<div class="csl-bib-body">
<div class="csl-entry">Yan, Y., Tang, K. H., Chu, H. T. T., Chow, S. S. M., Ling, S., Wang, H., & Zhang, K. (2027). Sovereign Modal Signatures. In <i>Applied Cryptography and Network Security : 24th International Conference, ACNS 2026, Stony Brook, NY, USA, June 22–25, 2026, Proceedings, Part I</i> (pp. 444–472). Springer Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-32560-0_16</div>
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dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12708/230330
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dc.description.abstract
Signing anonymously under both hidden and public policies with per-signature accountability has only been studied piecemeal, as prior schemes address at most one dimension or restrict function classes. Here, we introduce sovereign modal signatures, the first scheme unifying both dimensions with support for hidden-circuit evaluation over bounded-size arithmetic circuits without universal circuits. Each signer holds a private attribute and a hidden policy F, certified by an authority and concealed from signatures. Resting on a public combiner P, the signing process maps the joint outputs of F and an ad hoc function G to a derived message and an opening tag governing per-signature traceability. Modifying the effective policy at signing time requires no key reissuance, since G is chosen freshly against the fixed F. Achieving zero-knowledge evaluation of F without exposing its structure is our core challenge, resolved by treating F’s PLONK description as witness rather than statement. No universal circuits are required: our reduction yields a fixed verification circuit of size linear in F’s gate count; the resulting scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model.
Concretely, our generic construction needs only signatures, public-key encryption, and non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge for arithmetic circuits. Hidden arithmetic circuits over any finite field are fully supported, subsuming the restricted Boolean and linear function classes of prior hidden-function schemes. Our post-quantum instantiation combines ZKBoo (Usenix Security ’16) under the MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH, STOC ’07) paradigm with lattice-based primitives over , achieving plausibly post-quantum security without pairings or the algebraic group model. With proof sizes quasilinear in F’s gate count and linear in G and P’s multiplications, the scheme also readily admits richer MPCitH instantiations.
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dc.language.iso
en
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dc.relation.ispartofseries
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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dc.subject
accountable anonymity
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dc.subject
zero-knowledge proofs
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dc.subject
post-quantum cryptography
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dc.subject
lattices
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dc.subject
functional credentials
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dc.subject
functional signatures
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dc.subject
hidden policies
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dc.title
Sovereign Modal Signatures
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dc.type
Inproceedings
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dc.type
Konferenzbeitrag
de
dc.contributor.affiliation
Université Clermont Auvergne, France
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dc.contributor.affiliation
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
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dc.contributor.affiliation
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
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dc.contributor.affiliation
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
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dc.contributor.affiliation
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
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dc.contributor.affiliation
Shaanxi Normal University, China
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dc.relation.isbn
978-3-032-32560-0
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dc.relation.doi
10.1007/978-3-032-32560-0
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dc.relation.issn
0302-9743
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dc.description.startpage
444
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dc.description.endpage
472
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dc.type.category
Full-Paper Contribution
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dc.relation.eissn
1611-3349
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tuw.booktitle
Applied Cryptography and Network Security : 24th International Conference, ACNS 2026, Stony Brook, NY, USA, June 22–25, 2026, Proceedings, Part I