<div class="csl-bib-body">
<div class="csl-entry">Steinböck, M., Troost, J., van Beijnum, W., Jan Seredynski, Bos, H., Lindorfer, M., & Continella, A. (2025). SoK: Hardening Techniques in the Mobile Ecosystem — Are We There Yet? In <i>2025 IEEE 10th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)</i> (pp. 789–806). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP63326.2025.00050</div>
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dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12708/223690
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dc.description.abstract
Irrespective of the security and isolation guarantees offered by the mobile operating system, the Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS) recommends app developers to implement hardening techniques for self-protection—to prevent tampering and leakage, detect jailbreaks, etc. Despite regulations incentivize developers toward implementing self-protection, our understanding of the use of hardening techniques is still very limited—especially regarding differences, if any, between the two main mobile ecosystems. In this paper, we systematize knowledge on the use and analysis of hardening techniques, covering, for the first time, both Android and iOS apps.To this end, we present HALY, a framework to analyze the adoption of hardening techniques. Using HALY’s static and dynamic analysis, we analyze 2,646 popular apps available on both Android and iOS, and measure the prevalence of hardening techniques. Contrary to expectation, apps on iOS underperform in self-protection, implementing only half of the recommended hardening techniques compared to their Android counterparts—challenging the long-held belief that iOS is simply “more secure.” Equally surprising, while privacy-sensitive apps implement more self-protection, many apps implement hardening techniques on only one of the two OSes. Furthermore, as many common techniques are easy to individually bypass, the additional security is questionable. Overall, almost all apps implement some hardening techniques, but as many as 24.1% (Android) and 73.6% (iOS) implement fewer than half of the recommended ones, and we only found 26 apps on Android to implement all eight and only one app on iOS adopt all seven analyzed techniques.
en
dc.description.sponsorship
WWTF Wiener Wissenschafts-, Forschu und Technologiefonds
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dc.description.sponsorship
WWTF Wiener Wissenschafts-, Forschu und Technologiefonds
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dc.description.sponsorship
FWF - Österr. Wissenschaftsfonds
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dc.language.iso
en
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dc.relation.ispartofseries
IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)
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dc.subject
android
en
dc.subject
app hardening
en
dc.subject
app self protection
en
dc.subject
dynamic analysis
en
dc.subject
ios
en
dc.subject
static analysis
en
dc.subject
anti-analysis
en
dc.title
SoK: Hardening Techniques in the Mobile Ecosystem — Are We There Yet?
en
dc.type
Inproceedings
en
dc.type
Konferenzbeitrag
de
dc.contributor.affiliation
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands (the)
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dc.contributor.affiliation
University of Twente, Netherlands (the)
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dc.contributor.affiliation
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands (the)
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dc.contributor.affiliation
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands (the)
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dc.contributor.affiliation
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands (the)
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dc.relation.isbn
979-8-3315-9493-0
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dc.relation.doi
10.1109/EuroSP63326.2025
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dc.relation.issn
2995-1348
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dc.description.startpage
789
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dc.description.endpage
806
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dc.relation.grantno
ICT19-056
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dc.relation.grantno
ICT22-060
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dc.relation.grantno
F 8500
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dc.type.category
Full-Paper Contribution
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dc.relation.eissn
2995-1356
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tuw.booktitle
2025 IEEE 10th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)
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tuw.peerreviewed
true
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tuw.relation.publisher
IEEE
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tuw.project.title
IoTIO: Analyse des Internet der Unsicheren Dinge
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tuw.project.title
Fixing the Broken Bridge Between Mobile Apps and the Web
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tuw.project.title
Semantische und kryptografische Grundlagen von Informationssicherheit und Datenschutz durch modulares Design