Title: The strategic equivalence of extensive form games revisited
Language: English
Authors: Kasberger, Bernhard 
Qualification level: Diploma
Advisor: Ritzberger, Klaus
Issue Date: 2013
Number of Pages: 25
Qualification level: Diploma
Abstract: 
Non-cooperative game theory deals with games with complete rules. Most solution concepts in non-cooperative game theory are defined on the normal form. It is ex ante not clear whether a strategic situation is noncooperative and thus can be analyzed as a normal form game. The means to verify the completeness of the rules is to write the game in extensive form. However, many extensive form games have the same semi-reduced normal form. This paper characterizes the class of finite extensive form games with perfect recall and the same semi-reduced normal form by replicating the work of Elmes and Reny (1994) in a theoretical framework developed by Al´os-Ferrer and Ritzberger. The necessary and sufficient conditions are three transformations of the extensive form. These are embedded in the space of extensive form games and an order relation is established.
URI: https://resolver.obvsg.at/urn:nbn:at:at-ubtuw:1-70905
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12708/9999
Library ID: AC10895985
Organisation: E017 - Weiterbildungszentrum der TU Wien 
Publication Type: Thesis
Hochschulschrift
Appears in Collections:Thesis

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