DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMoosbrugger, Patrick-
dc.contributor.authorRozier, Kristin Y.-
dc.contributor.authorSchumann, Johann-
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-27T15:01:58Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.issn0925-9856-
dc.identifier.urihttps://resolver.obvsg.at/urn:nbn:at:at-ubtuw:3-4107-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12708/36-
dc.description.abstractWe present R2U2, a novel framework for runtime monitoring of security properties and diagnosing of security threats on-board Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). R2U2, implemented in FPGA hardware, is a real-time, Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit for runtime system analysis, now including security threat detection. R2U2 is designed to continuously monitor inputs from on-board components such as the GPS, the ground control station, other sensor readings, actuator outputs, and flight software status. By simultaneously monitoring and performing statistical reasoning, attack patterns and post-attack discrepancies in the UAS behavior can be detected. R2U2 uses runtime observer pairs for Linear and Metric Temporal Logics for property monitoring and Bayesian networks for diagnosis of system health during runtime. We discuss the design and implementation that now enables R2U2 to handle security threats and present simulation results of several attack scenarios on the NASA DragonEye UAS.en
dc.description.sponsorshipAmes Research Center-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherSPRINGER-
dc.relation.ispartofFormal Methods in System Design-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de-
dc.subjectRuntime monitoringen
dc.subjectMetric temporal logicen
dc.subjectLinear temporal logicen
dc.subjectBayesian networksen
dc.subjectFPGAen
dc.subjectSecurityen
dc.subjectUnmanned aerial systemsen
dc.subjectGPS spoofingen
dc.titleR2U2: monitoring and diagnosis of security threats for unmanned aerial systemsen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.typeArtikelde
dc.contributor.affiliationTU Wien, Österreich-
dc.contributor.affiliationIowa State University-
dc.contributor.affiliationNASA Ames, USA-
dc.description.startpage31-
dc.description.endpage61-
dc.relation.grantnoNNX12AK33A-
dc.rights.holderThe Author(s) 2017-
dc.type.categoryOriginal Research Article-
tuw.container.volume51-
tuw.container.issue1-
tuw.journal.peerreviewedtrue-
tuw.versionvor-
dcterms.isPartOf.titleFormal Methods in System Design-
tuw.publication.orgunitE191 - Institut für Technische Informatik-
tuw.publisher.doi10.1007/s10703-017-0275-x-
dc.identifier.eissn1572-8102-
dc.identifier.libraryidAC15187483-
dc.description.numberOfPages31-
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:at:at-ubtuw:3-4107-
dc.rights.identifierCC BY 4.0-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.openairetypeArtikel-
item.fulltextwith Fulltext-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.grantfulltextopen-
crisitem.author.deptTU Wien, Österreich-
crisitem.author.deptIowa State University-
crisitem.author.deptNASA Ames, USA-
Appears in Collections:Article

Files in this item:

Show simple item record

Page view(s)

88
checked on Apr 13, 2021

Download(s)

144
checked on Apr 13, 2021

Google ScholarTM

Check


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons