Title: Subsidy to search: welfare consequences of benefit entitlements for quitters
Language: English
Authors: Mazur, Karol 
Qualification level: Diploma
Keywords: unemployment; insurance; labor; search; quits
Advisor: Reiter, Michael 
Issue Date: 2014
Number of Pages: 31
Qualification level: Diploma
In this paper I analyze numerically and quantitatively a model of labor search with unemployment insurance, voluntary quits and various labor attachment requirements. In particular, I study welfare consequences of unemployment insurance design where workers who quit their jobs voluntarily are entitled to benefits. A simulation of the model calibrated to the US labor market shows that there are possible welfare gains associated with pursuing optimal re-entitlement policy for workers quitting their jobs voluntarily as compared to the actual policy employed in the US. By inducing monetary search costs and different unemployment benefit eligibility requirements, the model provides an explanation for empirical observations about differences in unemployment rate and income inequality between the US and European labor markets.
URI: https://resolver.obvsg.at/urn:nbn:at:at-ubtuw:1-71481
Library ID: AC11761969
Organisation: E017 - Weiterbildungszentrum der TU Wien 
Publication Type: Thesis
Appears in Collections:Thesis

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