<div class="csl-bib-body">
<div class="csl-entry">Aumayr, L., Moreno-Sanchez, P., Kate, A., & Maffei, M. (2023). Breaking and Fixing Virtual Channels: Domino Attack and Donner. In <i>Proceedings Network and Distributed System Security Symposium 2023</i>. 30th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) 2023, San Diego, United States of America (the). https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2023.24370</div>
</div>
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dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12708/177467
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dc.description.abstract
Payment channel networks (PCNs) mitigate the scalability issues of current decentralized cryptocurrencies. They allow for arbitrarily many payments between users connected through a path of intermediate payment channels, while requiring interacting with the blockchain only to open and close the channels. Unfortunately, PCNs are (i) tailored to payments, excluding more complex smart contract functionalities, such as the oracle-enabling Discreet Log Contracts and (ii) their need for active participation from intermediaries may make payments unreliable, slower, expensive, and privacy-invasive. Virtual channels are among the most promising techniques to mitigate these issues, allowing two endpoints of a path to create a direct channel over the intermediaries without any interaction with the blockchain. After such a virtual channel is constructed, (i) the endpoints can use this direct channel for applications other than payments and (ii) the intermediaries are no longer involved in updates.
In this work, we first introduce the Domino attack, a new DoS/griefing style attack that leverages virtual channels to destruct the PCN itself and is inherent to the design adopted by the existing Bitcoin-compatible virtual channels. We then demonstrate its severity by a quantitative analysis on a snapshot of the Lightning Network (LN), the most widely deployed PCN at present. We finally discuss other serious drawbacks of existing virtual channel designs, such as the support for only a single intermediary, a latency and blockchain overhead linear in the path length, or a non-constant storage overhead per user.
We then present Donner, the first virtual channel construction that overcomes the shortcomings above, by relying on a novel design paradigm. We formally define and prove security and privacy properties in the Universal Composability framework. Our evaluation shows that Donner is efficient, reduces the on-chain number of transactions for disputes from linear in the path length to a single one, which is the key to prevent Domino attacks, and reduces the storage overhead from logarithmic in the path length to constant. Donner is Bitcoin-compatible and can be easily integrated in the LN.
en
dc.description.sponsorship
CoBloX Pty Ltd.
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dc.description.sponsorship
Europäischer Forschungsrat (ERC)
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dc.description.sponsorship
FWF Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung (FWF)
-
dc.description.sponsorship
FFG - Österr. Forschungsförderungs- gesellschaft mbH
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dc.description.sponsorship
Wirtschaftsagentur Wien Ein Fonds der Stadt Wien
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dc.description.sponsorship
Christian Doppler Forschungsgesells
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dc.language.iso
en
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dc.subject
blockchain
en
dc.subject
security
en
dc.subject
privacy
en
dc.subject
payment channel networks
en
dc.subject
virtual channels
en
dc.subject
Bitcoin
en
dc.subject
Lightning Network
en
dc.title
Breaking and Fixing Virtual Channels: Domino Attack and Donner
en
dc.type
Inproceedings
en
dc.type
Konferenzbeitrag
de
dc.contributor.affiliation
IMDEA Software, Spain
-
dc.contributor.affiliation
Purdue University
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dc.relation.isbn
1-891562-83-5
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dc.relation.grantno
Funding Agreement coblox
-
dc.relation.grantno
771527
-
dc.relation.grantno
P31621-N38
-
dc.relation.grantno
843274
-
dc.relation.grantno
ViSP
-
dc.relation.grantno
CDL-BOT
-
dc.type.category
Full-Paper Contribution
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tuw.booktitle
Proceedings Network and Distributed System Security Symposium 2023
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tuw.peerreviewed
true
-
tuw.project.title
Security and Privacy for the COMIT Network
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tuw.project.title
Foundations and Tools for Client-Side Web Security
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tuw.project.title
Cryptographic Foundations for Future-proof Internet Security
-
tuw.project.title
SBA - COOP COMET SBA2
-
tuw.project.title
Forschungszentrum für Cybersicherheit und Datenschutz in Wien
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tuw.project.title
Blockchaintechnologien für das Internet der Dinge
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tuw.researchTopic.id
I1
-
tuw.researchTopic.name
Logic and Computation
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tuw.researchTopic.value
100
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tuw.publication.orgunit
E192-06 - Forschungsbereich Security and Privacy
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tuw.publication.orgunit
E192 - Institut für Logic and Computation
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tuw.publisher.doi
10.14722/ndss.2023.24370
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dc.description.numberOfPages
18
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tuw.author.orcid
0000-0001-8006-3172
-
tuw.author.orcid
0000-0003-2315-7839
-
tuw.event.name
30th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) 2023
en
dc.description.sponsorshipexternal
National Science Foundation
-
dc.description.sponsorshipexternal
Madrid regional government
-
dc.description.sponsorshipexternal
EIE Funds of the European Union
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dc.description.sponsorshipexternal
HACRYPT
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dc.description.sponsorshipexternal
IJC2020-043391-I/MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033
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dc.description.sponsorshipexternal
European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR
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dc.description.sponsorshipexternal
MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ and the European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR
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dc.description.sponsorshipexternal
SCUM Project
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dc.relation.grantnoexternal
CNS-1846316
-
dc.relation.grantnoexternal
S2018/TCS-4339 (BLOQUES-CM)
-
dc.relation.grantnoexternal
N00014-19-1-2292
-
dc.relation.grantnoexternal
PRODIGY Project TED2021-132464B-I00
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dc.relation.grantnoexternal
(RTI2018- 102043-B-I00) MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ERDF A way of making Europe.
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tuw.event.startdate
27-02-2023
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tuw.event.enddate
03-03-2023
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tuw.event.online
On Site
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tuw.event.type
Event for scientific audience
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tuw.event.place
San Diego
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tuw.event.country
US
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tuw.event.presenter
Aumayr, Lukas
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tuw.event.track
Multi Track
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wb.sciencebranch
Informatik
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wb.sciencebranch.oefos
1020
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wb.sciencebranch.value
100
-
item.openairecristype
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf
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item.openairecristype
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf
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item.cerifentitytype
Publications
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item.cerifentitytype
Publications
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item.fulltext
no Fulltext
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item.grantfulltext
none
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item.openairetype
Inproceedings
-
item.openairetype
Konferenzbeitrag
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item.languageiso639-1
en
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crisitem.author.dept
E192-06 - Forschungsbereich Security and Privacy
-
crisitem.author.dept
IMDEA Software, Spain
-
crisitem.author.dept
Purdue University
-
crisitem.author.dept
E192-06 - Forschungsbereich Security and Privacy
-
crisitem.author.orcid
0000-0001-8006-3172
-
crisitem.author.orcid
0000-0003-2315-7839
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crisitem.author.parentorg
E192 - Institut für Logic and Computation
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crisitem.author.parentorg
E192 - Institut für Logic and Computation
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crisitem.project.funder
Europäischer Forschungsrat (ERC)
-
crisitem.project.funder
FWF Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung (FWF)
-
crisitem.project.funder
FFG - Österr. Forschungsförderungs- gesellschaft mbH