Title: Earnings management : incentives and circumstances leading to performance manipulation
Language: English
Authors: Ettmar, Manuela 
Qualification level: Diploma
Advisor: Schwaiger, Walter
Issue Date: 2010
Number of Pages: 62
Qualification level: Diploma
Abstract: 
In firms that do not have their owner responsible for administration of business, but instead a chief executive officer, a gap arises between information the shareholders get from the CEO and the actual generated information. This so-called information asymmetry is a prime reason for earnings management. This thesis examines the motivations and circumstances a chief executive officer has to manipulate his firm's performance. By analyzing the work of different authors, the main influences these managers have are identified. The accounting standard used by a firm as well as bonus plans, retirement of a CEO and auditing are identified as reporting related incentives that are main factors for a manager's decision to manage earnings towards a target. Continental-European GAAP, British-American GAAP and International Financial Reporting Standards are looked on closer and their effects on earnings management is analyzed. Stock market related incentives, such as benchmarks, CEO stock options and speculators influence are also identified as factors that influence earnings management.
Keywords: Earnings Management; Jones Model; Informationsasymmetrie; Performance Manipulation; Discretionary Accruals
Earnings Management; Jones Model; Information Asymmetry; Performance Manipulation; Discretionary Accruals
URI: https://resolver.obvsg.at/urn:nbn:at:at-ubtuw:1-38988
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12708/11557
Library ID: AC07808854
Organisation: E330 - Institut für Managementwissenschaften 
Publication Type: Thesis
Hochschulschrift
Appears in Collections:Thesis

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