<div class="csl-bib-body">
<div class="csl-entry">Kozics, G. (2015). <i>Modeling favoritism with an imperfect information repeated game</i> [Master Thesis, Technische Universität Wien]. reposiTUm. https://doi.org/10.34726/hss.2015.31086</div>
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dc.identifier.uri
https://doi.org/10.34726/hss.2015.31086
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dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12708/2156
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dc.description.abstract
We model favoritism with an imperfect monitoring infinitely repeated game. We find that favoritism is driven by players trading favors over time. We show that favoritism is harder to maintain in larger groups, group mem- bers increase their payoff at the expense of others, and favoritism is easier to sustain in imperfect monitoring case compared to perfect monitoring. We also prove that for our game the Folk theorem does not hold if the number of players is 4, and we impose a restriction to the parameters.
en
dc.language
English
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dc.language.iso
en
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dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
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dc.subject
Favoritism
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dc.subject
repeated game
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dc.subject
imperfect information
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dc.subject
Folk theorem
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dc.title
Modeling favoritism with an imperfect information repeated game
