Reasoning With and About Norms in Logical Argumentation

Abstract

Normative reasoning is inherently defeasible. Formal argumentation has proven to be a unifying framework for representing nonmonotonic logics. In this work, we provide an argumentative characterization of a large class of Input/Output logics, a prominent defeasible formalism for normative reasoning. In many normative reasoning contexts, one is not merely interested in knowing whether a specific obligation holds, but also in why it holds despite other norms to the contrary. We propose sequent-style argumentation systems called Deontic Argument Calculi (DAC), which serve transparency and bring meta-reasoning about the inapplicability of norms to the object language level. We prove soundness and completeness between DAC-instantiated argumentation frameworks and constrained Input/Output logics. We illustrate our approach in view of two deontic paradoxes.