Professional MBA
Entrepreneurship & Innovation

Forecasting complex societal changes – An application of scenario analysis to the issue of refugees and migration

A Master's Thesis submitted for the degree of
"Master of Business Administration"

supervised by
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Affidavit

I, **LISA MARIA FELLHOFER**, hereby declare

1. that I am the sole author of the present Master's Thesis, "FORECASTING COMPLEX SOCIETAL CHANGES – AN APPLICATION OF SCENARIO ANALYSIS TO THE ISSUE OF REFUGEES AND MIGRATION ", 55 pages, bound, and that I have not used any source or tool other than those referenced or any other illicit aid or tool, and

2. that I have not prior to this date submitted this Master's Thesis as an examination paper in any form in Austria or abroad.

Vienna, 30.06.2016

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Abstract

This Master Thesis examines the application of the forecasting technique of scenario analysis in the non-profit context. The key research question reads as follows: What structural, organisational or leadership measures can be recommended to effectively use forecasting for complex social matters in the non-profit context? To this end, a scenario analysis on migration scenarios to Europe and Austria is conducted as practical case study. Based on a prior scenario analysis, key drivers and uncertainties are derived from data analysis and then used to create three plausible, but not inevitable stories how migration to Europe/Austria might develop in the next 10 to 15 years. The three scenarios are "Destination Europe", "Slow implosion" and "Exodus".

In conclusion I suggest for non-profit organisations to follow these four steps if they intend to introduce a forecasting tool like the scenario analysis: 1) Conduct an initial scenario analysis. It provides a set of key drivers, identifies critical uncertainties and supports the formulation of strategic actions for the different scenarios. 2) Review the initial scenario analysis after an appropriate time period 3) Follow-up with another analysis if necessary to re-focus the scope of the scenario analysis, taking into account the results from the initial analysis, and building on that. 4) Feedback to management in order to decide if there is a need of adjustment in strategic planning based on these scenarios.

Finally, leadership, team building and training measures geared towards the forecasting capabilities will increase the successful application of this tool.

Preface

.... defending yesterday – that is, not innovating –
is far more risky than making tomorrow. (P.F. Drucker)

The catalyst for the chosen research question was the recent asylum migration to Europe that had started, amongst others, with the escalating conflict in Syria and came to the attention of the broader European public in the last weeks of summer 2015 when thousands of people were daily *en route* to secure European destinations. Being professionally active in the field of integration and migration for the past six years, the migration movements of summer, autumn and winter 2015 propelled not only the issues of integration into the public spotlight, but also raised for me personally the question how a non-profit, government funded agency could go about future developments from an organisational, managerial point of view: What tools are there to make an NPO/governmental agency flexible and innovative enough to be able to not only respond to seemingly sudden new challenges in a timely manner, but to also use these tools to draw up flexible management structures that allow for innovation while remaining as cost-efficient as possible? After all, NPOs, especially government funded NPOs, are operating on tax payers' money. So cost-efficiency in creating public value can be seen is mandatory.

To connect the question of complex societal change from an organisational point of view with forecasting methods was the result of a talk with my thesis supervisor. It was a logical step, in hindsight: In the area of integration, objective facts and figures, statistical data, are an important part of my daily work. Neither policy measures nor operative and organisational strategy could be developed without a solid knowledge about current issues and challenges at hand. Only if we know what we talk about, if we use the same definitions and

objective data, can we start a dialogue on the real challenges and opportunities of migration and integration for a society.

Incidentally, a few years back the organisation I work for had already published a scenario analysis – it was part of our regular research efforts, but I now could identify the need to see, if maybe the application of scenario analysis could be done systematically, in an effort to detect changes and identify needs for organisational learning.

This thesis tries to tie together innovation, forecasting theory, the non-profit/governmental context, and the complex issue of migration. First I look at the characteristics of a non-profit organisation, its need for innovation, and the forecasting tools available to foster organisational learning, and in turn innovativeness in an NPO. The theoretical part is followed by the core piece of the thesis: the applied scenario analysis. Finally, the results of the analysis are presented in combination with a 4-step approach on how to integrate forecasting tools into a non-profit setting.

I would like to thank all those who supported me in one way or another in the last two years (you know who you are), my supervisor for his advice on considering scenario analysis as research topic and, mostly, his patience on my long silences these past few months, and a very special thank you to group B and my MBA friends – I learned a lot from you guys!

Content

Innovation has become quite the buzzword in recent years. With the technical and digital revolution came a focused attention on innovation, its theories and applications. In the setting of economics and business, this attention very much seems to be concentrated on technological innovation. Businesses, companies, need to be innovative to stay ahead, turn a profit. What then of not-for-profit organisations (NPOs)? Do non-profit organisations and public sector institutions need innovation? This section will look at the definition of NPOs, and look at innovation and organisational learning in the specific context of non-profit organisations.

1.1   Non-profit Organisations

Non-profit organisations (NPOs) differ from normal businesses by the fact that their goal is not to generate profit, as the name „not-for-profit" already suggests. They are concerned with the public good and often connected to social causes, thereby generating public value. Whilst not in pursuit of profit, NPOs are still guided by managerial and also economic principles. (Herzka, 2014) They are not necessarily non-governmental organisations (NGOs), even though all NGOs are not-for-profit.

The term non-profit organisation encompasses a multitude of organisations, structures and areas of work. NPOs can be civil society organisations dedicated to a core cause, like the Red Cross, or they can be private foundations, often set up by business owners to aid common causes and give back to the community; the Bill and Melina Gates Foundation would be one such example. NPOs can also be close to or a part of the governmental orbit without being a governmental body, i.e. Ministry or legal authority, in itself.

1.2 Innovation in the NPO context

Even though the public perception usually thinks of innovation in relation to technological achievements, innovation is first and foremost the ability to recognize new opportunities due to a changed setting. It is equally the ability to seize this opportunity and capitalize on it. Drucker makes the case for connecting innovation not only to for-profit businesses, but also to social (i.e. not necessarily for-profit) institutions or organisations in the very first chapters of his book on innovation and entrepreneurship:

„'Innovation' then, is an economic or social rather than a technical term. It can be defined the way J.B. Say defined entrepreneurship, as changing the yield of resources. Or, as a modern economist would tend to do, it can be defined in demand terms rather than in supply terms, that is, as changing the value and satisfaction obtained from resources by the consumer. " (Drucker, 1985, p. 33)

An innovation might be a new technological invention or application that ultimately leads to a new product on the market. Take the example of the iphone which meant not merely a new product in the market of mobile phones, but took the idea of the mobile phone and re-interpreted this very idea. Innovation, however, might also be a social innovation where the outcome is not so much a new product on the market, but a (fundamental) advancement in society or parts thereof. Sometimes the economic and the social invention can be linked, directly or indirectly, as can be observed with many technological innovations that fundamentally changed our current way of living, such as smartphones that have been changing the very way people communicate.

NPOs focus on social innovation, as their primary purpose is not to make a profit, but to add value to the greater public good. (Light, 1998) (Drucker, 1985) If NPOs do generate profit, this is re-invested for the realisation of the

core mission of the organisation. A dividend distribution to owners, share-holders and others is not part of the business model of a not-for-profit organisation. (Herzka, 2014) NPOs, however, still have a need to innovate:

"[…], nonprofit and government innovation involves *the broader public good*. The ultimate purpose of innovation is not to win awards, boost public confidence, or attract foundation support, but to create public value. [….] As a general rule, innovating organisations take care to specify the goals of their work and the results by which they expect to be measured. They know they are creating public value not because their innovative acts are novel or win awards but because those acts have clear impacts." (Light, 1998)

Innovative behaviour and the strategic application of innovation are not limited to the private business sector. Many NPOs undertake research, either in-house or by funding research activities in other organisations, or a combination of the two. (Schilling, 2013)

„ 'The challenge for executives is to build congruent organizations both for today's work and tomorrow's innovation. Organizations need to have sufficient internal diversity in strategies, structures, people, and processes to facilitate different kinds of innovation and to enhance organizational learning' " (Damanpour, 1991, p. 92; Light, 1998)

The degree, and, ultimately, ability of an organisation to become an innovative organisation depends on essentially four key dimensions. These are the embedding external environment, the organisational structure, the leadership and the internal management systems. (Light, 1998) The main argument is that not-for profit or even governmental organisations can not only be innovative in the short-term, for example to come up with a new product, project or programme. By creating the appropriate organisational setting, NPOs and governmental organisations can indeed become innovative in a sustainable

way, enhancing at the same time organisational learning. Innovation in a non-profit or governmental organisation therefore can be introduced or maximised by concentrating on the overall organisational design rather than single innovation, to make it more a "natural result of a tight alignment between the environment, internal structure, leadership, and internal systems." (Light, 1998)

In the following chapters we will look at the tools of forecasting as a means to set non-profit organisations up to be fit to deal with complex social developments. It is the strategic and systematic application of these specific research tools that have the potential to enable sustainable innovation and organisational learning in a non-profit environment.

To identify the right forecasting technique, it is important to define the goal and scope that is to be achieved. (Chambers, et al., 1971) The following chapter will provide a short categorisation of forecasting methods, introduce a the issue of forecasting in the non-profit context and then focus on the theoretical framework of scenario analysis.

2.1   General Types of forecasting

Chambers et.al. identified the following three types of forecasting methods:

a. Qualitative techniques
b. Time series analysis and projection
c. Causal models

These three types differ in their use of data: qualitative data, historical data and specific data on relationships in systems. (Chambers, et al., 1971) The scenario analysis, which has been chosen as the central tool in this research, can be identified to be a time series and projection type of forecasting method. The choice to use a specific method should always be made based on the available data:

"If the forecaster can readily apply one technique of acceptable accuracy, he or she should not try to "gold plate" by using a more advanced technique that offers potentially greater accuracy but that requires nonexistent information or information that is costly to obtain." (Chambers, et al., 1971)

1.1   Integrating forecasting in the NPO-structure

Forecasting can generally be considered a tool to support management in making decisions on future strategic business developments. The main pur-

pose is to reduce uncertainty and establish a frame of reference for taking action. Forecasting methods therefore help shape the strategy of an organisation and ensure better planning. (Chambers, et al., 1971) (van der Heijden, 1996) To successfully use forecasting techniques to foster innovative behaviour and thinking, the right forecasting method has to be chosen. In this regard, forecasting should be looking for those sources where innovative opportunities lie. The systematic approach to identify sources of innovation therefore "consists in the purposeful and organized search for changes, and in the systematic analysis of the opportunities such changes might offer for economic or social innovation" (Drucker, 1985, p. 35). Still, choosing the right tools is only one part of successfully using forecasting techniques.

There are several practices that have been identified to improve the successful application of forecasting techniques. Light for instance identifies a set of 6 key characteristics (mission management, pay and personnel, organisational learning, idea generation, budget, and accountability and governance) that innovative non-profit and/or governmental organisations require in their internal management. (Light, 1998) The importance of choosing the right team members is also underlined in other literature on forecasting and innovation. Especially forecasting teams with a certain diversity in knowledge and experience have shown to perform better:

"At least one member should have domain expertise (a financial professional on a budget forecasting team, for example), but non-experts are essential too – particularly ones who won't shy away from challenging the presumed experts. Don't underestimate these generalists. […], nonexpert civilian forecasters often beat trained intelligence analysts at their own game." (Schoemaker & Tetlock, 2016, p. 76)

Leadership is another important factor in this regard. It has to be emphasized that the leader is not necessarily required to come up with new ideas. Rather, their role is to enable team members to do this:

"[…], they must work to create the conditions that will advance a good idea to formal launch. […], as the principal architect of organizational life. Simply put, it is up to the institutional leader to help his or her organization achieve the preferred states of being needed to create and sustain innovativeness." (Light, 1998)

Evaluation in the context of the forecasting activity, feedback, and building trust in the team are essential ingredients. Especially trust is important to encourage open-mindedness. Forecasting, especially tools such as the scenario analysis, often require divergent thinking, as we will see in the following chapter in regards to scenario analysis:

"To ensure that forecasters share their best thinking, members must trust one another and trust that leadership will defend their work and protect their jobs and reputations. Few things chill a forecasting team faster than a sense that its conclusions could threaten the team itself." (Schoemaker & Tetlock, 2016, p. 77)

2.2   Scenario Analysis

The scenario analysis has its origins in military planning, but has since found its uses in business planning, political decision-making and other fields. (Rose, 2013) Scenario planning was used by the U.S. Air Force in World War II in order to prepare alternative strategies based on assumptions regarding enemy movements. In the 1960ies, Herman Kahn adapted this planning technique for business settings. (Mietzner & Reger, 2004) A prominent early adopter of scenario analysis in the business world was Shell, who first started

applying scenarios in the 1970ies under the lead of Pierre Wack. In effect, their work with scenarios helped them anticipate the oil shocks in 1973, enabling the company to recover ahead of their competition. (Shell, 2016) (Mietzner & Reger, 2004)

A scenario analysis is not a simple extrapolation of past and current data to project a linear future. Instead, multiple futures, i.e. scenarios, are developed that are possible, but not necessarily definite. This form of analysis enables critical as well as strategic thinking, the identification of uncertainties, and strategic learning.

Scenarios intend to broaden the perspectives of decision-makers and minimize surprises. In turn, decision-makers are able to not only detect changes early on, but also adapt their strategic planning accordingly. (Rose, 2013) (Mietzner & Reger, 2004) Research findings also show that organisations benefit through an enhanced capacity for organisational learning. (Wilkinson & Kupers, 2013)

By identifying key drivers of future developments and critical uncertainties, different scenario paths can be discerned. Key drivers are those driving forces that are most relevant to the core issue of the analysis. They can be social, political, economic, technological, and other factors. (Maack, 2001) Uncertainty can be categorized as risks, structural uncertainties and unknowns. Whereas risks can be appropriated to similar past events, and structural uncertainties with events where the likelihood of a given outcome is difficult to judge, unknowns are incidents that are unimaginable. (van der Heijden, 1996)

Scenarios take the assembled data, key drivers, assumptions and deliberations to create a story about a possible future that is "coherent, systematic, comprehensive, and plausible.". (Mietzner & Reger, 2004, p. 48) They take an additional step by incorporating causal explanations and risk assessments.

By asking the question "What if...?", scenarios allow for discontinuities and uncertainties. They provoke creative thinking. This is in the stark contrast to simple data extrapolation with its underlying assumption *ceteris paribus*[1]. (Rose, 2013) (The Management Centre, 2012)

In the corresponding literature, different classifications of scenarios exist. (Mietzner & Reger, 2004) One common classification would be along the lines of politics, economics, society, and technology (PEST). Others move along the intended focus of the analysis, i.e. industry, competition, etc. (Mietzner & Reger, 2004)

Similarly, the way scenarios can be built differs. However, a US report estimates that the process of scenario analysis shaped by Shell is the basis for most scenario processes. (Wilkinson & Kupers, 2013)

The basic steps the majority in the research literature seems to agree on are: 1) definition of core scope of analysis, 2) collection of data, 3) creation of (plausible) scenarios and 4) choosing strategic options based on the scenarios built. (Mietzner & Reger, 2004) (Rose, 2013) This core concept of how to do scenario analysis will be used for the applied analysis in chapter 3.

2.2.1 Limits and weaknesses of scenario analysis

As Mietzner and Reger point out, conducting a thorough scenario analysis can be very time consuming, even more so as data and information from various sources have to be collected and interpreted in such a way that plausible scenarios can be built. (Mietzner & Reger, 2004)

Second, the effectiveness of scenario analysis on organisational learning and therefore innovativeness depends on its role in the organisation: it needs to

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[1] All other things being equal, i.e. unchanged conditions

gather critical mass in affecting perspectives and the way of thinking for any real organisational learning. (van der Heijden, 1996)

In 2012 the Austrian Integration Fund commissioned for the first time a research report on future developments in integration in Austria. As stated further above, the right choice of a forecasting method should be made based on the available data. I therefore intend to draw upon the results and insights of this report, identify and focus core areas from it, and use it then as a basis and starting point for the applied scenario analysis done in this chapter. This approach will also allow me to then draw conclusions regarding the continued application of forecasting tools such as the scenario analysis in a NPO/governmental organisation in the concluding chapter.

Here I will first present the migration and integration framework necessary for understanding the background of the migration scenario analysis, followed by the main statistical data. This will then be followed by describing the basic results from the scenario report done in 2013. Then, key drivers and uncertainties will be analysed. Finally, the three scenarios that have been developed from this research will be presented.

3.1   Framework I: Migration to Austria

3.1.1   Terminology and definitions

It is necessary to explain what is meant if we talk about migration, integration and various statistical categories such as refugee or migration background. This will enable the readers to have a common understanding of the basic terms and not get lost in different interpretations.

The Glossary of the European Migration Network defines **migration** in its broadest definition as the movement of persons either across an international border or within a state (internal migration) for a longer period of time, usually

more than one year. (EMN European Migration Network, 2014) A **migrant** is therefore a person executing this action. A person with **migration background** on the other hand, was either themselves born in another country or a person whose parents both were born in a foreign country. (Statistik Austria, 2015) In this regard, migration and integration research also talks about **first generation** migrants (those who migrated themselves) and the **second generation** (those whose parents migrated, but who themselves were already born in the receiving country).

It is important to note that especially categories like "migration background" can vary in their definition from county to country. Whilst Statistics Austria, for instance, requires in their definition both parents to be born abroad, the German definition allows for only one parent to being born abroad. This differences needs to be considered in case of cross-national comparisons.

While in most countries national asylum legislation exists, the basis for these national legislations is an international treaty: According to the 1951 Refugee Convention (also sometimes known as 1951 Geneva convention[2]), a **refugee** is a person who has well-found reason to fear persecution based on their nationality, race[3], religious or political beliefs or membership of a particular social group and whose state is unwilling or unable to provide protection from this persecution. (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds (ÖIF), UNHCR, 2016)

Commonly, the responsible authorities distinguish between **asylum applicants**, i.e. somebody who applied for asylum in another country based on the

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[2] To be differentiated from the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which deal with rules of conduct of armed conflict. For further detail see: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additional-protocols

[3] The term *race* is used in the Convention itself. However, especially in the German language areas the tendency is to replace it with *ethnicity* due to the negative meaning and connotations of the original term.

grounds of the Refugee Convention, and **recognized refugees**, i.e. persons who were granted asylum based on the grounds of the Convention. In addition, European states such as Austria often also have the status of **subsidiary protection** offering protection to persons who were not eligible for asylum, but nonetheless have sufficient reasons to fear persecution or torture in their country of origin. (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds (ÖIF), UNHCR, 2016) Economic motivations as well as ecological disasters however, are not recognized as sufficient grounds for asylum, even though there have been various efforts in the past to include migration due to economic necessities or suffering and ecological disasters in the convention on international protection. The distinction between these categories (asylum applicant, recognized refugee, beneficiary of subsidiary protection, economic or ecological migrant) is important, since there is often a tendency in the public debate to subsume these all under the term *refugee*. While all are migrants, i.e. persons who moved from one place to another, crossing state borders, it is important to keep in mind that not all migrants are refugees and that migrants have various reasons for their decision to migrate to another country.

The practical focus of the applied scenario analysis at hand is on migration in connection to innovating not-for profit organisations. Integration of migrants will therefore not be the core focus of this analysis. Nonetheless, it is important to establish an understanding of what is meant if we talk about integration: **Integration** can be seen as a reciprocal process between the receiving society and immigrants, enabling the migrant in the long run to fully partake in society, as well as in the labour market. This two-way process needs to be guided by clear rules, and a mutual appreciation in order to ensure social cohesion and overall stability. (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds (ÖIF), UNHCR, 2016)

3.1.2 Austria's recent migration history

In the latter half of the 20th century, Austria has become a country of immigration. A notion that has been widely contested until recently even though data clearly showed that Austria had transformed from a perceived country of emigration to a country of immigration. This development as well as the rather hesitant change in perception of the public is in accordance with the overall European experience:

"Between 1750 and 1960 Europe was the prime source region of world migration sending some 70 million people – the equivalent of one third of its population growth – overseas. During the last 50 years, however, all countries of Western Europe gradually became destinations for international migrants. Several of the new EU member states in Central Europe and the Mediterranean also follow that pattern. […] Many Europeans, however, still do not see their homelands as immigration countries – in particular not as destinations of permanent immigrants." (Münz, 2007, p. 3)

In 1956, for the first time after the Second World War, Austria received an influx of refugees. It was the time of the Cold War, when the Hungarian Crisis led to an estimated 200.000 Hungarians crossing the borders into Austria, even though the majority moved on to other destinations, such as the United States. (Gruber, 2013) Similarly, the abrupt end of the "Prague spring" by invading soviet troops in 1968 and the Polish Solidarnosc movement in 1981 led to asylum migration to Austria. Far more impacting than these refugee movements in the context of the Cold War, however, was the economic migration that started in the 1960ies via the so-called *guest worker* migration programmes. Austria, like Germany and Switzerland, had experienced an economic upswing since the 1950ies, accompanied by a rising demand for

labour force that the available demographic pool could not satisfy accordingly.

Bilateral agreements, first with Spain in 1962, then Turkey in 1964, and finally former Yugoslavia in 1966, were put in place to recruit the necessary labour force. (Münz, et al., 2003) A rotation model was envisioned: guest workers would come to work in Austria for a limited period of time, after which they would return to their home country, re-investing their newly learned skills there and benefitting therefore both sending and receiving countries. The rotation model never intended any permanent settlement of the migrant labour force. In the mid-Seventies of the 20th century, the economy slowed down and then halted, making the labour force recruitment from other countries superfluous. Consequently, the active recruitment of guest-workers was stopped.

The proportion of guest workers returning to their country of origin was an estimated 40%. (Münz, et al., 2003) Those who stayed, however, began to bring their families to their new country of settlement. The statistical figures for this decade show a consistent level of percentage of foreign nationals in Austria (approx. 4%) which is explained by those oppositional movements that, apparently, balanced each other. (Münz, et al., 2003) (Statistik Austria, 2015) The next major migration movements started with the fall of the curtain iron, the demise of the Soviet Union and the wars in former Yugoslavia in the early to mid 1990ies. In 1992, an estimated 80.000 people came to Austria, primarily from war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also Croatia. (Bauer, 2008) (Fassmann & Münz, 1995)

Less dramatic, but perhaps even more important for the long-term migration, was Austria's accession to the European Union in 1995. Under the key princi-

ple of free movement of goods, services and people, intra-EU mobility has become a major factor for migration movements to and from Austria.

In 2014, for instance, of the 170,100 persons moving to Austria, almost 95,300 came from an EU or EEA country (incl. Switzerland). Approximately a third (i.e. 59,000) were migrants from third countries[4] in 2014. (Statistik Austria, 2015) Further details on recent migration data will be presented in chapter 3.3.2.1.

3.1.3 Institutional structures in Austria

The institutional landscape for migration and integration in Austria is as heterogeneous as its migrant population. This is due to the general political setup: Austria is a federally organised state, which has in the last 60 to 70 years since the end of World War II had its own special brand of consensus politics, the so-called "social partnership" (*Sozialpartnerschaft*). This overall political structure also characterizes the areas of integration and migration to a certain extent. Migration matters such as asylum and issues concerning legal residence are in the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. An experts' council made up from various experts from vital fields relevant for migration advises the Ministry and the government. Integration matters are largely seen as cross-sectional, touching upon a plethora of areas such as language (acquisition), education, labour, health, etc. Nonetheless, in recent years the government has seen the necessity to also establish political responsibility for integration.

This was realized first by the creation of the position of State Secretary for Integration, and then followed up by creating the Federal Ministry for Integra-

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[4] Third Country Nationals (TCN) is a term in the European Union for nationals from countries outside the EU.

tion, Europe and Foreign Affairs. The position as Minister for Integration has been filled by Minister Sebastian Kurz since 2013. An independent expert council on integration, made up of academic and other experts across various domains of integration[5] advises the government on integration. An advisory council on integration gathers twice a year all relevant stakeholders and players on the federal, regional, local and civil society level to coordinate integration efforts. In response to the large asylum migration that started in 2015 to affect Austria, the Minister for integration and the experts' council presented a 50 points action plan on the integration of refugees.

3.2 Framework II: the 2013 analysis

The report "Integration scenarios of the future – challenges of integration in Austria to 2030" was published in 2013 after nearly 10 months of data analysis, qualitative expert interviews, and a serious of workshops with various as well as varying stakeholders and experts to flesh out the scenarios. The scenario analysis tried to be as inclusive and broad as possible while staying focused on the question how the integration landscape could develop between the time of publication of the report and 2030. In the final report, three scenarios were presented as outcome of that 10-month process. These scenarios were developed by analysing economic, political and social data. Critical uncertainties identified in the research process were the political system, i.e. the political landscape, both in Europe and in Austria, as well as the identity processes of migrants. Key drivers identified were the economic development of Austria, radicalisation and extremism, the quality of the education system, the integration of young people, the demography of migrants, social cohesion and opinion on these issues in society.

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[5] E.g. language and education, employment, rule of law and values, health, leisure and sports, housing

The **first scenario** was named "Society Cohesion" and represents the most positive and ideal of the three scenarios. In this scenario it was assumed that all the positive developments of recent years would, in general, continue. The European Union would continue its own integration further, visible in a unified foreign policy. Similar the development of the Austrian political system: in this scenario a functioning representative democracy was envisioned, accompanied by a prospering Vienna and absences or at the utmost rather low levels of EU-scepticism. Accordingly, the economic outlook was positive, with stagnation overcome by 2018. Migration in this scenario benefitted the gross national product, Austria had been successful in attracting highly-skilled and skilled workers as needed by the industry. Additionally, by developing a new emotional narrative the integration of migrants is successful and a general consensus has been reached in the Austrian society on migration and integration. Consequently, social cohesion and high inclusivity are characteristics of the Austrian society and system in this scenario. This includes a well set up, up-to-date education system that in turn minimises radicalisation tendencies amongst young people. (Rose, 2013)

The **second scenario**, "fragmented society", departs from the idealistic and positive notions of the first scenario. Here, the crisis of the European Union deepens, with highly negative impacts both on the economic and political plane. The repercussions are also felt in Austria where the economic recession and the deepened crisis of the European Union are combined with national political centrifugal forces that lead to a destabilized, fragmented political landscape. In turn, fragmentation and polarisation of the society along the various political axis and ideologies emerges, rendering migration issues highly contentious, and integration of migrants gets almost impossible. Due to the economic and also political developments, in this scenario Austria is not able to attract highly-qualified and skilled human resources. Migration none-

theless exists, the persons migrating, however, have low education and low socio-economic status. The migration system becomes more restrictive, leading to a higher number of illegal migrants. The negative economic developments lead to resentments and fears towards migrants in the society, resulting in conflicts not only along ideological lines, but also between ethnic groups. The media play a crucial role in this spiral of events. The education system is highly fragmented into schools with excellent reputation and a high number of schools where low qualified people graduate, with little to no possibilities of upwards social mobility. Due to the fragmentation and polarisation across various social layers, radicalisation in various forms is on the rise. This does not mean exclusively migrant groups, but also encompasses groups of the overall Austrian society. (Rose, 2013)

Finally, the **third scenario** is simply called "Populism" and is a variation of the second scenario. The economic developments are similar, the political landscape, however, drifts towards a clear mentality of "us v. them", both on the European level, as well as on the national level. The political system as well as the society gain more populist and authoritarian traits, splitting society into a majority and minority groups that are marginalised and used as scapegoats. The migration movements in this scenario become less and more local (urban-rural movements). Integration does not have place in the Austrian society, assimilation is demanded from migrants. Low levels of acceptance and feelings of marginalisation, combined with low social mobility and a highly fragmented education system, lead to higher radicalisation and tendencies towards extremism, especially among the second generation migrants. More so than in the scenario "fragmented society", violence and extremism are a major factor in this scenario. Contrary to the second scenario, however, these tendencies are used and governed by the populist fraction in order to preserve their power. (Rose, 2013)

These three scenarios were developed and published in 2012/2013. In the three years since then some parts of the developments described have been realized, some have not or not yet come to fruition. If we take all three and subject them to a comparison with the current status quo, it becomes quickly apparent that scenario one (society cohesion) is the one most off. Scenario one might still be useful as a vision, a goal to work towards, but it is not a scenario that has come even partly to fruition.

Looking at current trends, we are moving somewhere in the middle towards scenario 2 (fragmented society) and 3 (populism). Neither of them have been fully realized, but contrary to scenario one, key developments can be identified. Major driving forces and uncertainties can be identified in these scenarios that will help to follow up with a scenario analysis that re-focuses the core issue and then in turn, supports the creation of according measures in the specific NPO context.

The key focus of this new scenario analysis will be on the plausible development of migration scenarios to Europe, specifically to Austria, in the next 10 to 15 years. We will look at the currently known, therefore relatively certain, regions of origin as well as at the development of the demographic make-up in Austria, and uncertainties that can be identified.

In the course of compiling the data and drawing up the scenarios, I also conducted qualitative experts' interviews. The interviews were an alternative to actually organising two to three workshops where the scenarios could have been created with together with a diverse team. Due to time constraints this approach had to be disregarded. There were also time and general resource restraints to organising and conducting the qualitative interviews. In the end, however, three interviews could be held successfully. The interview partners were a well-versed migration researcher, an expert in the field of (higher) ed-

ucation, as well as a representative from the Austrian Integration Fund. Their insights were evaluated together with the data on the key drivers and have influenced the creation of the scenarios.

3.3   Overview: key drivers and uncertainties

Key Drivers	Possible Impact
Strength of already established migration networks	Larger migration flows from regions that have already established migrant communities in the receiving countries
Increased Migration pressure from regions of origin due to (further) escalating conflicts, economic and/or social pressure	The higher the economic, political and/or social pressures are in the countries of origin, combined with high volatility, the bigger the groups of people who will migrate
The stability of Turkey and its willingness to act as a gateway between Europe and the East	Increasing instability will make Turkey either unwilling or unable to control migration flows to Europe; In addition, its unique position puts Turkey in a favourable position for negotiating with the European Union, turning around the dynamic of former decades when Turkey was more eager to join the European Union

Key uncertainties
Stability of the European Union
The degree of stability in the MENA region

3.3.1 Uncertainties

3.3.1.1 The European Union

In an attempt to keep the analysis as simple and focused as possible, the European Union and its future pathways are the main concern in this analysis, and they can be identified as critical uncertainty. Already the 2013 analysis of integration scenario identified the political level of the EU as critical uncertainty. In regard to the recent developments on the European level[6] the possible future of the EU and the European continent are yet highly uncertain. It is the first time that an EU-Member State held a referendum of leaving the European Union, and it will be the first time that a Member State will possibly trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. Article 50 has first been introduced in the Lisbon Treaty and never been applied so far.

Consequently, the EU as well as its Member States (still including the United Kingdom) face a hitherto unimaginable situation – a characteristic trait for uncertainties. It is highly probable, however that the current development will once again reinforce the "navel gazing" of the European states, leaving them less prone to take on a decisive role on the international level, especially regarding global crisis situations.

3.3.1.2 Global and regional crisis outside the EU

International conflicts and crisis usually do not occur unexpected, even though the general public might often be caught unaware. Regional and local experts, observers and actors in general have a good knowledge on im-

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[6] Result of the referendum in Great Britain on the question if the United Kingdom should stay in the European Union or leave on 23 May 2016. The majority (52%) voted to leave. (BBC, 2016)

portant factors influencing certain developments.[7] There are however also key issues where the unknown is bigger than the known.

A relevant uncertainty for this paper in the context of global and regional crisis is the overall development and stability of the Middle East and the North African countries (MENA).

The highly complex blending of state and non-state actors, political and economic interests, the burden of historic decisions, conflict lines between states, ethnicities and religions, as well as diverging interests regarding resources in the region create an inscrutable landscape. The one certain thing about the region is the uncertainty regarding its future stability. (National Intelligence Council, 2008) (Frank & Gustenau, 2015)

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[7] one of the reasons why the tool of scenario analysis can be of great value by gathering those insights and combining them with others in a larger frame of reference

3.3.2 Key drivers & their projections

3.3.2.1 Demography: Austria

On January 1, 2015 Austria had a population of more than 8.5 Mio. people. As in other European countries, the population is aging, as also illustrated in Figure 1: the average age on 1 January 2015 was 42,3 years. The birth rate was 1.46 children on average, while the natural population growth was positive with plus 3,470 persons (Statistik Austria, 2015)


Figure 1: (Statistik Austria, 2016), own depiction

Approximately 20% of the 8.5 Mio people in Austria had a migration background. The development of migration to Austria since the 1960ies has already been presented in chapter 3.1.2.: the increase in foreign nationals from

1.4% in 1961 to approx. 13% in the beginning of 2015 is clearly visible in Figure 2.


Foreign Nationals 1961 - 2015

Figure 2: (Statistik Austria, 2015), own depiction

If we look at the last ten years, it can be observed that the net-migration rate has been consistently on the plus side in the period between 2006 and 2015. In 2014, this net immigration rate reached a remarkable high of 72,300 people.

The largest group of foreign nationals in Austria[8] are persons from Germany (170,475), followed by Turkey (115,433), Serbia (114,289), Bosnia Herzegovina (92,527) and Romania (73,374). These numbers are indicative of what has been stated further above: the make-up of the migrant population in Austria goes back on the one hand to the guest-worker migration in the 1960ies, and to the European mobility on the other hand (see chapter 3.1.2).

The population of foreign nationals in Austria is significantly younger than Austrian citizens: the average age is 35.1 years. A closer look shows that the foreign population itself is diverse in its age structure: foreign nationals from other EU-Member States tended to be older, especially those from Great Britain and Germany (41.8 and 39.1 respectively). Foreign nationals from the Eastern European Union Member States tended to be under 35 years, while the youngest foreign nationals came from Third Countries, e.g. Afghanistan (24.4 years on average) or Russia (28.1 years). (Statistik Austria, 2015)

The birth rates are higher for women born abroad than for women born in Austria, with an average of 1.85 children (compared to 1.36). Those women, however, who had acquired Austrian citizenship came closer to the average fertility rate with 1.50 children. (Statistik Austria, 2015)

3.3.2.1.1 Recent refugee migration

Refugee migration movements have also been a large factor at certain time periods. Next to the by now historical refugee migration from former Yugoslavia in the 1990ies, the recent and current influx is rather unprecedented in Austrian history. This is true also regarding Europe to a certain extent, as figure 3 illustrates.

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[8] Reference date 1 January 2015; The numbers of the recent refugee migration are therefore not yet represented in these population statistics.

In 2015, the 28 EU-Member States recorded more than 1.3 Mio. asylum applications. 81% of these were concentrated on 6 countries only: Germany, Sweden, Austria, France, Italy and Hungary. The remaining 22 EU-Member States made up only 19% of asylum applications in the same time period. (Eurostat, 2016)

figure 3: (Eurostat, 2016) own depiction

Austria received more than 88,000 asylum applications in 2015. 8,277 came from unaccompanied minors[9], 24,478 from women. (BMI Asylwesen, 2016) The highest number of applications came from Afghans (25,563 applications), closely followed by Syrians (24,547) and Iraqis (13,633). Regarding the positive decisions on asylum however, the positions are reversed: the rate of Syr-

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[9] under 18 years of age

ians getting a positive decision for asylum is significantly higher than the one for Afghans: 8,114 positive decisions for the former compared to 2,083 positive decisions for the latter in 2015. (BMI Asylwesen, 2016)[10]

3.3.2.2 Demographic Projections for Austria

Given current fertility rates, the Austrian population would decline from currently 8.5 million to less than 6.5 mil. by 2075, if there were no migration at all. Given the highest imaginable migration, the population is projected to reach 10 Mio. by 2075. It is probable that the size of the population and the migration rate will be in between those two extreme projections. (Statistik Austria, 2015)


Figure 4: population projections 1975-2075; (Statistik Austria, 2015, p. 25)

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[10] applications and decisions in the same year do not necessarily correlate

Based on the experiences of the guest-worker migration illustrated in chapter 3.1.2, migrants that settle permanently will have more propensity for their families to join them. The family reunification compensated for the emigration of guest workers returning to their home countries in the 1970ies as we have seen above.

Migratory patterns between certain sending and receiving countries are very often established due to prior links, after an initial migration connection has been established. The movement between countries is facilitated by macro-structures (relations between states, economy, migration control systems, etc.) as well as micro-structures, i.e. social networks amongst the migrants that are able to provide relevant information on migrating to a certain destination. (Castles & Miller, 2009) This is important in regards to projections based on the existing or inflowing migrant population into any country.

3.3.2.3 Short migration profiles of regions of origin

As laid out in chapter 3.3.2.1, the migrant population in Austria is rather heterogeneous. As stated above, migration networks enable future migration flows between sending and receiving countries.[11] Therefore, it warrants to take a closer look at the current regions of origin and their demographic and economic profiles. By clustering the countries of origin into regions, I intend to simplify the often complex matter to such a degree that it eases understanding while simultaneously allowing a swift, and concise analysis.

The regions are Europe, encompassing all EU-28 Member States as well as the EEA countries and Switzerland, the MENA region, i.e. the Middle East and North Africa, as well as AFPAK, i.e. Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additionally, a closer look will be taken at one of the by now "traditional" countries of

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[11] The quantities may vary, however, depending on legal restrictions, economic development of sending and receiving countries and other factors that are essential for a person deciding to migrate to another country.

origin for migrants in Austria, namely Turkey. It has to be pointed out that even though I choose to cluster countries into regions, the underlying heterogeneity of the countries in and between themselves is not negated.

3.3.2.3.1 Europe

Europe is, quite literally, an old continent. The majority of the European countries have similar demographic data as the one described above for Austria. They are aging societies with low fertility rates: "[..] a lifetime average of around 1.5 children per woman". (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 117) This in turn leads to a shrinking labour force. The economic prosperity in the wake of the baby boom has been replaced by what Drucker calls the "baby bust", giving rise on the one hand to businesses accelerating automation processes and to increased pressure on the "social contract" between generations, i.e. the validity of social security systems especially in European countries on the other. (Drucker, 1985)

Researchers in the field of demography and migration have long projected the decline in labour force in Europe: "In the absence of immigration and at constant labour force participation rates this labour force would shrink to 201 million in 2025 and to 160 million in 2050." (Münz, 2007, p. 10) Whilst in general the common sentiment is that immigration, along with a reform of systems, higher participation of women in the work force and later retirement are the recipe for countering this development, there is also the question if lower fertility and a reduced (young) demographic isn't maybe an advantage in view of the progressing automation and the emergence of artificial intelligence. (Lutz, 2015)

3.3.2.3.2 MENA

North Africa and the Middle East are a region rife with conflicts, crisis and political and social instability. It is also a region bordering Europe – a fact that facilies the emergence of various migration routes between these two regions. The population of the MENA countries is, compared to Europe, relatively young. The median age, for instance, is 20 to 24 years in Syria and Jordan, 24 to 28 years in Libya, Egypt and Saudi-Arabia, 28 to 32 years in Morocco, Algeria, Iran, and Oman. (Müller, et al., 2016) Yet, the majority of MENA countries are on the verge of or already in transition to lower fertility rates.[12] The demographic composition of the population therefore is changing, with a comparatively lower numbers of children in relation to the number of persons in the age group of 20 to 64 year old.[13] (Müller, et al., 2016) In other words, the region seems to be very slowly beginning to shift from baby boom to baby bust:

"Although fertility transition is well under way in all MENA countries and in several countries, notably Iran, Lebanon, Tunisia, and the UAE, fertility has reached replacement level, for the region as a whole fertility transition has been slow. Transition to lower fertility is the most important and empirically consistent correlate of economic development. Recent economic development theory considers the change in the function of the family from procreators to producers of human capital as the most important factor for transition to modern economic growth. […] The relationship between average country income and fertility that one observes globally does not seem to hold for MENA in part due to the region's oil wealth and in part due to resilient social norms that affect women's participation in work outside the home." (Salehi-Isfahani, 2010, pp. 5-6)

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[12] the average number of children per woman

[13] essentially the available labour force population

The MENA "baby boomers" have been increasingly entering the labour force, whereas the employment opportunities have not increased. The MENA region basically suffers a huge waste of labour force potential. (Müller, et al., 2016) (Salehi-Isfahani, 2010) This fact alone accounts for a rather big pool of potential (economic) migrants. If the various political and social instabilities, crisis, violent conflicts and, in the case of Syria, civil war are factored in, this potential multiplies by an unknown factor – unknown due to the volatility of the region: 8 out of the 19 countries in the region are considered part of the 50 least stable states globally. (Müller, et al., 2016)

3.3.2.3.3 AFPAK

As we have seen in chapter 3.3.2.1.1 persons from Afghanistan are, together with persons from Syria, the top nation in asylum applications in Austria. In literature and policy analysis Afghanistan and Pakistan (AFPAK) are very often analysed together. The tensions in the border region between those two countries as well as the refugee migration from Afghanistan to Pakistan often render the relation between them difficult. (Schmidt, 2011) The migration movements from these two countries have different destination countries in Europe: the most important receiving country for persons from Pakistan was the United Kingdom. In the period between 1998 and 2008 roughly 46% of the Pakistani migration to Europe was registered in the UK. (Reichel & Hofmann, 2011) People from Afghanistan primarily migrated in the same time period to Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. (Reichel & Hofmann, 2011)

3.3.2.3.4 Turkey

As we have seen in chapter 3.3.2.1, persons from Turkey are the second largest group of foreign nationals in Austria, after Germans. The net migration rate between Austria and Turkey in the recent years has been mainly positive, but rather low: in the time period 2006 to 2015 it moved between 1,952

(in 2007) and 528 (in 2014). (Statistik Austria, 2016) The positive, yet low net migration rate hints at a trend experts have observed in the last few years: second generation persons of Turkish descendants were emigrating to the country of their parents, drawn by the economic success stories and also the professional opportunities in cities like Istanbul where employees who knew the European background as well as the Turkish one were highly sought after by companies and prospective employers.

Recently, however, Turkey has gained a vital role regarding questions of European security and stability. Internal political and social developments have led to experts' estimation that currently Turkey is drifting away from Europe. (Frank & Gustenau, 2015) The stability of Turkey is a key driver for migration movements to Europe, as emphasized by the recent deal between the EU and Turkey on asylum migration. The risk assessment foresees negative impacts for the security in South-East Europe, the conflict(s) in the Middle East, as well as for the regulation of migration flows (asylum migration as well as economic migration) should Turkey become more politically volatile. (Frank & Gustenau, 2015)

In this section, the key drivers and uncertainties that have been identified in the previous section will be used to create three different scenarios. It is important to note that these are not predictions. The three scenarios are plausible stories about the future development of migration, but they are by no means inevitable or even necessarily likely futures. Instead, they shall shortly illustrate what can be done with key drivers and uncertainties, before we then turn to the conclusion in section 5.

4.1   Scenario A: Destination Europe

In this scenario the existing links between Europe and the regions of origins, as well as the highly volatile and pressurised dynamics in those regions of origins, have led to a constant high volume flow of South – North migration. While asylum and economically driven migration are still very much a major part of these movements, the portion of migration motivated by family reunification has risen constantly, in parts sharply.

The European Union has managed to navigate the calamities after the Leave-vote of Great Britain by introducing a set of reforms that made the EU a more efficient system than before. Even so, the EU has lost in international importance and remains a highly volatile construct. The centrifugal forces within the EU remain high, and the concentrated efforts of Pro-Europeans to keep the EU unified has come at the cost of international relevance.

The constant stream of migrants has had positive effects on the economy, since a younger population brought also new impulses for businesses and economic innovations. The level of this development, however, is not as high and as effective as it could be due to the education profiles of the incoming migrants. The learning processes and the integration into existing economic

systems is too slow to produce a highly innovative landscape able to compete with innovation driven hubs in the U.S. and China.

4.2   Scenario B: Slow implosion

In this scenario, similarly to scenario A, we have an unmitigated inflow of migrants into Europe. The dynamics are similar as well, since the makeup of the migrant population is about the same, with similar education and cultural profiles.

Here, however, Europe becomes effectively paralyzed by the aftermath of the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union, since the legal and social separation of the UK from the EU binds a majority of efforts. The exit of Great Britain also entails a strengthening of independence movements in individual EU Member States. Europe becomes a continent of a variety of different "Europes", even though the organisational construct of the Union is still surviving.

The Member States are increasingly taking matters into their own hands, including migration legislation and regulation. This leads to a plethora of different as well as differing national regulation on migration to individual states. There is also an increase of bilateral agreements, since the European national states do not rely on or trust the European Union sufficiently. In turn this leads to ever sharper differences in the makeup of the migration population in different member states.

4.3   Scenario C: Exodus

In this scenario Europe has reverted back to being a continent of emigration rather than immigration. In wake of the break-up of the European Union, rising tensions amongst different political, social, ethnic and religious factions heightened even more and have led to an explosive situation on the continent. The nationalistic tendencies of this development have been accompanied by a complete shutdown of national borders. Simultaneously, the quest for independence of provinces and regions within countries have led to conflicts in the national states themselves.

Strife with conflict and unrest, Europe's allure as a destination for migrants has diminished. Migration flows still are large and consistent, since the migration pressure and situation in the regions of origin, especially the MENA and AFPAK, is still wore than the European unrest. Turkey has similarly become increasingly unstable, facilitating the passage of migrants into Europe.

The unthinkable has happened and Europe is again prone to easily engage in violent conflicts between neighbours, and neighbouring regions. Increasingly, Europeans see little perspective in a life on the continent. Those who do have the necessary means are themselves turning towards emigration to seek better circumstances elsewhere, outside of Europe.

In the previous chapters we have looked at the characteristics of a non-profit organisation, its need for innovation, and the tools available to foster organisational learning, and in turn innovativeness in an NPO. The focus was put on scenario analysis, a forecasting tool which enables decision-makers to think outside the box and adapt to important changes in the environment in a timely and adequate manner. By taking a step further and intending to conduct a concentrated scenario analysis regarding the future of migration inflows to Europe, the theoretical tool was put to a practical test. As a result, we have not only identified core key drivers and uncertainties for future developments regarding migration, but also created short scenarios on three plausible, though not necessarily likely, versions of the future.

In a last step we will now look again at the context of a non-profit organisation: How can forecasting, e.g. via scenario analysis, be integrated into an organisational context that has to handle its finances (very often subsidies or contributions) conservatively and therefore cannot invest the same way a for-profit business can invest in innovation and R&D? What structural, organisational or leadership measures can be recommended to effectively use forecasting for complex social matters?

First, let us take the results of the short scenario analysis. What insights could a non-profit organisation, active in the field of migration, have gained from this? The following key points seem of value:

a) In order to assess the impact of migration on the Austrian context, it seems beneficial to take the already established migration networks into account. This was one of the key drivers identified. By looking at data on the current migrant stock in Austria, as well as the data concern-

ing immigration and emigration, we can gain more insight into the current movements between sending and receiving countries and anticipate possible movements, e.g. in regard to family reunification efforts.

b) The profiles of the regions of origin can be used for further analysis on the integration needs and challenges of migrant groups from these regions or countries arriving in Austria.

c) Similarly, the information on the migration networks combined with the information on the regional profiles can be of use in the organisations' recruitment processes, if any services or programmes offered would require employees familiar with the linguistic, or cultural background of (future) migrant groups.

d) Scenarios A and B have a rather high, continuous influx of people from the assessed regions. Projections of this kind can support the organisation in coming up with a mid- to long-term strategic plan on how to adapt the organisation, its structures, services and general mission to this scenario. At the same time, the key drivers give us a good instrument of tracking the probability of these scenarios (or approximation thereof) coming to fruition.

If we now turn to the organisation itself, we will see that the mere execution of the scenario analysis is not sufficient. The non-profit organisation has to be open to the scenarios and their implications. Useful scenario planning takes a conscious effort on part of the decision-makers within the organisation, followed by the rest of the organisation embracing the mind-set and ideas behind this kind of forecasting:

"This requires embedding scenario planning in a formal process of strategy development, by making it the basis of the […] planning cycle. When this is done effectively scenario planning will influence strategy in the formal decision making process, but also in a less formal way by becoming part of the general conversation about strategy in the organisation. Views will be heard which otherwise would remain in the background. Weak signals of impending change, which would otherwise go unnoticed will be picked up and considered. New questions will be asked, triggering new thinking. There will be increased confidence that the organisation is capable of dealing with change. Change and uncertainty are no longer threatening but are understood in context, and therefore experienced as manageable opportunities for growth and development." (van der Heijden, 1996, p. 242)

Schoemaker and Tetlock do not specifically take into account scenario analysis in their article on superforecasting, but there are some valid points on encouraging a culture and mind-set that sees the benefit in forecasting, including scenario analysis. (Schoemaker & Tetlock, 2016) There is the dimension of building and training the right kind of teams to support valid forecasting, as mentioned in chapter 1.1.

If a (non-profit) organisation wants to realize the potential of forecasting tools like the scenario analysis, it is advisable to support the actual research by building and training a forecasting ad innovation team that is diverse, gathers people from different intellectual backgrounds, and are comfortable with challenging presumptions, as Shoemaker and Tetlock pointed out. (Schoemaker & Tetlock, 2016) It will also require decision-makers in the organisation to allow for unconventional approaches and challenging views in the context of the forecasting.

Finally, scenario analysis is a tool that requires more time resources than other approaches of forecasting, due to the broad approach that not only looks at quantifiable data, but also assessments, deliberations, and experts' opinions. The team responsible for this should be given the room to develop the scenarios accordingly.

In conclusion it can be said, that forecasting tools like scenario analysis not only enable decision-makers to change perspectives, but that they require them to.

If a non-profit organisation and their decision-makers feel that scenario analysis is the appropriate tool for them to deal with complex issues and foster organisational learning and innovation, I suggest to take a similar approach as in this thesis:

1) Conduct an initial scenario analysis

The 2013 research report on integration challenges to 2030 that was taken as a basis for the scenario analysis in this paper was such an initial step. It enables an organisation to get acquainted with the method and mind-set of scenario analysis.

It provides a set of key drivers, identifies critical uncertainties and supports the formulation of strategic actions for the different scenarios.

2) Review the initial scenario analysis after an appropriate time period

After a certain period of time, it may become necessary to review the scenarios and the paths taken. This was done here very briefly in chapter 3.2, where it was determined that the first scenario (social cohesion) that was developed in 2013 is not valid anymore.

Instead we seem to have move along the remaining two scenarios.

3) <u>Follow-up with a fresh analysis</u>

In general, this was the work attempted in chapter 3. To re-focus the scope of the scenario analysis, taking into account the results from the initial analysis, and building on that. The newly adjusted or identified key drivers and uncertainties can then be fed back into the overall strategic planning (see next step).

4) <u>Feedback to management and adjustment of strategic planning</u>

Finally, the results of the new analysis need to be presented to decision-makers in the organisation for review. They will decide if based on these scenario adjustments in the strategic planning are advisable and necessary.

After the dissemination of the results, it is equally important to keep tabs on the key drivers to detect changes.

These four steps best are accompanied by the structural and organisational measures illustrated further above (and in chapter 1.1) to ensure that the organisation is able, on the one hand, to fully use the potential of scenario analysis and scenario planning, and, on the other hand, be as time and resource efficient as possible.

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Table of Figures

Annex

Leitfaden qualitatives Interview: Forecasting complex societal changes – An application of scenario analysis to the issue of refugees and migration

Ziel des Experteninterviews ist es, zusätzlich zu den gesammelten quantitativen/statistischen Daten unterschiedliche Perspektiven und Blickwinkel für die Szenario-Analyse selbst zu gewinnen. Die hier angeführten Interview-Fragen werden im Rahmen dieser Analyse gemeinsam mit den quantitativen Daten verarbeitet werden, um zwischen 3 und 4 Szenarien zu entwickeln.

Themenbereich A: recent migration movements

a) Wie sahen die Migrationsbewegungen in/nach Österreich in den vergangenen 5 bis 10 Jahren aus?

b) Welche Rolle spielte EU-Migration?

- Wie schätzen Sie den Einfluss der aktuellen Entwicklungen auf europäischer Ebene in Bezug auf Migration ein?

c) Gibt es unterschiedliche Migrationsprofile und wie sehen diese aus?

d) Wie schätzen Sie die Entwicklung der Zuwanderung nach Österreich in den kommenden 5-10 Jahren ein?

Themenbereich B: implications

a) Welche Auswirkungen bestehen insbesondere im urbanen Bereich allgemein durch Migration?

- In welchen Bereichen sind besondere integrative Maßnahmen notwendig (z.B. Wohnungsmarkt, Arbeitsmarkt, Gesundheitssystem, etc.)

b) Ist aus Ihrer Sicht im Integrationsbereich ein Stadt-Land-Gefälle beobachtbar?

c) Waren für Sie im Zuge der erhöhten Fluchtmigration seit 2015 Veränderungen im Integrationsbereich beobachtbar?

- Wie schätzen Sie diese ein?

d) Welche sozialen Phänomene sind für Sie in Zusammenhang mit Migration beobachtbar?