUT THE TRUTH WAS I DID NOT HAVE TO DO IT, I DID NOT HAVE A BOSS TO TELL ME I HAD TO DO IT. I WAS SUPER FREE, AND I COULD DO IT WHENEVER I WANTED. (Webcam Model 2, 2020)

As some work from home, live in the studio or close-by, they either have no or little travel time. Nevertheless, at least at some point in their career, most had to travel through the city daily. Their modes of transport are diverse, as some choose to only travel by taxi and others use busses or cycle.

Excess time

Many participants indicated that they felt as though their work-life balance was negative. They indicated that their hours were too high, leaving no time for other activities in the day. One participant was studying simultaneously, while those who worked at the evening/night were also going out to party a lot and sleeping during the day. Their income usually strongly influen-ced their lifestyle, changing to more excessive structures as soon as they began to earn more.

I WORKED 24/7: I GOT UP, I WORKED, I SLEPT, I ATE IN FRONT OF THEM, I BATHED IN FRONT OF THESE PEOPLE, I DRESSED IN FRONT OF THESE PEOPLE, I HAD NO SOCIAL LIFE. THEN, THE MORE TIME YOU SPEND ON CAMERA, THE MORE MONEY YOU EARN, AND YOU LOSE YOUR SOCIAL LIFE ENTIRELY; THAT IS WHAT HAPPENED TO ME. (Webcam Model 2, 2020)

The models who work together in a studio, are spending much time working and with each other, resulting in their social life centered around their Webcamming circles. The stigma surrounding their type of work can also be a binding factor, as they usually do not tell many people. Their work does not allow them to openly talk about it, which results in not partici-pating in the city's public life. Through the studio, they meet those people with whom they can share their struggles and become friends. Their open connections become constrained to those people, which might leave them living in a social bubble. Furthermore, they are not just spending their time with them, but they are also supporting each other in problematic affairs concerning their work or studio. They work as a safety and support network and primary social relations for them.

ANOTHER CONSEQUENCE OF BEING A WEBCAM MODEL IS THAT YOUR SOCIAL LIFE BECOMES NOTHING; YOU HAVE NO SOCIAL LIFE. WHEN YOU ARE A WEBCAM MODEL, YOUR FRIENDS BECOME THE PEOPLE YOU WORK WITH BECAUSE YOU SHARE THE SAME EXPERIEN-CES WITH THEM. (Webcam Model 1, 2020)

4.2.4 WORK CONDITIONS

Economic objectives

My participants' reasons for starting Webcamming were all connected to one thing – quick and possibly large monetary returns. The virtual sex work industry is growing rapidly, easy and fast access to work combined with immensely high gains compared to low-wage jobs makes this job attractive for anyone who needs money fast and is open to trying this type of work.

WHILE I WAS WORKING I EARNED SO MUCH MONEY THAT I BECAME INDEPENDENT, I COULD ALREADY PAY RENT, I BOUGHT A COMPUTER, I WAS VERY HAPPY WITH EVERYTHING I WAS DOING. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)

The digital currency which many virtual sex workers accrue is worth more than the curren-cies of Colombia and Venezuela. These "tokens" are used to pay for services and shows on the platforms that they use. Users may pay a total fee for a private session or be charged per minute by the model. This currency is charged directly from the users' credit cards. One token is equivalent to 0.05 USD. If a Webcam model earns 10,000 tokens, this equals 500 USD (Rptv Noticias, 2017). Moreover, taking into account that the devaluation of the Colombian currency makes earning in dollars even more beneficial. However, the users pay more for each token and the model only earns part of it since the websites take their large percentage.

Those who leave large tips often provide a large part of the income of a Webcam model. One participant explains the mechanism as follows:

WITH 6 TOKENS, I WOULD SEND A PRIVATE MESSAGE, BUT I IGNORE WHAT THEY SAY IN THE PUBLIC CHAT; 10 TOKENS AND I STAND UP BECAUSE I AM SITTING ALL THE TIME. USUALLY, YOU HAVE GADGETS, A DILDO OR A VIBRATOR, THEN 500 TOKENS AND YOU TO THIS. FOR 1,000 TOKENS I GAVE MY WHATSAPP, BUT I HAD A DIFFERENT ONE FOR THAT. THEN SEVERAL TIMES THEY BOUGHT IT AND I HAD TO BE IN CONTACT. I HAD ANOTHER INSTAGRAM, WHICH I GAVE FOR 600 TOKENS. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)

They are paid either directly by the platform they use or by their studio after subtracting their percentage fee. However, some models may also be paid by international bank transfer through platforms such as Western Union. The models' experiences vary strongly. Most reported initial earnings of around 100,000 COP (25 Euros) in a day, increasing after some months to between 100 to 300 Euros a day. Others reported maximum earnings of 4,000,000 COP per month, around 900 Euros. Their pay is dependent on luck; however, the limits and willingness of the model to perform tasks requested by their audience is also a key factor. However, even if a model earns the "minimum" 100,000 COP per day and works a six-day workweek, they are still earning far in excess of the monthly minimum pay in Colombia — 877,802 Colombian pesos (194.77 EUR) (Ministerio de Trabajo, 2019).

I MADE A LOT OF MONEY; AT FIRST, I MADE ABOUT 100,000 COP A DAY, BUT THEN I MADE 1,000 EUROS A DAY WHEN I STOPPED. (Webcam Model 2, 2020)

As with the Rappitenderos, almost all sent money home to their families in Venezuela. However, an important aspect that I will explain further concerns their families' view of their chosen profession. If a model sends too much money, the family would probably suspect something. Participants reported that they would send their families 500.000 COP weekly, or more if their earnings allowed it.

I EARNED 30,000 COP EVERY DAY AT MY JOB IN A PARKING LOT. AND EVERYTHING I DID AT NIGHT AS A WEBCAM MODEL I SENT TO MY MOTHER AND MY WIFE. I MADE 400,000 COP A WEEK OR MORE, 400,000 COP OR 650,000 COP, DEPENDING ON HOW MANY CLIENTS I HAD. (Webcam Model 5, 2020)

These kinds of earnings can facilitate more than subsistence. For many, the earnings accrued through Webcam modeling facilitated international relocation. Therefore, the chances that a model can get out of poverty in this line of work are bigger than for many other informal jobs.

Form of work

Below I shall now focus on the model's actual forms of work on the platforms they perform. There are thousands of Webcam platforms in the world, each with specific rules and conditions. However, all feature public and private chatrooms. In the most recognized sites, a public chatroom facilitates a large number of users, allowing the model to interact and receive tips from several users simultaneously. A private chat room allows interaction with

a single user, and for each minute of transmission is charged a certain number of tokens.

Within a public chatroom, everyone who visits the homepage can see a picture in real-time of what the model is doing. As many Webcam models around the world are connected at any point in time, they have to attract attention to gain an audience. The pages prioritize more known and successful models as they show up on the front page, thereby receiving more viewers. The longer a model is connected, the further in front they advance towards the first page. Sometimes, the algorithm runs to the benefit of lesser-known models showing, generating many viewers for them. However, in private chats, the client is paying for alone time with the model who does "whatever the user wants". Every model can decide what they want to do or show in the public chat compared to private chats, as each person has a different perception of intimacy. However, the contrast is strong, from a public chatroom where a handful to several hundred or thousands of people can watch to the privacy of an online chat with one other person. This "private space" does not offer the theoretical protections of privacy, but instead imposes the opposite, as the model usually has to perform more extreme acts in private chatrooms. This also connects to the separation of private and reproductive space I made in chapter 3.1.2, and Murillo (1996) who argues that the private space in the home is not solely private but rather connected to the productive labor they have to perform. The model is working in their seemingly private space, performing highly emotional and physical reproductive labor. On the other side, for the client, the private interaction with the models can make them feel "special" as they pay for each minute, specifically that "private" feeling is why they often choose that type of service.

FOR EXAMPLE, IN PUBLIC, I TALKED AND LAUGHED, BUT I WAS NEVER NAKED, AND IN PRIVATE, I UNDRESSED AND DID WHAT I WAS TOLD. (Webcam Model 1, 2020)

A critical aspect of virtual public/private separation is established by models', studios' and platforms' policies regarding displaying content involving nudity. Many models seem to have different rules regarding nudity, depending upon whether they are performing in a public or private chatroom. Within the sphere of public chatrooms, there is a substantial stigma surrounding nudity. Some models think that nudity should not be present in public chats, as if many are doing so, those who do not will find it more challenging to build an audience. Studios may also impose certain standards, saying that models should not undress in public and should "not give it away for free". However, there may be studios that propose the opposite to stimulate faster growth in initial views. Some platforms furthermore may impose their own rules and only allow nudity in private chats.

I WAS WRITING, TALKING, MAKING JOKES, TALKING ABOUT MUSIC; YOU HAD TO KNOW HOW TO DO IT. BUT WHAT HELPED ME MOST WAS THAT I LIKED WRITING, I SPENT ALL MY TIME TALKING AND LISTENING TO MUSIC, IT WAS NICE FOR A WHILE. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)

Many mention the importance of talking in their performances, whether blindly speaking into the camera about whatever comes to mind, reacting to comments in the public chat, or talking directly to clients in a private chat. In private chatrooms, the user can activate their camera and microphone, allowing direct vocal communication. As in most chatrooms, English is the favored language of communication, models who can talk in English can more easily and quickly establish communication with their audience relationships. Those who cannot but work in a studio are often dependent on their monitor for help. Some mentioned that they actively aimed to practice their English while working as a Model.

This resulted in increased language skills and provided an essential asset for their life after modeling.

MANY PEOPLE HAVE TO WORK A LOT BUT I THINK IT
HELPED THAT I SPOKE ENGLISH.
(Webcam Model 2, 2020)

Character

Many of the Webcam models mentioned that they are playing a character when online. Inspirations for this character may be drawn from range from specific styles that the model already likes, a specific niche to serve certain audience fetishes or pure naturalism. That also plays into the aforementioned stereotypes and the decision to serve them or distinguish one from them. As one model mentioned to only speak in English and not saying where she is from, to not have to hear comments about certain prejudices.

IN GENERAL, YOU SEE LATINAS ALWAYS DOING THE SAME THING,
LISTENING TO REGGAETON, AND THAT WORKS FOR SOME BECAUSE
YOU KNOW THAT THERE IS THIS FETISH WITH LATINAS IN THE WEST
AND NORTH AMERICA. SOMETIMES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO DISTIN-
GUISH IF THERE ARE MANY DOING THE SAME THING, SO IT WORKED
FOR ME NOT TO SPEAK SPANISH, AND MY ENGLISH CAN BE FROM ANY
LATIN COUNTRY. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)

On sites such as Chaturbate, Webcam models can personalize their homepage with information about them, tipping prices for specific actions, and limitations regarding actions they are willing to perform. Those pages can be designed in line with the model's style. If the model works in a studio, the studio will typically create one for them, including their pricing and limits. Those prices generally refer to the "show" a model will do, as seen in figure x. It sometimes also contains their weekly schedule and rules of their "room", to avoid reoccurring questions and unwanted audience behavior. In the pages of different models, prices and rules vary enormously. However, many do not have a page and communicate only by writing in the chat and talking in their videos.

Many models work at different pages at the same time, usually around three to five. That comes along with additional difficulties, as models have to manage multiple public chat rooms at once. However, the chances of finding someone who wants to go to a private chat with them is higher. They try not to respond to specific questions from one platform so that users from their other platforms will not notice. When they decide to go private with a client, they usually pause their broadcast with the other pages.

Models, either individually or with the input of their studio monitor or producer, may plan specific shows in advance. Some feel the intense drive to stand out in any way possible. The owner/producer/moderator I talked to aimed to direct attention to this form of performance planning, with the intention of producing a sellable image capable of generating sufficient income. He saw himself as the producer of a show and accrued a sense of self-importance by intervening in developing a session. This involved telling the girls that they had to dance and provide guidance on what they should say and how they should act. However, due to the nudity limitations of the platforms the studio broadcasted on, this guidance did not involve pressuring the models to undress.

THE FUNCTION I PERFORM IS HOW THE PRODUCTION OF THE SHOW.
EXPLAIN TO THEM HOW IT WORKS, WHAT THEY HAVE TO DO, HOW
THEY HAVE TO TALK, THAT THEY HAVE TO DANCE. IT'S LIKE SELLING
A FANTASY. (Webcam Model 4, 2020)

Nevertheless, many models, even working in studios, insist on their free choice to decide what to do during a show. They affirm their choice lies in their own hands regarding what they will do, and that their judgment of an audience's reception is the most informed. This shows the differing influence of monitors in various studios. One participant said that she started working in a studio but noticed quickly that its atmosphere and expectations were not to her tastes, so she went to another studio.

EVERYTHING IS RELATIVE IN THAT JOB, I THINK IT IS A BIT OF LUCK,
YOU DO WHAT YOU WANT, YOU DO NOT DO WHAT YOU DO NOT WANT
TO DO. IF YOU WANT TO BE A MODEL, YOU CREATE A SCENE, YOU ARE
THE ACTRESS IN THE MOVIE, AND YOU DECIDE HOW YOUR SHOW IS
GOING TO BE(Webcam Model 1, 2020)

One male interviewee, who was not working in those typical Webcam platforms, had a different approach. He would exchange (sometimes daily) messages with women from Colombia, Mexico, and Argentina. His main work was the exchange of pictures and videos and regular video calls with explicit erotic content. This type of exchange was even more personal, as he almost only had regular clients.

Personal limits

The limits of the models strongly determine their form of work. These limits are formed by their comfort and may change over time. Apart from their own preferences, the platform's rules and the studio can permit or prohibit specific actions. As mentioned, everyone decides for themselves; typical requests include masturbation, with or without toys, posing in specific erotic positions, dancing, or showing certain parts of their body. Additional requests, including BDSM and anal play, actions geared towards foot fetishes, and role-play (amongst others) may also be requested. However, I will not discuss these latter examples in further detail.

YOU DO NOT HAVE TO DO ANYTHING YOU DO NOT WANT TO; IT IS
KIND OF FREE. THERE IS A RULE IN ALL THE STUDIOS, AND THAT IS
THAT YOU DO NOT DO DIRTY SHOWS, NEVER. THEY ASK FOR THEM A
LOT, BUT YOU ARE NOT ALLOWED TO DO THEM (Webcam Model 3, 2020)

However, many also talked about vulgar or "dirty" requests, which models can earn a great deal by following. Many models decided not to do them in the first place, while some studios prohibit them. Other models and studious had different limits and were more open to such interactions. These reported requests included defecation, urination, period bleeding, and vomiting.

I ONCE HAD AN ITALIAN CLIENT WHO PAID ME 100 US$ TO WATCH HIM
WHILE HE WAS TAKING A SHIT AND THEN ATE HIS OWN SHIT.
(Webcam Model 1, 2020)

Usually, webcam models work alone while broadcasting. Nonetheless, couples or other

groups may broadcast together as well. Working in a studio, a model will probably have the chance to perform a show with another model. This usually is not forced but rather is seen as a chance to gain more traffic. Other studios focus on bigger groups, filming together, however, it seems to serve a different audience as such shows resemble more classical porn (even though it is in a live, controllable setting) than the supposedly private setting with a single model.

Security issues and connecting with clients

To start this section off, I want to mention potential security problems which a model might perceive. If they feel unsafe or with a client, they can block them in public or private chats. As the tokens in a private chat are paid by the minute, they still get paid until they block the user. Many also fear the theft of their videos and pictures. Participants responded that they felt as if their broadcasting was real life, only accessible to their single audience member. However, thousands of bots (fake user accounts) continuously record videos and sell them to porn sites. There are even specific pornography homepages that specialize in the black market of stolen Webcam videos (Camvideo.me, 2020). This cannot be controlled, and all models may be exposed to this type of content theft. Still, some studios claim that they can protect models from this manner of content theft, which is patently untrue. Even more, there are reports where even studios sell their models videos without the consent of them (Sales, 2020). That again shows the unsymmetrical information regarding many factors that concern the models, and some studios using their power to exploit the models.

Furthermore, there is a general view amongst those in the industry that no model should give out any personal information for security reasons. In some studios, they also have that rule. However, this can sometimes go as far as forbidding models from giving out their name on other social media or platforms, as studious fear that models may make money outside the studio's financial framework.

Nonetheless, many Webcam models use these platforms to perform clandestine shows and start gaining money through other means. After working in it for some time, they can get regular clients who may try to get more "personal" information and pay them more, or pay them directly through bank transactions or gifts. On the one hand, the model's goal is to gain money from those relations. This may lead them to sell their account information for Whatsapp, Instagram, or Skype so that the client can contact them directly. On the other hand, some models themselves start to connect with some users as friends or romantic partners.

Often clients did not come for erotic performances, but more for the company. This leads models to try to make their clients feel like they have someone to talk to. That is an essential part of their work, and besides their highly physical labor, they have to perform emotional labor to build a bond with their clients. Sometimes they chat with the same people every day over months, so naturally, they both can feel emotionally attached at some point. However, when there is no clear separation between the Webcam model and their clients regarding the definition of their relationship, many clients attach themselves heavily. The models told me stories about clients threatening to kill themselves if the model did not connect with them and others who began to speak to the model as if they were a couple, progressively building them into their life.

THIS CONNECTION CAN BE DEVELOPED BUT NOT WITH ME, MANY PEOPLE WANT YOU TO TRAVEL OR MEET YOU, BUT THAT HAS ALWAYS SEEMED VERY INSECURE TO ME. (Webcam Model 3, 2020)

That connection can be based on the transaction of money or presents and just be platonic, or even more, a real emotional bond is formed. Some Webcam models are actively permitting that; however, others are open to such relationships. It can lead that far that they come to visit the model and get to meet in person. To define the line between defining this as continuous sex work or meeting someone and starting a relationship depends on each person's perspective.

ONE DAY I WAS WORKING, AND I MADE A LOT OF MONEY, I MADE 1000 EUROS IN ONE DAY, THEN THIS MAN FELL IN LOVE WITH ME. SO, WELL, IT ALL STARTED AS A GAME, HE BOUGHT ME A PHONE, THEN ALL THE CLOTHES YOU CAN IMAGINE, AND ONE DAY A FRIEND TOLD ME I SHOULD USE ALL THAT MONEY FOR TRAVELING. THIS MAN GAVE ME 14000 EUROS IN TOTAL. (Webcam Model 2, 2020)

By observing these various phenomena, a slow change of models' self-perceptions and an attendant shift in their definition of limits can be found. When starting to work as Webcam models, many feel like it is something they never thought that they would do. They then set themselves limits for which sexual acts they would perform, but they also considered the possibility that they may surpass this limit. The same relaxation process may, but does not have to, occur regarding models' limits concerning verbal communication with their clients. Some might have never thought of talking to clients outside of their work but still, enjoy it and may feel as though they need it after some time. The perception of their body and their comfort zone can change due to the experiences they have. For example, the male participant who was working independently also provided the possibility for physical sex work with some of his clients, if the distance allowed it. After working as a Webcam model, one woman also started to escort, engaging in many physical, sexual relations. The line is not that strong between the two forms of work in many cases. However, there is no strong trend suggesting that one leads to the other. Instead, physical/virtual and physical/emotional connections all belong to the same field of services provided for potential customers in sex work.

4.2.5 CHALLENGES OF A WEBCAM MODEL

Discrimination

I now will examine the study participants' experiences with discrimination due to their being Venezuelan and/or working in virtual sex work. Similar to the experience of the Rappitenderos, the perceptions of xenophobia are divers. Some felt as if they did not experience much discrimination due to them adapting to the Colombian accent. Some tried to ignore it, and others experienced it but tried not to let it affect them. Participants also highlighted stereotypes of Venezuelans engaging in theft and viewed their work as superior to this mode of criminal subsistence.

WE ARE ALL BROKEN, BUT I WOULD RATHER DO PORNOGRAPHY THAN STEAL, OR DO ANYTHING ELSE BUT STEAL. (Webcam Model 5, 2020)

Amongst others, Venezuelan women in Colombia are often confronted with the prejudice that many migrated and then became prostitutes (Rojas López and Castro Carpintero, 2020, p. 101 f.). This prejudice also informs the view which many have of Venezuelans who work as Webcam models. This prejudice was reported as both coming from clients and third parties not involved in their work.

This leads to another topic: Webcam models often do not tell their family or friends about their job. There is a joint silent agreement that most performers say that they work in a call center.

THE USUAL THING THAT A WEBCAM MODEL TELLS HER PARENTS IS THAT SHE IS WORKING IN A CALL CENTER.
(Webcam Model 1, 2020)

However, most never tell their close family, only a few reporting that they told some family members after some time. Usually, the parents do not know; models feel that telling them would only complicate the situation. One person who was married told their wife, however, still, she convinced him to stop working. Yet, models are even more afraid that some social circles, like university colleagues or new friends, would find out. They would generally tell their close friends, but mostly only people, if they think they are open-minded enough. For example, one girl who moved to another country did not tell her new boyfriend that she worked as a Webcam model before, and he is also why she thinks that she cannot start working again.

BUT IN THE END, I TOLD MYSELF THAT I DID NOT HAVE TO BE ASHAMED OF WHO I AM, I AM A WEBCAM MODEL, AND I DID NOT CARE AT ALL, IF I WAS ACCEPTED OR DISCRIMINATED AGAINST, I DO NOT CARE. (Webcam Model 2, 2020)

Many experience a delicate divide between not feeling shame and wanting to be open about it and social stigma about sex work. They see the power relations and misogynist structures in their work; however, they experience their day to day as another type of work. Still, they wish to shield themselves from comments, prejudices and differential treatment.

PEOPLE GET USED TO THAT TYPE OF WORK, NO MATTER HOW UGLY IT SEEMS TO OTHERS; BUT IT IS A WAY OF SURVIVING, AND EVERYONE CHOOSES THE FORM THAT SUITS THEM BEST.
(Webcam Model 3, 2020)

Emotional stress

IT WAS NOT EASY AT FIRST, AT FIRST I WAS CRYING, IT WAS A SHOCK AS IF AGAINST MY MORALS BECAUSE THAT IS NOT WHAT I WAS SUPPO-SED TO BE DOING; I WAS DEPRESSED ALL DAY, AND WHEN I GOT ON CAMERA IT WAS LIKE: "HI EVERYBODY, IT IS ME". (Webcam Model 2, 2020)

Starting off, many work as a Webcam model for several months and leave after having earned enough money. This step can be big, however it is normally not connected with any specific problem. However, it seems as if they easily come back to working as a Webbcam some point later in their life. Nevertheless, the emotional and physical stress they experience can make their career incredibly demanding. They have to put on a happy face, even if

they do not feel like it, and carry the constant burden of working in a hidden branch of work.

On one side, one might imagine that working in a plush setting with sexual pleasure would be ideal. However, many models feel physically exhausted after a day of work for several reasons. For example, they have to be in an upright position, look good on camera, constantly write on the keyboard, and be half naked in Bogotá's cold weather. Certain practices, such as BDSM for example, involve physical pain, and defining limits can be challenging. Working long shifts without sleep can push them into exhaustion.

BECAUSE YOU ARE GETTING SO EXHAUSTED FROM THAT WORK, DO YOU KNOW WHAT IT IS LIKE TO HAVE TEN ORGASMS IN SIX HOURS?
(Webcam Model 1, 2020)

Emotional labor requires a great deal of mental strength. In those chatrooms, users who show abusive behavior can be blocked; nevertheless, daily exposure to probable vulgar and insulting commentaries from users and pushing their bodily limits can affect the models long term. They might use drugs as a coping mechanism or try to block out their experiences. To work in a job where physical and emotional practices display success, directly translating to economic gain, is a challenging intrinsic motivation. The pressure can be deeply exhausting and cause substantial stress.

I WAS ALREADY TIRED OF THAT, I FELL INTO DRUGS BECAUSE I WAS IN THAT WEBCAM MODELING THING, I WAS GETTING HIGH EVERY DAY BECAUSE I DID NOT FEEL GOOD, I FELT THAT I NEEDED ENERGY AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO BE WITH SUCH DEPRESSIVE PEOPLE.
(Webcam Model 1, 2020)

Another model said she could not cope with the pressure of "selling" her body because it was not truly in line with her principles. She finally got depression and stopped working in front of the camera. Also, models reported that they feel the pressure to perform often and consistently. This involves self-discipline and the performance of hard work, both in the sense of physical actions and emotional intensity.

In academic literature, opinions about sex work and its connection with sexual exploitation are deeply divided. One the one hand, some say that prostitution can never be wholly voluntary and always, no matter if the sex work is done voluntary or involuntary, demonstrates an expression of oppression against women. On the other hand, voices coming from sex positive academics stand up for women's right to choose freely whether they want to do sex work (Gerassi, 2015, p. 2). The vulnerability of women with less (economic, social or cultural) capital is seen as critical, as their choice to do sex work often is influenced by not having any other option and having to survive in an oppressive system that does not provide similar opportunities to all people (Gerassi, 2015, p. 5).

Work in times of the pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic affected both virtual sex workers and the Rappitenderos. First of all, some models experienced a rise in users, as well as new models taking up the job. Nevertheless, at the same time, they felt that widespread unemployment resulted in a decreasing willingness to pay on the part of their clients.

THERE ARE MANY USERS WHO BECAME UNEMPLOYED OR ARE NO

PAID THE SAME AMOUNT, BELIEVE IT OR NOT IT IS EVEN AFFECT-
ED IN THAT; THEY CAN HAVE A LOT OF TIME BUT AND THE MONEY.
(Webcam Model 4, 2020)

Due to this extraordinary global situation, the demand for webcam services has increased by 30% and accentuated another type of interaction that goes beyond the sexual sphere to focus on the emotional. In addition to nudity and eroticism, models comment that in their sessions, they listen to their users who tell them aspects of their personal lives, ask them about different topics, or simply enjoy the company. "The work time remains the same, but the routine has changed: now one of their sessions includes physical exercises, diet recommendations and economic advice." (translated from Spanish, Pulzo, 2020)

Many in Colombia had the problem of not being allowed to work in a studio due to strict quarantine regulations for several months. Therefore many, due to the pandemic, started to live in their studios or work from home. El Tiempo describes it as follows:

> *...the confinement by the COVID-19 has triggered this business and today, in Medellin as well as in Cali and Bogota, there are studios where the models went to live to take advantage of this sort of 'rise' in demand, and to work in optimal conditions of a studio, the greatest number of hours possible. The studios are adequate houses with several rooms for the models to work in shifts of six to seven hours, approximately. (translated from Spanish, El Tiempo, 2020)*

Go home, stay or move on?

Some feel as if they are integrated in Colombia and want to stay here for a longer time. However, finding Colombian friends is relatively hard. Still, for this group, it seemed easier than for the Rappitenderos.

MANY FIND THEIR PLACE OF COMFORT, THEY HAVE WHAT THEY
NEED TO LIVE THEIR DAY TO DAY, WE ARE NOT SO BAD; WHAT IS
DIFFICULT FOR ALL OF US IS TO GET USED TO THE FACT THAT WE
ARE NOT FROM THIS COUNTRY, TO GET USED TO NEW CULTURES, TO
NEW PEOPLE, MANY OF US GET USED TO DISCRIMINATIONS, TO BE
WELL RECEIVED, EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON MANY THINGS. SOME
OF US BECOME VERY LONELY, SOME OF US HAVE MANY FRIENDS,
BUT THERE ARE VERY FEW OF MY FRIENDS WHO CAN TELL YOU THAT
THEY HAVE A GROUP OF FRIENDS. IT DOESN'T HAPPEN, IT IS ALWAYS
THE VENEZUELANS WHO JOIN OR LEAVE WITH THEIR FAMILY AND
BUILD THEIR SMALL COMMUNITY AND GET ATTACHED TO CERTAIN
THINGS. BUT YES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO GET FRIENDS,
TO GET ATTACHED, IT IS SUPER COMPLICATED AND I THINK THAT
THE BIGGEST POINT IS THAT WE FEEL SUPER LONELY WHEN WE ARE
OUTSIDE, IT IS A LOT OF LONELINESS, MANY THINGS THAT CHANGE
AND IT HITS A LOT. (Webcam Model 2, 2020)

Not one of the interviewees thought of going back to Venezuela and did not believe that the situation could change anytime soon. However, through high earnings, many can afford to move to another country in the world eventually. Two of the interviewees already lived in Europe at the time of the interview and did not work in Webcam modeling anymore. One person went to obtain an education and started working as a waitress, and the other started

a youtube channel. The remaining participants stayed in Bogotá, but only one person was currently still working in a studio. None, apart from the Studio owner, thought that this work offered a long term solution.

The description of Venezuelan Webcam models' daily life and struggles, working in Bogotá, was built to give an insight into an underrepresented form of work. This type of service labor is, from their workers' perspective, a quick and short term way out of a precarious situation. However, many stress the critical conditions and questionable ideology of entrepreneurs working in this, as well as the dangerous effects it can have on the people capitalizing their own bodies.

ANALYSIS INTER-PRETATION

5

5 ANALYSIS INTERPRETATION

5.1 EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC LIFE

The everyday practices, performed by the participant's work in digital platforms, indicates their exposure to discrimination and contested space. To understand this relation, I will differentiate between different forms of visibility in public space. Rappitendero's work is mainly executed outside in the cities' public spaces and roads, making them highly noticeable for its population. Their identity as Rappitendero is, by the media and the broad population in Bogotá, often directly connected to them being Venezuelan. However, since all Rappitenderos are subjected to a regular status with the PEP, they feel enabled to certain rights and securities. Therefore, they can be more easily included in the city's population and were willing to plan their future in Bogotá.

The visibility of Webcam models in public space is often confined to the virtual public space. Most Webcam models do not have any specific connection to urban public space, are mostly inside while working, can do so from home or in a seemingly private space (their office). The space of their studios becomes their everyday surrounding. Their public space seems to be online; they are not opening up to the public nearby but to a public far away. Therefore, their participation in public life is directed to the foreign as many strive to leave to another country. Most Webcam models only talk about their work selectively; however, it seems that there is a general awareness that this type of job exists. Still, there is some secretive talk when assuming that a building might be used as a Webcam studio.

Both groups report experiences of xenophobia from Colombians, not least because many people have the perception that those are typical jobs for Venezuelan migrants. However, their experiences differ due to their visibility, on the one hand, in terms of public space and, on the other hand, due to the participant's openness or seclusion about their job. Since Webcam models usually do not disclose the type of work to other people, they might not experience discrimination regarding their job. However, this leads to secretive handling of the topic and enlarges its stigma, which actually does indicate signs of discrimination.

Rappitenderos are basically permanently visible as they often find themselves alone or in groups taking up space in parks, in front of stores and restaurants and the streets. All cyclists carry a big orange backpack with the company's logo, causing them to stand out in all parts of the city's urban space. The Rappitenderos participants all reported to feel comfortable in their work in Bogotá and have good knowledge about the public spaces and directions. Still, their appropriation in public space is contested, as Rappitenderos are often marginalized for their sole presence. Even public policies are oriented towards the regulation of spaces they should use (4.1.3). It is no surprise that the necessity to be outside in public space reinforces the straightforward generalization of Venezuelan migrants working in jobs such as Rappi. Therefore, they experience different forms of xenophobia directed against Rappitenderos, but indirectly at Venezuelans. This can be connected to the struggles regarding the right to the city and who is "allowed" to appropriate it, resulting in a game of power between new and long-term residents of a city, as explained by Smith and Guarniz (2.1.2).

Both their presence in physical public space and virtual public space are putting them in security risks. Some of the Rappitenderos report to be afraid of discrimination or robbing outside at night because they carry a phone and probably a lot of cash (4.1.5). For most Webcam models, physical sex work in public space would not have been an option; howe-ver, also in virtual public spaces, they can face security risks such as identity theft and virtual abuse (4.2.5).

All those indices also point to the conceptual separation of the public and the private space, as explained in chapter 3.1.2. Looking at the gender aspects, the Webcam models are typically women and, at the same time, in Rappi work by far more men. Connecting this with the presence in public and private urban space, the spheres' classical historic gender separation comes through. Also, the mentioned visibility or secretiveness is connected to that and describes the possibilities and limitations of participating in urban public life.

As outlined by Lefebvre and Bayat (2.1.2), everyday practices in urban public space can be seen as a form of participation, or even protest. However, it seems that this high visibility of migrants working in public space comes with stigma and discrimination. Simultaneously, Webcam models whose work is not visible in physical public space may not be victims of direct discrimination, but this is also connected to their general exclusion from local public life. Therefore, it seems that a net of complex factors that either enable or permit Venezuelan migrants to participate in public life is coming into play. The enhanced fear of discrimination that comes with visibility goes hand in hand with the urge to blend into the Colombian population. However, they exercise their daily practices, necessary for their survival, and take up space that impacts the urban landscape in its own form.

> *THERE HAVE BEEN PEOPLE WHO SOMETIMES SAY: "THE VENEZUE-LANS, THE RAPPITENDEROS", SO SOMETIMES THEY TRY TO GENERA-LIZE. BUT JUST AS THERE ARE GOOD PEOPLE, THERE ARE BAD PEOPLE, REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY. THEREFORE, THERE ALSO HAVE BEEN RAPPITENDEROS WHO BEHAVED BADLY. HOWEVER, SOMETIMES NOT AT ALL AND THEN PEOPLE TEND TO GENERALIZE SITUATIONS OR GROUPS. (Rappitendero 7, 2020)*

5.2 VIRTUAL PLATFORMS AS A FORM OF PHYSICAL OR EMOTIONAL CONNECTION

Delivery services and Webcam platforms are two examples of digital platforms within an emerging economy. Both can be categorized as part of the gig-economy or peer-to-peer platforms (3.2.1). It is characterized by the performance of a "gig" in the form of a virtual Webcam show or delivery. Both also focus on the connection of individual people in exchanging a service for money via the platform. Those platforms enable them to provide the labor of care in public, semi-public, or private spaces. The separation is not that clear as many Webcam studios are constructed to make the user believe the model is working from home. Moreover, in regard to the work of Rappitenderos, it can be argued that, although they mostly move in public space, they bring goods from semi-public spaces, such as restaurants and stores, to private spaces. Both operate in border zones (3.2.1) that lie in-between or transcend the binary.

In reproductive labor, the main focus lies on the support and care of other people (3.1.1). Within the case studies, two scales of dependence on other people's needs can be identified. Those two jobs do not target people of their household, at one specific workplace or of a particular group, but rather many different people and their different realities. On the one hand, there are Rappitenderos who plan their day depending on the daily structures and consumption patterns of people in the city they live in. Therefore they mostly have to work

around noon and in the evening for food deliveries and at night and on the weekends for alcohol deliveries. The practices of everyday life of those consumers determine the conditions and times of work for the delivery service workers, which emphasizes the small scale dependence in this work form. Additionally, it connects people in the same city and builds on the physical exchange facilitated by a digital platform.

The service of a Webcam model is mainly provided to people in places far away. Depending on the preferred geographical group (continents), a model chooses their work time. This can differ due to the expected clients' cultural and economic differences, and to the time, they are usually free to communicate with the model. Therefore, the Webcam model's work routines are also influenced by other people's daily life structures, however, on a larger scale due to the geographic and consequent social dimensions offering services to clients of different continents.

Further, another characteristic of care labor that defines both cases is the execution of physical labor. Rappitenderos ride their bike all day to deliver the orders, and Webcam models cannot do without their own body either. In both cases, the worker experiences exhaustion after a day of work. Nevertheless, their physical and bodily experiences differ strongly. For Webcam models, this physical labor can not only change the perception of their body but also affect them emotionally. Therefore, their work is strongly linked to emotional labor, as described in 4.2.5. This is due to the fact that their work usually also demands a form of emotional connection with clients, which can cause mental stress and disorders.

Referring to the importance of virtual space compared to encounters in physical space (3.2.2), the cases show that the Webcam models produce shows that can be seen as virtual consumer goods for emotional purposes. The service does not contain physical products being exchanged but rather thoughts, concepts, time and money. However, their videos and messages materialize in virtual space, making their encounters memorable and vulnerable to abuse. Rappitenderos, on the other hand, are offering their resources (phone, bike and time) to help people receive goods they need to receive physically. Their connection to the virtual platform is enabling those physical encounters with other people.

I wanted to show in this section the strong entanglement of interactions in the virtual and physical space. Digital platforms can function as an intermediate of diverse connections, be them emotional or material. They can catapult the labor of care to an international level and facilitate functions that cannot be served by traditional formal work.

WHEN YOU ARE A WEBCAM MODEL, YOU ARE VERY CLOSED TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD; YOU LITERALLY CREATE A BUBBLE THAT TO GET OUT OF THERE IS VERY COMPLICATED. YOU ARE MUCH IN THE HOUSE IN YOUR ROOM. YOU GET USED TO THAT THESE PEOPLE ARE IN A COMPUTER AND THEN COMES THE POINT WHERE THIS PERSON IS NOT A PERSON, AND EVERYTHING IS VERY CONFUSING, YOU NEED TO TALK TO A REAL PERSON, THAT IS ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT MOST AFFECTED ME.. (Webcam Model 2, 2020)

5.3 INFORMAL WORK, LABOR EXPLOITATION OR IN BETWEEN?

As shown in the case studies, both types of work show formality and informality simultaneously. I cannot stress enough the risk for Venezuelan migrants to be subjected to unfair labor conditions regarding earnings, non-transparent information about pricing mechanisms, unclear conditions of insurance, and emotional pressure, as explained in detail throughout the case studies' description. First, Rappitenderos, as supposedly independent workers or another type of user of the platform (4.1.1), show evident characteristics of traditional employees. Not wanting to notice this and therefore categorizing their work independently in the formal sector just does put people with the need of protection in an even more vulnerable position. Yet still, this type of work is not entirely informal. Second and for the case of Webcam models, studios subletting their rooms to the workers officially have to pay taxes and insurance for their employees. Nevertheless, most studios simply do not do so, which leaves their models working in informal conditions. As mentioned above (3.1.3), one must consider that around 50% of work in Colombia is performed informally. Furthermore, classifying them as independent workers implies that they would have to pay their insurances themselves, which is difficult to do for someone hardly earning enough to survive. Also, incentives to pay into a non-sufficient insurance system seem non-existent for someone who probably will not work many years in formal employment because their educational level and general work possibilities in the country do not allow them to.

Regarding the factors described in chapter 3.1.2, informal employment can be defined statistically, but I hereby want to point out again the importance of looking at the in-between, the grey zone. Not everything can be classified as one or the other or even be a hybrid form of work. The most crucial part of this is not eliminating certain vulnerability factors, which come with informality, when presenting a work type as formal. There have been approaches of the government to obligate Webcam studios to pay taxes. However, not classifying Rappitenderos as employees of the company with certain rights are visible unjust policies. This is exacerbated by the fact that the platform economy is a relatively new discourse of work which still lacks the necessary (international) legal framework, allowing these companies to take advantage of existing loopholes. The government is said to be focused more on the state's possible economic gains at the expense of the social security of the people working in precarious situations.

Looking more deeply into exploitation not only in labor but also in platform labor, the case study analysis indicates mechanisms of these platforms designed to generate unequal outcomes for the worker. Through the immunity of platforms in their rights, the diverse forms of control over their workers, and their workforce's fluidity (for example, hindering the incentive for workers to join a workers' union), they intensify already precarious conditions of low-income service workers. "Platform labor remains thoroughly embedded in a world created by the capitalist value form, which hinges on the gendered and racialized subordination of low-income workers, the unemployed, and the unemployable." (van Doorn, 2017, p. 907 f.)

Also, Colombia's general labor situation, a country shaped through decades of armed conflict, is rough. There are high levels of informality, unemployment, and inequality, and a system (at least partly) built on exploitation and corruption is a massive challenge for people living there. Looking at Venezuela and how the crisis evolved, any chance for a decent job to survive, not even mentioning opportunities for upward social mobility, is eradicated

for most of the Venezuelan population. Those who could not migrate to other countries The political and economic situation in Latin American Countries has been deteriorating in the past years, resulting in waves of large protest movements in 2019 and 2020. The people's discontent with their governments led to violent protests in Colombia, resulting in a prolonged national strike (BBC, 2019). All Latin American Countries have experienced a profound loss of their GDP and are expected to lose 9,1% in 2020, catapulting it to levels as low as in 2010. The Latin American population was having different economic difficulties even before the pandemic intensified the negative effects in 2020. Some speak of a "lost decade" to come and the biggest fall in economic activities in 100 years (Barria, 2020).

That being said, both cases show certain structures and signs of labor exploitation of vulnerable migrants looking for income. However, when comparing the work of a Rappitendero to a regular minimum-wage job, and Webcamming to physical sex work, both in terms of economic means and security issues, they show noticeable differences. Colombia's economic situation limits access to the informal and formal labor market for Colombians and Venezuelans, simultaneously but differently. The minimum wage is hardly enabling survival. Therefore, considering that a Rappitendero would usually earn more than that. Further, for Webcam models, their job is a way out of poverty and low-income work. Their usual daily starting income is around the same as the longest and most successful day of a Rappitendero. Putting those two jobs in the context of a crisis-ridden continent and the functioning of capitalist labor platforms, both are representing a way to survive or even transcend economic uncertainties.

OBVIOUSLY, AS A WOMAN, YOU ARE AWARE THAT THIS WORK IS PART
OF A CHAUVINIST SOCIETY. HOWEVER, ONCE INSIDE, YOU FEEL
IT EVEN STRONGER. ALSO, WHEN THEY TREAT YOU KINDLY, YOU
SEE THAT YOU ARE HERE FOR THEIR ENTERTAINMENT, AND ONE
DOES NOT EXIST ONLY TO BE ENTERTAINING. AS A COLOMBIAN, AS
A LATINA, IT IS VERY OFFENSIVE WHEN SOMETIMES AMERICANS
COME IN, AND THEY KNOW THAT YOU ARE FROM COLOMBIA, AND
THEY TALK ABOUT COCA. I EXPEL THEM FROM THE CHAT, AND I
DO NOT CARE IF HE HAS MONEY. IT IS A BAD POINT TO REINFORCE
THE STIGMA THAT LATINAS ARE PROSTITUTES, AND YES, OBVIOUS-
LY, THERE IS A LOT OF PROSTITUTION AND WEBCAM MODELING
STUDIES. HOWEVER, IT IS BECAUSE OF OUR SITUATION; IF WE WERE
A MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRY, PEOPLE WOULD HAVE A LOT MORE
OPTIONS TO WORK. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS NO WORK, THAT IS WHAT
YOU HAVE TO DO, BECAUSE IF NOT YOU WILL NOT HAVE FOOD.
(Webcam Model 3, 2020)

Figure 27: Rappitendero and informal recyclers in Bogotá; own photograph

CONCLUSIONS

6

6

6 CONCLUSIONS

6.1 THEORETICAL REFLECTION

I introduced this research by explaining concepts of migration and its implication for urban areas. I do so by building a theoretical framework to embed the everyday life perspective of Venezuelans in Bogotá, including their experiences before and after arrival. This context made it possible to draw light on certain institutional aspects, such as the PEP, a legal key element for integration in Colombia's labor market for migrants, that significantly shape their situation in the host country and – as shown in this study – the development of urban life in the long run. In particular, the theory outlines the difficulties with access to housing, health care, education, and the labor market underpinned by statistical data outlining the reality of many Venezuelans in Bogotá over the past decade.

As the focus of this thesis lies in Venezuelans' experiences in the job market in particular, which is shown to be accompanied by the rise of digital labor platforms, I followed with outlining theoretical concepts connected to work and space (online and offline). For this, it is necessary to understand the legal interpretation of informal settings within this kind of work and its implications for people of particular vulnerability. The spatial perspective was formed through the division between productive and reproductive work, as well as private and public space. Their boundaries and connections guided this research and provided an essential conceptual understanding for the following interpretation of the analysis. With the necessary explanation of everyday life theories to provoke looking at mundane activities within daily activities, not only in physical but also in virtual space, it allowed a thorough theoretical foundation to conceptualize the two case studies.

6.2 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION

Moving further to the methodological reflection, I am content with the analytical outcome of the investigation I conducted. The triangulation of methods, including narrative semi-structured interviews, observations, ride-alongs, and secondary literature, allowed me to get a thorough understanding of the everyday life context with particular insights to the participants' movement through the city as well as their experiences and perceptions. At the same time, the sensitive subject matter, for example, due to experiences with discrimination, can make it challenging to keep the necessary distance and objectivity as the researcher. Yet still, the level of personal affinity to the research subject helped me gain the trust of the respondents and thus access to crucial in-depth information. For both case studies, the personal connection and close contact with study participants was essential to the continuation of the field research and analysis process, particularly considering the lock-down measures due to the COVID-19 outbreak.

In the analysis of these experiences, work conditions, compliance with payment mechanisms, social security, and other kinds of obligations towards the platform owner are the essential factors to look at. Regarding the research on the experiences of the food deliverers Rappitenderos, these factors are particularly influenced by their daily practices and their work routines and the integrated nexus with the urban landscape. In the case of Webcam models, emotional relations and well-being play a decisive role, along with their work-life separation regarding space and time.

Following this in-depth analysis, I continued with a separate interpretation. I first kept the interpretation and analysis to some extent apart, which was essential for the description of the participants' perspective as individuals. Eventually, in the subsequent chapter, I looked into the two cases' interface in relation to the aforementioned contextual and theoretical background to further conclude my findings.
.

6.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS

The study of everyday practices of people in a vulnerable situation is the focal point of this study. This contemplation of experiences of people who oftentimes do not have a voice in political and academic discourses and thus are less often on the radar of planning becomes even more important considering their increasing presence in urban life, which is demonstrated in this study. This is also why research, which follows a post-disciplinary approach, should be included more in the academic field of urban planning. Within urban studies, a focus on anthropological phenomena comes naturally; however, I believe that this emphasis and in-depth analysis should form the basis for any planning. By focusing on each person's perception, giving each of their daily experience a platform, this thesis is an approach to do so. As Crawford (1999), among others, pointed out: "[…] everyday urbanism demands a radical repositioning of the designer, a shifting of power from the professional expert to the ordinary people" (p. 12).

There has been an increase of more inclusive planning doctrines during the past years and decades. Still, everyday life analysis is persistently relevant due to its power to describe and understand changes and new phenomena in society, with migration trends being one of them. Therefore I argue that one could look at any part of the analysis and find something that can eventually help understand and further plan a better environment for migrants after arrival. These findings can be summarized as follows:

Due to new forms of technology, the rise of digitalization, and their implications for urban space and work, divisions of space experience an expansion of "in-betweens". The socio-spatial planner has to think beyond the common categories of private and public to understand how these types of work function with daily life. This is exemplified by the appropriation of public space by Rappitenderos and the pretense of Webcam models' private workspace in their office settings. These arising stages have consequences for many other aspects of the respondents' life, including their encounter with Bogotáns, their experiences with discrimination, and ultimately shape the execution of their right to the city. Thus, by considering such "in-betweens", the planner receives a more thorough picture as the basis for planning principles that benefit the urban society as a whole.

Further, to enable vulnerable groups to participate in urban life, one must also consider what this participation might look like in reality. As shown in this thesis, respondents from both cases are experiencing stigmatization due to their job. In a society where discrimination and xenophobia are present, participation of newcomers comes with visibility and certain burdens. In order to eliminate those damaging structures, educational work towards an inclusive view on diverse types of life and work has to be achieved. This being said, also employers, including those of new types of work facilitated by digital platforms, have to be held accountable to provide their workers with a safe work environment that supports them

with necessary measures when needed. Finally, politicians and planners should take these realities into consideration as ignoring them carries the risk of contributing to the division of society into rich and poor and privileged and underprivileged.

Lastly, legal frameworks, such as the definition of informality, not only within work but within all aspects that contribute to a decent living standard, have to be reconsidered. In doing so, one has to ask the following questions: What do certain steps towards a formalization mean for the affected population with different living realities, and how can the distinctive needs be included in this endeavor? This study demonstrates with only a few individuals' insights how the informal nature of, for example, work and residence status, carry risks and uncertainty that reinforces their vulnerability. This being said, as more and more people have and will migrate to urban areas in the upcoming decades, many of whom are at a young age, the formalization of institutional aspects and provision of a long-term perspective are of utmost importance for both the individual development as well as the socio-economic thrive of the host society. This again emphasizes the importance of understanding and incorporating everyday experiences of people concerned in order to gain the necessary insights for inclusive planning and policy decision.

Going beyond this research scope, I want to make some recommendations for further research on this topic. First, the mentioned programs' legal framework and policy accuracy could be investigated more in detail, as implications could not be fully incorporated within this study due to the limited scope of a Master thesis. Second, I want to encourage researchers to study people's everyday lives, which not have been the focus of many investigations yet. This is even more apparent with the case of Webcam models who find little consideration in the academic discourse when it comes to in-depth analysis of personal realities. This research has shown that these individuals do not only make up a large part of economic activities but also of social interactions found in between or beyond the limits of time and space. It is our job as researchers to identify these realities and give them a voice.

REFERENCES

ACRIP and Fedesarrollo (2018) 'Editorial: Migración venezolana a Colombia', Informe mensual del Mercado Laboral, (10), pp. 3–10.

Arango Arango, L. M. and Londoño Moreno, D. (2016) Posicionamento legal y reconocimiento social del cibersexo en colombia. Corporación Universitaria Minuto de dios.

Bahar, D., Dooley, M. and Huang, C. (2018) 'Integración de los venezolanos al mercado laboral. Mitigando costos y maximizando beneficios'. Washington D.C.: Bookings Global Economy and Development.

Banco Mundial (2018) 'Migración desde Venezuela a Colombia. impactos y estrategia de respuesta en el corto y mediano plazo.' Washington D.C.: Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento/Banco Mundia.

Bandeira, L. (2019) 'The gig economy is a double-edged sword for migrant workers', BBC News, 2 July. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20190701-the-gig-economy-is-a-double-edged-sword-for-migrant-workers (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Barria, C. (2020) 'Coronavirus en América Latina: los países en que se prevén las mayores caídas económicas este año (y los que serán menos golpeados)', BBC News Mundo, 21 July. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-53438543#:~:text=La economía de Latinoamérica tendrá,un retroceso de diez años (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Bayat, A. (2010) Life As Politics. How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Bays, E. (2019) Exploitation or Empowerment? Women's Experiences in the Cam Modeling Industry. University of Montana.

BBC (2019) 'Ola de protestas en América Latina: ¿puede la amenaza de una nueva "década perdida" explicar lo que ocurre en las calles?', BBC News Mundo, 29 November. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-53438543#:~:text=La economía de Latinoamérica tendrá,un retroceso de diez años (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

BBC (2020) 'Venezuala crisis: How the political situation escalated', BBC News, 13 January. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877 (Accessed: 3 September 2020).

Becerra Elejalde, L. L. (2019) '"Los contratos laborales de Rappi no son ilegales": Ministra de Trabajo', La República, 9 July. Available at: https://www.larepublica.co/economia/los-contratos-laborales-de-rappi-no-son-ilegales-ministra-de-trabajo-2882430 (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Bermúdez, Y. et al. (2018) 'Informe sobre la movilidad humana venezolana. Realidades y perspectivas de quienes emigran'. San Cristóbal: Servicio Jesuita a Refugiado.

Bernal, R. (2009) 'The Informal Labor Market in Colombia. Identification and Characterization', Desarrollo y Sociedad, 63, pp. 145–208.

Bernstein, J. (2019) 'How OnlyFans Changed Sex Work Forever', The New York Times, 9 February. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/09/style/onlyfans-porn-stars.html (Accessed: 1 October 2020).

Blokland, T. et al. (2015) 'Urban Citizenship and Right to the City: The Fragmentation of Claims', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 39(4), pp. 655–665.

BLU Radio (2019) ¿Qué hay detrás del negocio de las modelos 'webcam' en Colombia?, BLU Radio. Available at: https://www.bluradio.com/sociedad/que-hay-detras-del-negocio-de-las-modelos-webcam-en-colombia (Accessed: 1 October 2020).

Bryman, A. (2012) Social Research Methods. 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bustos, J. (2017a) 'Por qué Colombia se convirtió en la nueva capital del modelaje webcam', 26 November. Available at: https://juanbustos.com/infobae-por-que-colombia-se-convirtio-en-la-nueva-capital-del-modelaje-webcam/ (Accessed: 1 October 2020).

Bustos, J. (2017b) 'Ser una camgirl en Venezuela, una carrera para salir de la crisis', 31 August. Available at: https://juanbustos.com/ser-una-camgirl-en-venezuela-una-carrera-para-salir-de-la-crisis/ (Accessed: 27 September 2020).

Bustos, J. (2019) 'En 10 pasos: ¿Cómo crear un estudio webcam legal?', 17 December. Available at: https://juanbustos.com/como-crear-un-estudio-webcam/ (Accessed: 27 September 2020).

Calle, D. P. (2017) Jóvenes migrantes venezolanos en Colombia. Una Mirada sus actuales trayectorias migratorias bajo el enfoque transnacional. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.

Canal RCN (2020) 'Rappitenderos, la ola naranja que protesta en el norte de Bogotá', Noticias RCN, 2 May. Available at: https://noticias.canalrcn.com/bogota/rappitenderos-la-ola-naranja-que-protesta-en-el-norte-de-bogota-353423.

Carpiano, R. M. (2009) 'Come take a walk with me: The "Go-Along" interview as a novel method for studying the implications of place for health and well-being', Health and Place, 15(1), pp. 263–272.

Castillo, J. et al. (2018) Seguridad ciudadana y migración venezolana. Análisis exploratorio. Bogotá: Fundación Ideas para la Paz.

Castillo, J. et al. (2019) Seguridad ciudadana y migración venezolana. Documento de seguimiento No. 1. Fundación Ideas para la Paz.

Choudary, S. P. (2018) The architecture of digital labour platforms. Policy recommendations on platform design for worker well-being, ILO future of work research paper series. Geneva: International Labour Organization.

Cohen, N. and Margalit, T. (2015) '"There are Really Two Cities Here": Fragmented Urban Citizenship In Tel Aviv', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 39(4), pp. 666–686.

Coles, A., Macdonald, F. and Delaney, A. (2018) 'Gender and informality at work – theoretical provocations. an introduction to the special issue on gender and informality', Labour & Industry. Routledge, 28(2), pp. 93–98.

Community Economies Institute (no date) Diverse Economies Iceberg. Available at: http://www.communityeconomies.org/resources/diverse-economies-iceberg (Accessed: 10 August 2020).

Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (2019) Regional refugee and migrant response plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/es/documents/download/67282 (Accessed: 20 July 2020).

Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (2020a) Colombia: Refugiados y migrantes venezolanos. Juli 2020. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/es/documents/details/78581 (Accessed: 5 September 2020).

Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (2020b) RMRP 2020 Dashboard. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/es/situations/platform (Accessed: 20 August 2020).

Corté Bernal, V. (2020) 'Las industrias del sexo y el erotismo en cuarentena', El Espectador, 16 June. Available at: https://www.elespectador.com/coronavirus/las-industrias-del-sexo-y-el-erotismo-en-cuarentena-articulo-919779/ (Accessed: 15 September 2020).

Crawford, M. (1999) 'Introduction', in Chase, J., Crawford, M., and Kaliski, J. (eds) Everyday Urbanism. New York: The Monacelli Press, pp. 8–15.

Creswell, J. W. (2007) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. 2nd edn. Sage Publications.

Dale, S. (2014) 'Gamification. Making work fun, or making fun of work?', Business Information Review, 31(2), pp. 82–90.

DANE (2018) 'Boletín técnico. Encuesta Nacional de Uso del Tiempo (ENUT) 2016-2017'. Bogotá: Colombian Government.

DANE (2020) 'Boletín técnico. Medición de empleo informal y seguridad social'. Bogotá: Colombian Government.

DANE (no date) Estratificación socioeconómica para servicios públicos domiciliarios. Available at: https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/servicios-al-ciudadano/servicios-informacion/estratificacion-socioeconomica (Accessed: 26 September 2020).

Departamento Nacional de Planeacón (2018) Documento CONPES 3950: Estrategia para la atención de la migracioón desde Venezuela. Bogotá: Consejo nacional de política económica y social.

Dinero (2001) 'Cúcuta en plena bonanza', Dinero, 26 October. Available at: https://www.dinero.com/edicion-impresa/negocios/articulo/cucuta-plena-bonanza/7101 (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Doomernik, J. and Ardon, D. (2018) 'The city as an agent of refugee integration', Urban Planning, 3(4), pp. 91–100.

van Doorn, N. (2011) 'Digital spaces, material traces: How matter comes to matter in online performances of gender, sexuality and embodiment', Media, Culture and Society, 33(4), pp. 531–547.

van Doorn, N. (2017) 'Platform labor: on the gendered and racialized exploitation of low-income service work in the "on-demand" economy', Information, Communication and Society, 20(6), pp. 898–914.

van Doorn, N. and Velthuis, O. (2018) 'A good hustle. The moral economy of market competition in adult webcam modeling', Journal of Cultural Economy, 11(3), pp. 177–192.

Endeavor (2018) Rappi Becomes Latin America's Latest Unicorn with New $200 Million Investment. Available at: https://endeavor.org/blog/in-the-news/rappi-becomes-latin-americas-latest-unicorn-new-200-million-investment/ (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Fajardo Guevara, C. and Mesa Lorza, C. (2018) 'Trabajadoras "Sexcam" en Colombia: una Impresión Diagnóstica sobre la Seguridad y Salud', Revista Colombiana de Salud Ocupacional, 8(2), pp. 1–8.

Fancy, J. and Mejía, M. (2019) Los compromisos de Colombia frente a los migrantes venezolanos en virtud del Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados. Universidad Católica de Colombia.

Farné, S. and Sanín, C. (2020) 'Panorama laboral de los migrantes venezolanos en Colombia 2014-2019', Observatorio del Mercado de Trabajo y la Seguridad Social. Universidad Externado de Colombia.

Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Germany (2016) White Paper – Work 4.0. Available at: https://www.bmas.de/EN/Services/Publications/a883-white-paper.html (Accessed: 20 September 2020).

Forbes (2020a) 'Rappi inicia sus primeras entregas con robots', Forbes Colombia, 16 April. Available at: https://forbes.co/2020/04/16/tecnologia/rappi-inicia-sus-primeras-entregas-con-robots/ (Accessed: 16 September 2020).

Forbes (2020b) 'Rappitenderos entran en huelga en Bogotá para reclamar mejores condiciones', Forbes Colombia, 15 August. Available at: https://forbes.co/2020/08/15/actualidad/rappitenderos-entran-en-huelga-en-bogota-para-reclamar-mejores-condiciones/ (Accessed: 16 September 2020).

Fraser, N. (2016) 'Contradictions of capital and care', New Left Review, 100(7/8), pp. 99–117.

Gerassi, L. (2015) 'A Heated Debate: Theoretical Perspectives of Sexul Exploitation and Sew Work', J Sociol Soc Welf, 42(4), pp. 79–100.

Global Migration Group (2016) 'Principles and Guidelines, supported by practical guidance, on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations'. Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Gómez, S. A. (2019) 'Rappi: ¿"Unicornio" económico o esclavitud moderna?', Razon publica, 10 June. Available at: https://razonpublica.com/rappi-unicornio-economico-o-esclavitud-moderna/ (Accessed: 16 September 2020).

Grupo Bedoya Estudios (no date) Grupo Bedoya Estudios. Available at: https://www.grupo-bedoya.com/ (Accessed: 5 October 2020).

Hernández Bellón, P. Y. (2018) Posición que debería tomar el Estado frente a la vulneración de los derechos de las que son víctimas las mujeres que laboran en video chats eróticos a través de estudios en la localidad de chapinero (2012 - 2016). Universidad Libre Cololmbia.

Hernández Bonilla, J. M. (2018) '¿Informalidad y malas condiciones laborales en Uber y Rappi?', El Espectador, 3 March. Available at: https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/informalidad-y-malas-condiciones-laborales-en-uber-y-rappi/ (Accessed: 16 September 2020).

Hester, H. and Srnicek, N. (2017) 'The Crisis of Social Reproduction and the End of Work', The Age of Perplexity: Rethinking the World We Knew. Madrid: BBVA, OpenMind, Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial.

International Justice Resource Center (2020) Immigration & migrants' rights. Available at: https://ijrcenter.org/thematic-research-guides/immigration-migrants-rights/#Migrant_Worker (Accessed: 30 June 2020).

International Labour Organization (2018) Women and men in the informal economy: A statistical picture. 3rd edn. Geneva: International Labour Office.

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (no date) The Global Compact for Migration. From words to action. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document_new/file_list/movement_messages_gcm_final.pdf (Accessed: 10 September 2020).

Intrix (2019) INRIX Global Traffic Scorecard. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/02/commuters-in-these-cities-spend-more-than-8-days-a-year-stuck-in-traffic/ (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Johnson, R. et al. (2004) The practice of cultural studies. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Jones, A. (2016) '"I get paid to have orgasms": Adult webcam models' negotiation of pleasure and danger', Signs, 42(1), pp. 227–256.

Knierbein, S. (2011) 'A plea for urban studies beyond disciplinary constraints' (Magruder, W. Trans.), Positionen zur Urbanistik I, pp. 79–104.

Law, R. (1999) 'Beyond "women and transport": Towards new geographies of gender and daily mobility', Progress in Human Geography, 23(4), pp. 567–588.

Lefebvre, H. (1991) The production of space (Nicholson-Smith, D. Trans.). Cambridge: Blackwell.

Lefebvre, H. (1991) The Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. I, (Moore, J. Trans.), London: Verso. Originally published as: Lefebvre, H. (1947) Critique de la vie quotidienne, Paris: L'Arche.

Lefebvre, H. (2002) Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. II. Foundations for a sociology of the Everyday. London, Verso. Originally published as: Lefebvre, H. (1961) Critique de la vie quotidienne II, Fondements d'une sociologie de la quotidienneté, Paris: L'Arche.

Lefebvre, H. (1981) Critique de la vie quotidienne, Vol. III. De la modernité au modernisme (Pour une métaphilosophie du quotidien). Paris: L'Arche.

López Linares, I. (2019) De la mano de sus usuarios, Rappi quiere ser la primera ' superapp ' de Latinoamérica, Forbes Mexico. Available at: https://www.forbes.com.mx/de-la-mano-de-sus-usuarios-rappi-quiere-ser-la-primera-superapp-de-latinoamerica/ (Accessed: 20 September 2020).

Luque Velarde, M. E. (2012) De lo privado y doméstico a lo público transformaciones de las relaciones de género en las mujeres de los sectores populares de Lima Metropolitana. Universidad Ncional Mayor de San Marcos.

Madanipour, A. (2010) 'Introduction', in Whose public space? Internatipnal case studies in urban design and development. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1–15.

Malaver, C. (2020) 'La cara dramática del trabajo de los domiciliario', El Tiempo, 18 July. Available at: https://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/rappi-la-cara-dramatica-del-trabajo-de-los-domiciliarios-519080 (Accessed: 20 September 2020).

Maruland Melo, C. M. et al. (2018) Iinclusión laboral de la población migrante venezolana laboralmente activa en Bogotá. Universidad Piloto de Colombia.

Mason, J. (2002) Qualitative Researching. 2nd edn. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Mazuera-Arias, R. et al. (2019) 'Informe de movilidad humana venezolana II. Realidades y perspectivas de quienes emigran'. San Cristóbal: Servicio Jesuita a Refugiado.

McKinnon, K., Dombroski, K. and Morrow, O. (2018) 'The Diverse Economy. Feminism, Capitalocentrism and Postcapitalist Futures', in Elias, J. and Roberts, A. (eds) Handbook on the International Political Economy of Gender: part III Governing markets and economies, pp. 335–350.

Migración Colombia (2020) Radiografía Venezolanos en Colombia 31 de mayo de 2020, Migración Colombia. Available at: https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/infografias/venezolanos-en-colombia-corte-a-31-de-mayo-de-2020 (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Ministerio de Trabajo (2019) Salario mínimo para 2020 será de $877.802. Available at: https://www.mintrabajo.gov.co/prensa/mintrabajo-es-noticia/2019/-/asset_publisher/5x-J9xhWdt7lp/content/salario-m-c3-adnimo-para-2020-ser-c3-a1-de-877.802 (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Minsalud (2019) 'Plan de Respuesta del Sector Salud al Fenómeno Migratorio', Minisalud. Bogotá: Colombian Government.

Miraftab, F. (2011) 'Right to the City and the Quiet Appropriations of Local Space in the Heartland', in Smith, M. P. and McQuarrie, M. (eds) Remaking Urban Citizenship: Organizations, Institutions, and the Right to the City. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 191–202.

Muggah, R. and Abdenur, A. E. (2018) 'Refugees and the city: The Twenty-first-century front line', World Refugee Council Research Paper. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation.

Neira Marciales, L. (2020) 'Coyuntura también ha causado que las personas dejen a un lado la búsqueda de marcas puntuales y se enfoquen en encontrar los productos necesarios', La República, 27 March. Available at: https://www.larepublica.co/empresas/domicilios-se-cuadruplican-en-tiempos-de-cuarentena-por-el-covid-19-2983817 (Accessed: 16 September 2020).

Observatorio Laboral LaboUR (2018) 'Perfil actual de la informalidad laboral en Colombia. Estructura y retos'. Universidad del Rosario.

Observatorio Laboral LaboUR (2019) Encuesta para trabajadoras y trabajadores de Rappi. Available at: https://www.urosario.edu.co/Periodico-NovaEtVetera/Sociedad/Quienes-son-los-rappitenderos-en-Colombia/ (Accessed: 15 August 2020).

OECD (2016) 'Protecting Consumers in Peer Platform Markets', Oecd Digital Economy Papers. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Ojeda, D. (2018) 'La voz de los "rappitenderos"', El Espectador, 1 December. Available at: https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/la-voz-de-los-rappitenderos/ X (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

de Oliveira, O. and Araiza, M. (2000) 'Trabajo femenino en América Latina. Un recuento de los principales enfoques analíticos', Tratado Latinoamericano de Sociología del Trabajo, pp. 644–663.

La Opinión (2019) El mundo de una modelo webcam, La opinión. Available at: https://www.laopinion.com.co/cucuta/el-mundo-de-una-modelo-webcam-186587 (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Oomen, B. (2017) 'Beyond the nation state? Glocal citizenship and its consequences for integration', in Baubock, R. and Tripkovic, M. (eds) The integration of migrants and refugees. An EUI Forum on Migrantion, Citizenship and Demography. European University Institute, pp. 57–60.

Organización de los Estados Americanos (2019) Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA para abordar la crisis de migrantes y refugiados venezolanos en la región. Washington D.C.

Parrado Beltrán, K. (2020) 'El negocio de las modelos "webcam" se dispara con la pandemia', El Tiempo, 2 May. Available at: https://www.eltiempo.com/cultura/modelos-webcam-en-la-pandemia-491058 (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Patiño, L. (2020) '45.000 personas están en lista de espera para ser 'rappitenderos '', El Tiempo, 1 April. Available at: https://www.eltiempo.com/tecnosfera/apps/entrevista-con-rappi-sobre-medidas-por-el-coronavirus-479882 (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Pollio, A. (2019) 'Forefronts of the Sharing Economy: Uber in Cape Town', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 43(4), pp. 760–775.

Population Stat (2020) Bogota, Colombia Poplation. Available at: https://populationstat.com/colombia/bogota (Accessed: 23 August 2020).

Portafolio (2017) 'La polémica y lucrativa industria de las modelos webcam en Colombia', Portafolio, 7 December. Available at: https://www.portafolio.co/negocios/modelos-webcam-en-colombia-una-industria-creciente-y-lucrativa-512359 (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Portafolio (2019) 'Contratación de rappitenderos es legal' , Mintrabajo, Portafolio. Available at: https://www.portafolio.co/economia/empleo/contratacion-de-rappitenderos-es-legal-mintrabajo-531353 (Accessed: 20 September 2020).

Proyecto Migración Venezuela (2019) 'La integración de los migrantes venezolanos en Bogotá. Razones para migrar y condiciones a las que se han enfrentado los migrantes en Bogotá', Proyecto Semana S.A. Bogotá: Semana S.A.

Przyborski, A. and Wohlrab-Sahr, M. (2010) Qualitative Sozialforschung. Oldenbourg: De Gruyter.

Pulzo (2020) 'Modelos "webcam" de Colombia ahora también dan consejos para lidiar con encierro', Pulzo, 13 April. Available at: https://www.pulzo.com/nacion/modelos-webcam-colombia-ahora-ofrecen-consejos-para-llevar-cuarentena-PP879619 (Accessed: 15 September 2020).

Purcell, M. (2014) 'Possible worlds: Henri Lefebvre and the right to the city', Journal of Urban Affairs, 36(1), pp. 141–154.

Quemba, J. (2018) 'Informalidad laboral en el sector rural colombiano', Econografos Escuela de Economia, 124(6).

Rodgers, S. and Moore, S. (2018) 'Platform Urbanism. An Introduction', Mediapolis, 23 October. Available at: https://www.mediapolisjournal.com/2018/10/platform-urbanism-an-introduction/ (Accessed: 20 September 2020).

Rodriguez Higueras, J. and Mantilla Agredo, N. (2017) Merdacdo laboral. Caso: Rappi. Universidad ICESI.

Rojas López, J. O. and Castro Carpintero, D. K. (2020) Discriminación, estereotipos y prejuicios sobre las mujeres migrantes venezolanas en la ciudad de Bogotá. Universidad de la Salle.

Romero, P. (2018) 'Debunking a Myth: Hugo Chavez & Venezuelan Socialism', LSE Government Blog, 18 May. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/government/2018/05/18/debunking-a-myth-hugo-chavez-venezuelan-socialism/ (Accessed: 15 October 2020).

Royal Models (2020) Conoce los espacios de Royal Models: Habitaciones, royalmodels. Available at: royalmodels.net/habitaciones.html (Accessed: 10 October 2020).

Rptv Noticias (2017) 'Dos modelos webcams cuentan secretos de su negocio en el ciberespacio', Noticiero 90 Minutos. Available at: https://90minutos.co/dos-modelos-webcam-cuentan-secretos-su-negocio-en-el-ciberespacio-22-11-2017/#:~:text=Un token equivale a 0,de 1.500.000 pesos colombianos. (Accessed: 20 September 2020).

Saldana, J. (2009) The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington D.C.: Sage Publications.

Sales, L. (2020) 'Modelos "webcam": ¿prostitución o trabajo formal?', El Tiempo, 31 March. Available at: https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/modelos-webcam-prostitucion-o-trabajo-formal-478902 (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Secretaría Distrital de Planeación (2017) Estratificación socioeconómica. Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. Available at: http://www.sdp.gov.co/gestion-estudios-estrategicos/estratificacion/estratificacion-por-localidad (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

Secretaría Distrital de Planeación (no date) Estratificación socioeconómica, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. Available at: http://www.sdp.gov.co/gestion-estudios-estrategicos/estratificacion/preguntas-frecuentes (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Semana (2018) '¿Cómo llebó Rappi a valer 1.000 millones de dólares?', Semana, 9 August. Available at: https://www.semana.com/economia/articulo/rappi-el-primer-emprendimiento-criollo-en-alcanzar-una-valoracion-de-1000-millones-de-dolares/582336/ (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Serrano, C. (2018) ¿Por qué los estudios de modelos web cam están felices con el impuesto que les clavaron?, La FM. Available at: https://www.lafm.com.co/colombia/por-que-los-estudios-de-modelos-web-cam-estan-felices-con-el-impuesto-que-les-clavaron (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Sima, R. (2017) 'Theorising Public and Private Spheres', Gender Studies, 15(1), pp. 60–73.

Smith, M. (2020) 'Venezuela Faces The Real Possibility Oil Production Dropping To Zero', Oilprice.com, 1 September. Available at: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Venezuela-Faces-The-Real-Possibility-Oil-Production-Dropping-To-Zero.html (Accessed: 15 October 2020).

Soy Rappi (2019) Pit stops, Soy Rappi Blog. Available at: https://blog.soyrappi.com/pit-stops/ (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Soy Rappi (2020) Conoce todo sobre tur ganancias, Soy Rappi Blog. Available at: https://blog.soyrappi.com/ganancias-cl/ (Accessed: 25 September 2020).

Stanoevska-Slabeva, K., Lenz-Kesekamp, V. and Suter, V. (2017) 'Platforms and the Sharing Economy: An Analysis', SSRN Electronic Journal, (11).

Statista (2020) Venezuela: Inflation rate from 1984 to 2021. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/371895/inflation-rate-in-venezuela/ (Accessed: 3 September 2020).

Tapia Jáuregui, T. (2018) Así es un día en la vida de un rappitendero venezolano en Bogotá, Vice Colombia. Available at: https://www.vice.com/es_latam/article/xwjqwa/asi-es-un-dia-vida-rappitendero-venezolano-bogota (Accessed: 20 September 2020).

El Tiempo (2018) '¿Cuánta plata mueve industria erótica de las "webcam" que pagará IVA?', El Tiempo, 23 December. Available at: https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/cuanta-plata-mueve-la-industria-erotica-de-las-webcam-en-colombia-308282 (Accessed: 20 September 2020).

El Tiempo (2019a) ' Rappitenderos no son empleados de Rappi , son usuarios ', El Tiempo. Available at: https://www.eltiempo.com/economia/rappitenderos-no-son-empleados-de-rappi-son-usuarios-390362 (Accessed: 10 September 2020).

El Tiempo (2019b) 'Proyecto de acuerdo ordena al Distrito organizar los domiciliarios', 1 November, pp. 1–5. Available at: https://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/medidas-para-que-los-domiciliarios-no-ocupen-espacio-publico-429758.

UNHCR (2016) Refugee or Migrant?, UNHCR Representation in Cyprus. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/cy/wp-content/uploads/sites/41/2018/02/UNHCR_Refugee_or_Migrant_EN.pdf (Accessed: 1 September 2020).

UNHCR (2020) Figures at glance. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html (Accessed: 1 September 2020).

Vaiou, D. and Kalandides, A. (2009) 'Cities of "others". public space and everyday practice', 16 Geographica Helvetica, 64(1), pp. 11–20.

Vega, E. (2019) 'Rechazo a estigmatización de los venezolanos como los vándalos de Bogotá', Semana, 22 November. Available at: https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/son-los-venezolanos-los-culpables-de-los-desmanes-en-bogota/641625/ (Accessed: 15 September 2020).

Velthuis, O. and van Doorn, N. (2020) 'Weathering winner-take-all. How rankings constitute competition on webcam sex platforms, and what performers can do about it', in Stark, D. (ed.) The Performance Complex: Competitions and Valuations in Social Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vink, M. P. (2017) 'Citizenship and legal statuses in relation to the integration of migrants and refugees', in Baubock, R. and Tripkovic, M. (eds) The integration of migrants and refugees. An EUI Forum on Migrantion, Citizenship and Demography. European University Institute, pp. 24–47.

Wegerif, M. C. A. (2019) 'The ride-along: a journey in qualitative research', Qualitative Research Journal, 19(2), pp. 121–131.

Wood, P. (2018) 'Urban Citizenship. Making places where even the undocumented can belong', in Intercultural cities Exploratory Workshop.

Yin, R. K. (2003) Case study research. Design and Methods. 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Zapata Berrio, A. L. (2012) Representaciones sociales del Cuerpo desde la experiencia de trabajadores y trabajadoras sexuales en internet. University of Antioquia.

Zhu, F. and Iansiti, M. (2019) 'Why some platforms thrive and others don't', Harvard Business Review, (1/2), pp. 118–125.

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Figures

Tables

APPENDIX

Research Participants Transparency

I conducted twelve interviews, which have been transcribed and documented in altogether almost 200 pages. Due to the protection of my interviewees' personal information and the density of sensitive and private information, I decided not to attach them to the thesis.

Interviews in person:

Rappitendero 1, male, met on the 22.1.2020 in a café in Galerias.

Rappitendero 2, male, met on the 4.3.2020 in a café in Galerias.

Rappitendero 3, male, met on the 6.3.2020 in a café in Galerias.

Rappitendero 4, male, met on the 17.3.2020 at Parque 93.

Rappitendero 5, male, met on the 17.3.2020 at Parque 93.

Rappitendero 6, male, met on the 19.3.2020 at Parque 93.

Webcam Model 3, female, met on the 2.6.2020 in a park.

Online interviews:

Webcam Model 1, female, talked on the 17.3.2020 on Skype.

Webcam Model 2, female, talked on the 18.3.2020 on Skype.

Rappitendero 7, female, talked on the 23.4.2020 on Whatsapp.

Webcam Model 4, male, talked on the 16.7.2020 on Whatsapp.

Webcam Model 5, male, talked on the 16.7.2020 on Whatsapp.

Interview guide

The interview guide helped me structure the conversations; however, (follow-up) questions were adapted to each interviewee's answers. The interviews were conducted in Spanish; a translated version follows:

General:

Venezuela

Could you tell me a little about yourself and your life before coming to Colombia?
When did you come here and how was the migration to Bogotá?

> *Hometown, where did they live?*
> *Work/study?*
> *How old?*
> *Reasons for leaving?*
> *When and how did you leave, singles group?*
> *How long on the road?*
> *Do you have a passport? What is your residency status?*

Bogotá

Could you tell me a little about your arrival in Bogotá?
Where in the city do you spend most of your time and has that changed over time?

> *Experience at the beginning (response of society/public administration)*
> *What contacts did you have? (Venezuelans, online?)*

Access to services:

Accommodation

Where are you staying right now? Who are you living with, and has that changed?

> *Steps of accommodation in Bogota; movement through the city*
> *Where do you live now, with whom, and how did you find it?*
> *What kind of accommodation is it?*
> *Do you like your neighborhood?*

Health/Education

Did you have any experience with the health/education system here?
Would you know how to access it when necessary?

Work

As you told me, you are currently working on Rappi/Webcam.
Can you tell me about your experience with this job?
What are your daily structures, and why do you work like this?
What is different about this job compared to other jobs you have worked in?

> *How did you find it?*
> *Place of work (away from home?) which neighborhood?*
> *Intensity (stress)*
> *Schedule*
> *Goals*
> *Online aspect?*
> *Happy with the job?*
> *Do you also use the bike in your free time?*

Participation:

Public life

Do you know other Venezuelans in Bogotá?
Where do you get information on topics important to you?
Who do you spend your time with?

> *Information*
> *Talking to people in the neighborhood*
> *General political involvement*
> *Friends and Family*

Public space

What do you do in your free time? Do you spend a lot of time outside?
What modes of transportation do you use?

> *Travel: Home - work*
> *Activities outside?*
> *What times? Where? What kinds of activities?*
> *Transport?*
> *Where do you eat, do you go out?*

Discrimination / Acceptance

How welcoming are Bogota citizens towards Venezuelans?
Did you have experiences of discrimination here?

> *Because of your work?*
> *In public space?*